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PRELIMINARY REPORT ON DAUPHIN BASTION

BY

BERNARD POTHIER

September 9, 1964

(Fortress of Louisbourg Report H B 8)

NOTE:
Presently, the bibliography is not included here.
For these, please consult the original report in the archives of the Fortress of Louisbourg

PARAGRAPH K:

THE SIEGE OF 1758

On 8 June 1758.the British effected a landing at 1'Anse de la Cormorandière, not far from where their New England counterparts landed In 1745. At Louisbourg the French had been making preparations for a defensive siege since 12 May: repairs, building épaulements, setting up mortar batteries ("à bombes"), moving artillery about. 

It is striking to note that the four deficiencies of the fortress, three of which were of major consequence at the siege of 1745 (Cf. supra. paragraph H, P. 35-37) were again present in 1758, and were of decisive
import during the action at Louisbourg in that year. 

The day of the British landing the faubourg de la Porte Dauphine, whose very existence constituted the first threat to the besieged fortress, was once again put to the flame. Since 1749. this settlement concentrated
near the Barrachois, while the south-west shore of the harbour was in 1758 virtually free of habitation (Plans 1758-11, 1759-1). 

The following day, 9 June, 50 workmen were dispatched to the 'hauteur de la four a chaux" in an effort to level this eminence which in 1745 had been the Francoeur battery. Franquet had urged this in 1751, and
some work in this direction had been done when the tenaille across the étang was built in 1755 from excavations at the four A chaux. After the tenaille was built financial considerations dictated the problem be left in abeyance. 

A repeat of 1745 could well have occurred in 1758, for we learn from an inscription on the plan of the siege prepared by Sr. Lartigue that the British intended to erect a battery over the ruins of the lime kiln, when the fortress capitulated on July 26 (Plan 1758-12). As it turned out, the English trenches were still quite beyond the "hauteur du four à chaux" when the French capitulated.

In 1758, as in 1745, it was the batteries erected on the "hauteur de Martissans which unleashed the greater part of the destruction against the Dauphin bastion, and in particular the gate. Here the French had no choice but to have had occupied this range, rather than level it, and having failed to do so, provided General Wolfe less than a month after the landing at Anse de la Cormorandière with an excellent position from which to lob cannon balls and bombs into the Dauphin bastion and shipping in the harbour, and to enfilade all the way up the rampart and the covert way of the curtain.

In 1758 the British artillery positions in front of the face of the Dauphin bastion were on hills, we have noted above, to the rear of the "four à chaux", and at the '"justice". For all that these entered late - 2 batteries were involved for three days. and one mere volley, respectively - the difficulty of Louisbourg's position can be appreciated. There would always have been hills from which to fire, despite any number of levelling operations.

In spite of the several recommendations to this effect, no provision had been made for the faces of the tenaille of the Dauphin gate to be flanked by some other work. And the general condition of the fortifications despite the several repairs brought about since the Spring of 1755,, were in a chronically sorry state of crumbling escarps and weak parapets.

The Governor Drucour recorded some of the mood of the situation of 8 June 1758 when he dismally wrote: 

"Cet évenement jette de la consternation et de la tristess dans tous les esprits, avec d'autant plus de fondement qu'il décide de la perte de la colonie. ..tout annonce une rédition prochaine" (Quoted in McLennan, page 267).

Inside Louisbourg, despite the gloomy prospects, the French girded best themselves for the assault, and deployed their best efforts in keeping with their resources. In artillery, we are told, there were fifteen 18 and 24-pounders in service on the bastion, six 24-pounders on the cavalier battery, six 24- and 12-pounders at the éperon (Plan 1758-12, legend). These figures, Lartigue's, do not accord with those gleaned from Drucour's account of the artillery, August 1755, or the one of 26 July l758 (Cf. paragraph J).

On June 11, at the rounded place of arms at the re-entrant angle of the King's bastion, a traverse made of "barriques" was built across the covert way (Plan 1758-12, legend) to guard from the enfilading fire from the hauteur de Martissans, north of the barrachois (Plans 1758-1, 7, 10, 11, 12, 14, 16, 18).

A similar device - an épaulement - was erected in the gorge of the Dauphin bastion to the rear of the flank to protect its guns from the same fire. I am quite unsure of its exact location, and its shape. A colour reproduction of the plan 1759-1 (Franquet) would be conclusive in dealing with this particular problem. We do know that this structure was begun on 15 June and terminated on the morning of the 18. The rest of the day was spent making the barriers of both covert ways in front of the gate, and the entrance to the town at the gate itself.

Thanks to the remarkable celerity of Brigadier General Wolfe the English fired their first guns at the town from their positions on Lighthouse point during the night of 19-20 June. Ten days later Wolfe took possession of the hauteur de Martissans, which in 1745 served so well the cause of the New England besiegers. Once again the idea was to open the breach at the Dauphin gate front. By 6 July two mortars were lobbing 13-inch shells at the French shipping in the west harbour (Plans 1758-7, 11, 12 and 14).

Meanwhile at the Dauphin bastion the defenders continued preparations for the onslaught of a full-scale siege. The depth of the right face of the tenaille, that of the gate, was added to: we do not know to what degree or in what manner (1758, Franquet, Génie / 14 / L. et I. R, / 53, and cf. paragraph J, P. 57).

The walls of Louisbourg were in several parts so weak that the French guns when they fired caused patches of masonry to fall away from the body of the escarp. To obviate this to some degree, 5 July saw the beginning of an effort to add 6 pieds to the thickness of some of the merlons. At the Dauphin bastion the case of the éperon and the cavalier was most acute, but these batteries were destined to forego any reinforcement. And each firing made matters worse.

It was disconcerting to the engineers to see on 11 July the artillery men point the guns of the éperon to the English batteries being built on the Martissans hills. We recall the éperon's only function was to prevent enemy movement along the profile of the glacis-covert way. By provoking in this manner the big guns atop the Martissans, the moribund éperon was snuffed out in very short order,

In the gorge of the bastion a work of retrenchment, which to us remains a bit vague was continuing in mid-July.

Three batteries commenced their fire on 17 July from the hautours de Martissans. This fire was directed at the Dauphin bastion, the curtain and the King's bastion. To the left was the "Admiral's" battery of six guns, four 32-pounders and 2 24-pounders. Next was a battery of two guns, 24-pounders. Finally, another two-gun battery of 24-pounders was opened that same day, It was this latter which so quickly silenced the pretensions of the éperon.

The effect of these three emplacements on the D. B. front was devastating. The tenaille of the gate, the éperon and the cavalier all bore the direct assault, the left flank was commanded from its rear, despite the épaulement (Cf. supra, p. 63), the left face, curtain and covert way were all open to enfilade and beyond shelter.

By 19 July, the cavalier and éperon were out of order for the artillery. The left face of the tenaille had been badly treated, and resulting from the brisk initial fire from 10 new guns, a flurry of activity saw more work of reinforcement in the gorge: épaulements and traverses.

By 20 July however, the first breach had appeared, at the left face of the tenaille of the gate, to such an extent that the ditch had to be cleared that night, end the night following.

It daybreak of the 23, part of the wall had fallen at the flanked angle, and had taken with it two guns of the barbette battery.

The first battery on the South side of the harbour directed at our front opened fire on 23 July. It was a "kettle of mortars" - two 8-inch, 5 "Royals", 12 "cohorns" - erected to harass the covert way, which ordinarily was the habitat of the infantry in time of siege.

By this time the situation along the front had become critical. The breach at the tenaille continued to widen, and the ditch filled with its rubble faster than it could be cleared. The footbridge from the postern, the counterscarp, the palisade and the parapet of the glacis continued in good order so long as workmen effected repairs swiftly as needed. The batardeau was still intact, despite some damage, and the water level in the ditch remained at 3 and 1/2 pieds, besides the 1 and 1/2 pieds of the cunette.

The two guns at the centre of the curtain could only be fired if "circumspection" were used. The concussion caused the escarp under them to crumble away, despite their having been "supported without and eased with plank to the ditch" (1758, John Montresor Journal, Massachusetts Historical Society). There was a small breach on 23 July.

On 24 July the guns from the Martissans continued to batter the left face of the tenaille, and a second breach was begun at the left face of the bastion, near the flanked angle. That evening the governor Drucour, the engineer Franquet and the commander-in-chief La Houlière made a tour of the fortified front and the covert way to keep abreast of the situation. The following day, 25 July, the latter recorded in his Journal that Franquet tended to minimize the situation (6 août 1758, LaHoulière, Guerre / Al / 3499 / 13). In effect Franquet's document, also dated 25 July, in the forenoon, strongly endeavored to suggest further resistance was feasible.

Il reste encore (à la face gauche de la tenaille de la porte) neuf à dîx pîeds de revêtement à abattre, ce que les ennemis ne seauraient faire sans placer du canon sur le chemin couvert (25 juîllet 1758, "L'état actuel ... , A, Marine / B4 / 80 / 164-)

La Houlière astutely pointed out that the whole front of the tenaille was not flanked and that the only defense was direct, and that from behind a battered rampart with a breach 26 or 28 pieds wide (La Houlière). 

Later in the afternoon of 25 July the Governor, commander-in-chief, and the commanders of the individual battalions took a second look at the breach, and reckoned it was manoeuvrable with very little effort on the part of the enemy, Nevertheless the work of clearing debris and buttressing the parapets at the breaches (there were three now: at the tenaille, below the embrasures at the curtain, and at the left face of the bastion) continued again that night.

On the morning of 26 July Franquet again joined the governor, the military and Desgouttes of the navy at the breach. Immediately following this visit Franquet returned home and appended the following to his "Etat actuel ... " of 25 July:

"La braiche s'étant accrue ... au point que suivant l'avis des officiers du conseil, l'ennemi pourait partir de ses ouvrages avancés pour venir combler avec des fascines le fossé, et de la monter par la brèche sur le bastion ..." (25 Juillet 1758, Franquet, A, Marine / B4 / 80 / 166-169).

At 10 a.m. on 26 July, the white flag was raised at the breach at the tenaille, and a cease-fire was requested (26 juillet 1758, Prévost. Guerre / Al / 3498 / 174). That very morning, at the "hauteur de la justice", a battery of four 24-pounders and an 8-inch howitzer was made ready against the bastion. As it turned out, it only had the opportunity to fire once before the fortress capitulated.

It was agreed the British would take possession via the Dauphin gate at 8 a.m., 27 July. A delay was occasioned by the need to unmask the barriers of the covert ways and the Dauphin gate, and to rebuild the bridge across the ditch (27 juillet 1758, Drucour to Amherst. PAC / MG 18 / 14 / no. 1 / p. 11). It was only at 10 a.m. that the Dauphin gate was given over. The transfer of the fortress itself it would seem, was completed by noon.

The Dauphin bastion-curtain area in all probability had suffered more for its ordeal in 1758 than in 1745. Both sieges had required about the same amount of time: 46 days from debarkation to capitulation in 1745, 48 in 1758. Though our area suffered 28 days fire in 1745. and only 9 days in 1758, it is nevertheless significant that the fire delivered in the latter campagne was unquestionably of a superior order, not only from the point of view of ordnance, but also because of the higher calibre artillerymen and the more effective control displayed by professional officers.

In 1745 the New Englanders fired from two emplacements, the hauteur du four à chaux (Francoeur), and the hauteur de Martissans. At the former, four guns - probably 18-pounders - trained their fire on the Dauphin bastion, while the latter featured 5 or 6 36- and 42pounders, a total of 9 or 10 cannons concentrated on the front of the Dauphin bastion and curtain.

In 1758, the batteries on the Martissans fired a total of 10 guns - 4 32-pounders and 6 24-pounders - and 2 13-inch mortars. At the hauteur de la justice were set up 19 small mortars,, and at the capitulation a brand new battery of 4 24-pounders and an 8-inch howitzer had just been opened. Thus a total of 14 guns, 21 mortars and 1 howitzer had served the efforts of the siege at the Dauphin bastion area in 1758.

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