Louisbourg: A Focus of Conflict 

H E 13

By

Peter Bower

March 1970

Fortress of Louisbourg

Chapter IX: Colonies in the Balance

As a colonial executive versed in the mercantilist concepts of his time, Governor Shirley viewed the empire as an integrated system of commercial and state interests working together for mutual benefit, one extending the strength, influence and power of the other. Colonies figured-prominently in this system, but with a proper subordination to the interests of the parent country. Within this framework, Shirley believed that the security and future development of the New England colonies, Nova Scotia and Cape Breton were so interwoven as to demand the formulation of a detailed British policy acknowledging and exploiting this interdependence. At almost every opportunity, Shirley strove to coordinate the links he saw between the commercial and territorial ambitions of British and colonial interests. During the autumn and winter of 1746-47, when the threat of an attack on Nova Scotia and Cape Breton by the d'Anville expedition and the roving land forces led by Canadians was at a climax, Shirley's letters to the ministry dwelt at such length on this theme that he felt obliged to apologize to Newcastle. He wrote:

I am afraid your Grace will think, from my incessant Representations of the State of Nova Scotia, that I imagine that Province should be the sole Object of your Attention .... I hope, my Lord, I shall be excused if I have gone beyond my, Line ... at a time when the fate of one of his Majesty's Northern . Colonies, the most important of 'em all to the Crown in many respects, as I apprehend, and which will be in the hands of the french the Key to all the other British Colonies upon this Continent, A even to Cape Breton, And in his Majesty's Possession the Barrier of 'em against the Enemy .... [1]

While Newcastle indicated that he appreciated the important relationships between the northern colonies, [2] Shirley's anxiety was matched by the ministry's increasing preoccupation with affairs European and the impact Cape Breton could have in this context rather than how the island and Nova Scotia could best be developed and integrated into the colonial system. 

The war had helped bring many New Englanders to the realisation that they had a considerable stake in what happened in Nova Scotia, that the frontier of that colony was their frontier, and that the problem of the neutral French on British soil was their problem. The result of this awareness and of the confidence bred by the victory at Louisbourg was a revival of interest in various proposals for dealing with the Acadians. [3] The question of the security of Nova Scotia entailed consideration of the Acadian presence within British territory, compelling Shirley and Knowles to devote a considerable amount of attention to this issue.

Knowles, who became almost obsessed by a personal detestation of Louisbourg, lacked Shirley's interest and perspective in the northern colonies. Inexperienced in colonial affairs, Knowles was unappreciative at first of the intricate relationships between the colonies which Shirley stressed. Almost from the moment he set foot on Cape Breton Island as governor, he enveighed against the development of Louisbourg as a major British military or naval installation, arguing that whichever nation maintained the superior navy in adjacent waters would control the fishery and whatever tracts of land were wanted or needed. While suffering the hardships of his first horrible winter at Louisbourg, [4] he could not envisage Cape Breton Island as a settlement. Further, he wrote to Newcastle, "the Severity of the Winters, and the Want and Misery I foresee people In these Parts must be exposed to make me despair of any Enterprize Succeeding in Accada or Nova Scotia ...." [5] Knowles, like Shirley, regarded the neutral French as a menace to British authority, and was convinced that the ease with which Canadian raiders roamed Nova Scotia and the enormous effort behind the d'Anville expedition demonstrated with what facility and eagerness France could reclaim the territory. Viewing the British colonies in what Shirley would have considered improper isolation from each other, Knowles' initial reaction to the Acadians was to see them simply as enemies of the Crown, and to promote the extreme and superficially simple solution of expelling them by force. Shirley, on the other hand, hoped the Acadians could be cultivated as a potential advantage to Britain and her colonies. However, as Knowles gradually acquired more insight into the affairs and circumstances of the northern colonies, through contact with Shirley's more refined analysis of the situation and his own dealings with neutral French, the Louisbourg governor modified his opinions in some respects. While he did not abandon his attitude concerning the futility of developing Louisbourg, or the necessity of maintaining a strong naval force in adjacent waters, he arrived at some appreciation of the potential usefulness of Acadians co Britain and the apparent importance of implementing certain measures to secure Nova Scotia, and thus the neighbouring territories, in the British colonial system.

Apart from his awakening concern with the security of the northern colonies and the Acadian problem, his attention to the state of Louisbourg's fortifications, the immediate defence of the fortress and his observations on the overall strategic utility of Louisbourg to Britain, Knowles had to cope during the winter of 1746-47 with the often desperate condition of his garrison troops, who finally mutinied in the spring. These considerations and difficulties, complicated by the total lack of instructions from England, confirmed Knowles in his indictment of Louisbourg, but paved the way for his agreement with Shirley on proposals submitted to the ministry for developing Nova Scotia as a British settlement with a series of strategically located forts, including one at Chebucto, which "now Serves as a Key for the Enemy into [the British colonies] ... and is in a particular manner the most expos'd dangerous part of Accadie." [6] While he had earlier argued that the navy alone could secure Cape Breton, "without this expensive weak Fortress of Louisbourg", [7] he came to agree with Warren and Shirley that the loss of Nova Scotia "would greatly endanger the safety of the other British colonies upon this continent and even of the island of Cape Breton itself.... "[8] 

Periodically since the conquest of Acadia in 1710, the Board of Trade had recommended that the British government remove the Acadians from Nova Scotia. When war between England and France seemed imminent in 1743, the Board recommended to the King once again that, 

It is absolutely necessary for Your Majty's Service, That these French Inhabitants should be removed; For it is not to be expected, That they will ever become good Subjects to Yor Majesty; And there is all the Reason in the World to apprehend, That upon any Rupture between the two Crowns, They may openly declare in favour of France. [9] 

As usual, this particular recommendation resulted in no action, nor did any policy emerge to deal with the Acadians. As J.B. Brebner observes, it was one thing to recommend the expulsion of the Acadians, but quite another to effect the removal: "the mere cost and labour of removing ten thousand people would have given the Privy Council good reason to pause had their proposal been followed by action." [10] The application of expediency, not policy, continued to be the rule-of-thumb for dealing with the neutral French, as had been the case since the conquest. [11]

Following the capitulation of Louisbourg and some skirmishes with a small expedition sent by Pepperrell and Warren to Ile-St-Jean, the French inhabitants of this fertile little island petitioned for permission to remain unmolested in the possession of their farms and other belongings. Apparently because of difficulties in gathering the French together to ship them to France, and because of the shortage of vessels to transport them, Warren, Pepperrell and Shirley granted this request "until further orders upon condition that in the mean time the sd inhabitants shall behave themselves in all respects as loyall & faithfull subjects of the Crown of Great Britain (except only that they shall not be obliged to take up arms against the French)... " [12] The inhabitants were bound to offer early information on any hostile intentions or movements of the French enemy which came to their attention; they were not to erect any armed places or supply the enemies of Britain with provisions or assistance of any description; they were to send all their arms and warlike equipment, with six hostages, to Louisbourg and to influence the Indians to remain peaceful; they were to supply the fortress with all the livestock and other provisions in their possession beyond that needed for their own subsistence, for which they would be reimbursed at a reasonable rate. Finally, they were reminded that the terms of the capitulation signed at Louisbourg on June 27, 1745, prohibited them from taking up arms against the English for one year, on pain of "penalty of the utmost rigour of war." The agreement was signed at Louisbourg on October 14, 1745, by six representatives of the inhabitants of Ile-St-Jean. [13]

Pepperrell and Warren, who believed there were about 1,000 French on Ile-St-Jean, [14] suggested to Shirley in February, 1746, that 

in the spring we presume the lst thing proper to undertake will be ye getting the French from ye isld of St. Johns , if they don't prevent us by going to Canada, and transporting them and those that remain on this island [Cape Breton] to France, agreable to the capitulation, for we are of opinion none of them are to be trusted. [15]

They dispatched a similar recommendation to Newcastle. [16] Late in May, Warren urged Townsend Lo evacuate the French from Ile-St-Jean as soon as possible, particularly because in June, they "can without a Breach of Faith take up arms against us." [17] Difficult ice conditions at sea had earlier prevented Warren from executing at once the removal. [18] 

On June 18, shortly after Warren and Pepperrell had finally left for Boston, Townsend and Knowles held a Council of War with the senior garrison officers to consider the implications of the imminent Canada Expedition. In order to achieve a state of preparedness for the expedition, the Council decided unanimously, 

that the Evacuating of St Johns cannot be comply'd with at present, as the Transports that were design'd for that Service will now be wanted for the use of the Troops and further Considering the Vast Expence that the Transporting those Inhabitants to France will amount to and the Great Exigencies of the State at present for money. [19]

After hearing solicitations from the French deputies, the Council concluded that the French inhabitants had met the conditions laid down by Shirley, Warren and Pepperrell, and recommended that Knowles "Grant them Liberty to remain in possession of their Lands 'till his Majesty's further pleasure shall be known or till the Intended [Canada] Expedition be over..." [20] Knowles, who estimated the cost of transporting the French from Ile-St-Jean would amount to between £6 ,000 and £8,000, informed Newcastle of the decision, adding "they are poor Miserable inoffensive People, and I have Hostages in my Possession, there is no Danger to be apprehended from them." [21]

The decision to permit the French to remain on their lands was incorporated into the Articles of Indulgence signed by Knowles on June 20. The articles enjoined the French to abide by the terms of the Capitulation and the earlier dispensation permitting them to remain on Ile-St-Jean. The French were now to send ten to twelve hostages to the fortress and one half of their livestock, for which they would be paid a reasonable price. One of the "principal inhabitants" of the island was to reside at Louisbourg acting as a deputy for the inhabitants. Through this individual, all matters relating to Ile-St-Jean would be settled. Six or eight families were to be permitted to move to Cape Breton Island, where they would receive, according to the Articles: 

a sufficient Quantity of Land for their Encouragement, and that a small Vessell shall be appointed to pass and Repass between this Island and St. John's in which they shall be obliged to bring what cattle, Provisions or other refreshments that Island affords to furnish us with and if they do supply this garrison with Wood, Coal or Lime, they shall be paid the full Value thereof. [22]

In October, Knowles wrote to d'Anville complaining that de Montesson's raid [23] in July had violated the agreement with the French of Ile-St-Jean. He promised Newcastle that if he discovered the neutral French were implicated in the raid, he would make the hostage "Sufferr accordingly". Yet, suspicious as he was, the governor was apparently unable to prove that the islanders were involved in the 'raid, for he took no reprisals. [24] Knowles was unaware that shortly before he wrote to d'Anville, the inhabitants of Ile-St-Jean had sent deputies to de Ramezay, the commander of the Canadian militia and Indians operating out of the Beaubassin area, asking for advice for their conduct under the circumstances. De Ramezay naturally hoped they would resist the English, so he distributed powder and shot amongst them. However, he left them to their own devices, and as D.C. Harvey wrote: "no occasion arose for the use of these ammunitions against the English. As the war dragged on Ile-St-Jean again dropped into the background." [25]

After leaving Annapolis Royal in November, de Ramezay moved back to Beaubassin for the winter and to establish a supply depot and rallying place for Indian allies. [26] In December, the lieutenant governor of Nova Scotia, Paul Mascarene, [27] received about 500 men from Massachusetts, about half the number of reinforcements be had requested to counter the roving Canadian forces. [28] These men were quartered among the Acadians at Grand Pré. Not expecting an attack, they remained in an unfortified position, scattered over about two and a half miles of settlement. De Ramezay dispatched about 250 Canadians and 60 Indians, who were joined by about 25 Acadians, overland under the command of Antoine Coulon de Villiers to surprise the provincials. The attack early in the morning of February 11, 1747, was a complete success. The English lost at least 130 men killed, wounded or captured. The commanding officer of the provincials, Colonel Arthur Noble, was killed in action. The French casualties numbered little more than twenty. The French officers obtained provisions from the Acadians, although some of the neutral French in the Minas region protested that they had little enough food left for themselves, the English having already consumed much. In June, de Ramezay and most of his men left for Québec, having received orders from Governor Beauharnois recalling them. [29] Less than a month earlier, Anson and Warren had destroyed a French fleet under La Jonquière which was heading for Canada. [30]

Mascarene frequently looked to Shirley for assistance and guidance during these difficult times for the small garrison at Annapolis Royal. A fairly close working relationship developed between them as Mascarene's appeals for help and his moderate views on the Acadians found a reasonably receptive spirit in Shirley, who recognised that his own interests, ambitions, as well as those of Massachusetts, were intertwined with the security, of Nova Scotia. Naturally enough, Shirley came to rely on Mascarene's opinions and advice concerning Nova Scotia quite considerably. Mascarene agreed that the expulsion of the Acadians would probably be greatly to the advantage of Britain and her colonies, but believed the expense and difficulties involved in executing this task would be enormous. Furthermore, he feared the Acadians might escape first to Canada, augmenting France's strength there. In December, 1745, he wrote to Shirley: 

I have look't upon them as grafted in the body of the British Nation, as an unsound limb indeed and therefore to be nurtur'd and by time and good care to be brought to answer the purposes expected from them; first to become Subjects and after that good Subjects; which I have represented might be effected in some generations by good usage and by removing some impediments, to witt the influence of the French att Cape Bretton and that of the Missionaries which have been suffer'd to remain amongst this People and which hitherto it has been reckon'd dangerous to attempt to drive away, as it has been a Question, how farr the Treaty of Utrecht was binding in that case, which certainly cannot be resolv1d here. [31]

Knowles, however, adhered to the rather brutal expedient of forcibly ejecting the Acadians. from their homeland. He mentioned to Newcastle late in 1746 that he would like to lead some of the forces already assembled in New England for the Canada Expedition, accompanied by some troops from Louisbourg, to "drive all the French out of Accadia which is a most fertile country and abounds with Timber and Masts beyond any other part of out colonys ..." [32] He even suggested to Shirley that Nova Scotia might be repeopled by rebel Highlanders and their families. [33]

In September, 1746, when d'Anville's ships were assembling at Chebucto, rumours spread among the Acadians that a large New England force was coming to deport or to destroy the French in Nova Scotia. According to Mascarene, de Ramezay fostered these stories in hopes of encouraging the Acadians to revolt and to join his forces against the English. However, Shirley sent a copy of a letter he had written to Mascarene on September 27, in which he discounted the rumours and gave assurances that he anticipated the Crown would protect the estates of those Acadians who remained faithful and obedient, but punish as rebels and traitors those who assisted the French cause in America. This letter was printed in French at Boston, and copies of it circulated by Mascarene among the Acadians with good effect. [34] 

Characteristically, Knowles made no secret at Louisbourg of his desire to lead an expedition to expell the Acadians. Shirley feared the effect such stories would have on the Acadians, especially after he had reassured them that he knew of no plans for their deportation. If reports of Knowles' statements reached the neutral French, wrote Shirley to Mascarene,

[they] will inevitably lessen, if not destroy whatever Influence my Letter dispers'd among 'em may have had, and ruin our Credit with 'em, and that an End will be put to all Dependence on our promises or Assurances to 'em, when they shall find two of his Majesty's Governours acting so contradictory to each other; at least it is most likely their fears of being drove off their Settlements and Estates the next year grounded on Mr. Knowles's declar'd Scheme will prevail over any hopes they may have conceiv'd from my late Declaration to 'em. [35]

Shirley was concerned that if the Acadians believed the rumours, the most dangerous consequences could be expected from a desperate people. They would probably join with the Canadians, jeopardizing not only the expedition planned against Canada for 1747, but also continued British possession of Nova Scotia. The Massachusetts governor concluded that only a "certain Assurance coming directly from his Majesty that they shall be treated upon the foot of Subjects, and not all droved off as Enemies, can quiet it so effectively as is to be wish'd at this time .... He asked Mascarene to tell the Acadians that Shirley would lay their case before the Duke of Newcastle in a most favourable light, recommending Crown protection for the property of those who remained loyal. [36] In May, 1747, Shirley observed 'to Newcastle that, 

[the] fluctuating state of the Inhabitants of Accadie seems, my Lord, naturally to Arise from their finding a want of due protection from His Majesty's Government; and their Apprehensions that the French will soon be Masters of the Province, which their repeated Attempts every year for the Reduction of His Majesty's Fort at Annapolis Royal, and the Appearance of the late Duke d'Anville's Squadron from France upon their Coast with that View strongly Impressed upon 'em, as does the Residence of the Enemy in the province, and the Sollicitations of their own Priests .... [37] 

Basically, Shirley's scheme for dealing with the Acadians remained the same in 1747, even soon after the Grand Pré disaster, as it had been in 1746.. However desirable it might be to-extinguish the French presence in Nova Scotia, Shirley doubted the practicability of dispersing what was variously estimated at between 20,000 and 30,000 Acadians from the province to other British possessions. Furthermore, such an expulsion would be manifestly unfair to those Acadians who remained loyal despite the pressures to join with France. [38]

In April, thankful for the change of location which he hoped would help him regain his health, Knowles sailed to Boston to confer with Shirley on various matters, including the state of Nova Scotia and the Acadian problem. Earlier, Shirley had told Mascarene that until this meeting took place,

I will be bound to 'em [Acadians] that he [Knowles] shall not offer the least Hostility to 'em till his Majesty's Commands shall be receiv'd here concerning 'em, which I will venture to take upon me to promise 'em will be full of tenderness towards all such, as shall not forfeit their title to his Clemency by joining with his Enemies. [39]

Although it is not clear exactly what transpired in the subsequent discussions between Knowles and Shirley, it is evident from their joint letter to Newcastle that Knowles' perspective un the northern colonies underwent some substantial modifications. He accepted Shirley's thesis that the loss of Nova Scotia would entail wider and more serious consequences than he had first recognised.

Knowles? experience at Louisbourg with the Acadians who fell under his responsibility indicated that they were neither an aggressive nor uncontrollable people. [40] In fact, he even acknowledged to Newcastle that some Acadians had proven to have been of considerable value to Louisbourg by providing supplies, "Particularly in getting-Fuel, without whose assistance it would be Impossible for us to get three Months firing in the Year ..." [41] The garrison simply could not survive without adequate fuel for the winter. He was willing to concede in his discussions with Shirley that the neutral French were potentially useful subjects of the Crown, especially if they could be assimilated. He also accepted Shirley's broad view of the importance of Nova Scotia. [42] He and Shirley wrote to Newcastle:

we have fully Communicated to each other our Sentiments concerning the Importance of the Province of Nova Scotia to the Security & Welfare of all His Majesty's other Colonies upon this Continent, as well as to Cape Breton, & Newfoundland, and to the British Fishery and Navigation of these Seas, and how sensibly the loss of it to the French must affect the general Interest of His Majesty's Dominions not only in North but South America, and be in a particular manner attended with the immediate Loss of the Mast Country, from whence the Royal Navy is at present supply'd with all the Masts Yards & Bowsprits &ca. which are drawn from, the Northern Colonies .... [43]

Significantly, and here it can be presumed Knowles prevailed with his opinion of Louisbourg, no mention was made of developing the fortress. 

The proposals Shirley and Knowles forwarded to Newcastle in their joint letter advised the construction of fortified positions for 300 men at Chebucto, 150 men at Grand Pré, a strong fort at Baye Verte for 500 to 600 men to command the Isthmus of Chignecto, and a blockhouse on Canso Island for 150 men. They suggested abandonment of the earlier scheme, on which Bastide had been about to begin work when he was called to Louisbourg in 1745, of enlarging the fort at Annapolis Royal and the construction of a new fort at Canso. In addition to the land defences recommended for the province, they argued that the harbour at Chebucto could be fortified at moderate expense, 

as an essential Article for Strengthening Nova Scotia, as this Port is extremely commodious for large Ships of War, as well as the Trade & Fishery ... and lyes in the. fair way of all Vessels that fall in with that Coast from Europe, which is generally done by those bound for Louisbourg, & frequently by those which are going to New England; with all of which Advantages it must soon draw a considerable resort of ships to it ... and as it seems design'd by Nature to be the main Harbour of Accadie or Nova Scotia, being in the Center of it, would more strengthen protect it, & go farther toward making the Province (what it ought to be) the Barrier of the British Colonies upon this Continent, than any one Security that can be thought of otherways .... [44]

Through such means, communications between Canadians and Acadians could be terminated and the neutral French would be awed. Rather than removing all the Acadians to other British colonies, the two governors advised that British subjects and foreign Protestants be encouraged to settle in Nova Scotia, while the "most obnoxious among the French inhabitants" were gradually dispersed to various British colonies. Roman Catholic priests should be driven away and be replaced by Protestant French ministers. Special inducements should be offered for conformity to the Protestant religion or at least to those inhabitants who sent their children to an English school. Thus "the present Generation of the French might be made at least Contented, peaceable Subjects; and the next Generation good protestant ones, especially if Intermarriage of the English among 'em were Encourag'd ... [45]

Shirley and Knowles outlined some of the dangers they envisaged if an attempt were made to evacuate the Acadians. They suspected the neutral French would either rise in armed revolt or retire in a body to Canada where they would increase the French population. The departure of most of the French would deprive new settlers of assistance, leaving the country almost devoid of population for some time before they could be replaced completely. Indians and Canadians would roam this empty land, committing barbarous acts against the isolated new settlers and the forts, the garrisons of which would be cut off from supplies, thereby having to remain uselessly with the protective walls. If the Acadians remained, they would contribute to "reclaiming the Indians to the British Interest...." Shirley and Knowles requested finally that if the Canada Expedition failed to get underway again this year, some of the men raised for the expedition be used to eject the Canadians from Nova Scotia, to remove the most troublesome Acadians, and to take hostages to ensure the good behaviour of the rest. [46]

In June, Newcastle instructed Shirley to issue a proclamation to the Acadians assuring them that the King intended to protect the loyal inhabitants and their property. and to permit the free exercise of their religion. The Duke told Shirley the King would have issued such a proclamation himself, but since it appeared likely that some of the Acadians were involved in the Grand Pré incident, it had been decided to leave the proclamation to Shirley. [47]

Shirley promulgated the proclamation on October 30, 1747, but omitted the promise for the free exercise of religion because he did not consider it guaranteed by the Treaty of Utrecht, and because Mascarene had assured him that religion was the chief medium the French utilized to influence the Acadians. Furthermore, wrote Shirley, the omission would probably not disturb the Acadians, who seemed to harbour no apprehensions that they might lose the freedom of worship. [48]

In July, 1747, Shirley recommended to Newcastle that when it was considered too late in the season for an attempt to be made on Louisbourg from France, Knowles send 1,000 men from his garrison to meet 2,000 from New England at Annapolis Royal. This force could then march overland to Chignecto to expell any Canadians there. Furthermore, since the Acadians of this region appeared to have been disloyal frequently to Britain, they should be transported to New England and their lands distributed amongst the New Englanders engaged in the expedition, "on Condition of their setling therewith their Families in such a defensible manner as they should be directed to do...." Thus a barrier region would be created through which Canadians would have to pass in any overland attempts to reach Nova Scotia to activate the Acadians. The neutral French would be impressed and awed by the deportation of the Chignecto settlers, and would themselves be located between the English-settled Chignecto region and the various garrisons in the province. [49]

Newcastle asked Bedford to comment on Shirley's proposals. Bedford commended the scheme in general terms, but raised two critical objections: the season was already too advanced to execute the operation; the cost of financing the expedition and transporting the Acadians would deter Chancellor Pelham from supporting the scheme. [50] Newcastle instructed Shirley not to proceed with his plan, adding that the deportation of some of the Acadians might alarm the rest and dishonourably contradict the proclamation issued by the governor in the King's name. [51]

No decisive policy for dealing with the Acadians emerged during the war beyond promises that their persons and possessions were secure so long as they remained loyal. This approach was calculated to soothe the Acadians in the hope of preventing them from becoming troublesome, rather than to provide a long-term solution. Nevertheless, Shirley and Mascarene had at least convinced Knowles and represented to an increasingly parsimonious ministry that a wholesale deportation was inadvisable. Furthermore, the ministry had received a large body of up-to-date information on the new and old northern colonies, part of which was studied by the British government and its offices prior to the decision late in 1748 to settle and develop Nova Scotia, providing for the security of the British trade and colonies so earnestly solicited by Shirley. A number of Shirley's dispatches and proposals were included with or incorporated into the instructions of Edward Cornwallis, who was appointed Governor of Nova Scotia in 1749. [52] Shirley's attitude to the Acadians, which owed much to Mascarene's expressed opinion, was relatively moderate and generally humane for its time, advocating gradual assimilation rather than expulsion.

In the meantime, Governor Knowles was experiencing great difficulties administering the garrison at Louisbourg, partially because he received no instructions for some time from the ministry, which was distracted by events considered greater moment in Europe. On August 17, barely two months after assuming command at Louisbourg, Knowles received a petition from his senior garrison officers complaining of the acute shortage of money to pay the troops. They protested that their personal credit was exhausted and asked the governor to obtain specie to subsist the troops either by drawing bills of exchange on the Paymaster General, "or otherways to prevent any Consequences that may arise from the Troops in Your Garrison wanting their proper Pay.... [53] The following day, in an attempt to acquire money to pay the garrison and to repair and maintain the fortress, Knowles solicited Clinton's assistance in persuading New York merchants to discount his bills of exchange. [54] He made a similar plea to Shirley regarding the Massachusetts merchants, drawing £11,000 on the Paymaster General and £1,200 on the Ordnance Office. He subsequently obtained only £1,950 in the Bay colony so he pressed Shirley to pass the remaining bills on to Clinton. He apologized to Clinton for troubling him, "but really we are driven to the utmost difficulty and Shifts for money, none being come from England for the Payment of the Troops, nor Instructions of any kind. " [55] Knowles had no more success in New York than he had in Massachusetts. [56]

The regular garrison of Louisbourg, which may be said to have begun with the arrival of the Gibraltar regiments and the departure of the colonial volunteer militia, appears to have subsisted for some months on the fairly large quantity of clothing, provisions, and other garrison stores left at Louisbourg by the New Englanders in the summer of 1746. [57] The British merchant firm of Samuel and William Baker signed a victualling contract for the garrison on February 11, 1746, and their accounts suggest they provisioned the troops from September 26, 1746, to July 27, 1749. 58 Peter Bennett, the Bakers' agent at Louisbourg, informed Knowles of this contract, but the governor had received no official notification from the ministry. According to Knowles, Bennett stated that "he was to pay the troops but as yet wants both money and Instructions about it... [59] By mid-October, Knowles realised he was not going to be able to raise much money in New England, so he addressed Bennett:

You are hereby Required and Directed for the Good of his Majesty's Service and to prevent any ill Consequences that may happen by the Soldiers wanting their Pay to deliver to me Six Thousand Pounds for their Subsistence for which I shall give You Bills of Exchange on the Pay Master General, ... or repay You in Specie as soon as any Arrives .... [60]

Bennett resisted Knowles' attempt to obtain this money, probably because he had himself received no instructions from his employer. Knowles observed to Clinton that "I was obliged to make use of all my Authority to get him to lend it...." [61] Bennett provided the money, and by late December, with the continuing shortage of currency and since "all communication between this and the Colonys being now at an end for this winter by the severity of the Season", Knowles compelled the agent to supply money again, this time to the amount of £4,000 for the garrison. [62] These funds, with the little he had obtained in the other colonies, enabled Knowles to carry his garrison through the winter, but the troubles still persisted by mid-May, when the governor wrote to Clinton: 

it was by mere Accident we pick'd up Money to pay the Troops this Winter, and if we have not some speedily from England I realy dont know what will be the consequences; it is amazing that I cannot get an answer to any of my Letters, not having yet had a Script of a Pen since I left England; that my Patience is quite worn out; and I observe your Excellency in much the Same Situation .... [63] 

Life at Louisbourg for the garrison was basically a raw struggle for survival. On September 29, 1746, Knowles wrote that the men were dying at the alarming rate of eight to ten a day from dysentery, "chiefly occasioned as the Surgeons Imagine by the Unwholesomeness of the water ...." [64] The garrison returns for the fortress show that between June 20, and September 20, nearly 200 non-commissioned men died, while about 300 were generally classified as sick. Between September 30 and January 31, nearly 300 private men died. The two American regiments usually surpassed the British regiments in numbers dead, sick or deserted. Desertion figures were never particularly high at the fortress, no doubt because of the difficulties of escaping from this isolated stronghold, especially during the winter. During the shipping season, escape was easier, complained Knowles, because of "the opportunities and Encouragement from Masters of Vessels that come here [which] are no small Temptations." Desertion from the fortress was a serious matter despite the low number of escapes, for replacements were not available locally, and it took time to obtain men from Britain or New England. By the end of January, 1747, about 40 men, almost entirely from the American regiments, had fled. The highest number of desertions since the arrival of the regular troops was recorded during this period. [65] As early as September, 1746, Knowles was warning Newcastle that deaths were depleting the garrison strength so rapidly "that Recruits or Drafts to fill up the several Regiments will be greatly wanted soon.... [66] In January, 1747, Knowles conveyed the grisly information to the Duke that "we cannot Bury our Dead but are forced to let them lay in the snow till the Thaws come I persuade my Self you'l think our Scene as Shocking as it is Malencholly." [67]

Knowles' descriptions of the conditions at Louisbourg during the winter suggest the rigours faced once again by the garrison. The men were terribly short of bedding, most of it having been lost at sea with the ordnance ship in 1745, or arrived "Rotten and Spoiled having lain so long on Board the Ships" which were sent from England in 1746. [68] In November, the governor wrote:

I have found my self under the necessity of allowing the Men Spruce Beer for the preservation of their Health; the Doctors giving it as their Opinion the badness of the Water was the Principal Occasion of the loss of so many [by] Fluxes, & it will be also absolutely necessary during the Severe Cold Season in the Winter, to allow them some Rum or Spiritous Liquor which Admiral Warren & Sr Wm. Pepperrell strongly recommended to me to do, having found their Men could not subsist without, last Year. [69] 

Knowles informed Newcastle that the shortage of money to pay the troops was now critical: "I have taken up what Money there was in the Garrison from all Ranks of People & communication is just at an end for this-winter, I despair of any more's coming & shall Husband it with the utmost Frugality. [70] At the same time, he mentioned another problem:

Victualling the Women I have got the better off, having sent most of them to the Colonies they being rather a Publick Nusance than help to the Men by which the Crown is eased of the expence of Victualling and Fireing. [71]

The reaction of the comfortless garrison to this firm measure is not known. By November, the shortage of fodder and hay compelled Knowles to order the destruction of the cattle which had been obtained, probably from Ile-St-Jean for the St. Clair expedition. The fresh meat was issued to the sick in the fortress. [72] 

fit storehouses have not been appointed for my Provisions at Louisbourg as by my Contract I am entitled to. The Governor immediately on his arrival seeing the want of proper Store [houses] directed the framing such at Boston, but on their arrival at Louisbourg they were appointed to the service of the Ordnance, so that, as Mr. Bennett writes me, all the dry Provisions are exposed to the snow. [75]

Thomas Corbett, secretary to the Admiralty, informed Knowles by a lette'r dated June 16, 1747, that the Lords of the Admiralty were extremely perturbed by the conditions described by the governor at Louisbourg, and instructed him that future complaints about any contracts be accompanied by proper representations "with Facts dully attested to...." [76]

On October 1, 1746, Lieutenant John Suttie, quartermaster in Pepperrell's regiment, wrote to his patron Sir Hew Dalrymple, a baronet of Nova Scotia, describing the situation at the fortress: 

As to this place its worse than any place in the known world Nothing but ffogs Rains fivers Death & every thing thats bad and Disagreeable As to the fortifications they are bad mere [more] so as are ye are entirley commanded by Numberless hills within point blank Shot of ye Walls Mr Knowles indeed has done every thing in his power to make the place Strong & we happy & Easy but thats impossible Except he change the Climate make the American Merch[an]ts honest who impose upon us for every Necessary of Life .... [77] 

Knowles' description of the garrison life is even more graphic: 

As to this Place words are wanting to represent it, this severity of the Weather being now such and the Miseries and Sufferings of the Troops so great as to be beyond Expression or Comprehension many have been froze to Death; and the Sentrys though relieved every half hour frequently loose their Toes, and Fingers, some have lost their Limbs by Mortification in a few Hours, the Houses and Quarters in general are so bad they can not be made to keep out the Snow and cold, so that both Officers and Men have but little comfort even within Doors when off Duty; and without, there is no such thing as using any kind of Exercise to keep themselves Warm; the Snow in many Places laying ten, twelve, and Sixteen feet Deep: and when it ceases Snowing the whole Island is covered with an Intire Sheet of Ice. nothing is more Common than for one Guard to Dig the other out of the Guard Room before they can relieve them, and so by the rest of the Officers and Soldiers out of their Quarter s; the Drift Snow sometimes covering the Houses intirely, add to this the want of every necessary refreshment of life and I persuade my Self Your Grace will thing our Case very deplorable. [78] 

As for himself, Knowles explained that the dreadful winter had so impaired his health "that I have not been able to Stirr out of my House above twice since the beginning of  November last and Seldom out of my Bed Chamber...." [79] He begged to be permitted to winter in the West Indies or to return to England for the sake of his health. He wrote privately to the Duke observing that: "Nature never seems to have designed this Place of Residence for Man for with the Poet we may justly say 

'Here elements have lost their Uses'
'Air ripens not nor Earth produces.' [80]

Knowles confirmed his harsh judgements made earlier concerning the fortifications and its strategic location. The fortifications were irremediably bad because, 

The Months of June, July and August (called here the Summer) did not afford us five fair days together without some alteration or other bad [conditions] for working in and to those five fair we generally had twelve or fourteen days foul (Drizling Rain or Foggs) this not only retarded the Works going on but prevented them from Cementing and drying. [81]

Even the works which had been completed and repaired began to disintegrate with the first frosts, reducing them to almost as bad a condition as the neglected parts of the fortifications. The governor anticipated that when the spring thaws occurred, 

[the fortifications] will Tumble down in the same manner as the Old Works Yearly do: so that I cannot foresee any End to the Expence of them; and I no longer Wonder at the French Court complaining of their Expensiveness .... though I am convinced our Masons work is better Executed than the French yet I plainly see twill undergoe the same Fate the severity of the Frost even splitting and Scaling the Stones as well as forcing them out of their Places by swelling and Destroying the Adhesive quality of the Mortar: and as all the Stones are rough or Rubble they will Slip away when the Rains sett in, and every Stone Building in the Mace is in much the same Condition. [82]

The governor at Louisbourg had little respect for colonials and found their professions of the value of Louisbourg, which he called a "bewitching Idol", [83] to derive strictly from self-interest. Referring to New England merchants, and possibly also those of Britain, Knowles wrote to Newcastle: 

I am Sensible those Persons who are Interested in supplying us with anything, clamour loudly for its [Louisbourg's] importance; thó I do defy them to contradict my Hypothesis: There is not a Single Person yett to come to Settle and fish here, nor will they, however forward they seemed upon the Place's being first taken ....[84]

Knowles found the reasons for a lack of settlement quite obvious. [85] He maintained that too many fish were already being caught off New England, and Newfoundland; furthermore, the fishing banks were but five or six leagues from the shores of Newfoundland, whereas Louisbourg stood twenty to thirty leagues from the fishing grounds. He stated that the New Englanders, having only a poor and weak paper-money system, would "ever cry out for its Importance, knowing that whatever Money comes here for Subsisting the Troops must circulate amongst them and they would gladly subsist us wholly with with Rum for it would I but suffer them." [86] In a private letter to Newcastle, Knowles contemptuously claimed to have unearthed, he wrote,

Knowles rather pompously mentioned that he expected Warren, having left the presence and influence "of those enterprizing Genius's at New England", would now realise the very real difficulties facing an attempt to conquer Canada. He wrote: 

he [Warren] has most honourably acquired Reputation, and Riches and I wish him happily to enjoy them in old England, and next to the Good he did his Country by taking this Place I hope I shall add some by destroying it. [88] 

In many respects, Knowles personified the arrogant and narrow-minded disposition of some Englishmen toward colonials and their aspirations, which many of the maturing provincials found increasingly irritating. Convinced that colonies, their people and trade, were subservient to the good of the metropolis, Knowles concluded that any deviation from this attitude followed from an ignorant and avaricious misconception of the true relationship between Britain and her colonies. His intense personal detestation of Louisbourg, his feeling that his stay there was ruining his health, and his yearning for recognition and advancement, undoubtedly contributed to his opinion that Louisbourg would be but a continuing financial liability to Britain, offering little or no strategic advantage in return. He was as convinced of the value and importance of sea power as he was sure of the inadequacy of the fortress for Britain's ambitions, and equally that the maintenance of the stronghold would really benefit only the colonies, especially colonial suppliers and merchants. His forceful criticisms of the fortress cast a shadow over the schemes which had been formulated for the development of Louisbourg and Cape Breton Island. His arguments against the fortress were probably reinforced in the eyes of the ministry by developments in Europe during the winter of 1747-48, [89], at which time it appears that some principal English merchants signed a memorial laid before Newcastle to the effect that the island was more a burden than necessity. [90]

The greatest single internal difficulty Knowles had to face at Louisbourg derived from the abysmal conditions under which the garrison had to survive. The final blow for the troops came in the spring of 1747, when Knowles received at last some instructions from England. The Paymaster General and the Treasury ordered Knowles to stop three pence a day for the victualling of each man from their subsistence pay. Since 1660, subsistence pay for a private soldier had been six pence a day. [91] The consequence of the stoppage was the third major garrison disturbance at Louisbourg in four years. [92]

Pepperrell, Warren and Shirley had advised against stoppages at Louisbourg. Shirley and Pepperrell were particularly concerned that such a deduction would make it more difficult for them to recruit men for their regiments at Louisbourg, but also because it would disturb the men already enlisted. Warren shared their concern, and suggested that the Louisbourg garrison be supplied in the same manner as was the garrison at Gibraltar, where no deductions were required. He intimated that further deductions from the soldiers' pay would impose substantial hardship for the men at the fortress, where costs were so high. [93] 

Although Bennett informed Knowles in the fall of 1746 that stoppages were to be made on account of the victualling contract, the governor did not initiate them, but reported to Newcastle in September that "I dare not Order any Stoppage to be made out of their Pay till you are pleased to Signifye His Majesty's Pleasure for my so doing." [94] In January, 1747, he informed the Duke that he was especially concerned about the effect stoppages would have on the troops when the order arrived: 

Your Grace is sensible two of the Regiments here have had their Pay and Provisions at Gibraltar without any stoppages which the other Regiments all know, and such an Alteration I am very Apprehensive will create great uneasiness should it be Attended with no Worse consequences, as the Spirit of Desertion is strong amongst the Men and the opportunity and Encouragement from Masters of Vessels that come here are no small Temptations. [95]

On March 9, 1747, Bennett finally received his deputation as Paymaster and instructions from the Baker firm. Nearly four weeks later, on June 6, Knowles got instructions from England to make the stoppage. Although the Articles of War prohibited stoppages being made on any other authority than under the King's Sign Manual, he ordered implementation of the deduction despite the absence of the King's signature. He told Newcastle that he only ventured to impose the stoppages because he was confident the Treasury would support an action it had ordered. [96] On July 3, Knowles mustered the garrison and told them of his instructions, and that the stoppages would commence in two day's time. [97] The men reacted almost at once. Knowles explained to Newcastle, that within a few hours,

the whole garrison was in a General Mutiny and the Troops ran and return'd their Provisions into Store in a Tumultuous manner and Swore they were no longer Soldiers it was Impossible to discover any leader for in an Instant there were more than a thousand Assembled together; As I thought no time was to be lost to prevent the Treatening danger I immediately Order'd them under Arms and met them upon the Parade and informed them it was his Majesty's Order and that nothing but the Exigency's of the State for money to carry on the War would Occasion this Stoppage being made they Remonstrated Regiment by Regiment that they were ready to Obey His Majesty's Commands with their Lives but they must Perish in this Climate if those Stoppages were made that it was Scarce possible for them honestly now, to Supply themselves with necessarys and the Common Refreshments of life in this Scarce and dear place but it would be absolutely so with those deductions and that therefore if they had not their full pay they could be no longer Soldiers all reasoning proving ineffectuall and perceiving many to be heated with Drink I found my Self Obliged to Order their Pay and Provisions to be continued to them till His Majesty's further Pleasure should be known when they Huzzald and said they would serve faithfully. I told your Grace in several of my former Letters that I dreaded the consequences of such an Order being Issued and may now rejoyce that nothing worse has happen'd for I will Ventury to Affirm thathad four hours been neglected to have given them Satisfaction no reasoning would have been able to have Stopp'd their Rage a . nd Force we had not to Quell them. [98]

A British officer in Pepperrell's regiment, Lieutenant John Suttie explained to a friend in England that he thought the two Gibraltar regiments, who had their provisions supplied without stoppages at Gibraltar, instigated the mutiny. He hoped the ministry would take into account the very high costs at the fortress and that they would not force Knowles to make the deduction as it would probably have "very Dangerous Consequences". [99] Henry Fox, the Secretary at War, replied to Knowles' letter concerning the stoppages and mutiny on September 23.

He stated that the Treasury had resolved to alter the victualling contract with the Baker firm in accordance with the remonstrances of Knowles and his field officers to remove the necessity of making the deduction. [100] The matter seems to have rested here, for no reprisals appear to have been taken against the mutineers. Even as Fox was writing his letter, Knowles was preparing to leave the fortress. Sometime in late August or early September, the governor had received, with enormous delight, instructions to proceed to Boston to discuss problems of North American defence with Shirley, and then to sail southward to command the squadron at Jamaica. He reported to Newcastle that he was leaving "the Government in perfect Harmony & Friendship with every Officer in it; 

except an Impliment of my Good Friend the Aldermans [William Baker] One Captn. Bradstreet; but as his dislike proceeded from my not permiting him to Plunder the Government (he having in Mr. Warren's time Supplyd the Garrison with Fuel & made him pay upwards of 6000 pounds & I have done it for little, more than four thousand.) I am not the least uneasie at his Clamour, otherways then his representations to the Alderman may occassion Your Grace the trouble of being teazed by him w[hi]ch is the reason of ray mentioning this. [101]

Knowles also told the Duke that the troops were now quite healthy and had received their clothing. Their quarters were repaired, and he believed they should withstand the severities of winter more satisfactorily in future. [102] On September 28, Knowles sailed happily from the fortress. [103] Peregrine Thomas Hopson, the lieutenant governor and senior garrison officer, assumed Knowles' duties immediately and at a time when most members of the British ministry had reconciled themselves to the apparent necessity of restoring Cape Breton to France to facilitate a peace settlement. After the Canada Expedition was officially terminated, Bedford became increasingly resigned to seeing Louisbourg used in the manner. many of his less sanguine colleagues had been promoting for years: that is, as a pawn in peace negotiations. Although he argued that the fortifications should be destroyed before restitution, [104] he did not insist on his position possibly because the destruction might weaken the strength of Louisbourg as a bargaining point, and perhaps entail a large compensatory payment to France for the reconstruction of the works if the place were returned to France. [105] Without Bedford's influential support, Newcastle was left virtually alone in the ministry opposing an immediate peace. [106] Even the usually warlike Pitt was beginning to regard peace as essential for Britain to recuperate from the financial strain of the war and to prepare for the next struggle with France. [107]

In February, 1748, Chesterfield, who had long advocated an immediate end to the continental war, resigned from his office as Secretary of State for the Northern Department. His departure was prompted by Newcastle's incessant correspondence with Sandwich, which had undermined Chesterfield's authority and supervision of peace negotiations. However, Chesterfield agreed to continue supporting the ministry publically. Newcastle replaced Chesterfield while Bedford assumed the office of Secretary of State for the Southern Department. Newcastle was fully aware of the eclipsing of ministerial support for a policy of continuing the war, and that Bedford was favouring an immediate peace. He promptly drew up instructions for Sandwich directing him to consider terms for a definitive peace based on a mutual restitution of conquests. [108]

Newcastle's stand against a precipitate peace with France was based on his belief that France had more to gain by rupturing the English system of alliances than by obtaining advantageous terms of peace. The Duke wanted a peace which would not alienate Britain's allies, and which would keep the Austrian Netherlands in friendly hands. This would take time to negotiate, and could probably not be achieved in any bilateral agreements, which had been proposed earlier by d'Argenson, between England and France. This position probably delayed the signing of peace preliminaries between England and France in the autumn of 1747, to which agreement the Dutch and Austrian governments would probably have acceded, however unwillingly. Newcastle was prepared to risk a worse peace by protracting the war rather than to jeopardise the alliances. Parliament was even induced, despite its increasing recalcitrance, to provide the huge sum of £11,000,000 for the war effort in 1748, by which means the Puke hoped in one last campaign year to reverse the desperate situation in Flanders, to improve prospects in Italy, and to use the navy to sweep the seas. In February and March, Newcastle received the devastating news that Holland was on the verge of financial collapse, and that the Prince of Orange had become as pacific now as he had been bellicose in 1747. The House of Commons was horrified by these developments, and the clamour for peace intensified. Under these conditions, Newcastle recognized the impossibility of an eleventh hour campaign to save all or risk much. [109]

Newcastle was bitterly upset by the turn of events in Holland, and was furious that the Dutch had not confessed their plight earlier. Angrily he denounced the Dutch to the Duke of Cumberland, George's favorite son and commander of the British land forces, for having deluded him into believing there was substantial reason for rejecting French peace proposals, thereby prolonging the war and perhaps even undermining the Newcastle's prestige and influence in the ministry. Yet he remained unwilling to jeopardise future association with Holland. No possibility seemed to remain open for Newcastle to continue with the war programme he favoured, especially since he could no longer be sure of commanding the support of any significant elements in the ministry. [110] In fact, he could expect dangerous opposition in view of the crisis in the Netherlands, where almost certain military disaster threatened. Peace negotiations at Breda had collapsed in mid-1747, not because France had made extravagant demands, but rather because Newcastle still hoped for some major allied military successes and because he opposed the restitution of Cape Breton Island. ill By early 1748, conditions looked much worse for Great Britain and her allies. The Duke now thought that he could use Cape Breton Island most effectively in salvaging the best possible terms from France. The question of the demolition of the fortress before restitution dwindled to insignificance before the priorities of state such as the continued existence of the Netherlands in friendly hands and the maintenance of the old system of alliances. However, fortunately, for England and her allies, France was nearing financial exhaustion, brought on in considerable measure by massive war expenditures, her naval defeats, shipping losses, the dislocation of trade and industry, and serious domestic food shortages caused by an unprecedently bad harvest which left workmen starving in many parts of the country. Other factors contributed to France's desire for peace, including court intrigue, diplomatic entanglements, and some military reverses in Italy. [112] In March, 1748, peace negotiations resumed at Aix-la-Chapelle.

Meanwhile, Hopson took over the command at Louisbourg. Although Knowles probably exaggerated the good conditions of the garrison at the time of his departure, [113] the garrison returns during Hopson's administration indicate that the troops were indeed considerably more healthy than in previous years. The number of private men sick during the winter of 1747-48 was generally less than half the figures listed in the preceding winter. The number of  deaths in the garrison was not listed in the returns during the winter of 1747-48. [114] Knowles had reported that he laid in sufficient fuel in the fall to last the winter; however, in April, Hopson mentioned to Newcastle that the quantity of fuel had fallen far short of the requirements. He wrote: 

Notwithstanding the Fuel fell short of what was reported and expected, I found myself obliged for the greatest part of the Severity of the Winter, to Issue a larger quantity for ye preservation of the Health of the Garrison than I would otherwise have done, and afterwards to make an allowance to every officer, in money, to enable them to lay in 'fuel for themselves, which was continued for six weeks, and likewise an allowance for the Non Commission officers and Soldiers, to lay it in for themselves which was done accordingly. [115]

Fox informed Hopson in a letter dated October 10, 1747, that since the three pence a day stoppage for salt provisions was no longer to be exacted, he was to attempt to require the men to pay for rum and molasses supplied to them. However, the governor was left to use his discretion in deciding whether or not to apply this formula for saving money. [116] Hopson did not receive this letter until the fall of 1748, even after which time he continued giving the soldiers their full pay and "an Allowance for Rum and Molasses conformable to Mr. Knowles' promise to them." [117] On November 8, 1748, Hopson called a Council of War to obtain the opinion of the senior garrison officers concerning the rum and molasses issue. The Council recommended the allowance be continued: 

It has greatly contributed to the health of this Garrison, [and] we think it may be prejudicial, should the whole, or any part of it, be withdrawn from [the garrison] or any stoppage made on that Account. [118]

Apparently no ships of the line remained at Louisbourg during the winter of 1747-48, after Kuowles, who had been promoted to rear admiral of the white, left for Jamaica.

The bombship Comet, 8-12 guns, under Captain William Leaver, was probably the only naval vessel which wintered in the harbour, during which time it was frozen into the shallow north-east section of the bay. [119] 

Hopson, who was the only non-naval governor at Louisbourg during-the British occupation, received notice of his commission, dated October 11, sometime in April, 1748. [120] The other governors, Warren and Knowles, had been able to count at least on having their own man-of-war at the fortress, as well as disposition of the rest of the ships in the North Atlantic area. Hopson early felt concern for the lack of naval support at Louisbourg, and in December, 1747, he wrote to Newcastle: 

it will be absolutely necessary, that a couple of good arm'd Vessels, at least, should be employ'd, for the protection of our Colliery, [121] and Fuel Vessels; and they to be entirely under the orders of the Governour, which would, not only be of Service in the above mention'd particular, but likewise wou'd keep off the Enemy's small Cruisers from our Coast, and thereby be a means of our getting Supplys from our Colonies with less hazard than we do now....[122]

These armed vessels would also provide a means of communication with other colonial governors in times of emergency. [123] Hopson was not worried about a major assault on the fortress by sea, but he did fear land and sea raids by relatively slight numbers of men and small armed ships on the fuel vessels, on the colliery especially, and on the supply ships coming to Louisbourg. Knowles had ordered a blockhouse, prefabricated in Boston, to be erected at Table Head to shelter the colliery, but it did not arrive until late February or early March 1748. [124] In April, Hopson attempted to get the Comet to sea to protect the colliery because the blockhouse would not be completed at the mouth o' the Indian River for some months to come. Captain Leaver reported his ship could not sail until mid-May because it was shorthanded and in a state of ill-repair. [125]

On May 26 and 27, the incident occurred which Hopson feared. Near midnight on May 26, an estimated 120 Frenchmen and Indians surprised and captured a number of coal vessels lying at anchor in Indian Harbour. Seven unarmed soldiers were taken prisoner. [126] At noon the next day, the commander of the contingent erecting the blockhouse, Lieutenant Samuel Rhodes of Pepperrell's regiment, received a summons to surrender with honourable terms. The French commander advised him that if he did not surrender, he and his men could expect no quarter at the hands of the Indians. Rhodes asked to be given until 8 a.m. to consider the proposal. At once he initiated frantic preparations for a defence in the partially completed blockhouse. In the evening, he received a communication from a Jacques Le Coste, who warned of the unmanageability of the Indians, agreeing to Rhodes' request for time to consider the terms of surrender. Rhodes thanked Le Coste for his gentlemanly warning and continued the defence preparations. At 8 a.m., Lieutenant Rhodes replied that he and his men would defend themselves, reminding Le Coste that the honours of war had been granted to the French at Louisbourg in 1745. The Lieutenant refused, he wrote later, to be intimidated by the "Bugbears his [the French commander's] Indians." He expressed contempt for the French officer leading the raiders, stating that "The Governour of Canada had done ill to repose any Trust in a Man that could so procrastinate an affair like this, [and] that I was acting under a Governour that would soon reinforce me." Following a short period of suspense, the raiders, after saluting Rhodes and his men, sailed away in the captured vessels, taking about twenty prisoners, including one English woman. [127]

Rhodes reported that Le Coste and his men were joined by the French settlers in the immediate area, and that when he withdrew, all the men, women and children went with him. [128] The French settlers in the Mira River region, however, had fled to Scatarie Island on hearing the first rumours of the incident. They finally went to the fortress for protection. [129] It was generally believed at Louisbourg that the raiders had come from Chignecto isthmus to St. Peters, thence by canoe over the Brador Lakes to the colliery. [130]

The blockhouse was completed soon after the incident, at which time Rhodes observed that "if the Governour of Canada's 500 Creoleans & Indieans should come [now] they would be very welcome guests...." [131] Hopson did not share Rhodes' contemptuous bravado, but he did commend the lieutenant's brave stand which "prevented the Colliery from being destroy'd.... [the incident being] only attended with the Consequence of our not being able for about a month afterwards to get any Coals from thence, for want of Shaloups to Load our Vessels with, in place of those taken by the Enemy ...." [132] Hopson redoubled his efforts to protect the sea route to the colliery by using the Comet and some small armed trading sloops as coastal cruisers. However, he still considered the colliery extremely vulnerable to attack. A successful raid on the colliery would probably prevent enough fuel being stockpiled for the winter, when a shortage would be critical and potentially disastrous. [133] He reiterated his request to the Secretary of State that, 

Arm'd Vessels are likewise necessary for keeping the Coast to the W[es]tward of Us clear of the Enemy's Cruizers, as all our live Stock and other Refreshments which we get, cone from Boston and that part of the Continent, likewise the Provisions, which the King is pleased to Allow the Garrison, at least the Bread comes from New York and' Philadelphia, which if intercepted by the Enemy must be attended with Ill Consequences. [134]

On August 23, a force of about 160 French and Indians under the command of Joseph Marin, captured 11 men, including officers, soldiers and sailors from the garrison at Louisbourg
and the 60-gun Worcester, which was then anchored to the harbour. These men had been dispatched from the fortress to reconnoitre the land up to the Brador Lakes. While they were near the Mira River in the vicinity of a house belonging to a Frenchman, Jean Chapuy, they were surprised and captured. [135] Hopson was furious and wrote at once to Marin, whom he believed was en route to attack the colliery when he had encountered the reconnaissance detachment near Chapuy's house. Hopson accused Marin of willfully violating the peace preliminaries signed at Aix-la-Chapelle on April 30, the armistice proclaimed at St. James Court on May 16 and at Louisbourg on August 6. [136] Hopson's letter did not catch up with Marin until he was back at Baye Verte. On September 10, Marin replied to Hopson denying prior knowledge of the armistice before capturing the detachment from Louisbourg. He also sent most of the prisoners back to the fortress on the vessel Hopson had hired to take his letter to Marin. [137]

The French frigate Friponne put in at Louisbourg on September 23, carrying a letter from the Marquis de la Galissonière, Governor of New France. La Galissonière informed Hopson that since the restitution of Cape Breton Island was assured by the peace preliminaries, he had sent a small number of soldiers and habitants to Ile-St-Jean and Ile Royale especially to prevent the Indians from disturbing the peace, and to make some preparations for the return of the area to French control, which would probably occur in the spring of 1749. The men were also to cut some wood to fuel the fortress the following winter. [138] This presumptuous action offended Hopson, who believed the French had no authority to land their men on British territory before obtaining the English governor's permission. He protested to Decour, the commanding officer of the French detachment on Cape Breton, who responded in terms similar to those contained in La Galissonière's letter. Decour added that he had forbidden the Indians from going near the fortress, but observed that too much faith should not be placed in these people who could not be controlled so easily as he could discipline his own troops. [139] However, no further incidents occurred between the occupants of the fortress and the French with their Indian allies.

Although overwhelmingly preponderant on the Continent, France did nut seek to retain her conquests in Europe. Instead, her negotiators assumed the posture that the campaigns in the Netherlands had been undertaken to bring the enemy powers to terms. Essentially, France's representatives at Aix were directed to secure a peace based on the mutual restitution of conquests, to obtain satisfaction for their allies, and to weaken the anti-French coalition. [140] St. Severin, the French negotiator, artfully exploited the disagreements between England and Austria, represented respectively by the young and inexperienced Earl of Sandwich, and the stern and tenacious Count Kaunitz. St. Severin's devices of playing one ally off against the other and negotiating separate preliminary agreements with each, successfully increased the divisions among the anti-Bourbon states and convinced Europe that France was its master and arbiter. [141]

One of the principal disputes at Aix arose over the restitution of Cape Breton Island and the Netherlands. France would not evacuate the Netherlands until assured of regaining Cape Breton, and the Maritime Powers wished to terminate the threatening French occupation of the Austrian Netherlands as soon as possible. Austria argued that the restitutions should be made at once, in particular that French troops should leave the Netherlands, and not be delayed until a definitive treaty was concluded. Since a simultaneous evacuation from colonial conquests, such as Cape Breton, and from the Netherlands would retard the removal of French troops, the English and Dutch negotiators urged their provisional occupation of the Austrian Netherlands, following a procedure similar to that employed at the end of the War of Spanish Succession when the southern Netherlands was turned over to Austria upon ratification of  the Barrier Treaty. [142] This manipulation was quite unacceptable to Austria, which, to the horror of the allies, wished to repudiate entirely the Barrier Treaty as an infringement of sovereignty. The Austrian position and refusal to agree on other terms obstructed the peace settlement which Newcastle was now anxious to conclude. Despite his often stated firm attachment to the alliance with Austria, the Duke in desperation instructed Sandwich to sign separately with France if necessary, expecting Austria would finally have to accede to the terms. Such a step,' as Newcastle realized, would possibly place a disastrous strain on the alliance with Austria and provide Maria Theresa with more reason to believe the Barrier Treaty challenged the sovereignty of her empire. [143]

However, late in July, 1748, Newcastle was overwhelmed by his fear of losing the alliance with Austria and the knowledge that France was deliberately disrupting relations between the allies. Less than two weeks after his instruction to Sandwich to sign separately if necessary, the Duke reversed his position and insisted that the settlement must be acceptable to Austria, and that the idea of a separate treaty with France had to be abandoned. In the meantime, France had decided against its tentative agreement to a provisional occupation of the Netherlands, asserting that the evacuation of the French troops would eliminate France's security for other cessions and restitutions. The Court of Vienna was aware of England's attempts to coerce Austria into signing a settlement. and Newcastle's belated order to Sandwich to lay all British communications and plans before Kaunitz in the hope of conciliating Austria served admirably to confirm the Austrian distrust of the Maritime Powers. [144]

Such dissension between the allies, exploited by France during the negotiations, underlined the decrepitude of the old system of alliances so dear to Newcastle. Sir Richard Lodge writes of the situation:

The negotiations at Aix-la-Chapelle had shown that the Barrier Treaty, long regarded as a bond between Austria and the Maritime Powers, was really a dissolvent. England could only regain the alliance of Holland by restoring the Barrier; and England could only hope to conciliate Austria by removing what was regarded in Vienna as an intolerable and degrading servitude. [145]

Yet the Duke clung to the system, deeply regretting his brief lapse when he had thought to coerce Austria into signing in July.

France finally chose to settle directly with Britain, for a peace with Austria would not regain Cape Breton, nor curtail the naval war which was seriously disrupting French commerce. On the other hand, a peace with England would probably entail Austrian concurrence. Kaunitz's continued recalcitrance forced Newcastle by late August to waver again from his hope of signing with Austria. By this time, the principal obstruction to a general peace was the conflict between the allies. However, the situation was retrieved somewhat for the Duke when in October a compromise of sorts was reached in which the Dutch were to receive the Barrier towns from France and Maria Theresa's sovereignty was to be acknowledged. Thus Austria evaded admitting the validity of the Barrier Treaty. In point of fact, nothing was resolved between the allies concerning the Barriers, but the manoeuvre enabled the signing of the peace treaty on October 18, 1748, by France, Holland and Britain. Austria, having served notice that the Barrier Treaty was entirely unacceptable, merely acceded to the peace treaty. [146]

While France did not seek to retain her European conquests, she certainly sought the restitution of Cape Breton Island. While Louis XV assumed the lofty, if ill-advise d, desire to negotiate "like a prince and not like a merchant", [147] and his ministers professed to seek nothing for France, the design to regain Louisbourg appears consistently in the fabric of French military and diplomatic activities after the loss in 1745. From the time of the victory at Louisbourg until the late years of the war, there was a corresponding decline in the British desire for an early peace. Following the failure of the d'Anville expedition to recapture, or at least to negate the loss of Louisbourg, England was informed by France in 1747 that refusal to restore the island would block all negotiations for peace. There could be no compromise, but France would keep the Netherlands if England retained Cape Breton. The loss of the Netherlands, of course, was unacceptable not only to England, but also to Austria and Holland, who reviled British attachment to the island. While Newcastle's protestations that the restitution of Cape Breton was a greater sacrifice than any demanded of her allies seemed contemptible to Austria and Holland, Chesterfield's half-hearted statement in August, 1747, that since Cape Breton was Britain's only acquisition in a long and expensive war, giving England reason to accept its retention, must have been dismissed as ludicrous by France. As a victorious power in the war, France certainly might have maintained extensive demands at the peace, but for once, in her history, as Sir Richard Lodge expresses it, that country "was prepared to dispense with territorial gain." [148]

The spirit of the peace was a return to the status quo ante bellum, with a mutual restitution of conquests so far as England and France were concerned. France released the Netherlands, having successfully exacerbated the dissensions between Britain and her allies. The seaward fortifications at Dunkirk were to be dismantled, but there was to be no inspection by British commissioners. England returned Cape Breton Island, and gave as a guarantee for the restitution, two hostages "of  rank and consideration" [149] Sandwich failed to elicit a similar surety for the return of Madras to Britain. The treaty read that England was to restore. to France all her conquests in the East and West Indies, and Cape Breton Island, "with all the artillery and warlike stores, conformable to the inventories, which have been made thereof, and in the condition that the said place was in, on the said day of its surrender." [150] It was a peace without victory for France and England, whose respective military power and naval supremacy had resulted in a stalemate. The reaction in France to the peace was bitter, for France had given up great advantages, and the peace became a common synonym for stupidity. [151] Peace was welcomed in Britain, and while there was probably some unhappiness with the restitution of Louisbourg, there was also glee that Cape Breton had regained the Austrian Netherlands and rescued Holland, and that Britain was to be saved the expense of maintaining the fortress. [152]

A copy of the peace treaty was sent to Governor Hopson at Louisbourg with orders to turn Louisbourg over to the French. Pepperrell's and Shirley's regiments were to be disbanded and Hopson was instructed to persuade as many of these men as possible to enlist in the other regular regiments, or to settle in Nova Scotia, where the ministry now sought to create secure settlements and a naval base at Chebucto, the future Halifax and counter-poise to Louisbourg. The Gibralter regiments were to be semt to Nova Scotia, and thence to Ireland. The artillery company and some artificers were ordered to go to Annapolis Royal. All stores and provisions no longer fit for service were to be sold to the public and the remaining roods shipped to various places in Nova Scotia, New England and Great Britain. [153]

The evacuation of the garrison was completed in July, 1749, the French assisting in the transportation of the men and stores by providing seven ships [154] Having amicably completed all the formal arrangements by July 23, Hopson delivered the keys of the fortress to the new French governor, Charles des Herbiers, Sieur de la Ratière. The French flag was raised over Louisbourg after more than four years' absence, ending the first British occupation. [155]

Less than 150 miles away the British flag had just begun flying over nascent Halifax, opening a new chapter in the Anglo-Frencin confrontatlion in America. The abandonment of Louisbourg had outraged many New Englanders, who had been brought to an acute awareness of the French menace in the north by the wartime activities. Halifax was established in large measure to counterbalance Louisbourg, and to mollify New England by providing the general security so anxiously solicited by men such as William Shirley. France viewed with alarm the resurgent British interest in Nova Scotia. Here was a direct threat, not only to Ile Royale and Ile-St-Jean, but also to Canada, and by extension, to Louisiana and the French West Indies. The Minister of Marine informed des Herbiers that the King had decided that nothing would be neglected to provide for the protection of Louisbourg and Ile-St-Jean, in case of war, and that efforts should be undertaken to thwart the English in their new settlement and to nullify the effects of Halifax. A substantial increase in population was indicated as being of particular importance to the security of the French territory. Furthermore, the erection of "indirect obstacles" to harrass the English and their settlements, such as surreptiously inciting the Indians against the British and urging the Acadians to rove to French territory or to secretly assist the Indians, clearly would be countenanced unofficially. [156] Obviously, there would be trouble. While the peace of Aix had closed the great theatres of war in Europe and on the high seas, Nova Scotia and other points of Anglo-French contact in North America became the active cockpits for the contest between the rival empires.

The reaction of France to the founding of Halifax underlined the precarious balance existing between the British and French colonies in America. While Britain ostensibly established Halifax to protect her colonies and commerce, France interpreted this as a direct challenge to her own interests and ambitions in America. If Britain came to control the wealth of the Americas, French, empire and power everywhere would suffer. It was the same fatalistic doctrine of mercantilism by which Britain was interpreting the development of French commerce and colonies. The conflict over Louisbourg had contributed toward bringing the competition between the two great imperial powers into clearer focus, and helped ensure that no European peace could be complete without a final settlement in North America. Yet the peace of Aix had largely ignored the colonial issues which increasingly became serious mutual irritants, keeping the flames of war flickering in North America until Europe was engulfed by the final' straggle for mastery of the continent.

ENDNOTES

[1] N.S., A30, pp. 125, 138-139, Shirley to Newcastle, November 21, 1746. Warren agreed with Shirley that Nova Scotia "Serves as a Key for the Enemy" to the British, colonies , rather than as the Barrier" it ought to be. Correspondence of Shirley, 1, Lincoln, ed., pp. 351-353, Warren and Shirley to Wentworth, September 12, 1746,

[2] Correspondence of Shirley, I, Lincoln, ed., p. 386, Newcastle to Shirley, May 30, 1747; pp. 401-404, Newcastle to Shirley, October 3, 1747.

[3] Brebner, New England's Outpost, pp. 107-123 passim.

[4] See below., pp. 409-422, for a discussion of the conditions in Louisbourg during the winter of 1746-47.

[5] N.S., A30, pp. 14-15, 18, Knowles' private letter to Newcastle, January 20, 1747.

[6] P.R.O., CO5, vol. 901, fol. 120v, Shirley and Knowles to Newcastle, April 28, 1747.

[7] N.S., A30, p. 15, Knowles' private letter to Newcastle, January 20, 1747.

[8] Correspondence of Shirley, I. Lincoln, ed., p. 35, Warren and Shirley to Wentworth, September 12, 1746.

[9] P. R. O. , CO5 , vol. 4, quoted in Brebner , New, England's Outpost, p. 123.

[10] Brebner, New England's Outpost, p. 123.

[11] Ibid., pp. 121-123.

[12] Colls. M.H.S., 6, X, p. 70, "Permission for the Inhabitants of St. Johns to remain there", signed by Pepperrell, Warren and Shirley, September 30, 1745; p. 438, Pepperrell and Warren to Newcastle, January,18, 1746. 

[13] Ibid., pp. 70-71.

[14] P.R.O., CO5, vol. 13, fol. 97v, Warren to Townsend, May 10, 1746.

[15] Colls. M.H.S., 6, X, p. 444, Warren and Pepperrell to Shirley, January 28, 1746.

[16] Ibid., p. 438, Warren and Pepperrell to Shirley, January 18, 1746.

[17] The clause in the terms of capitulation for Louisbourg forbidding the French from taking up arms against the English for one year would expire in this month. P.R.O., CO5, vol. 13, fol. 97v, Warren to Townsend, May 16, 1746.

[18] P.R.O. CO5, vol. 13, fol. 97v, Warren to Townsend, May 16, 1746. See also Colls. M.H.S., 6, X, pp. 96-97, "Instructions to the Commanding Officers sent to St. Johns" signed by Townsend, Pepperrell and Warren, n.d.; pp. 97-98, "Letter to the Inhabitants of St Johns", signed by Pepperrell and Warren, May 14, 1746.

[19] P.R.O. CO5, vol. 44, fols. 124-124v, "At a Council of War held at Louisbourg", signed by Warburton, Townsend, Knowles, Hopson, Horsman, Ellison, Mercer, June 7, 1746.

[20] Ibid. , fol. 124v.

[21] Ibid., fols. 116v-117, Knowles to Newcastle, July, 8, 1746.

[22] Ibid., fols, 126-127, "Articles of Indulgence to be granted to the Inhabitants of the Island of St. John", signed by Knowles, June 9, 1746.

[23] See above, pp. 346-347

[24] La Jonquière assured Knowles that the French of Ile-St-Jean had not been involved in the murder of an Englishman, and that the Indians had committed the offence in the absence of their French officer despite specific orders against the mistreatment of prisoners. He told Knowles the prisoners taken at the Northeast River had been sent to Québec. Knowles decided that this action would provide him with the opportunity to send a flag of truce to Québec in the spring, on the pretext of exchanging prisoners. He informed Newcastle that he proposed "sending some experienced Persons disguised as Common Sailors to make the best remarks of the Navigation of that River St. Lawrence as well as the Strength of the Place." P.R.O., CO5, vol. 44, fol. 143, Knowles to Newcastle, September 18, 1746; fols. 182-183, La Jonquière to Knowles, October 27, 1746; fol. 179v, Knowles to Newcastle, November 8p 1746.

[25] Harvey, French Régime in  P.E.I., pp. 119-120.

[26] Brebner, New England's Outpost, p. 117.

[27] Major Paul Mascarene had been appointed Lieutenant Governor of Nova Scotia in 1740, succeeding the quarrelsome Major Lawrence Armstrong, who died in the preceding year. Mascarene was born in France to a Hugenot family, one year before the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685. After spending some years in Geneva, he went to England where he was naturalized in 1706. Two years earlier, he had entered military service, subsequently spending most of his life in Nova Scotia. Mascarene possessed a moderately optimistic view of the potential menace of the Acadians, having been impressed by their widespread refusal to take up arms against the English in 1744. During the remaining years of the war, a very small number of Acadians did assist the French cause, by joining marauding French and Indians from Canada and by providing provisions and shelter. However, the large majority of the five to ten thousand Acadians maintained their neutrality. Colls. M.H.S., 6, X, p. 230n; Brebner, New England's Outpost, pp. 107-123; Stanley, New France, pp. 23-25; Parkman, Conflict, pp, 291-292, 361-362, 367-382; McNutt, Atlantic Provinces, pp, 42-44; Murdoch, Nova Scotia, II, pp. 119-122; P.R.O., Adm. 1, vol. 2655, n.p., Mascarene to Shirley, September 11, 1745,

[28] Parkman stated that about 500 men, including Rhode Island and New Hampshire levies, were unable to reach Annapolis Royal because of the severe winter weather. Half Century, p. 368.

[29] Brebner, New England's Outpost, pp. 117,418; Murdoch, Nova Scotia, II, pp. 104-110; Parkman, Half Century, pp. 372-380.

[30] See Chapter 8 , footnote 55.

[31] N.S., A27, p. 247, Mascarene to Shirley, December 7, 1745, quoted in Brebner, New England's Outpost, p. 124.

[32] N.S., A29, fol. 42, Knowles to Newcastle, September 19, 1746.

[33] P.R.O., CO5, vol. 901, fol. 79v, Shirley to Newcastle, November 26, 1746.

[34] Correspondence of Shirley, I, Lincoln, ed., pp. 354-355, Shirley to Mascarene, September 16, 1746; Report concerning Canadian Archives for the Year 1905, 11, Sessional Paper No. 18. Appendix C, (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1906) p.46, Mascarene to Newcastle, January 23, 1747.

[35] Correspondence of Shirley, 1, Lincoln, ed., pp. 370-371, Shirley to Mascarene, December 19, 1746.

[36] Ibid., pp. 371-372.

[37] N.S., A30, pp. 218-219, Shirley to Newcastle, April 29, 1747.

[38] Brebner pointed out that the actual number of the Acadian population was nearer 10,000. New England's Outpost, pp. 124n, 127-128. See also. P.R.O., CO5, vol. 901, fol.121, Shirley and Knowles to Newcastle, April 28, 1747.

[39] Correspondence of Shirley, 1, Lincoln, ed., p. 372, Shirley to Mascarene, December 19, 1746; P.R.O., Adm. 1, vol. 234, n.p., Knowles to Corbett, April 26, 1747.

[40] See above, p. 385-387.

[41] N.S., A30, p. 78, Knowles to Newcastle, April 26, 1747; P.R.O., CO5, vol. 901, fol. 120v, Knowles to Newcastle, April 28, 1747.

[42] In the autumn, Knowles wrote to Newcastle: "I am fully persuade[d] Your Grace will find it [Nova Scotia] turn out the most flourishing Colony of any, we have; the Land being perfectly good, and abounding with Masts (wch are now very scarce in New England) and the Coast full of good Harbours more convenient for the Fishery then [sic] any place we have, as the Banks lay close to the shore...." PR.O., CO5, vol. 901, fol. 148v, August 31, 1747.

[43] P.R.O., CO5, vol. 901, 120, Shirley and Knowles to Newcastle, April 28, 1747.

[44] P.R.O., CO5, vol. 901, fol. 120v, Shirley and Knowles to Newcastle, April 28, 1747.

[45] Ibid., fol. 121.

[46] Ibid., fols. 121v-122.

[47] Correspondence of Shirley, I, Lincoln, ed., pp. 388-389p Newcastle to Shirley, May, 30, 1747.

[48] P.R.O., CO5, vol. 901, fol. 164, Shirley to Newcastle, October 20, 1747; Brebner, New England's Outpost, pp. 125-133.

[49] P.R.O., CO5, vol. 901, fols. 136-136v, Shirley to Newcastle, July 8, 1747.

[50] Ibid., fols. 151-151v, Bedford to Newcastle, September 11, 1747.

[51] Ibid., fols. 154-154v, 157-158v, Newcastle to Shirley, October 3, 1747.

[52] Thomas B. Akins, "History of Halifax City", Collections of the Nova Scotia Historical Society, VIII, (Halifax; Moring Herald Printing and Publishing Company, 1895) p. 4; Canadian Archives Report, II, Part 3, Sessional Paper no. 18, Appendix "A", (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1906) pp. 49-52, Royal Instructions for Edward Cornwallis, April 29, 1749. For details of the activities of the Acadians during the war years, see Brebner, New England's Outpost, pp. 104-165 passim. In October, 1747, Newcastle directed Shirley to prepare a submission on a civil government for Nova Scotia. This scheme was forwarded to Bedford early in 1749, and may be found reprinted in Correspondence of Shirley, I, Lincoln, ed., pp. 472-477, General Heads of a Plan of Civil Government propos'd for his Majesty's Province of Nova Scotia", signed by Shirley, February 18 dispatch, 1749.

[53] P.R.O.2 CO5, vol. 44, fol. 152, Hopson, Stillingfleet, Warburton, Ellison and Mercer to Knowles, August 6, 1746.

[54] Clements Library, Clinton Papers, III, n.p., Knowles to Clinton, August 7, 1746,

[55] Ibid., IV, n.p., Knowles to Clinton, October 4, 1746.

[56] Ibid., V, Knowles to Clinton, May 4, 1747.

[57] P.R.O., CO5, vol. 811, n.p., Massachusetts Assembly Minutes, August 15 and November 3, 1747. The province requested reimbursement by Britain for the supplies taken over as King's stores.

[58] P.R.O., CO5, Audit Office 1, Bundle 189/588, n.p., The Accounts of Messrs. Samuel and William Baker for supplying Louisbourg, from September 15, 1746, to July 16, 1749; Treasury 1, vol. 32, n.p., Baker to the Treasury, September 18, 1746.

[59] N.S., A29, fol. 33, Knowles to Newcastle, September 15, 1746.

[60] P.R.O., CO5, vol. . 44, fols. 200-200v, Knowles to Bennett, October 6, 1746.

[61] Clements Library, Clinton Papers, V, n.p., Knowles to Clinton, April 13, 1747. See also P.R.O., CO5, vol. 44, fols. 194-194v, Knowles to Newcastle, January 20, 1747. Knowles wrote to Newcastle that "before I could prevaile upon Mr. Bennett to lend the money for the use of the Troops I was Obliged to give him several Orders... which I did with the advice of the Field Officers to prevent the Disorders that must have happen'd from the Troops wanting their Pay."

[62] P.R.O., CO5, vol. 44, fols. 201-201v, Knowles to Bennett, December 16, 1746.

[63] Clements Library, Clinton Papers, V, n.p., Knowles to Clinton, May 4, 1747.

[64] N.S., A29, fol. 32, Knowles to Newcastle, September 18, 1746.

[65] P.R.O., CO5, vol. 44, fols. 129, 155, 185, 233, 245, Garrison Returns signed by Knowles for July 8, September 19, November 7, 1746; January 20, June 27, 1747. See also fols. 243, 267, Garrison Returns signed by Hopson, November 26, 1747; April 11, 1748.

[66] N.S., A29, fol. 32, Knowles to Newcastle, September 18, 1746.

[67] P.R.O., CO5, vol. 44, fol. 194v, Knowles to Newcastle, January, 20, 1747.

[68] N.S., A29, fol. 32, Knowles to Newcastle, September 18, 1746; A30, fol. 4, Knowles to Newcastle, January 20, 1747,

[69] P.R.O., CO5, vol. 44, fol. 179v, Knowles to Newcastle, November 8, 1746.

[70] Ibid., fol. 180.

[71] Ibid., fol. 180v.

[72] Ibid., fol. 179v.

[73] These details on victual allowance derive from a submission by one John Thomlinson and John Ranbury, English merchants who applied for the Louisbourg victualling contract, and the contract to supply money to the garrison. These contracts were won by the Baker firm, but the victualling figures were probably standard. P.R.O., Treasury 1, vol. 318, fol. 63, memorial of Thomlinson and Hanbury relative to the Victualling of Louisbourg, October 22, 1745.

[74] P.R.O., CO5, vol. 44, fol. 194, Knowles to Newcastle, January 20, 1747.

[75] P.R.O., Adm. 1, vol. 4285, n.p., William Baker to the Lord Commissioners of the Treasury, May 5, 1747.

[76] P.R.O., Adm. 2, vol. 504, fol. 427, Secretary to Knowles, June 5, 1747.

[77] Scottish Record office, North Berwick. Munimenta, G.D. 110/ 919, Suttie to Dalrymple, September 20, 1746.

[78] P.R.O., CO5, vol. 44, fols. 192-192v, Knowles to Newcastle, January 20, 1747.

[79] Ibid., fols. 194v-195.

[80] N.S., A30, fol. 18, Knowles' private letter to Newcastle, January, 20, 1747. 1 have not been able to identify the source of Knowles' quotation.

[81] P.R.O., CO5, vol. 44, fol. 192v, Knowles' public letter to Newcastle, January 20, 1747.

[82] Ibid., fols 192v-193.

[83] Ibid., fol. 13.

[84] Knowles' "hypothesis" ran along the following lines: the expense of maintaining Louisbourg would be an enormous and continuing drain on the treasury. The strength of d'Anville's expedition would probably convince popular opinion of the value of the stronghold, which was of much greater value to the French than to the English. Although d'Anville's expedition failed, it demonstrated how easily the French could take Nova Scotia and Cape Breton Island unless Britain kept a superior fleet in adjacent waters, regardless of the troops maintained in the garrisons of Nova Scotia and Cape Breton Island. However, it would ever be necessary for Britain to keep a fleet in the area, if only for the protection of the fisheries. Consequently, the maintenance of the garrison and fortifications at Louisbourg would be to no useful end. 

"Neither the Coast of Accadia or any of the Harbours in Newfoundland (except St. John's & Placentia) are fortify'd (and those but triflingly) and yett we continue Masters of them, and whatever Nation sends the Strongest Fleet into these Seas will always be masters of the Cod fishery for that year, whether there be a Louisbourg or not. For the Severity of the Seasons evinces to us that it requires many years to build a Fortress of any kind of strength, and that during the Winter Season no Enemy but Indians can come to molest us, and the Damages they could do, would be but trifling, as they could keep possession of nothing but what the Men of. War in the Spring of the year would drive them out of again, so that the Island of Cape Breton would be as much our own without this expensive weak Fortress of Louisbourg as it is with it, it was near forty years work to pile it up in the manner as it is, and if it was once levelled it would take as long time again I dare say, if it ever was attempted, for the French seemed heartily tired of the Expense, and I as heartily wish we may not keep it so long as till that. becomes Our Motive of Complaint." 

N.S., A30, fols. 12-15, Knowles' private letter to Newcastle, January 20, 1747.

[85] McLennan, Louisbourg, pp. 176-177, wrote: 

"The forecasts of Knowles proved nearer correct than those of Shirley or Warren. The holding of Cape Breton had not proved the advantage to England which they and many others had hoped. The settlers were few, but this was accounted for by the disturbed conditions of these few years. At least two thousand men died as the result of the siege, a large proportion of the young and adventurous of the people of sparsely settled Colonies. The projected expeditions against Canada in 1746 and 1747 so upset the normal course of events that New England was unable to adequately exploit industries her people had already developed. War and commercial depression rather than any local conditions accounted fully for the stagnation of Louisbourg during the year it was under the British flag."

[86] N.S., A30, fols. 15-16, Knowles' private letter to Newcastle, January 20, 1747.

[87] Ibid., fols. 19-20. This comment may refer to what was probably an innocent and well-meaning proposal advanced by the Council at Louisbourg, which suggested in May, 1746, that all fines, save for the proportion belonging to the informers, for breaches of the garrison orders be "appropriated for the settling of such poor people in this garrison as shall be thought proper by the commander in chief and the Council, in wch the preference is to be given to such persons as were on the expedition, and are enlisted into either of the new American regiments and have families here." , M.H.S. Colls., 6, X, p. 64, Council at Louisbourg, May 8, 1746.

[88] N.S., A30, fols. 18-19, Knowles' private letter to Newcastle, January 20, 1747.

[89] See below, pp. 431-436.

[90] J.M, Sosin, "Louisbourg and the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, 1748", The William and Mary Quarterly, XIV. no. 4, series 3, (October, 1957), p. 531 and note.

[91] See entry under "Pay" in Smith, An Universal Military Dictionary, (London: J. Millan, 1779) n.p.

[92] P.R.O., CO5, vol. 44, fol. 228v, Knowles to Newcastle, June 28, 1747; W04, vol. 44, fol. 43, Fox to Knowles, September 12, 1747. For details on the other disturbances, see above, pp. 99, 226-234.

[93] Correspondence of Shirley, I, Lincoln, ed., p. 315, Pepperrell to Shirley, April 6, 1746; M.H.S. Colls., 6, X, p. 314, Warren to Pepperrell to Newcastle, July 4, 1745; P.R.O., Adm. 2, vol. 369, fols. 257-258, Admiralty Board to Newcastle, October 10, 1745; Adm. 1, vol. 2665, n.p., Warren to Corbett, August 8, 1745.

[94] N,S., A29, fol. 24, Knowles to Newcastle, September 18, 1746.

[95] P.R.O., CO5, vol. 44, fol. 193v, Knowles' public letter to Newcastle, January 20, 1747.

[96] Ibid., fols. 228v-229, Knowles to Newcastle, June 28, 1747.

[97] Scottish Record Office, H.M. General Register House, notebook with garrison orders, Louisbourg, Cunninghame of Thornton Muniments, Part 2. No. 625, fol. 62, entry for June 22, 1747.

[98] P.R.O., CO5, vol. 44, fols. 228v-229, Knowles to Newcastle, June 28, 1747.

[99] S.R.O., North Berwick Muniments, G.D. 1101919, Suttie to Dalrymple, June 30, 1747.

[100] P.R.O., WO4, vol. 44, fol. 43, Fox to Knowles, September 12, 1747.

[101] Ibid., CO5, vol. 901, fol. 148v, Knowles to Newcastle, August 31, 1747.

[102] Ibid., fol. 149, Knowles to Newcastle, September 4, 1747.

[103] S.R.O., H.M. General Register House, notebook with garrison orders, Louisbourg, Cunninghame of Thornton Muniments, Part 2. No. 625, fol. 77, entry for September 17, 1747.

[104 Nottingham, The University, Newcastle Mss., NeC 477, n.p., "Observations upon the Draught of a Plan for a general Peace etc.", unsigned, September, 1747; NeC 489, n.p., Horace Walpole to Pelham, September 3, 1747; Mapperton House., Beaminster, volume entitle "Private Letters" fols. 143-146, Bedford to Sandwich, January 28, 174A. Sosin, "Louisbourg and the Peace", William and Mary, p. 531.

[105] This is a surmise on the part of the author, in the absence of documentary evidence.

[106] Lodge, Diplomacy, pp. 301, 306.

[107] Hotblack, Chatham, p. 47.

[108] Lodge, Diplomacy, pp. 306n, 307, 311-312.

[109] Ibid., pp. 268-273, 302-303, 311-316.

[110] Ibid., pp. 311-317.

[111] Mark A. Thomson, "The War of the Austrian Succession", New Cambridge Modern History, VII, J.C. Lindsay, ed., p. 436.

[112] Ibid., pp. 416-439 passim; Dorn, Empire, pp. 123-177 passim; Pares., West Indies, pp. 390-393; Stanley, New France, pp. 31-32; Graham, North Atlantic, pp. 140-142; Richmond, Navy, III, p. 112.

[113] See above, pp. 430-431.

[114] P.R.O., CO5, vol. 44, fols. 243, 267, 277, Garrison Returns for November 26, 1747, April 11, July 11, 1748.

[115] N.S., A 32, fols. 52-53, Hopson to Newcastle, April 12, 1748.

[116] P.R.O., WO4, vol. 44, fols. 72-73, Fox to Hopson, September 29, 1747,

[117] N.S., A 31, fols. 13,4-135, Hopson to Newcastle, November 30, 1747.

[118] Ibid., A 32, fols. 201-202, Council of War, signed by Hopson and officers, October 28, 1748.

[119] P.R.O., Adm. 51, vol. 152, n.p., Journal of the Comet, Captain William Leaver, May 10, 1747 to November 28, 1748. See also P.R.O., Adm. 8, vols. 25 and 26, passim, n.p., dispositions of His Majesty's ships and vessels in sea pay, May 1, 1747 to November 1, 1749.

[120] P.R.O., WO25, vol. 22, fol. 132, Hopson's Commission as governor, September 30, 1747; CO5, vol. 44, fols. 268-268v, Hopson to Newcastle, April 12, 1748.

[121] This Colliery was located near present-day Glace Bay.

[122] N.S., A 31, fols. 129-130, Hopson to Newcastle, November 30, 1747.

[123] Ibid., fols. 130-131.

[124] Ibid., fol. 136; A 32, fol. 55, Hopson to Newcastle, April 12, 1748.

[125] Ibid., A 32, fol. 55, Hopson to Newcastle, April 12, 1748, fol. 183, Hopson to Newcastle, July 12, 1748.

[126] Ibid., A 32, fols. 182-185, Hopson to Bedford, July 12, 1748.

[127] Ibid., fols. 279v-283, Rhodes' account of the colliery incident, May 18, 1748.

[128] Ibid., fols. 282v-283.

[129] Late in July, Hopson reported to Bedford that he was having to provide for these French refugees, who apparently feared to return to their habitations. N.S., A 32, fol. 185, Hopson to Bedford, July 12, 1748.

[130] P.R.O., CO5, vol. 44, fol. 272v, report of the colliery incident, unsigned, but probably prepared by Hopson, June 3, 1748.

[131] Ibid., fol. 283, Rhodes' account of the colliery incident, May 18, 1748.

[132] N.S., A 32, fols. 181-182, Hopson to Bedford, July 12, 1748.

[133] Ibid., fols. 182-185; fol. 53, Hopson to Newcastle, April 12, 1748.

[134] Ibid., fols. 185-186, Hopson to Bedford, July 12, 1748.

[135] Ibid., fols. 187-189, Hopson to Marin, August 22, 1748; fol. 190, "List of Prisoners taken at Miray", August 22, 1748; fols. 193-198, declaration of the officers taken at Mira, enclosed in Hopson's dispatch to Bedford, October 30, 1748.

[136] Ibid., fols. 187-188, Hopson to Marin, August 22, 1748.

[137] A.C., C11B, vol. 27, fols. 306-306v, Marin to Hopson, September 10, 1748.

[138] N.S., A 32, fols. 206-207, La Galissonière to Hopson, September 7, 1748.

[139] Ibid., fols. 229-230, Hopson to the "Commanding Officer of the party of French Soldiers on the Island", October 14, 1748; fols. 263-264, Decour to Hopson, November 1, 1748.

[140] The extremely complex negotiations at Aix-la-Chapelle are a treated in considerable detail in Lodge, Diplomacy, especially chapters 8 and 9.

[141] Lodge, Diplomacy, pp. 362-363.

[142] The Barrier Treaty of 1715 stipulated that the Spanish Netherlands was to be turned over to Austria on conditions that Austria would pay three-fifths of the cost of supporting the fortresses occupied by the Dutch as security against French aggression, and that the import duties of the region would not be raised without the consent of England, Holland and Austria. The Maritime Powers deliberately evaded agreeing on changes in the favourable import duties, which Austria regarded as overly advantageous to foreign traders. The treaty, was highly resented in Vienna as an infringement of  Austrian sovereignty. Lodge, Diplomacy, pp. 379-380; Dorn, Competition, p. 128.

[143] Lodge, Diplomacy, pp. 378-384.

[144] Ibid., pp. 396-400.

[145] Ibîd., p. 410.

[146] Ibid., pp. 352-353, 398,408.

[147] Lanctot, Canada, III, Margaret Cameron, trans., p. 75.

[148] Lodge, Diplomacy, pp. 282, 286-287, 318, 330.

[149] English Historical Documents, 1714-1783, X, D.B. Horn and Mary Ransome, eds., David C. Douglas, gen. ed., (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1957) p. 926; The Boston Evening-Post, December 19, 1748, contains an item datelined "Whitehall, October 22", which reads in part: "As our Nobility and Gentry are so fond of French Customs ... we hope there will be no difficulty to find two Noblemen that will be willing to live there [France] all their Days, rather than we should give up the few Conquests we have made." The Louisbourg Restoration Project houses typed transcripts and paraphrases from a number of Boston newspapers published between 1744 and 1760. However, no source for these transcripts is given.

[150] English Historical Documents, 1714-1783, X, Horn and Ransome, eds., p. 926.

[151] Lacour Gayet, La Marine militaire, p. 220.

[152] Sosin, "Louisbourg,", William and Mary, p. 535.

[153] N.S. A34, fol. 91, Hopson to Bedford, May 27, 1749; P.R.O., WO4, vol. 46, fols. 105-107, Fox to Hopson., March 22, 1749; Adm. 1, vol. 4322, n.p., Fox to Clevland, February 14, 1749; Adm. 2, vol. 509, fols. 133-134, secretary of Admiralty to Watson, November 25, 1748; fol. 142, Secretary of Admiralty to Navy Board, November 30, 1748.

[154] P.R.O., Adm. 2, vol., 510, fol. 495, secretary of Admiralty to Commissaries for Sick and hurt Seamen, November 22, 1750; Adm. 1, vol. 2043, n.p. , Lloyd to Corbett, July 25, 1749. 

[155] N.S., A34, fols. 166-167, "Certificat de la Reprise de Posession de Louisbourg," signed by des Herbiers, July 12/23, 1749.

[156] Canadian Archives Report, 1905, Vol. II, Appendix "A", part III, Sessional Paper No. 10, p. 292, memorial read to the King, unsigned, August 29, 1749; A.C., B, vol. 91, fols. 340-340v., Minister to des Herbiers, 23 May, 1750; fols. 341-341v, Minister to des Herbiers, 31 May, 1750.