HF-5 - Preliminary Historical Report, Royal Battery Number 2. By John Humphreys, October 15, 1964 -Section 11A

The earliest reference to the manning of the Royal Battery occurs in December 1725, when Ste. Marie, as senior captain, asked for the command of the battery, proposing initially to mount guard there with a detachment, pending the transportation of his whole company to the battery during the following year. [1] However, other available evidence indicates that the battery was not ready for initial occupation until the summer of 1727, [2] and that even at that time no definite arrangements were made concerning the size of its garrison. In November of 1727 De Mezy proposed to the Minister that one master gunner and two assistants be employed at the battery,[3] but this suggestion was tentatively rejected on the grounds that it was necessary to wait until the battery had been furnished with its cannon before deciding what personnel were necessary for its service. [4] The arming of the battery was completed during the summer of 1728 with the installation of thirty-three 36-pounder cannon, the powder for these guns being stored in the chapel in the eastern wing, since the powder magazines in the towers were still in the process of completion.[5]

It appears that no regulation concerning the manning of the Royal Battery was formulated until 1732, the structure being presumably occupied in the interim by a relatively small body of troops detached from the town garrison. On 27 June 1732 the Minister wrote to St. Ovide and Le Normant informing them that it was the King's wish that the battery should be held by a whole company, but that St. Ovide was to have the option of guarding the battery by detachment if he considered it wiser. In the event of the battery being occupied by a company, the Minister's instructions enjoined that it should be relieved annually, the eight companies of the Louisbourg garrison undertaking the service consecutively on a rotor system.[6] However, before these instructions had arrived at Louisbourg, the Governor and the Intendant had sent the senior captain, Dangeac, to command at the battery. The remainder of his company was to have followed him, but Verrier having represented that the number of troops remaining in the city would not be sufficient to continue the work on the fortifications, only twenty of Dangeac's men were actually ordered to the Royal Battery.[7] In reply to the Minister's instructions of 27 June, the Governor and Intendant gave the opinion that it would be wiser to garrison the battery with a detachment of forty men, drawn five apiece from each of the eight companies,[8] and asked for an annual gratification for the battery's commanding officer.[9]

Thus the regular occupation of the battery by garrison troops appears to have began with the detachment of a portion of the Compagnie de Dangeac in the spring of 1732. Despite the preference of St. Ovide and Le Normant for the manning of the battery by detachments of forty men, the practice during the years 1732-1745 seems to have been to assign the occupation of the battery to one company each year. In spite of the fact that in October 1733 Dangeac asked for a commission and pension as commander of the Royal Battery, [10] the Compagnie de Laperelle relieved the Compagnie de Dangeac during the same year, [11] and was relieved in turn the following year by the Compagnie de Rousseau, [12] thus following the rotor system recommended by the Minister in the summer of 1732. The officers of the companies thus posted took their wives and families with them to the Royal Battery, along with the livestock and fowl necessary for their subsistence, and the damage caused by the latter in the rooms and attics of the battery give rise in 1738 to the construction of a building in the place d'armes to serve as a stable.[13]

Although a company was assigned to the battery each year, it was rarely occupied by more then fifteen or twenty men at any time during the course of the 1730's, the rest of its garrison working on the fortifications in the summer and going into the forest to gather wood in the winter. [14]. This circumstance, combined with that of the damages caused by the livestock, prompted Le Normant to suggest to the Minister in 1736 that the guard at the battery be reduced to a small number of men under a subaltern officer, who would take their meals at some house near the battery and who could be relieved every eight days. Although Le Normant was of the opinion that such a detachment would be sufficient to safeguard the battery in time of peace,[15] the proposal was rejected by the Minister, who pointed out in a letter of 3 May 1737 that it was the King's desire that the battery should at all times be occupied by a company. [16]

The detached companies had at the battery their own baker and resident priest, the latter being originally appointed by Pere Zacharie The Recollet Superior, and taking office from 1 January 1733.[17] Upkeep of the battery's chapel- the Chapel of St. Jean - involved an expense of 260 per-annum on the part of the Crown,[18] and an additional 240 was assigned annually as wages for a person responsible for the distribution of food at the battery: during the time that Dangeac commanded there, however, he received this stipend as commanding officer and was himself responsible for the distribution, although de Thierry, who was commander at the Royal Battery at the time of the first siege, was refused the wage while continuing to perform the same duties.[19]

The officers at the battery made use of the cellars under the chapel and the store-house for the storage of their "provisions humides" and drinks,[20] while tools and instruments for the battery's artillery were stored in a special chamber of their own. A clash between St. Ovide and Le Normant took place in 1736 over the possession of the keys to this chamber.[21]. The dispute was mediated in the following year by the Minister, who ordered two locks to be put on the room's door, the key to one being left with the commanding officer at the battery, and that to the other with the quartermaster.[22]. Other tools and instruments in the barracks of the battery were listed in an inventory made by he Normant in 1735. Designed as a preventive measure against breakage and loss, the inventory was intended for use as a checklist of equipment by commander's of companies relieving the garrison of the Royal Battery,[23] a wise precaution in view of the fact that repairs and replacements w pre almost invariably necessary with each change of garrison.[24]

The number of men in residence at the Royal Battery varied considerably from the time of its first occupation up to the commencement of the first siege. As has already been noted, Le Normant informed the Minister in 1736 that of the company assigned to the garrison of the battery only fifteen to twenty men actually remained in residence there.[25] In contrast with this small number Verrier estimated in 1739 that at least 250 men were necessary at the Royal Battery, excluding the gunners.[26] An English source dated 1741 reported that the battery was manned only by a subaltern and about 20 men, relieved annually, [27] but this statement appears to be effectively contradicted by Duquesnel's report of the same year that a company of seventy men was stationed at the battery.[28] In October of the following year, however, the company nominally garrisoned there was employed in the works at the city.[29] Duchambon, writing in November 1744,, was of the opinion that 196 men were necessary to man the battery, with an additional eleven to serve as crews for mortars. [30]

During the first portion of the siege year 1745, the battery was under the command of de Thierry. Preparations were made early in the year for the battery's role in the event of an attack upon the town. In March arrangements were made for the Srs. Hiriard and St. Martin, with the fifty sailors under their supervision, to retire to the Royal Battery on a cannon-shot signa1, [31] and during April food and firewood were brought in quantity to the battery, possible indicating that a prolonged resistance was planned in the case of an attack. [32] However, the epaulements of the battery were still in a state of partial demolition following the work done during the previous year on the mortar battery in the retour of the left flank. Verrier was later to claim that these demolitions were made in his absence, and that frosts in April had prevented their repair or the erection of palisades it the battery.[33]

For their part, the commanders of the New England forces regarded an attack on the Royal Battery as a vital stage in any proposed siege operation against Louisbourg. Shirley wrote confidently that the New England troops could not fail to take the battery which he judged to be occupied by a captain and fifty men. [34] He instructed Pepperrell to order the attack on the battery by a low part of the wall "that is unfinished at the east end", i.e., the still incomplete left-flank modification of the battery.[35]

The vulnerability of the demolished left flank, combined with the fact that the battery itself was incapable of accommodating a defensive force of more than two hundred, caused de Thierry to write to Duchambon on May 11, recommending that the battery be evacuated and blown up after the cannon had been spiked, to prevent such a useful outwork from falling in act into the hands of the New England forces attacking the town. [36]

Upon receipt of this letter Duchambon immediately assembled the officers of the garrison in a Council of War to take into consideration de Theiry's written request for orders. [37] The council agreed unanimously that the battery should be abandoned and was also of the opinion that it should be blown up, but strong opposition by Verrier caused this last proposition to be rejected.[38] De Thiery was ordered to abandon his post after having spiked the guns and brought away as many munitions and provisions as possible.[39]

At this time there were two to three hundred men at the Royal Battery,[40] although many of them may have been fishermen and inhabitants who retired to the battery from the barachois and the northern coast of the harbour on May 11,[41] and one report states that only fifty men held the battery at the time of the enemy landing.[42] Yet another account indicates that the battery's garrison was strengthened by the presence of Petitpas, the Chapitaine de Milice, with his company of ninety men.[43] At all events, evacuation was commenced by de Thierry on the evening of May 11, but in the confusion the guns were poorly spiked, the gun-carriages mostly left intact, and the balls not thrown into the sea. De Thierry retired with some of the munitions and most of the garrisons reaching the town by shallop about midnight, but - apparently inadvertently - leaving twelve men in each of the battery's towers. These unfortunates found a shallop in a creek near the battery and arrived at the town at about 2 a.m. [44] The neat morning a Lt. Estienne, in company with one Ensign Savigny, went back to the battery with about twenty men (Possibly fishermen volunteers [45]) - in two shallops to complete the evacuation, which they did, with the astounding exception of all the roundshot and mortar bombs. [46]

Meanwhile a detachment of four hundred New England troops had marched around to the north-east end of the harbour, burning the store-houses and fish-stages there which were approximately one mile from the Royal Battery.[47] It was this action which apparently provided the initial stimulus for the French evacuation. On the morning of 2 May (OS) Captain Vaughan with a detachment of thirteen men entered the deserted battery, which was to have been attacked by Bradstreet that night with 500 picked men.[48] Vaughan immediately relayed the news of the battery's capture to Pepperrell, [49] who thereupon sent a detachment of men under Bradstreet to reinforce Vaughan and secure possession of the battery. [50] Before Bradstreet's man could arrive, the French had made a futile attempt to recapture the battery by an eight-boat amphibious assault, and had been beaten off by Vaughan's men and some marauders, after which the French began to bombard the battery with balls and bombs both from the Island Battery and from the town.[51]

Meanwhile scouts posted on the hills overlooking the town had informed Pepperrell that a large party of French from the city were marching towards the Royal Battery. The general at once ordered the regiment "first in readiness" - Waldo's - to march out and trap the French between their fire and that of Bradstreet's detachment, or failing this, to intercept them in the course of their return to the city. The French sortie proved to be a feint, however, and by the end of the day both Bradstreet's men and five companies of Waldo's regiment had arrived at the Royal Battery.[52] They found a quantity of shot and a large number of mortar shells, in addition to twenty-eight 36 pounders, ("42-pounders" as the New Englander's called them) two 18-poundors.[53] The cannons had been spiked by the French, who had also damaged a number of the carriages; however, Bradstreet had hope of returning these guns to their operational condition, and wrote to Pepperrell requesting smiths and amourers to drill them out, and expressing the hope of having one "42-pounder" ready to fire on the town by noon of May 3 (OS) if his request was met. [54] Pepperrell seems to have provided Bradstreet with the required personnel, for by 10 a. m. of May 3 (03) one cannon was drilled out [55] and the same day the Royal Battery opened fire on the town to good effect - the third, fourth, and fifth shots fired reputedly entering the citadel through its roof.[56] The French returned this fire with bombs and balls from the Island Battery, but in spite of this annoyance Waldo concentrated his fire on the town in order to distract the French garrison there from Pepperrell's movements at other points on the perimeter.[57] At this time the Royal Battery was held by a force consisting of three companies of Waldo's regiment,[58] and some troops under Bradstreet, although many of these men were employed in marauding and "speculation on the neighbouring hills", leaving Waldo with only. two hundred men at hand instead of the five hundred he thought necessary for the security of the battery. In addition, shortages of powder and victuals - problems which were to plague the battery's garrison for the remainder of" the siege - were becoming serious. [59]

The following day (May 4 (OS)) three "42-pounders" were firing on the town from the Royal Battery, although a defect in the platform of the battery had slowed the rate of fire somewhat. [60] The French replied with two shot and forty shells, few of which landed-within the Royal Battery, thus keeping the toll of English wounded low.[61] Waldo at this time expressed his anxiety concerning the security of the battery and his wish that a complete regiment with officers should be stationed there.[62] During the day all the companies of his own regiment arrived, and although powder and rum were still in short supply, Waldo optimistically reported that a fourth cannon would probably be ready to bombard the town on May 5 (OS), and projected plans for a battery close to the "West Gate" of the city.[63]

On 5 May (OS), however, one of the guns at the Royal Battery was accidentally double-shotted, and split, wounding five men, including Captain Rhodes, the chief gunner. Rhodes complained to Pepperrell that the accident was due to the negligence of his subordinates and the fact that he himself was forced to "attend two bastions" - i.e., to divide his attentions between the only four embrazures in the battery which bore on the city, namely the two on the right flank, and the two on the right flank of the eperon. [64]Firing on the town continued despite this accident, and the following table gives Waldo's first-hand account of the exchange of fire between the Royal Battery and the French in the City and the Island Battery:

					Received
Date		Shot fired		Shot		Shell
May 3 (OS)	...........	40	............	146	...............	50
May 4	...........	115	...........	2	...............	40
May 5	...........	23	...........	2	...............	27
May 6	...........	70	...........	24	...............	18
May 7	...........	44	...........	54	...............	13
May 8	...........	................	...........	...........	...............	.................
May 9	...........	49	...........	39	...............	2 [65]

This account is probably the most accurate record of exchange of fire during this period, since Waldo was personally in command of the battery. [66]

For the remainder of the siege, the Royal Battery played a triple role: firsts it continued its own artillery bombardment of the city; second, it was considered as a point from which attacks against. both the town and the Island Battery might be launched; and, third, it served as an advanced base to support new siege-works and to extend the range of the English patrols.

To consider first the Royal Battery's basic role, that of a siege-battery; the battery continued to concentrate its fire on the western portion of the town, although it was continually hindered by lack of powder, ammunition, and trained gunners.[67] The un-spiking of the guns continued, however, and by 12 May (OS) twenty of the battery's guns were ready for service although only four could be brought to bear on the town.[68] The remainder pointed towards the harbour and the Island Battery, and although Waldo did not want to waste ammunition in attempting to hit the Island Battery,[69] he declared himself ready to use these guns against any French ships attempting to enter the harbour.[70] The bursting of guns through careless loading was a continual hazard at the Royal Battery - the accident of May 5 has already been described. Rhodes and another gunner were once more working at the battery by 20 May (OS) [71], but meanwhile a similar accident had seriously wounded Capt. Daniel Hale, upon whom, next to Rhodes, also most depended on for "playing" the guns. [72] This was apparently the last major mishap of this nature prior to the end of the siege.

Early in the siege the Royal Battery had been placed in its second role - that of a staging-point for attacks against the city or the Island Battery. As early as 8 May (OS), Waldo offered fifty to one hundred volunteers for what apparently was to have been an attack on either the islôt or the town, launched from the Royal Battery, but this scheme seems to have been postponed due to lack of sufficient time for preparations.[73] Three days later, on 11 May (OS), Vaughan volunteered to lead an attack on the Island Battery using boats assembled at the Royal Battery,[74] and on May 16 (OS) Warren outlined a plan for the attack on the city itself involving an assault launched by water from the Royal Battery against the city's harbour front coordinated with attacks at two other points on the perimeter of the city - a proposal which he repeated in more detail on 24 May (OS).[75] Renewed preparations for an attack on the Island Battery were discussed on 17 May (OS),[76] and by 22 May (OS) Waldo was actively concerting these preparations with Gorham at the Royal Battery.[77] The mixing of officers and men from different regiments caused Waldo to write pessimistically to Pepperrell on 23 May (OS) concerning the planned attack, reporting that he could probably only get fifty or at most one hundred men from his regiment to volunteer for the operation. He did his utmost to recruit volunteers from other regiments, however,[78] and continued to aid preparations for the ill-fated attack up to its launching on the night of 26 May (OS).[79]

The Royal Battery's third role, that of an advanced base of operations, was really a double ones first, it supplied ammunition and artillery to other batteries, specifically those near the "West Gate" of the city. Fascine batteries in this area were prepared to receive cannon by 15 May (OS), and on the night of 17-18 May (OS), two large cannon from the Royal Battery were hauled into position in these emplacements.[80] By 20 May (OS) two "42-pounders" and two 18-pounders from the Royal Battery were planted in a battery near the "West Gate" of Louisbourg, to which the Royal Battery was also supplying portions of its scanty supply of powder along with a number of made-up cartridges.[81] On the following day a new battery site was chosen by Major Tidcomb and Waldo, and the latter hoped to have two "42-pounders" mounted at this location by the dawn of 22 May (OS) [82] - possibly the two that Waldo had mounted on sleds at the Royal Battery on 20 May (OS).[83] Two cannons were also hauled from the Royal Battery on June 12 (OS).[84] Thus the total number of guns moved from the Royal Battery to batteries near the "West Gate" during the siege appears to have been as follows:

Although these numbers are taken from first-hand accounts, it is possible either that one of the documents contains an error, or that two cannon were returned to the battery before the conclusion of the siege, for an accurate account of the Royal Battery's equipment on 17 June (OS),[85] gives:

- whereas according to the figures for removals, only twenty sound cannon should have remained.

A second facet of the battery's status as an advanced base was its use as a guard post and as a base-point for extended patrols. In order that this role might be effectively fulfilled a relatively strong garrison was needed at the battery, and consequently on 11 May (OS) a Council of War advised that a regiment (presumably Waldo's) be posted at the battery, which was to be rendered defensible.[87] ,Although Waldo thereafter complained of the weakening of his troops through sickness grid wounding, they were continually used for patrols and for the support of the "West Gate" and Light House batteries.[88] Large patrols were launched into the interior of the island by units stationed at or around the Royal Battery. On 11 May (OS) Vaughan sent 150 men from the Royal Battery to attack a marauding force of Indians and Frenchmen at Laballen.[89] On 20 May (OS) two hundred men from the Royal Battery, including detachment's from Gorham's troops were sent on a scouting mission,[90] and on 26 may (OS) a scouting party of 150-160 men under Captain Noble was sent from the Royal Battery to a region about twenty miles west-north-west of the city.[91]

With the conclusion of the siege the status of the battery was once more open to question. However, a Council of War held 24 June (OS) decided to have the army begin repairs on the Royal Battery at once, in order to take advantage of what remained of the short summer, before the end of which the battery was in some manner garrisoned by the English.[92]

During September 1745, on Shirley's orders, Bastide made a survey of the battery in order to determine its weak points and gauge the optimum size of a proposed garrison force.[93] He reported that, exclusive of four rooms for officers, the hospital, chapel, bakery, smith's shops and one garrett, the battery would hold two hundred private men; in addition he noted that the battery had no defence against artillery on the landward side, and recommended that palisading (then under construction) and other minor repairs be carried out to make it tenable against surprise or scaling. He suggested that the least number of men that should be stationed at the battery was 250, and that as little powder as possible should be left at the battery, since it could receive its stores and supplies by water from the town.[94] Partially as a result of this report, Pepperrell, Warren, and Shirley decided to remove all heavy cannon from the Royal Battery, in order to preclude their use against the town in the event of a surprise attack, and to render it tenable against all forces except shipping or land troops supported by heavy artillery.[95] This might have been the origin of apparently garbled French intelligence reports that the English had abandoned the Royal Battery around Christmas 1745.[96] That the battery actually was abandoned by the English at this time is unlikely in view of various items of evidence - the palisading and repair work done in the late summer, the disastrous results of the French neglect of the post during the siege, and the fact that more reliable French sources considered it likely that the English would garrison the battery strongly and protect it by the erection of a blockhouse nearby.[97] It is probable, however, that the battery garrison was reduced for the winter after the withdrawal of the heavy guns, although no positive evidence exists to support this assumption.

On 10 March 1746 (OS) a council held at Louisbourg decided to remount the cannon at the battery and place it in fighting order.[98] Possibly as a consequence of this decision another council held 23 April (OS) undertook an investigation to discover what number of officers could be accommodated in the Royal Battery barracks.[99] No account of the number of troops stationed at the battery during 1746 exists in the sources so far searched. There is, however, direct but vague evidence that the battery was occupied during this year, both in the garrison orders for Louisbourg and in the account of annual expenses, which includes the cost of hiring a cart to take provisions weekly to the Royal Battery.[100]

During the winter of 1746-1747 there were again no heavy cannon at the Royal Battery, which was apparently occupied by seamen from the "Vigilant" and the "Chester".[101] This assumption is supported by French reports that during the British occupation the battery was used as quarters for the crews of vessels wintering at Louisbourg.[102] The seamen replaced unspecified "American troops" who had previously been stationed at the battery and who were moved into the town for the winter.[103]

Garrison orders dated May 1747 (OS) indicate that some ,guns were at that time in service at the Royal Battery;[104] in August and September of the same year the officers' and men's barracks at the battery were repaired, and various soldiers' rooms were fitted out for the officers of General Frampton's regiment, who occupied the battery at about this time, and remained in quarters there until the new year.[105] By late September 1747 there were twenty-three 42-pounders and four 4-pounders at the Royal Battery, and there is no evidence that these were removed for the winter according to previous practice. [106] In March 1748 the battery had a daily garrison of 143 sergeants, corporals, drummers and privates, presumably with a proportionate number of officers.[107] The final reference to the English occupation of the battery occurs at the end of August 1748 (OS) and indicates that a portion or perhaps all of Pepperrell's regiment was stationed at the Royal Battery at that time.[108]

Following the return of Louisbourg to the French in 1749, Desherbiers, then Governor, gave Dangeac the command of the Royal Battery. [109] However, the Royal Battery's status eras at this time brought under serious consideration due to its role in the 1745 siege. The debate was opened in 1749 by Desherbiers, who, in a letter to the Minister in September of that year, [110] expressed the opinion that the battery was useless for the defence of the port, and suggested that it should be desired, leaving only the barracks to serve as a naval hospital, although he advised that this too should be blown up in the event of an attack. He pointed out that the battery would be of more use to the attackers than to the defenders of the town, as bitter experience had shown.

The next year Franquet reflected this opinion when he wrote [111] that the general advice was to destroy the battery. Franquet himself, regarded this as a step to be taken only if absolutely necessary, and undertook, au an alternative, to find a method of rendering the battery's artillery harmless to the town. While admitting that the battery, once captured, would become a resource to the enemy, he insisted that it had been designed specifically to defend the entrance to the port, and observed that if it were to be abandoned enemy vessels would be tempted to run the gauntlet of the Island Battery's fire in order to gain access to the northeast anchorage, where only bombs fired at 1800 toise range (i.e., from the town), could hope to harm them. He stressed that while the battery remained in existence no enemy could think of attacking the town via the harbour, but recommended, in the event of an attack from any other quarter, that the battery be instantly abandoned and its artillery retired to the city on flat boats.

In this opinion he was supported by Prevost, who, writing to the Minister on 14 October 1750, repeated Franquet's apprehension that in the absence of a threat from the Royal Battery, enemy vessels might risk the Island Battery's fire in order to gain entrance to the port. [112] Roma likewise expressed similar opinions, stating that the battery was useful for the defence of the harbour, but incapable of defending itself against an attack from the landward side.[113]

In November 1751 Franquet sent to the Minister a comprehensive memoire concerning the Royal Battery, in which he listed its advantages and defects. [114] While stressing that the battery was advantageously situated for the defence of the harbour entrance, he enumerated the following faults:

Franquet went on to propose works to reinforce the battery against artillery, but noted that this would not alter the fact that it was still commanded by high ground. To remedy this defect he suggested the establishment of a redoubt on the commanding height, with a communication from the redoubt to the battery and a strong-point at half the length of the communication. Franquet stated that this was Roymond's idea, but actually a similar scheme for a redoubt on the height, connected to the battery by a palisaded communication, had been put forward by Verrier as early as 1739.[117] Franquet indicated that such a scheme would be costly and would necessitate the moving of large quantities of earth to form the communication. In addition, he noted, the battery and its proposed outworks would require five hundred men for its defence, a force which could not be sustained from the town in the event of attack. Also, he observed, there existed the possibility that an enemy attacking the town from the landward side might choose simply to by-pass the heavily garrisoned battery. He summed up his arguments thus:

His final conclusion was that the battery should be left in existence, put in condition to resist a coup de main, and be provided with flat boats for the withdrawal of the artillery in case of an attack from the land side. He estimated that the time consumed by the enemy in bringing cannon around by land to assault the Royal Battery would allow the troops stationed there ample opportunity to withdraw themselves, their guns, and their munitions, to the town.

Four days later Franquet again reported to the Minister, describing the two opinions which had developed around the question of the Royal Battery's utility. [118] These he summarized as follows:

Raymond was of the latter opinion, but Franquet disagreed with both, as he had made clear in his earlier memoirs, and in a letter in which he had pointed out that the proposed battery at Ross's Point would suffer from the same disadvantages as the Royal Battery itself. [119] If other advice than his were to prevail, however, he expressed himself willing to co-operate in the redoubt scheme, and indicated that on his return to France he would be ready to form the project for the redoubt and its communication.

Raymond expressed his opinion in favour of the redoubt scheme in a letter written the same day as was Franquet's letter described immediately above.[120] He insisted that a redoubt if only one capable of accommodating a fifty-man force was necessary on the dominating height, with another on a lower hill between the first height and the Royal Battery. He stressed that if the heights were not thus occupied it was to be presumed that the enemy would easily take the battery as had been done in 1745. The outworks, on the other hand, would retard the enemy for at least fifteen days, giving the troops in the battery time to make an orderly retirement of their artillery to the town under cover of night.

Obviously a wide divergence existed between Raymond's redoubt project and Franquet's less ambitious scheme of merely placing the battery in a condition to resist a surprise attack. Thus when Raymond asked Franquet in December 1751 to write to the Minister regarding the redoubt scheme, it is not surprising that Franquet carefully avoided advocating the plan, suggesting instead that the Minister speak to la Galissonière, who, Franquet indicated, knew the locale of the battery, and could therefore justly compare Franquet's scheme with that of Raymond. [121]

During the winter of 1751-1752, a decision was made by the authorities in France regarding the future use of the Royal Battery. In this it was probably influenced by the opinions of de Noailles and la Galissonière, who disapproved of the redoubt scheme and advocated the retention of only six to eight cannon at the battery, for the defence of the harbour. [122] In consequence, the Minister wrote to Raymond and Prevost on 15 May 1762,[123] and instructed Raymond and Franquet that the battery was to be left in existence, with six or at most eight 36-pounder cannon mounted, and with all preparations made for a retirement to the town after the spiking of the guns in the event of an attack by land forces. Raymond's redoubt and communication project was rejected on the grounds that while it was sound in principle, the size of the garrison and population of Louisbourg at that juncture did not warrant such an expansion of the outworks.

On 25 May Franquet wrote a detailed reply to this letter. [124] In this he repeated his continual assertion that the Royal Battery should be kept in a condition to resist a coup de main. To the Minister's observation that the battery did not appear to be useful except for the defence of vessels retired to the northeast arm, Franquet replied that it would be more advisable to sacrifice such vessels than to risk the capture of the battery's guns. He therefore agreed with the plan of leaving only six to eight cannon in the battery, with preparations for evacuation, but insisted that the battery should nonetheless be kept in a state to resist all assaults not supported by artillery. He concluded by pointing out that Raymond had formed the redoubt project on the assumption that an augmentation of the town's garrison would be necessary before it could be put into effect.

This marked the close of the contention over the battery's fate, and its continued existence was for the moment assured. Raymond acquiesced in the decision, which followed closely the lines suggested by Franquet, and after visiting the battery in Franquet's company, in June 1752, he wrote to the Minister that he had nothing to add to Franquet's observations.[125]

Although there were already several 36-pounders mounted at the battery in the spring of 1752,[126] the order to reduce the number to six appears to have been carried out forthwith, [127]although the peacetime garrison of the battery continued under normal circumstances to be one company.[128]

Shortly before his departure for France in 1753 Raymond, conferred the command of the troops at the Royal Battery on de Montalambert, [129] and asked for an annual gratification for this officer, a request which, was refused on the grounds that the post was not a "considerable" one. [130] Montalambert appears to have maintained good discipline among his troops at the battery, however,[131] and in 1754 he received the Croix de St. Louis for his services. [132]

The question of the garrison of the Royal Battery was next raised in connection with the King's intention of sending two battalions of "troupes de ferret" to Louisbourg during 1755. Lodging had to be provided for these soldiers, and Bigot suggested in a letter to the Minister dated 14 May 1755 that the garrison of the Royal Battery might be augmented by one company.[133] Prevost was of the opinion that the battery could lodge three captains, five subaltern officers, and 120 men, [134] while Franquet wrote that there was enough room in the battery for three companies. [135]

During this period there remained only six guns at the battery in the summer of 1755, however, Drucour doubled the number, [136] and the battery remained furnished in this manner until 1757, when Bois de la Mothe, fearing a repetition of the disaster of 1745 in the event of a British attack, evacuated the battery's one-hundred man garrison to the town, along with all its guns, some of which were placed in the Island Battery and some at the town itself. [137]

During British preparations for an attack on Louisbourg in 1757, it was initially assumed that the Royal Battery still mounted its offensive armament. A memorandum drawn up by J. H. Bastide in February of that year recommended the capture of the Royal Battery as an opening move in any siege, a suggestion which was repeated at the Council of War held in Halifax that July by Lt. Mitchell of the 45th. Regiment and Captain George Scott, on the grounds that the battery's capture would give the British control of the harbour and facilitate an attack on the Island Battery. [138] Knowles was at this time of the opinion that at least two 74-gun ships would be required to silence the Royal Battery, which he believed to be armed with "42-pounders". [139] Reports from French prisoners of war indicated, however, that some if not all of the battery's cannons had been removed. [140]

When the British attack came in the following year, the battery does not appear to have been occupied in strength, for when Desgouttes feared that the enemy might use its still-subsisting gun-platform against the town, he was under the necessity of asking Drucour for an engineer with two companies of volunteers to aid in its demolition,[141] although Desgouttes' men apparently made a considerable start on the process before the request was made.[142] The demolition of the battery was started on 8 June 1758,[143] with powder, sulphur, and tar, and before retiring the French had over-turned the parapet of the right face and burnt the barracks roofs and floors and the coverings of the towers. This appears to have effectively prevented the British from making use of the battery during the siege, although they did establish a siege battery on the heights in the rear of the Royal Battery.[144]

The British once in occupation considered repairing the damage at moderate cost and using the buildings as a naval hospital, or, with a small guard, as a cover for the watering place for warships and as a post to keep "roving Indians" from venturing too near to the sides and head of the harbour.[145] However, only the vaguest evidence indicates that the building was in fact turned into a naval hospital - during the demolition of the battery in 1760, Bastide mentioned that the "Navy Hospital" (i.e., the Royal Battery barracks) were preserved, and the Procter Diary almost contemporaneously notes that the battery had been repaired by the English only for use as a naval hospital.[146] There are no documents in the sources searched for the years 1758 and 1759 which indicate that the battery was actually put to this use.

It was indeed used as a guard post, and in August 1759 mounted a daily guard of one sergeant, one corporal, and twelve men. [147] In December of that year the companies of Captains Gorge and Newhall, along with men ordered to join them, were sent into winter quarters at the Royal Battery, Newhall's company moving in on Christmas Day with its bedding and barracks equipment. The preparations necessary at the battery before these two hundred men could take up quarters there seem to indicate that it had not been occupied by any considerable force during the first half of the winter.[148] A large body of men were still in residence at the Royal Battery in June of the following year, at which time the commanding officer of the battery was ordered to send a sufficient number of cooks to the town to mess the parties engaged in the demolition operations. [149] Demolition of the battery itself was carried out in late October and early November of the same year as described in Section II L of this Report.

6. AC B V.57-2 ff.776-781v, Minister to St. Ovide and Le Normant, 27 June 1732.

11. AC C11B V.17 ff.122-126v, Sabatier, Rondeau, Le Normant, 20 October 1735.

29. AC C11B V.24 ff.37-40v, Duquesnel and Bigot to Minister, 30 October 1742.

34. Adm. 1 Bundle 3817, No pagination, Shirley to (?), 29 January 1745 (OS) / Documents and Records Relating to the Province of New Hampshire from 1738 to 1749, Vo1.5, pp.272-274, 2 February 1744/1745. (OS).

35. Collections of the Massachusetts Hististorical Society, First Ser. V.1., pp.5-11, Shirley to Pepperrell, 19 March 1745 (OS) / See also Section II A of this Report.

36. AC F3 V.50-1 ff.301-301v, Conseil de Guerre / AC 33 V.50-1, ff.272-298 / AC F3 V.50 ff.368-381, Bigot to Minister.

41. AC F3 V.50-1 ff.301-301v, Conseil de Guerre, 11 May 1745 / AFO DFC Am. Sept. Ordre No.216, 11 May 1745.

47. Early American Imprints 1639-1800, Evans No. 6307, American Antiquarian Society, William Douglass, A Summary, Historical and Political..., V.l, p.348.

48. Louisbourg Journals 1745, Ed. L. E. de Forest, Tenth Journal Bradstreet , p.174.

49. Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Sixth Ser., V..10, p.138, Vaughan to Pepperrell, 2 May 1745 (OS).

51. Louisbourg Journals 1745, Ed. L. E. de Forest, First Journal, p. 11 / The Journal of Sir William Pepperrell Kept During the Expedition Against Louisbourg, pp. 18-19.

54. Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Sixth Ser., V.10, p.138, Bradstreet to Pepperrell, 2 May 1745 (OS).

57. Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Sixth Ser., V.10, pp.140-145, Waldo to Pepperrell, 3 May 1745 (08).

59. Ibid., pp.140-145, Waldo to Pepperrell, 3 May 1745 (OS). Samuel Nile's account of the siege states that a Major William Hunt had initial command of the Royal Battery, but this appears to be an error in the light of the direct evidence provided by the letters of Waldo and Pepperrell. Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Ser. 4, V.5, 1760 - A Summary Historical Narrative of the Wars in New England, Rev. Saml. Niles, p.402.

60. Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Sixth Ser., V.10 pp.147-148, Pepperrell to Warren, 4 Mar 1745 (OS) / Ibid., pp.150-151, Waldo to Pepperrell, 4 May 1745 (OS).

64. Journal and Letters of the Late Samuel Curwen, London, 1842, p.13 / Journals and Papers of Seth Pomeroy, Ed. L. E. de Forest, Society of Colonial Wars in the State of New York, 1926, p.23 / Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Sixth Ser., V.10 pp.155-156, Rhodes to Pepperrell, 7 May 1745, (OS).

66. However, he mistakes the dates on which the various guns were brought into action. In his table, written 12 May (OS), he states that the second gun was opened on 4 May, and the third and fourth on 6 May, whereas it has already been seen by his letter of 4 May that he had at that time three guns in operation and expected to open the fourth the next day. (Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Sixth Ser. V.10, ff.151-154, Waldo to Pepperrell, 4 May 1745 (OS)). French accounts of the exchange of fire are less accurate, and give the number of shot fired from the Royal Battery as 91 from three guns on 15 May (NS); they also state that by 3 June (NS) 18 guns were in use at the Royal Battery. (AFO DFC Am. Sept. Ordre No. 216 Girard la Croix, 3 June 1745.)

67. Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Sixth Ser., V.10 pp.157-159, Waldo to Pepperrell, 8 May 1745 (OS) / Ibid., pp.166-168, Waldo to Pepperrell, 13 May 1745 (OS) / Ibid., pp.190-191, Waldo to Pepperrell, 20 May 1745 (OS).

69. Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Sixth Ser. V.10, pp.166-168, Waldo to Pepperrell, 13 May 1745 (OS).

72. Ibid., pp.172-174, Waldo to Pepperrell, 16 May 1745 (OS) / Ibid., pp.180-181, Arthur Noble to Pepperrell, 17 May 1745 (OS)

75. Ibid., pp. 175-180, Warren to Pepperrell, 16 May 1745 (OS) / Ibid., pp. 21-23, Unsigned, 24 May 1745 (OS).

78. Ibid., pp.213-216, Waldo to Pepperrell, 23 May 1745 (OS) / Ibid., pp.212, Waldo to Pepperrell, 23 May 1745 (OS).

79. Ibid., pp.223-226, Waldo to Pepperrell, 26 Play 1745 (OS) / Ibid., pp.231-232, 27 May 1745 (OS).

80. Journals and Papers of Seth Pomeroy, Ed. L. E. de Forest, Society of Colonial Wars in the State of New York, 1926, pp.24-25 / Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Sixth Ser., V.10, pp.181-182, Pepperrell to Waldo, 17 May 1745 (OS).

81. Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, First Ser. V.1, pp.29-31, Pepperrell to Shirley, 20 May 1745 (OS) / Ibid., Sixth Ser., V.10, pp.190-191, Waldo to Pepperrell, 20 May 1745 (OS).

82. Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Sixth Ser., V.10, pp.196-198, Waldo to Pepperrell, 21 May 1745 (OS).

84. Benjamin Cleave's Journal, Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, 1912, p.121.

87. Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Sixth Ser., V. 10, pp.17-18, Unsigned, 11 May 1745 (OS).

90. Ibid., pp.192-196, Waldo to Pepperrell, 20 May 1745 (OS) / There was a certain amount of friction between Waldo and John and Shubael Gorham (Ibid., pp.272-273, Waldo to John Gorham, 12 June 1745 (OS)

91. Ibid., Waldo to Pepperrell, pp.223-226, 26 May 1745 (OS) Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Ser.4, V.5, A summary Narrative of the Wars in New England, Rev. Saml. Niles, p.402.

92. Documents and Records Relating to the Province of New Hampshire, 1738-1749, V.5, p. 363 / AC C11B V.27 ff.48-49, Boucher to Minister, 28 August 1745 / AC F3 V.50-1, ff.272-298.

94. C05 V.900 ff.232-232v, (Bastide?), 21 September 1745 (OS) / CO5 V.900 ff.234-234v, Bastide to Shirley, 26 September, 1745 (OS).

95. Transcript of CO/PAC Nova Scotia A27 pp.223-246, Warren to Newcastle, 23 November 1745 (OS).

96. Anon. Military Journal, French, Documents Relating to the Colonial History of the State of New York, Vo1.10, 1858, pp. 38-75.

97. Documents Relating to the Colonial History of the State of New York, V.10, 1858, Hocquart and Beauharnoir to Maurepas, 12 September 1745.

98. Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Sixth Ser. V.10 pp. 5-7, Unsigned, 10 March 1746 (OS).

100. Cunninghame of Thornton, Muniments, N.485, 9 November 1746 (OS) / C05 V.44 ff.148-149, Unsigned, Undated 1746.

101. Transcript of CO/PAC Nova Scotia A28, pp.1-11, Pepperrell and Warren to Newcastle, 29 January 1747 (OS).

102. Service Historique de l'Armée (Vincennes.) Ser. A1, Reg. 3393, Pièce 25 / AC C11B V.31 ff.104-108, Raymond to Minister, 12 December 1751.

103. Transcript of CO/PAC Nova Scotia A28, pp , 1-11, Pepperrell and Warren to Newcastle, 29 January 1747 (OS).

104. Cunninghame of Thornton, Muniments, N485, Garrison Orders, May 1747 (OS)

105. See Section II K of this Report / Cunninghame of Thornton, Muniments, N.485, 23 January 1748 (OS).

106. WO34 V.101 f.139, Unsigned, 27 September, 1747 (OS) / Library of Congress, AC-2444, No pagination, Signed E. Browne, J. Beswick T. Oake, 30 September 1747 (OS).

111. AC C11B V.29 ff.306-315, Franquet to Minister, 13 October 1750 / Com. Téch. du Génie. Art.22 (MSS Réliés) Ms.205b, Franquet to Minister.

114. AC C11A V.126 Pièce 88, Franquet / Min. de Guerre, Com. Téch. du Genie, Art .14, Carton 1, Pièce 38 / AC C11B V.31, ff.182-195, Franquet.

116. Com. Téch. Du Génie Art.22 (Mss. Réliés) Ms.205b, ff.59-60, Franquet.

118. Com. Téch. du Génie Art.22 (Mss. Réliés), Ms.205b ff.38-43, Franquet to Minister / AC C11B V.31 ff.136-141, Franquet to Minister, 24 November 1751.

121. Com. Téch. du Génie Art.22 (MSS. Réliés) Ms .205b ff.45-46, Franquet to Minister, 14 December 1751 / AC C11B V.31 ff.142-143v, Franquet to Minister.

124. AC C11A V.126 Pièce 36, Franquet to Minister, 25 May 1752 / Min. de Guerre Com. Téch. du Génie, Art.14, Carton 1, Pièce 45, Franquet to Minister / Com. Téch, du Génie Art.22, (Mss. Réliés) Ms.205b, ff.67-99.

128. Com. Téch. du Génie Art.22 (MSS. Réliés) Ms.205b, ff.174-176, Franquet to Minister, 8 June 1755 / AC C11B V.35 ff.271-272v, Franquet to Minister.

134. AC C11B V.35 ff.155-155v, Prevost, 9 June 1755 / with Prevost's letter of the same date, q.v., AC C11B V.35 f.150v / AC C11B V.35 ff.273-273v, Franquet.

135. Com. Téch. du Génie Art.22 (Mss. Réliés) Ms.205b ff.174-176, Franquet to Minister, 8 June 1755 / AC C1IB V.35 ff.271-272v, Franquet to Minister.

136. AC C11B V.35 ff.84-87, Drucour to Minister, 25 August 1755 / AC C11B V.35 ff.120-121, Drucour.

137. AN Marine Sér.B4 V.76 ff.20-25, Unsigned, Undated 1757 / AC C11C V.16 Pièce 13, Unsigned / WO34 V101 ff.92-134, Loudon and other, 23-30 July 1757. This is the evidence of a French officer. Other prisoners of lower rank contradicted his statements, alleging that only a few of the battery's cannon had been removed, but this seems to have been either a mistake or else a deliberate lie to confuse the British.

138. WO34 V.101 ff.135-137, Bastide, 10 February 1757 / Ibid., ff.140-144, G. Scott, Mitchell, 23-30 July 1757.

140. WO34 V.101 ff.92-134, Signed Loudon and others, 23-30 July 1757 / CO5 V.53 ff.37-38, Unsigned, Undated 1757.

143. AC F3 V.50 ff. 539-602v, Unsigned, 9 June 1758 / AC B V.80, Pt. 1, Drucour to Desgouttes, 8 June 1758 / PAC MG18 14 Packet 4 pp.15-I6, Boscawen, 10 June 1758.

144. Archive du Com. Téch. du Génie, 210D, ff.75-117, Unsigned, 3 July 1758, The bombs referred to in this document almost certainly came from this battery, not from the Royal Battery itself.

145. CO5 V. 53 (MG11) pp.136-153, J. H. Bastide in J. Amherst's letter to the Board of Trade, 28 August 1758.

146. WO34 V.14 pp.15-16, Bastide to Amherst, 26 October 1760 / Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Louisbourg E172, Procter Diary, p.53 5 November 1760.

147. Journal of Mr. Gibson Clough, pp.1-178, Gibson Clough, 8 and 18 August 1759.

148. Ibid., 20 and 22 December 1759 / Diary of an Expedition to Louisbourg, No pagination, Unsigned, 25 December 1759.

149. Diary of an Expedition to Louisbourg, No pagination, Unsigned, 1 June 1760.

Night of 17-18 May (OS)	........................	2"42-pounders."
Between 17-20 May "	........................	2 18-pounders.
Night of 21-22 May "	........................	2"42-pounders."
June 12 "	........................	2