HB-03: Princess Bastion Report: A Survey of the Area from the Right Reentrant Angle of the Princess Bastion to the Right Reentrant angle of the Brouillan Bastion, and the Relation of this Area to Cap Noir: Section II, Chapter 7

PRINCESS BASTION REPORT:
A SURVEY OF THE AREA FROM THE RIGHT REENTRANT
ANGLE OF THE PRINCESS BASTION TO THE RIGHT REENTRANT
ANGLE OF THE BROUILLAN BASTION, AND THE RELATION OF THIS
AREA TO CAP NOIR

Presently, only some illustrations are included here.
For all of them, please consult the original report in the archives of the Fortress of Louisbourg

Technically a discussion of the Princess Bastion need only extend to the tail of the glacis before it, but to stop there would be to omit the one thread which runs throughout the Bastion's history and accounts for the various and sundry alterations made at this section of the Fortress. This thread is the hill which was located some 700 to 800 feet from the right face of the Bastion. The situation of the Princess Bastion and its environs in relation to this hill - Cap Noir - is one of the most important factors to be taken into consideration when discussing the fortifications in general, the Princess Bastion in particular, or the works of Louis Franquet, Chief Engineer at Louisbourg from 1750 to 1758.

It is hard to understand - using the gift of hindsight not available to the French at that time - why they permitted themselves to be dominated by the several hills surrounding the city. Surely they were aware that these hills commanded the works they were building. Why then was no action taken to insure against the use of these vantage points by a would-be attacker? From all that can be gathered, the French were aware of the threat posed by the hills, but until the 1740's did not consider the threat sufficient to warrant remedial action.

A 1717 map of the terrain around Louisbourg showed Cap Noir to be 33 pieds 6 pouces higher than a point just to the right of where the right shoulder angle of the unconstructed Princess Bastion would later be placed. East of this point, the ground's elevation decreased. The right face, therefore, would have been scheduled for erection on an even lower piece of land in relation to Cap Noir. [408]

During the period of construction, there were only two significant references made to the danger of Cap Noir. In 1737 Verrier commented that the earth to be used in construction would be taken from the surrounding hills since these, for the security of the place, had to be lowered. [409] Presumably Cap Noir was included in this reference. Two years later it was stated that, at some future date, Cap Noir would have to be lowered at least 9 pieds so that it would not command the Princess Bastion. [410 ] Neither statement would seem to indicate an excessive concern on the part of the French.

It was not until 1743 that fear of Cap Noir began to grip the Governors and Intendants - if not the Engineers. Cap Noir, according to DuQuesnel and Bigot, entirely dominated the city, especially the base of the ramparts of the Princess and Queen's Bastions. Anyone on the ramparts or on several parts of the covert way was thus exposed. [411] Duchambon wrote in 1744 that were the enemy to put ashore in chaloupes, they would be able to move along the shore under the cover afforded them by Cap Noir. [412]

The engineers were charged with treating Cap Noir as a trifle because they did not wish to admit the mistake they had made when they failed to include the hill in the fortifications. Cap Noir had to be lowered, it was felt, or some work had to be devised which would stand on its summit. [413] A small tower with a reveted arch as a covert way was suggested by Duchambon. Placed on top of the hill, this tower would hold four cannon [414] capable of battering the seashore all the way to Point Blanche. Though a list of artillery in place in 1744 lists 4 eight pound cannon on a cavalier on Cap Noir, it is likely that it Was only a projection since there was nothing on the hill in 1745. [415]

Disagreeing with all the commotion being made over Cap Noir, Verrier, then Chief Engineer, attempted to prove that there was no danger in having the hill overlook the Princess Bastion. Among other things, he pointed out that the summit of the hill, as it stood, was not large enough to hold a battery of six cannon. If it were lowered, however, the surface would be enlarged and the enemy would be able to place a battery there. [416]

Also, he declared, the enemy would experience such difficulty in rolling the cannon to Cap Noir that the goal would not be worth the effort involved. For, it would be necessary to proceed around the harbor, cross the marsh, and remove the French from near the streams and hills. Lastly, Verrier felt that it was doubtful that any battery on Cap Noir would be sufficient to oppose one of greater calibre which could be brought to range along the face of the Princess Bastion. [417]

Bouchert also an_engineer, had been ordered in 1743 to make an experiment on Cap ,Ioir to determine its composition. With a brigade of five miners, he placed a mine 12 pouces deep into the hill. It would found that the surface of the rock was very hard, but the interior was no harder than the earth which had been taken from the ditch. Lowering Cap Noir, therefore would not be an impossible task. [418]

Unconvinced by Verrier's arguments, DuQuesnel and Bigot thought that levelling Cap Noir would be the wiser course. However, a different line of action was followed, and the French worked all during 1744 to construct a battery on the right face of the Princess Bastion to beat against the hill. [419]

There are references which indicate that the English had maaged to place a battery on Cap Noir during the first siege. [420] Realizing, therefore, the advantage of the hill to a besieger, the English exhibited concern over it when they took possession of the Fortress in 1745. They considered building a redoubt on Cap Noir connected with the fortifications by a covert way. [421] Bastide, however, felt that fortifying Cap Noir would be expensive and would require more men than they had available. He suggested blowing it up or raising the stone by quarrying since material would be needed for raising the face of the Princess Bastion to a height sufficient to command the hill. [422] During 1745, work was done toward placing a battery on the right face of the Bastion. [423] And, in 1748 the French reported that , the English had made a battery of two cannon on Cap Noir. [424]

With the appointment of Franquet to Louisbourg in 1750, the realization of the danger presented by Cap Noir spread to the engineers. In October he reported that the fortifications of Louisbourg had been constructed according to Vauban's system with all the works mutually flanking each other except for the Dauphin and Princess Bastions. The latter, he noted, could be entirely ruined by fire from Cap Noir. [425]

Though he did not share Verrier's confidence with regard to Cap Noir, Franquet was not so awed by the presence of the hill that he could not see some virtue in its existence. The French, he felt, should take advantage of Cap Noir and use it for their own benefit. Rather than lower Cap Noir, he wished to build upon it. The Princess Bastion would then cease to be the weakest part of the fortifications. The redoubt he proposed would
have protected on the right everything from the Princess to the Maurepas Bastion, and on the left everything to the King's Bastion. All enemy trenches would have been enfiladed. [426]

Franquet warned that none of the above advantages would accrue if the hill were razed, [427] and that if the latter course were chosen, the works would have to be greatly reenforeed. [428] The extent of the area exposed to Cap Noir, he said, was too large and the defenses too weak to leave matters as they stood. [429]

Despite Franquet's arguments, the decision was reached in 1752 to lower Cap Noir and use the materials obtained from its destruction to help in the reenforcing of the existing fortifications and the constructing of a demi-lune and contregard opposite the Porte de la Reine. [430] An advocate of the system of redoubts which had been proposed by himself and Franquet, Governor Raymond [431] ordered the destruction of Cap Noir haulted soon after it was begun in 1753. It was said that he did this "on the pretext" that he had received no ad hoc order to lower the hill. The men taken from this project were then used to search for gold in some mines said to be located in the area. It did not appear that any work on Cap Noir would be done during the winter of 1753. [432] Before the work at Cap Noir had been stopped, 200 L of powder had been consumed. [433]

The Minister wrote in 1754 reaffirming the Court's intention of razing the hill, and adding that if it were found that the earth taken from it was not suitable for filling the ramparts and parapets, the earth necessary for these projects was to be taken from wherever Franquet might see fit. Regardless of the quantity of earth it might yield, however, the destruction of Cap Noir was to be completed. [434] Apparently the difficulties with Raymond had been resolved by the orders from the home government, for, by August of 1754, it was reported that the hill was well on its way to being destroyed. Work progressing quickly, there was reason to hope that little would be left for the next year. [435]

In November of 1754 Franquet reported that up to that point 1650 L of powder had been used in blowing up Cap Noir, and that 2455 L of iron for the tools needed in the demolition had been supplied by the store at Louisbourg. [436] He also presented an interesting list of tools and expenses which the project required. [437] It read:

4369 3/4 days used to blast and clear away the rock at 30 sols a day
51 wheelbarrows at 9" each
28 pickaxes at 4" each
100 wooden shovels at 12 sols each
22 planks 10 pieds long and 2 pouces thick at 24 sols each
9 buckets for removing water from the cavities in the rock at 30 sols each
Repairs to 90 wheelbarrows
595 tool handles at 5 sols each
To sharpen 9 L of common steel at 15 sols a livre
the tools 9 L of German steel at 20 sols a livre
4 measures of tin to measure the powder at 20 sols each
Sharpened 21 picks at 25 sols each
Heated 349 picks at 10 sols each
Resharpened 40 drill bits at 2" 10 sols each
Heated 585 drill bits at 15 sols each
Heated 610 drill heads at 5 sols each
Welded 85 drills at the middle at 20 sols each
Resharpened 47 needle bits at 2" 10 sols each
Heated 531 needle bits at 15 sols each
Heated 47 heads of the said needles at 5 sols each
Welded 2 needles at 20 sols each
Straightening one needle
Sharpened ends of 17 sledge hammers at 3" each
Heated 64 ends of the handles of hammers at 10 sols each
Heated 5 large ends of pliers at 15 sols
Heated 37 ends of sledge hammers at 20 sols
Heated the small end on one plier
Heated a "bouroir"
Welded two scraping tools at 10 sols
Extended 7 bolts from wheelbarrows of 3 pouces at 10 sols
For supplying 15 boring tools of different lengths
4 scrapping tools at 4" each
Sharpened 3 boring tools at 5 sols each
Making 22 L 1/12 weight of iron used in a "bouroir" and 2 wedges at 6 sols a livre
Making 2683 L 1/2 weight of iron at 30" the quintal
For a hatchet and knife proper for mines
For the hut 907 pieds of boards 1 pouce thick for the miners at 60" the "milieu"
and conductors 500 nails at 40 sols a hundred
on the work. a lock
                        6 days wages for master carpenters at 3" each
                        5 days wages for journeymen at 2" 10 sols each
                        Transporting of wood

6554: 12: 6:
459:
112:
    60:
    26: 8:
    13: 10:
159: 10:
148: 15:
      6: 15:
      9:
      4:
    26: 5:
174: 10:
100:
438:
152: 10:
    85:
117: 10:
398: 5:
    11: 15:
     2:
          10:
    51:
    32:
      3: 15:
    37:
           5:
          15:
      1:
      3: 10:
    41: 10:
    16:
           15:
      6: 12: 6:
805: 1:
      8:
    54: 8: 4:
    10:
     6:
    18:
    12: 10:
      7: 10:

____________
11077: 12: 4:

It had been planned that part of the material for the works being done would be obtained from the digging of the ditches of the demi-lune and the contregard. However, these diggings had produced more rocks than earth, necessitating the removal of earth from a "rideau" [438] located to the right of Cap Noir. Excavations of 4 pieds were planned, the needed materials including palisades thus becoming available. Also, the obstruction which this rideau presented parallel to the landward fortifications would be done away with. [439]

Fearing Cap Noir themselves, the French managed to instill a feeling of respectful caution in the hearts of the English during the 1750's. Reports of French preparedness, especially in connection with the fortifying of Cap Noir, caused the English to consider carefully the danger of the hill to themselves as assailants rather than to the French as defenders of Louisbourg. A few examples of the testimony received by the English in 1757 will suffice to illustrate the extent of the image the French had succeeded in creating:

Though the above references may seem to be superfluous, they are of interest because the French, for their part, spoke little of Cap Noir during the same period. No reference was made to the construction of anything on top of Cap Noir. It was stated that during the first nine months of 1757, eight quintals of powder had been consumed in the destruction of the hill. [451] Also, mention was made of an order given by Comte Bois de la Motte for the erection of a battery en barbette on the seashore to cover behind the rocks of Cap Noir and to fire upon ships between the hill and Isle Verte. This was to hold three cannon and was to be situated some distance from Cap Noir, not on the hill itself. [452]

In May of 1758 Prévost, the Intendant, said that the French had begun a new retrenchment between Point Blanche and Cap Noir which was to be defended by cannon. [453] Most likely, Franquet was speaking of the same work when he wrote two days later that because of the four large coves found along the coast between Point Blanche and Cap Noir, they had decided to erect some redans on the points of land to flank [454] the said coves. These works were to hold some small cannon. [454]

As for the battery on Cap Noir itself, there does not appear to have been one during 1757. The French could not have left the old English battery in place while they were engaged in demolishing the hill. And, as was said, they did not record having built a new one when the demolition was completed. The English sources of information either had vivid imaginations or had expanded upon hearsay evidence as it passed from one person to another.

Three French journals make clear that their authors were in favor of a redoubt on Cap Noir which would be out of the reach of cannon. The enemy not being able to turn or batter this work, it would prevent anyone from advancing toward the city. If the attacker wished to move on the fort, he would be flanked by the redoubt. Likewise, if he were to attempt to storm the redoubt, he would be flanked by the fire of the landward fortifications. [455] It is obvious that the three authors lamented the fact that such a work was not in existence at the time of their writing - July 7, 1758.

On July 2 a proposal to make, from quarry stone, a retrenchment before Cap Noir was disclosed. [456] This plan was not considered feasible by LaHouiliere, commander of the garrison at Louisbourg, who wished to defend Cap Noir by frequent sorties if the English were inclined to move in its direction. [457]

Two days later it was reported that the French had placed a retrenchment made of stone end holding 2 pieces of 4 calibre cannon at Cap Noir. [458] Exactly where this was is not indicated, but it may be presumed that it was again situated off to a side of the hill. This assumption is made because on July 8, for the first time, the French announced that they had decided to erect some kind of work at Cap Noir. The proposed work was to hold 4 twelve pound cannon. The engineers, Governor Drucour declared, had traced the plans, and work was to start immediately. [459]

By the 11th of the month the retrenchment had been raised almost to its full height in dry stones. Palisades had been carried to the area for use in the work. [460] Londes, in his diary, claimed that the retrenchment extended from Cap Noir to opposite the left traverse of the demi-lune, probably the left traverse of the salient place of arms. This, he said, was a distance of 80 to 100 toises. [461]

Bastide, on examining the condition of Louisbourg after the siege, described the "Communication" to Cap Noir as a covert way from the foot of the glacis of the demi-lune to the sea. With improvement, he felt, the work would be a considerable hindrance to an enemy's access to the coast if such an attempt were made. Having been built during the siege, the retrenchment was only as secure as the haste in such projects permitted. [462]

Most of the plans from 1758 and one from 1759 show the retrenchment built by the French. Not all of the representations are the same, disagreeing with one another on one or several details:

All the while the French were engaged in the construction of the retrenchment for the protection of Cap Noir, the English were not idle. On July 3, 1758 it was reported that they were at work perfecting a battery to the right of Cap Noir. [463] The besiegers stated that their wish was to remove some of the advance cannon said to be in the area around the hill. And, three French journals of the siege reported on July 5 that the English
seemed intent upon directing their attack against Cap Noir. [465] The next day Amherst himself claimed that the English had forced some French troops back to Cap Noir with "smart fire". [466] On the 10th of July, Captain Spry erected a 4 gun battery to drive the French from their place at its foot . [467] And, though Amherst declared on July 13 that possession of Cap Noir would be of no consequence, the English continued to fire in that
direction. [469]

The plans show an English battery directing its fire toward the Cap Noir retrenchment. It is stated on one of the plans that the battery held 4 six pound cannon and had been erected on the 16th of the month. [470] The other plan [471] gave no particulars, but the lines indicate that there were at least two guns there.

The dimensions of the retrenchment were not to be found in the documents. It is likely that however high the wall itself was, it was topped with palisades. [472] Upon surrender, it was reported that there were 2 cannon of 12 pounds and 2 of 6 pounds at Cap Noir. The former had been brought there at the completion of the retrenchment, but the latter had been there at least as early as July 6 when the English recorded their having been fired. [473]

The hospitals of Amherst's, Anthruther's and Bragg's regiments and of the garrison of Louisbourg were moved to Cap Noir by General Amherst in August of 1758. [474] A detachment of the Company from St. John's' was quartered in houses erected at Cap Noir. [475]

The fortifying of Cap Noir, belated as it was, did not prevent the fall of Louisbourg for the second time. In the course of the years the presence of this hill had so intimidated both English and French alike that they repeatedly sought to remake the Princess Bastion so that it would not lay open to an enemy's fire. For some unexplainable reason the idea of using the hill for their own advantage failed to win favor with those in whose hands the last decision lay. If Amherst was sincere in his statement that the taking of Cap Noir would be of no consequence, the French must be considered to have been successful in their attempts to protect the area around the Princess Bastion. As far as is known, the Bastion was untouched by enemy fire in the course of the second siege. When the time came for considering where a final stand might be taken, the French repeatedly mentioned the Princess Bastion as the best place were it not for its small size. [476] It is ironic that so much time and effort had been expended to fortify one section of the Fortress while the other weak point was left virtually at the mercy of the enemy. It must have taken the English little time to observe that their chances of success were greater at the Dauphin Bastion. That the French were foolish in concentrating on the east side of the city, while neglecting the vulnerable west side, can never be said with absolute certainty. However, it would seem that had the French been able to fortify and hold Cap Noir, the east side would have been safe and the network of fortifications needed at the Dauphin front might have been built.