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Fortress of Louisbourg National Historic Site of Canada
Recherche sur la Forteresse-de-Louisbourg Lieu historique national du Canada
Louisbourg: A Focus of Conflict
H E 13
Fortress of Louisbourg
Chapter III: Louisbourg at the time of the Attack
Even to the trained eye, the fortifications at Louisbourg must have presented a forbidding appearance. There was no fortification in the British American colonies which even remotely approached Louisbourg's elaborate system of bastions and connecting walls. Although few of the provincials advancing on Louisbourg in the transports knew it, the fortifications were a direct application of the first system of Sébastien LePrestre de Vauban, Louis XIV's celebrated chief military engineer.  Vauban's formalization of the methods of siegecraft, fortification and strategy in the seventeenth century exercised a profound influence on European military science throughout much of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
The development of the science of
fortification and siege in warfare
during the eighteenth century was in part a response to France's problem of having exposed and vulnerable northern and
northeastern land borders. Furthermore, relatively static warfare
depending largely on fortification and siege was appropriate to the
limited goals, equipment and logistic capabilities of eighteenth century
states.  While developments in armies, armaments and tactics in the
eighteenth century brought about a decline in the use of siege warfare, it
was not until the
Revolutionary wars changed the character of war
so substantially that the number of battles exceeded sieges.  Fortresses were constructed in Europe along the historical and geographical routes of invasion, and it was considered unthinkable in an extended campaign to bypass such strongholds because an offensive thrust fro m the fortress would seriously disrupt the attacker's lines of communication.  Basically, a fortified position simply enables a limited number of men to defend themselves against a far larger number of attackers. Louisbourg was clearly an application of European methods of warfare to the North American wilderness, and when Britain and her colonies contemplated the destruction of New France, it was ever thought necessary to capture Louisbourg first.
The fortifications at Louisbourg were largely harbour oriented; that is, the entrance to the harbour and anchorage was protected by an awesome array of artillery. The Island Battery, mounting 33 guns, which Shirley called the "chief Strength" of the harbour, and the Royal Battery, mounting 30 guns, which Shirley described as the "most Galling Battery in the Harbour". defended by cross-fire the entrance to the harbour.  The principal fortifications and town of Louisbourg were situated on a projection of land at the south side of the bay. Here was a double-crowned work consisting of two bastions, the King's and Queen's, anchored by two demi-bastions, the Dauphin and Princess. A "Circular" battery to the rear of the Dauphin Bastion was designed to provide further protection for the harbour and some cover for the adjacent walls and port facilities. This work mounted sixteen 24-pound guns, some of which may not have been present during the siege of 1745. The Princess demi-bastion, designed to prevent landings from ships outside the bay and to protect adjacent walls, mounted four 8-pounders, and after the siege had begun, three 6-pounders were placed facing Cap Noir. The King's and Queen's bastions were situated on small rises to dominate the boggy plains of Gabarus which lay immediately westward.. The King's Bastion was the citadel, erected on the highest piece of land in the immediate vicinity. There were probably little more than six 16 and 24-pound guns firing from the King's Bastion-during the siege, and a lesser number of similar guns at the Queen's. To enclose the town completely, additional works were constructed in the late 1730's and early 1740's. Two-bastions, the Maurepas and Brouillan, were built at the eastern extremity of the town, neither of which appear to have had any artillery mounted during the 1745 siege. The other major supplementary work was the Pièce de la Grave at the northeastern end of the town, armed with eighteen 24 and 36-pound cannon and two mortars. The guns of the Pièce de la Grave commanded the harbour entrance and part of the harbour itself, as did the artillery of the Royal Battery. In addition there were upward of forty mortars and swivel guns placed strategically about the works. 
So long as enemy fleets could be kept outside the harbour, the fortress was secure from sea attack; however, Louisbourg could be threatened by an overland assault via the plains of Gabarus or from the peninsula to the northeast where the lighthouse stood. Furthermore, the fortress suffered chronically from a lack of manpower, artillery, ammunition and frequently provisions, despite numerous requests from Louisbourg for more substantial support. 
Despite Louisbourg's imposing appearance and reputation the fortress was not in a good defensive posture in 1745. Since the war between England and Spain had erupted in 1739, Maurepas had received many reports from the governors and commissaire-ordonnateur at Louisbourg, who were aware that the conflict could expand to include England and France, concerning the weak defensive situation at the fortress and recommending the possibilities of offensive thrusts from Louisbourg against British possessions in North America. It had proved extremely difficult t o keep the fortifications in a state of good repair for a variety of reasons, including the use of inferior building materials and poor workmanship in some cases, but most particularly because of an inability to overcome the problems associated with building in the cool, damp climate of Louisbourg.  Govenor Du Chambon warned Maurepas late in 1744 that the state of the batteries, artillery and other war supplies were inadequate to withstand a siege; furthermore, there were not enough soldiers and able men to provide for a strong defence.  Earlier in the year, Maurepas had conveyed to the governor the King's surprise that after so many years of work, the fortress was still reported to be in an incomplete state. He pointed out that the treasury would not permit the dispatch of the men and supplies requested, but that the frequently urged attack against the English in Acadia had not been forgotten. However, the season was considered too far advanced for the preparation and launching of an attack in 1744. Nevertheless, he repeated an earlier promise to send two warships to protect the fishery and trade, and to harass the commerce of the enemy. 
The two ships apparently allotted to Louisbourg were L'Ardent of 64-guns and Le Caribou of 26-guns, a frigate built in Québec and fitted for privateering.  Both ships arrived at Louisbourg late in the summer of 1744 and merely carried out some largely unsuccessful cruising in search of English privateers before convoying a merchant fleet of about 50 vessels to France from Louisbourg in the late autumn. Their departure left the fortress without any substantial naval protection. Before these ships left Louisbourg, Du Chambon and Bigot prepared dispatches urging Maurepas to send some warships which would arrive no later than April 15.
In February, 1745, Maurepas sent the frigate La Renommée, 32-guns, under a Captain Kersaint to Louisbourg, which arrived late in April. Unable to enter the harbour because of the pack-ice flowing from the north, Kersaint sailed to the southwest and encountered some colonial cruisers convoying the New England transports to Canso. After a running fight, and unable t o reach Louisbourg because of contrary winds and the blockade, Kersaint put for France without having been able to inform Louisbourg of his presence. He reached Brest in mid June. In the meantime, Maurepas ordered the 60-gun Mars readied to sail for the fortress in March to join Le Castor, a frigate being built at Québec with orders to sail for the fortress. However, Le Castor was not completed in time to be of use at Louisbourg. The Mars was so long in being outfitted that Maurepas, having received in late April the distressing news of a mutiny in the Louisbourg garrison in December, 1744, ordered the 64-gun Vigilant to sail in her place. The Vigilant, under the bold but inexperienced Captain Alexandre Boisdescourt de la Maisonfort left Brest on April 26, laden with military stores, including powder, small arms and cannon, provisions, and manned by more than 500 men. De la Maisonfort's orders were to protect Ile Royale, its fisheries and French commerce, and to disrupt the fishery and commerce of the English. If an attack were made on the fortress, he was to provide all possible assistance to Louisbourg, without exposing his ship uselessly.  Unquestionably, if the Vigilant arrived at Louisbourg in time, the defences would be strengthened enormously.
While the governor hoped for naval assistance from France, the problems of defending Louisbourg were compounded in December, 1744, when the restive garrison mutinied, claiming they were being bilked by their officers-,of firewood, pay, proper food and clothing.  An anonymous Habitant of Louisbourg stated that the mutiny had a considerable effect on the siege: "Troops with so little discipline were scarcely able to inspire us with confidence; we therefore did not think it well to make any sorties [during the siege] fearing that such men might range themselves on the side of the enemy." 
The problems of an inadequate garrison considered of dubious loyalty, the poor state of the batteries, artillery and war supplies, and no guarantee of timely naval support from France would have tried the abilities of even the most experienced governor, the leader Louisbourg lacked at its moment of crisis. Du Chambon, who replaced Du Quesnel when he died suddenly in October, 1744, had little practical knowledge of warfare. In fact, according to McLennan, neither Du Chambon nor any of his troops' officers had ever seen action.  This compared with the New England forces approaching Louisbourg who included very few officers or men with any real military experience. Only second Colonel John Bradstreet of Pepperrell's own First Massachusetts Regiment could lay claim to any substantial service in the regular British forces.  Furthermore, his voice was but one in Pepperrell's Council of War, the advice of which Shirley had strongly recommended Pepperrell to follow.  No one man was to dominate totally the direction of the expedition made up of the forces of four New England colonies. While this system might have been the most politically practical and designed to reduce friction between the various colonies and their contingents, it did not prove conducive to good discipline, decisive leadership and vigourous action during the siege. In short, the inexperience of Du Chambon and his officers was more than matched by Pepperrell and his officers.
French lookouts. had sighted a number of ships off Louisbourg since the middle of March, and although it was feared these might be blockade ships cruising as a prelude to a naval assault on the fortress, Du Chambon hoped they were French supply ships unable to gain the harbour because of the severe off-shore ice conditions. Unable to confirm reports of British ships at Canso, Du Chambon remained unalarmed and on April 23, he optimistically sent a supply of weapons and ammunition to assist Paul Marin and his force of French and Indians who had been dispatched from Canada in January to attack Annapolis Royal and to assist Louisbourg if necessary. Marin gratefully accepted the supplies, and having been told that he would not be needed at Louisbourg, he went on to invest Annapolis Royal with about 700 men. On May 7, a small armed vessel, the St. Jean du Luz, managed to work through the offshore ice into Louisbourg harbour bringing the news that Louisbourg was indeed under blockade. Two days later, Du Chambon and Bigot sent the ship La Société during the foggy night to France with. information of the blockade. La Société reached France at the end of May.. On May 16, five days after the siege had started, Du Chambon sent a long overdue letter to Marin, urging him to make haste to Louisbourg with all his forces.  If Marin could arrive in time, the New Englanders would have to divert a substantial portion of their resources to meet the challenge of these seasoned French and Indian fighting men.
In the meantime, the New Englanders had begun landing operations at Gabarus Bay on May 11. Du Chambon, whose thoughts were geared to a naval assault, appeared to be unable to cope with this unexpected situation nor to comprehend fully until the last minute that a land and pea attack was imminent. Although urged to send a strong detachment to repulse the landing, this confused and indecisive man failed to act boldly. A feeble force composed largely of civilians was sent to Gabarus Bay, but failed miserably to make any impression on the New Englanders, save surprising them by the lack of opposition during the difficult and critical landing period. 
Du Chambon was severely criticised by his contemporaries for this irresolute action, and historians have agreed he should have taken stronger measures.  Yet, even accepting Du Chambon's failings, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the critical factor missing was the French navy. The ships Du Chambon and Bigot had so earnestly requested to arrive by April 15 had not materialised. Naval harassment of the British. squadron under Warren and the New England transports would have made the landing much more difficult, and if combined with a strong French land force at Gabarus Bay, the beachhead could only have been secured at great cost to the invaders, if at all. Du Chambon still hoped some French ships would appear, but once the New Englanders had landed in force, with so little loss in life and equipment, only time and hard labour remained before they could exploit the weakly-armed landward defences of the fortress.
Indeed Maurepas was acutely aware of the poor condition of the French navy, and he preached that to meet the maritime and commercial ambitions of other European powers, France should bring her naval strength to a level comparable to that of the French army.  However, he was unable to reverse the long neglect of the navy, and at the outbreak of the war with England, France had only about half as many ships-of-the-line as England. Furthermore, French sailors were in short supply, many of the ships were in poor condition and spent long periods in port, especially since there was a shortage of materials for the maintenance of the navy.  These shortcomings and a conscious knowledge of naval inferiority, even though French naval architecture remained of a higher order than that of the English, encouraged the French to husband their resources at sea and to concentrate not on the destruction of the British fleet, but on piratical raids against British commerce. However, a war on commerce and coasts could be only of limited effectiveness while command of the seas was in the hands of the enemy.  The maintenance of an overseas empire which relied on France for supply and direction was inconsistent with the failure to maintain a navy capable of securing the routes of communication.  Furthermore, the normal practise of the French government in deploying naval forces was to send a squadron of ships from France to an area for a specific purpose such as defending or attacking commerce and colonies. A particular emergency might require the dispatch of a squadron at any time of year. On the other hand, the British navy was organised into squadrons deployed at various "stations", where a more or less permanent force would generally be maintained.  For this reason, and the neglected condition of the French navy, Louisbourg rarely could rely on substantial and timely naval support.
The disquieting news of the mutiny at Louisbourg determined the King to remove the Swiss mercenary regiment, the Karrer,  which was reported to have instigated the disturbance in December. On May 15, Maurepas ordered Périer de Salvert, reputedly "the best Sea Officer in france"  and Captain of the Mars, to sail for Louisbourg to execute this order, to take over the government until the new governor arrived, and to report on the situation at the fortress.  If Louisbourg had fallen, de Salvert was to return to France with the most accurate information he could obtain of the incident. The arrival of La Société and La Renommée with definite news of the blockade at Louisbourg convinced the French, government to send five more warships with de Salvert. However, this powerful force took time to equip, and did not sail from Brest until July 16.  While these elaborate preparations were being made in France to secure Louisbourg, the inhabitants of the fortress were enduring the agony of an unrelieved siege. 
By nightfall on May 11, more than half the New Englanders had landed at Kennington Cove, a small sand and rock beach about three miles from Louisbourg. But for the one feeble attempt by, the French to obstruct the landing on this day, the French offered no further resistance to the operations, although it took nearly two more weeks before all the supplies were landed in the heavy surf which ran almost continually during this period. 
While the jubilant Neur Englanders boisterously celebrated their easy success at Kennington Cove, Du Chambon and his Council were frantically debating whether or not to abandon the Royal Battery, which had been permitted to deteriorate into what was now considered by its commanding officer to be a defenceless state. After hearing a number of reports which confirmed the weakened condition of the fortification, the Council recommended the cannon be disabled, the ammunition and stores be salvaged where possible and otherwise be dumped into the harbour, and the 200 soldiers and civilians manning the Royal Battery be brought into the fortress to assist in the defence. However, the battery was not mined, for Etienne Verrier, the chief engineer, apparently convinced the Council that the siege might well be lifted, in which case the battery would have to be reconstructed as an essential link in the sea defences. The frightened men in the battery received Du Chambon's orders before midnight to withdraw. In their haste to depart, the cannon were poorly spiked and the carriages not properly disabled. 
On the morning of May 13, the New Englanders discovered the battery had been abandoned and occupied it at once. Pepperrell could hardly believe this stroke of good fortune, which seemed all the more remarkable since Bradstreet had had the amazing foresight to persuade Shirley to send not only workmen and tools for drilling out cannon, but also 42-pound shot which could be used in the heaviest guns of the Royal Battery.  Pepperrell wrote to Shirley: "Cannot conceive of any reason why the enemy should 'desert so fine a fortification, but extreme want of men."  The anonymous Habitant of Louisbourg, who harshly criticised the conduct of the siege and the state of preparedness of the fortress, blisteringly condemned the abandonment of the Royal Battery as a "criminal withdrawal" and a "stupid mistake." The Habitant expressed himself at a loss to explain the withdrawal before a single shot had been fired against the battery, "Unless it was from a panic fear which never left us again during the whole siege..."  By May 14, the New Englanders had begun to fire on the fortress with the great guns of the Royal Battery, and according to the Habitant,
kept up a tremendous fire against us. We answered them from the walls, but we could not do them the harm which they did to us in knocking down houses and shattering everything within range. 
Du Chambon had made some serious tactical blunders by not calling Marin to Louisbourg sooner, by not opposing the New England landing more vigourously, and by ordering the abandonment of the Royal Battery even before he had time to assess the scope of the New England attack. The Habitant condemned Du Chambon for such actions, but he also advanced severe criticisms for other matters involving Louisbourg. He wrote that although the construction of the fortifications had begun under an able engineer, his successors were "men who had never been engaged in war and were rather architects than engineers .  The Habitant also indicted the neglected state of the French navy. He begged the French Court to listen to Maurepas' pleas for a more powerful navy,
But as long as his [Maurepas'] hands are tied and he gets only small and ineffective grants of money, and attention is turned away from this motive power of our greatness and strength, every penetrating and impartial mind will take care not to blame him for the blows levied at our maritime commerce, to which the state is more indebted than is imagined. 
With a policy of expanding the French navy and encouraging shipbuilding more in the colonies, it could soon rival the English navy, "and we should no longer see them so arrogant in their prosperity;" wrote the Habitant,
but we let them take advantage of our weakness, and, while we check them upon land, upon the sea they avenge themselves by destroying our commerce. Where is the navy of Louis the Great? 
 Ronald Way, Report on the Defensive Works of the King's Bastion, Fortress of Louisbourg, (Louisbourg: unpublished manuscript, 1962) p. 2.
 A large number of publications followed Vauban's works in England, including for example: The New Method of Fortification, As practised by Monsieur de Vauban, Engineer-General of France, signed "A.S.", (London: S. and E. Ballard, 1748), Isaac Landmann, The Principles of Fortification, (London: T. Egerton, 1831), was used as a text for the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich as late as the mid-nineteenth century.
 Sebastien LePrestre de Vauban, A Manual of Siegecraft and Fortification, G.A. Rothrock, trans. and intro., (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1968), pp. 1-11, passim, introduction.
 Ibid., p. 15, introduction; Eric Robson, "The Armed Forces and the Art of War", The New Cambridge Modern History, VII, J.O. Lindsay, ed., (Cambridge: University Press, 1963) p. 167.
 Robson, "The Armed Forces and the Art of War", Cambridge Modern History, p. 166; de Vauban, A Manual of Siegecraft, Rothrock, trans. and intro., p. 12, introduction.
 P.R.O., Adm. 1, vol. 3817, n.p., Shirley to Warren, January 29, 1745.
 Way, Report on the Defensive Works, pp. 1-3; McLennan, Louisbourg, pp. 50-52; Tim Le Goff, Artillery at Louisbourg, (Louisbourg: unpublished manuscript, 1967), pp. 66-76, pp. 11-13, Appendix "A"; John Humphreys, Royal Battery Report #2, (Louisbourg: unpublished manuscript, 1964), pp. 8-9. The number of cannon actually mounted varied from year to year; however, the figures given should represent the situation reasonably accurately, while remaining open to revision.
 Le Goff, Artillery at Louisbourg, pp. 62-65; McLennan, Louisbourg, pp. 94-110, 126n; A.C., C11B, vol. 26, fols. 219224, memorial "Porté au Roy", unsigned, June 20, 1743; A.C., B, vol. 76-2, fols. 492,492v, Maurepas to Duquesnel and Bigot, June 27, 1743.
 A.C., C11B, vol. 19, fols. 232-242, Verrier to Maurepas, December.30, 1737; vol. 21. fols. 25-25v, de Forant and Bigot to Maurepas, November 14, 1739; vol. 26, fols. 40-41v, Du Chambon and Bigot to Maurepas, November 14. 1744; vol. 29, fols. 306-315, Franquet to Rouillé, October 13, 1750.
 A.C., C11B, vol. 26, fols. 61-64, Du Chambon to Maurepas, November 10, 1744.
 A.C., B, vol. 78-2, fols. 412-412v, Maurepas to Duquesnel and Bigot, April 30, 1744; vol. 78, fols. 388-388v, Maurepas to Duquesnel and Bigot, March 18, 1744; McLennan, Louisbourg, pp. 105-109.
 Guy Frégault lists Le Caribou as carrying 50 guns. However, my evidence suggests that this ship was a frigate, built in Canada, and launched in May, 1744, mounting 26 guns. "L'Expédition.du duc dAnville", Revue d'Histoire de 1'Amérrique française, II, no. 1, (June,'1948) p. 43; A.C., C11A, vol. 77, fols. 401-402, Hocquart to Maurepas, September 28, 1742; vol. 82, fols. 78-79, Levasseur to Maurepas, May 14, 1744; vol. 81-2, fols. 303-305, Hocquart to Maurepas, June 22, 1744; fols. 308-309, unsigned description of ship's equipment, July 6, 1744; fols. 341-346, Hocquart to Maurepas, July 22, 1744.
 L'Ardent and Le Caribou were the two ships Du Vivier had awaited in vain during his attempt against Annapolis Royal in September and October. Le Caribou reached Louisbourg late in July, but L'Ardent, having left La Rochelle late and convoyed a number of merchant vessels toward Canada and the West Indies, did not make Louisbourg until August 16. The captain of L'Ardent promised to be ready to sail for Annapolis Royal in the first week of September after the ship had some gale damage repaired and was provisioned. However, according to the captain, to his surprise Governor Du Quesnel suddenly informed him shortly before the proposed departure, that the English had reinforced Annapolis Royal and that it would be more important to protect Louisbourg's trade lanes. Governor Du Quesnel died on October 9, and his successor, acting-Governor Du Chambon, and commissaire ordonnateur Bigot maintained that the captain, after being told by pilots that the entrance to Annapolis Royal was dangerous and that the season was too far advanced, refused to risk the King's ship. Instead of going to Canso, the two ships went in search of English privateers, of which they captured but one before returning to Louisbourg on October 11. Soon after their arrival, L'Ardent and probably Le Caribou convoyed a large merchant fleet, including eight "fast Indiamen to France, leaving the fortress without any substantial naval support. Du Chambon and Bigot urged Maurepas to send some warships to the area which would arrive no later than April 15. The anonymous Habitant of Louisbourg heaped great abuse on the captains of L'Ardent and Le Caribou for he believed that had they participated in the attack on Annapolis Royal, the expedition would have been successful and English influence ruined in Acadia. The Habitant wrote:
"But an abuse prevails in the Navy of France against which it is difficult to protest too much, though the protests are always in vain. Most of the officers of the King's ships, induced by the love of gain, carry on trade operations, although this is forbidden by the Ordinances of His Majesty. It is impossible to conceive how greatly commerce suffers from this, nor does the service gain anything. Presumably, all this is unknown to the Minister, who has only the glory of his master in view; persons who are near him, however, have quite different motives, for a share in this base traffic gives them a pretext for self-justification and for concealing it from him."
A.C., C11B, vol. 26, fols. 40-43, Du Chambon and Bigot to Maurepas, November 20, 1744; A.C., B, vol. 73, fols. 409-409v, Maurepas to Duquesnel, April 30, 1744; vol. 82-1, fol. 131, instructions to Perier de Salvert, May 15, 1745; Louisbourg in 1745 (Lettre d'un Habitant de Louisbourg), Anonymous, G.M. Wrong, trans. and ed., (Toronto: Warwick Bro's & Rutter, 1897) pp. 12-13; Gérard Giasson, La Forteresse de Louisbourg, 1744-1748, (University of Montreal: unpublished Master's thesis, 1966) pp. 43n, 95-96, 100; McLennan, Louisbourg, pp. 114-117; Rawlyk, Yankees, pp. 10-14, 70-76.
 Lettre d'un Habitant de Louisbourg, Anon., pp. 32-36;McLennan, Louisbourg, pp. 123-124; Rawlyk, Yankees, pp. 71-75.
 Lettre d'un Habitant de Louisbourg, Anon. , p. 35.
 McLennan, Louisbourg, p. 148.
 Bradstreet was born in Nova Scotia, or emigrated there at an early age, probably from England. He purchased an Ensign's commission in 1735 in General Richard Phillip's regiment stationed in Nova Scotia. He visited Louisbourg in 1736 and 1738 and became involved in illicit commercial dealings with the French there. In 1744, he was captured in the French raid on Canso. Personally acquainted with some of the French at Louisbourg, and possessed of a driving ambition which led him to be an arrogant and overbearing individual, he soon alienated many of the New Englanders serving in the expedition of 1745. See Dictionary of American Biography, Allen Johnson, ed., II, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929), pp. 578-579.
 Colls. M.H.S., 1, 1, p. 11, Shirley to Pepperrell, March 19, 1745.
 A.C., F3, vol. 50, fols. 272-274, Du Chambon to Maurepas, September 2, 1745; fols. 305-305v, Du Chambon to Marin, May 16, 1745; A.F.O., D.F.C., Am. Sept., piace 216, fols. 1-2, deposition of Girard La Croix concerning the siege, July 17, 1745; see also, Giasson, La Forteresse, pp. 73-74 and Colls. M.H.S., 6, X, p. 256, John Henry Bastide to Warren, June 4, 1745.
 A.C., F3, vol. 50, fols. 275v-276, Du Chambon to Maurepas, September 2, 1745; A.F.O., D.F.C., Am. Sept., pièce 218, n.p., Bigot's report on the siege, August 15, 1745; Les derniers Du jours de l'Acadie, 1748-1758, Correspondances et Mémoires, Gaston du Boscq De Beaumont, ed., (Paris; Emile Lechevalier, 1899) p. 288, Boularderie to-Surlaville, September 1, 1755; Sixth Journal, Anon., Louisbourg Journals, de Forest, ed., p. 84.
 For instance: Les derniers jours de l'Acadie, De Beaumont, ed., p. 288, Boularderie to Surlavllle, September 1, 1755; Lettre d'un Habitant de Louisbourg, Anon., p. 38, McLennan, Louisbourg, pp. 148-149; Rawlk, Yankees, pp. 82-83; Giasson, La Forteresse, pp. 77-80.
 Maurice Filion, Maurepas, Ministre de Louis XV, (Montreal: Les Editions Leméac, 1967) p. 154.
 A.T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Rower upon History, 1660-1783, (London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle, & Rivington, 1889) p. 259; Walter L. Dorn, Competition for Empire, 1740-1763, (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1950) p. 119.
 Dorn, Empire, pp. 119-120; Graham, North Atlantic, pp. 109, 148; Mahan, Sea Power, p. 329n.
 Graham, North Atlantic, pp. 109-110.
 Daniel A. Baugh, British Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965) pp. 341-352; Pares, West Indies, pp. 265-279. For a, discussion and comparison of the two-systems of naval deployment, see Pares, West Indies, pp. 279-288.
 The removal of the Karrer to France would deprive the garrison of about 150 men. They were to be replaced from the crew of Le Castor, which was to winter at Louisbourg, and if necessary from the crews of other ships under the command of de Salvert.
 This estimate of de Salvert's ability was made by James Douglas, the fourteenth Earl of Morton, in a letter to Henry Pelham in which he warned that de Salvert had left Brest on July 16, bound for Louisbourg with six men-of-war, "on board of wch they have put the very pick and choicest of their Marines...." I am indebted to Mrs. M.A. Welch, Keeper of the Manuscripts Department, Nottingham University, who offered the following suggestion in reply to a letter asking for assistance in identifying Lord Morton. Her reply read in part: "Morton apparently lived in Paris over the years 1745-6, and was put in the Bastille for three months, but none of his biographers know why. The evidence of the Newcastle Mss. suggests strongly that he was an English agent spying on the French Court and the Jacobite party. He returned to Scotland in 1747, and subsequently had a distinguished academic career." Nottingham, the University, Newcastle Yss., NeC 370, n.p., Morton to Pelham, August 11 [n.s.], 1745.
 A.C., B, vol. 82-1, fols. 130, 131, two letters, instructions from the King to de Salvert, May 15, 1745.
 A.C., B, vol. 82-1, fol. 146, Maurepas to de Salvert, June 16, 1745; Nottingham, the University, Newcastle Mss., NeC 370, n.p., Morton to Pelham, August 11 [n.s.] , 1745; Giasson, La Forteresse, pp. 100-101.
 An Accurate Journal, attested to by Pepperrell et al, pp. 11-13.
 First Journal, Anon., Louisbourg Journals, de Forest, ed., p. 9; A.C., F3, vol, 50, folos. 300-360v, Chassin de Thierry to Du Chambon, n.d., but obviously May 11, 1745; vol. 50, fols. 277-278, Du Chambon to Maurepas, September 2,.1745; A.C., C11B, vol. 27, fols, 41v-42, Verrier to Maurepas, August-22, 1745; fol. 300, Du Chambon to de Thierry, May 11, 1745; Colls. M.H.S., 1, 1, pp. 26-27, Pepperrell to Shirley, May 11, 1745.
 Tenth. Journal, Col. John Bradstreet1s, Louisbourg Journals, de Forest, ed., p. 174; Colls., M.H.S., 1, 1, pp. 26-27, Pepperrell to Shirley, May 11, 1745.
 Colls. M.H.S., 1, 1, p. 27, Pepperrell to Shirley, May 11, 1745.
 Lettre d'un Habitant de Louisbourg, Anon., p. 39.
 Ibid. p 39.
 Ibid.9 p. 31,
 Ibid., p. 72.
 Ibid., p. 29.