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Researching the Fortress of Louisbourg National Historic Site of Canada
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J.S. McLennan, Louisbourg: From Its Foundation To Its Fall (Sydney: Fortress Press, 1969), Chapter 5

© Fortress Press

Louis XV. attained his majority on February 17, I723. The policy of Du Bois, friendly to England, was succeeded by that of Fleury, more widely pacific. Many years of peace were unmarked by any incidents like that of Canso, which with a more spirited Minister would have led to action, the consequences of which might have been felt far beyond the confines of this little colony. 

The immediate effect on it of the King's majority was the substitution for the Navy Board of Maurepas as Minister of the Navy. To his hands, those of a young man of twenty-two, were entrusted the affairs of the vast colonial empire as well as the navies of France.[1] No striking change took place in Isle Royale in consequence of this change at Court. The definite selection of Louisbourg as the chief place of the colony had improved its position. Its population increased, but to a less degree than that of the outports. The growth was 

Louisbourg         Other Places
1718    ....    568 815
1720 .... 733 1181
1723 .... 795 1102
1726 .... 951 2180

The number of places at which settlements were made also increased. In 1718 outside of Louisbourg there were apparently only four places, while in I726 there were settlements of more or less importance in thirteen other localities, the most important of which was Ninganiche (Ingonish), which did not exist in 1720, [2]but in 1726 was much larger than any other place, except Louisbourg, and put out more than twice as many fishing-boats as that port. Four years later the number of settlements was eighteen. While Ingonish was a successful competitor in fishing, in general commerce which employed larger vessels Louisbourg quite surpassed any of the outports or, indeed, all of them together. Of the sixty-one vessels which came from France in I726, 


1. For the character of Maurepas see Chap. XV. 
2. G1, 467.


thirty-nine came thither ; of fifty-seven from Canada, the West Indies, New England, and Nova Scotia, all came to the port of Louisbourg.[1] 

During these years, Isle Royale, like the northern colonies of Britain, suffered from the ravages inflicted by pirates on the commerce of the high seas. The increase in the number of these freebooters, brought about by the disbanding of the men-of-war's men after the Peace of Utrecht, produced its effects in these waters. It will be remembered that, as evidence of the sad condition of Louisbourg in 1715, St-Ovide feared that after the leaving of the King's ships it would lie defenceless to the attacks of pirates. 

In the autumn of 1721 the authorities at Louisbourg were dismayed to find that in the town there was no powder or shot, when the pirates were on the coast, and the inhabitants were so badly armed that St. Ovide drew the attention of the authorities to their state. Their condition, in the face of what was real danger, apparently led them to tempt the soldiers to sell their muskets, which the authorities punished with a fine of 200 £. The following year Phillips sent an officer to warn the authorities that a pirate brigantine and schooner were on the eastern coast of Acadia, and had taken ten or twelve vessels. [2] A vessel of St. Malo on the coast of Isle Royale was taken by a pirate schooner, her rigging destroyed, her yards broken, and she was ordered to return to France. She reached Scatari after sixteen days, and reported the outrage to the authorities at Louisbourg. Further havoc was done by a vessel of seventy or eighty tons, eight cannon, sixteen swivels, and one hundred and fifty men. In 1720 the ship of Captain Carey, from London to Boston, near the Grand Banks, was plundered by a pirate of twenty-six guns with a consort of ten. The loss was £8000. Carey brought in the report that they had destroyed the Newfoundland fishery. [3] 

So serious was the menace that Bourville, acting Governor after St. Ovide had left for France in 1721, found it necessary to fortify Louisbourg, a town of a thousand people, with a garrison of three hundred against an attack by pirates.[4] He mounted seven large guns of twenty-four pounds on the island, seven near the fortifications, and six at the ancient fort, the site of the first settlement. 

Throughout this period, apparently some of the freebooters, whose names have been preserved to history, and throw a lurid glare over modern fiction, left the richer commerce of the West Indies to come northwards to plunder on the coasts of New England, Acadia, and Isle Royale. The force of some of those vessels was so great that it could not have been sent out by the other 


1. Its people also owned most of the vessels used for coasting. 
2. I.R. vol. 6, p. 22. 
3. Shute to the Lords of Trade, Boston, August 19, C.O. 5/868. 
4. Bourville had become King Lieutenant in succession to de Beaucours.


pirates who also preyed on this commerce. These were outlaws largely from English fishing vessels frequenting the coasts of Newfoundland, who had been turned adrift for insubordination or drunkenness, or had deserted on account of low wages and poor fare. Their head-quarters were at Cape Ray. While possibly the majority of them were English, their rendezvous received accessions from the French and became the " cave of Adullam " of these coasts. Fishermen stole the boats and gear of their masters, notably from Ingonish. De Mezy's exalted position did not prevent one of his boats being stolen from under his windows. All such malefactors joined the outlaws. They plundered vessels on the Grand Banks and on the coasts of Newfoundland. Although the site of their settlement was known, and the British Government sent out regularly vessels to protect its commerce against the pirates, and a joint French and English expedition was contemplated, no steps were taken to break it up. Throughout the whole period of Louisbourg's history, while the freebooters in its immediate neighbourhood disappeared, both French and English men-of-war visited the fishermen on the Grand Banks, for the purpose of protecting them from pirates. [1]

The incident which marked these years was a shipwreck which de Mezy described as the most frightful which he had known in the five and thirty years of his seafaring life.[2] 

The rock-bound coast of Isle Royale is, to the eastward of Louisbourg, free for some distance from outlying dangers. Near Cape Breton, its eastern extremity, currents, which are at times impetuous, rush round the low island of Porto Nova and other rocks and shoals, and so make impossible a safe approach to this shore.[3] At this time, August 1725, the inhabitants of these hamlets, some six or eight score, most of whom were at Baleine, took refuge before nightfall of the 25th, in their rude huts ("cabannes"), from an east-southeast gale which blew furiously on this coast, the steep-pitched beaches of which mark the force of the seas. It was ten the next morning before any of them ventured out, and they found in the sea-wrack on the shore the wreckage of a large vessel. Among it were pulleys marked with fleur de lys, which, when this news was brought to Louisbourg on the following day, the 27th, indicated to the authorities that a King's ship had been lost near Baleine. De Mezy himself, de Bourville, Major of the troops, and Sabatier the Comptroller, at once set


1. The lesser value of the commerce of the North made it unnecessary for the pirates to obtain a foothold on this coast, although at more than one place in Nova Scotia and Cape Breton are legends of the buried treasure of Captain Kidd. Rhode Island is the most northern of the colonies whose officials and citizens were accused of complicity in this piracy ; the French certainly had no share in it. See Weeden, passim, Channing, vol. ii. 
2. The intimate connection of colonial administration with the Navy is shown in his expression in writing to a minister who knew his record, " depuis trente cinq ans que je vais & la mer," although in many of these years he served in the colonies. 
3. The small harbours of Grand and Petit Lorambec, and Baleine, afford shelter to only smaller craft.


out. They found along the coast, from Grand Lorambec to Baleine, the beach strewn with wreckage, among which was the figure-head which identified the vessel as the Chameau, which, under command of M. de St. James, was carrying supplies, money, and dispatches, together with a distinguished passenger list, to Quebec. The first bodies found were those of Chazel, the newly appointed Intendant of Canada; the ship's pilot, Chointeau, and one which they believed was that of young de Lages, son of de Ramezay, Governor of Montreal. Papers came ashore, among them the patent of Chazel. These victims were but the forerunners of many. In two days, forty more were found by men of the three detachments which had been promptly formed to make salvage of what came ashore. The wreck was indeed complete ; the ill-fated ship, evidently under sail, had been carried over the outlying reefs. She at once broke up ; part of her starboard side came ashore with the main mast and its rigging ; another part of the side side with the mizzen mast was found nearly a mile farther along the coast. The suddenness of the disaster was made evident by the fact that most of the bodies were undressed. The fury of the sea was shown by the fact that from the live stock carried on her, not even a pig came ashore alive ; " les cochons mesmes qui nagent si bien sont venus morts à la coste." Among the victims who were recognized were two officers of Canada, de Morrion and Pachot, but if L'Hermitte's body was found it was not identified, and De Pensens, who was at one time thought to be on board, had not sailed. The missionary priest at Baleine buried one hundred and eighty ; the total loss was three hundred and ten. 

The authorities acted with effectiveness in this disaster. They advised those of Quebec, and arranged to lend them ammunition and money from the Louisbourg supplies which were coming on the Dromedary. There was no sign of the after part of the ship having come ashore, so it was hoped that some salvage might be made of her guns and treasure, particularly as the rock on which she broke up was covered at low tide by only a few feet of water. Detachments were kept posted along the shore to save what wreckage they could, their men being promised a share of whatever was found. The next season some soldiers who were skilful divers were sent from Quebec and were employed at the wreck. They were in charge of Sabatier and of young Le Normant, then acting as clerk under his father. They lodged in an abandoned house of Carrerrot, a merchant of Louisbourg. It was roofless, except for one room. It had been occupied by his sister, Madame La Salle, a sprightly lady to whose attractions Le Normant lightly refers, and to whom he and Sabatier sent a message of esteem and gratitude in his letter to " Monsieur mon très cher Père." Morpain conducted the actual operations, which were carried on in September, Le Normant whiling away his spare time by shooting when bad weather interrupted the work. He sent to his father the game which he got, and in his last letter from Baleine ends his requisition for supplies with " five or six days of good weather or an order to return." The latter came in due course. No more striking contrast in circumstances is connected with Louisbourg than that between young Le Normant in Baleine and Le Normant at the head of the Navy in attendance on the King, and belonging to the party of Madame de Pompadour.[1] Further search was abandoned, but the wreck left its mark on the colony, although no one connected with it was lost, for almost the latest French maps mark, on the bleak shore of the cove, the cemetery of those of its victims which the sea gave up. It lived in the memory of the French of Isle Royale as the August gale of 1873 is still before the people of Cape Breton, and when two heavy gales in November 1726 swept Louisbourg with great damage, it was vividly recalled to its people. 

Isle Royale was at this time, thirteen years after its foundation, described as a colony beginning to be considerable. Its commerce with the West Indies had by 1726 become important, as had its trade with France and Quebec. Its principal export, after fish, was its coal, followed in value by furs gathered at Louisbourg from Nova Scotia. 

The trade suffered from a scarcity of ready money not seriously felt within the colony, but for example making trade difficult with Quebec, whither the merchants of Louisbourg had to send cash to pay the duties on goods they exported to Canada. 

The regulations which in the earliest stage governed trade between France and her colonies, established by the Edict of  1716 were irksome. Vessels could sail for the colonies from only a few of the ports of France. [2] Bonds had to be given that they would return to the port of departure. [3] The destination had to be named before leaving, and a certificate produced, after the round voyage was finished, that the vessel had been at the port named. This restricted freedom in seeking markets, and in taking advantage of the triangular trade, which for so long was the normal course of shipping between Europe and America. This was modified by an edict in October 1727 , [4] which provided that no foreign product, except Irish salt beef loaded at a port of France, should be admitted to Canada or the West Indies, and that none of their products should go directly to a foreign country, with the exception of refined sugars to Spain. Foreign 


1. The value, about 6000 £., of the salvage from the Chameau was trifling, although she bad on board 289,696 £ in cash, for the expenses of Canada (I.R. B, vol. 48, f. 862). 
2. e.g. Sables d'Olonne then a fishing port, not, as now, a watering-place, had to apply to the Conseil de Commerce for this privilege. Previously to its being granted its outfitters had to pay local imposts on the goods they sent out, which they brought to their port from Bordeaux (Arch. Nat. F, 12, vol. 75). 
3. Dugard Le Vieux of Rouen was hampered by this regulation, which was modified on his application. The Conseil generally decided in favour of freedom of trade (Arch. Nat. F, 12, vol. 87). 
4. Isambert, Recueil, vol. 26.


vessels were not permitted to enter a port in the colonies nor come within a league of them, under penalty of confiscation, and a fine of 1000 £. Officers were ordered to seek them out, and men-of-war and privateers to capture foreigners or French vessels engaged in illicit commerce. An elaborate scale of division of the proceeds of such confiscation was established, the only relaxation on humanitarian ground of the stringency of these regulations being that a vessel in distress could take refuge only in a port where there was a garrison.

A later chapter [1] deals with the lack of balance of the trade which centred at Louisbourg. The defiance or ignoring of the regulations made by distant authorities, enforced in many cases by officials who had a personal interest in illicit trade, was as important a factor in the economic conditions as official regulations.

If the margin of profit is adequate, any trade will be carried on in defiance of law. Vessels from the British colonies had been permitted to come to Isle Royale from time to time, until, under pressure of necessity in 1726, a proclamation was issued permitting the importation from them of building materials, live cattle, poultry, etc., but prohibiting everything else.[2] This opened one door, for the returns of the permitted vessels would indicate that none of them carried full cargoes, the balance of their lading would be contraband goods. Others apparently depended on corruption, and made no colour of being on a legitimate voyage. We have the record of an agreement made in 1724 at Boston between three merchants, - " Johonnot," P. Evarts, Hough, and one Pierre Grouard, - who undertook to sell the lading of the schooner Hirondelle and purchase a cargo of fish and bring back in money or taffetas [3] any balance for a commission of 6 per cent. The Hirondelle was seized at Rimouski, suspected of spying. Grouard and others were imprisoned, and were the occasion of charges of official improprieties, and a conflict of jurisdiction .[4] While this cargo went to the Gulf of the St. Lawrence there is no reason to believe that a similar method of doing business was not carried on with Louisbourg, and that the merchants named were the only ones in Boston who conducted trade with the French colonies in this fashion. The ledger of one of the most important of them, Mr. Faneuil, contains may entries of transactions with merchants of Louisbourg. The evidence of Newton, the collector of Customs at Canso, makes this reasonably certain, for in no year during the period under consideration did the number of vessels declared as from British ports come to as many as he says was the normal number. He wrote, as follows, in speaking of eighteen vessels then in that port : 

" They will without any Restraint Load and carry from thence to several Ports in his 


1. Chap. XII. 
2. 1728, I.R. vol. 10, f. 4.
3. This is so printed. It unquestionably means tara (rum). 
4. MSS. Que. vol. 3, p. 106, and B, 48 (Canada).


Majtys Plantations, Brandy, Wine, Iron, Sail Cloth, Rum, Molasses & several other French Commoditys with which there is from 8o to 90 Sail generally Load with in a Year, these Vessels generally carry Lumber, Bricks & live stock there, they commonly clear out for Newfoundland, tho never design to go farther than Lewisburg, often they sell their vessels as well as Cargoes." 

The prosperous farmers of Nova Scotia shared in a simple way in trade with Louisbourg. Their shipments were made mostly from Bale Verte on the Gulf coast, although there are instances of vessels of ten tons making the long voyage from the Bay of Fundy to Louisbourg. Ordinarily they were not interfered with, and Verville's theory that the Acadians were of more value to Isle Royale where they were, than if they had migrated, was borne out. At times Armstrong, then in charge of Nova Scotia, attempted to stop this intercourse, and on one occasion his reply to St. Ovide being unsatisfactory, de Pensens was sent to him to declare that they would arm a ship to prevent him making seizures on the high seas. He desisted in face of this threat, which would have been proved, in the contrary case, to have been empty, for Maurepas refused permission to fit out this vessel.[1] 

The entrepôt which should flourish by freedom of exchange, foreseen by Raudot, was struggling with the enactments of its rulers to come into existence. The furniture and axes [2] which New England sent there, the winnowing machines with which Louisbourg supplied Quebec, the rum and molasses, the sail cloth and iron she exported to the British colonies, none of them her own production, indicate his sureness of judgment as to the proper foundation for a flourishing colony situated on Isle Royale. The scanty records of the trade which are available make tenable the hypothesis that had the civil population of Louisbourg been left untrammelled to develop its commercial possibilities, it would have been so prosperous and populous an establishment that its later history would have been entirely different. 

Raudot's views were as far in advance of his time as was the commercial Treaty of Utrecht, the provisions of which waited until the younger Pitt in 1787 forced them through an unwilling House of Commons. Maurepas' objections to this trade were held in common with all his contemporaries, and the ineffectiveness of his opposition was probably owing to his lack of force rather than a philosophic acquiescence in a state of affairs which was theoretically wrong, but practically extremely profitable. In at least one instance he connived in it. When Ste. Marie was pressing, in 1724, for repayment of his expenses, 1893 £, incurred in 17I8-19 in visiting Boston, Maurepas wrote to St. Ovide that Ste. Marie brought back goods presumably to sell, and rejected the claim.[3] 

In the earlier days of the colony the merchants of France objected to it, for 


1. I.R. vol. 8. 
2. 1100 in 1740. 
3 I.R. vol. 39, B, vol. 48, f. 716.


their chief business was the sale of commodities to the new settlers, later they were silent on the subject. The merchants of Louisbourg objected from time to time, notably in 1728, and again ten years later. On the former occasion St. Ovide was accused with full details of carrying on this trade through De Pensens, under the names of Dacarette and Lartigue. It appeared as if Maurepas intended to take some action, for he wrote to De Mezy sending a list of questions about the trade, with the assurance that his reply would be confidential, so that he might not be restrained by the fear of incriminating St. Ovide.[1] De Mezy replied on the 30th of November and the 2nd of December, in some fashion which was satisfactory to the Minister. His replies unfortunately are not extant. St. Ovide contented himself with a short denial. 

In 1738 an anonymous letter was forwarded to the Minister on this commerce and its abuses.[2] It was followed by a new attack against Du Vivier which goes into detail. It says he bought the cargoes of two French vessels which he resold ; that he took a cargo of molasses which he sent to Boston in partnership with Faneuil, who had traded with Louisbourg through one Morel ; that they took money from the country, as they sold for cash ; that they put in quarantine a vessel from Martinique on account of smallpox, because two vessels of Du Vivier arrived shortly afterwards ; that Du Vivier forestalled the market by having early news from Quebec ; and they did not hesitate to say that Le Normant was interested in Du Vivier's transactions ; and that they enriched themselves by taking provisions from the King's stores in the autumn, selling them at a high price, and replacing them the following year when they were cheap. 

But however the trade was carried on, it was unquestionably large, profitable, and essential to Isle Royale. The real complaint of its merchants was of the competition of military and civil officials, whose influence and command of information gave them great advantages. The only people to suffer were the Admiralty officials, who found their confiscations overruled by the Governor and the Commissaire-Ordonnateur. Ship-owners benefited by full cargoes. None of them were placed at a disadvantage except vessels with letters of marque, which, relying on the edict of 1727, made these captures. 

In trade, like the fishing at Canso before the incursion of Smart, all things were peaceable and quiet, the French and English in defiance of the laws trading "together in all amity and love," a happier state than in the West Indies, where mutual savagery brought on the war between England and Spain. But the protests of Mr. Newton to his Government, the prohibition of Maurepas to his officials, both disregarded, caused less irritation than the guarda costas and the pirates of Jamaica. Thus prohibited trade in Northern waters led to a friendly 


1. I.R. B, 52, f. 605, 607
2. I. R. Vol. 20, f. 311. See Appendix. 


intercourse between Isle Royale and the sea-ports of the Puritans, not to mutilations which inflamed against the Spaniard both the humanity and the patriotism of England. [1]

The fishermen had in the earliest times placed on the knoll of the eastern side of the harbour a beacon to serve as a guide to its entrance. This proved unsatisfactory as the commerce of the port grew, and it was visited by other ships than those of its ordinary trade. The first foreign ship, other than English, which visited the port, was the Spaniard, Nostra Signora de la Toledo, homeward bound from Havana. [2] Three years later the Mercury, a ship of the French East India Company, came into Louisbourg with sixty men ill of scurvy, who in the pure air of Isle Royale soon became convalescent. When the project for a lighthouse, to take the place of the beacon, was seriously considered, the difficulty of landing coal for its fire was an objection to the best site. The home authorities proposed on this account placing the light on the clock tower of the citadel, but this project was fortunately abandoned, and the lighthouse was erected on the eastern side of the harbour, where its ruins are still to be seen. It was first lit in 1734, and the statement is that it was visible for six leagues at sea. It was burned oil the night of the 11th of September 1736, but was immediately rebuilt of fireproof materials. [3]

St. Ovide and De Mezy acted in harmony in only one matter-their efforts to restrict the excessive consumption of intoxicants. Although De Mezy was effective in the steps taken in connection with the Chameau, the laxity of administration in his department shortly thereafter became evident, through the death of Des Goutins the Treasurer. St. Ovide insisted on having particulars of De Mezy's accounts, which he was asked to approve, and of verifying the contents of the Treasurer's chest. It was found empty. Nevertheless, De Mezy took offence at what he considered an interference with his rights. He took high ground in writing to the Minister. He expressed his extreme repugnance, after " thirty-seven years of service, to submitting his documents to a naval officer, who, although meritorious and of easy intercourse, has neither the experience, nor other qualities superior to his in a matter concerning my administration." [4]

Maurepas did not accept his views, but replied that he was wrong in putting the blame on Des Goutins when his own accounts should have been better 


1. Camb. History, vol. vi. p. 24.
2. August 10, 1726. 
3. In the new lighthouse the light was supplied from forty-five " pots " (about twenty-two and a half gallons of oil), fed through thirty-one pipes in a copper circle to the wicks which gave the flame. As this oil was held in an open bronze basin, three feet in diameter, and ten inches deep, there was constant danger of fire. This was provided against by sustaining this ring on pieces of cork, which, if fire took place, would burn through and let the ring fall into the oil where it would be extinguished. No wood was used in the construction of the tower. 
4. " À un officer de guerre qui quoique homme de mérite, et de très bonne société, n'a ni l'usage, ni les services, ni autres qualité supéricures à moi dans une affairs de mon ministère " (vol. 9, Nov. 24, 1727). 


kept.[1] De Mezy admitted that his books were not in perfect order, his excuse being that the entire financial business for the year was transacted in the fortnight following the arrival of the King's ship with remittances. He further excused himself by saying that the records were in extremely bad order when he came to the colony, and that it had taken them some time to correct them. This is borne out by the documents themselves. By 1724 they are much fuller, and on the surface appear more accurate than in the earlier years of the colony.

But the disregard of instructions was evident in more serious ways than book-keeping. De Mezy admitted having disobeyed orders about rations, not without justification, for he says he had given food from the King's stores to four widows who were destitute, but that hereafter he would execute orders without mercy. Without any charge having been made against him, he assures the Minister that the only funds he can touch are those of the extraordinary expenditures 15,000 or 20,000 livres. He was largely responsible for so important an edict as that of October 1727, in reference to Colonial Trade, not being registered or put in force in Louisbourg until October 1730. [2] Other tangible evidence, of neglect of royal instructions was before the eyes of all. An ordinance had been passed establishing the width of the quay, and another forbidding building within 350 toises of the fortifications, yet in a few years one cronier had built a stone house within the prohibited distance, and there were also encroachments on the quay. This took place in so small a town that from any point on the ramparts every house could be seen. That the infraction of regulations, presumably important, could go so far under the eyes of the Governor, the Commissaire- Ordonnateur, and the Engineer, that it required ministerial action to stop it, illustrates the weakness of the system on which the French attempted to administer their colonial empire. 

Whether the complaints of the Minister against De Mezy, founded on these irregularities and his quarrels with St. Ovide, led to the change in his department, which was determined on by Maurepas, is uncertain. De Mezy had completed about forty years in the King's service, and when St. Ovide heard that he was to be succeeded he wrote to the Minister, saying that he trusted he would select a new Commissaire-Ordonnateur of a gentle disposition, with whom the merchants and people could carry on business in comfort.[3] The favourable impression the younger De Mezy (usually known as Le Normant) had made, or possibly family influence, led to his succeeding his father. [4] He had been in the colony during the greater part of his father's tenure of office, employed first as a subordinate, and then as principal clerk, and during his 


1. B, vols. 52 and 53. 
2. B, 55/570. 
3. I. R. vol. 12, Nov. 25, 1731. 
4. The De Mezys were of the family of that Le Normant who was the husband of Madame de Pompadour, and as a Fermier-General had great influence before she rose to power. Oct. 8, 1733 is the date on which young Le Normant wrote to Maurepas his thanks. The official appointments were made March 23, 1735. 


father's leave of absence had in his place administered the office. He was therefore well fitted by experience for the position. But he began his administration with the same quarrels with St. Ovide as had disturbed the relations between the Governor and his father, and in one of his first important acts he displayed a lack of judgment which seriously imperilled the well-being of the colony. 

In 1732 the Ruby came into port with smallpox on board. Although from time to time there had been regulations establishing a quarantine once against the plague which raged in Toulon and Marseilles, and at another against a pest in Boston, at this time no precautions were taken, or if taken were ineffective. 

The disease spread throughout the colony and many of all ages died, not only sailors and passengers of the ill-fated ship, but residents of the colony and soldiers of its garrison. The ship, however, proceeded to Quebec, leaving those who were sick on shore, replacing them by sailors taken from the merchant's vessels. Further misfortune followed the survivors, who late in the year were shipped to Quebec on a brigantine which was wrecked at Ingonish. This epidemic was followed by a famine, the cause of which Le Normant explained by the method by which the inhabitants supplied themselves. The earliest vessels to arrive were those of the Basque ports. Their captains lent the provisions of their large crews to the inhabitants. These people counted on returning them by purchases from the provisions brought from Canada. If this supply was short, it had for the greater part to be utilized in returning these borrowings, which the Basques required for their homeward voyage, instead of being retained by the inhabitants for consumption during the winter.[1] While the Quebec vessels were there in the summer the inhabitants, living on their borrowings, offered only meagre prices, and therefore, De Mezy said, fewer vessels came from Quebec. [2] This condition was aggravated, as the Quebec authorities explain, by a local regulation that Quebec vessels should not leave port without selling their cargoes. But whatever were the causes the situation was most serious in the autumn of 1733,[3] and with an optimism for which no grounds are shown, Le Normant delayed action. St. Ovide changed from the devotee of Costebelle's description, or justified by the gravity of the situation, says he trusted Providence less than Le Normant ; but it was not until St. Ovide declared that he would send a vessel to the Minister with a statement of their condition, brought about by Le Normant's refusal to supply funds to purchase supplies in New York, that the latter consented to take action.[4] Two 


1. I.R. vol. 14, f. 175. 
2 This is not borne out by the officials' returns which are available.
3. I.R. vol. 14, f. 126. 
4 " De vous seul monsieur dépend aujourd'huy la conservation ou la perte de cette colonie, que j'alois faire embarquer un officier le lendemain sur un batiment qui devait partir pour France & fin d'informer Mgr." (Nov. 14, 1733, vol. 14, f. 77).


small vessels, under charge of De Gannes and Bonnaventure, were sent late in the year for these supplies, New York being chosen in preference to Boston, where the plague had recently existed, but they did not return before spring, and the colony passed a winter in want, mitigated only by the opportune arrival of one vessel from Quebec and one from New England. 

In I734, at the beginning of the outbreak of war between France and the Emperor, the unsettled affairs on the continent gave rise to rumours of war with England, and St. Ovide took up the question of their relations with the New England colonies. He points out in a letter in cipher [1] to the Minister that the English, particularly those of New England, dislike the existence of Isle Royale as a French colony. He dwells on the necessity of being advised early of the outbreak of war, as it is important to take the offensive. In another letter he lays before the Minister the steps which they propose to take to protect themselves, which were to complete the fortifications between the citadel and the Dauphin battery, which, although projected from the first had not yet been carried out, and to protect, by chevaux de frise, the quay where a landing from boats could be made. He then gives his opinion of what might occur ; which was, that if England made an attack on Louisbourg it would be by New England militiamen, of whom he had not a high opinion ; that they would be supported by English men-of-war, and that they would come very early in the year in order to prevent the fishermen from France, or vessels of force from entering Louisbourg ; that they would not make their base at Port Dauphin or Bale des Espagnols as apparently some thought, as these points were too distant, but that the landing would be made in Gabarus or Miré bays. His plan of campaign, if the King intends the offensive, with all its advantages, is that two men-of-war and a frigate should be sent early in the year with four or five new companies for the garrison and six hundred regular troops and munitions of war. These, with volunteers from Louisbourg and Indians would make adequate force to take Annapolis Royal, if secrecy and celerity could be attained. He points out, notwithstanding the previous views he had expressed to the Minister, that the Acadians were not to be depended on. He informs him that Annapolis Royal [2] is in a wretched condition, a statement quite within the bounds of truth, and that the English in Canso are in such a poor condition that its commander has instructions to abandon the port at the outbreak of war. He intended further to supplement the force with the forty men of the garrison of Isle St. Jean, and the Indians of that island. He also assured the Minister that not only Placentia, but Boston, would easily fall before such an expedition. He 


1. Letters of St. O. to Minister, in particular Oct. 28, 1734 (I.R. vol. 15). 
2. The garrison of Annapolis and Canso was nine companies : 360 officers and men, five at Annapolis, four at Canso (1734, B.T.N.S. vol. 33, f. 361). "Canso lies naked and defenceless " (1734, A. & W.I. vol. 30). Kilby says Canso is so ill-prepared that 100 men could capture it in one hour (1743, A. & W.I. vol. 594). 


followed this by a second letter, saying that twenty companies are necessary, part of whom should be commanded by local officers ; repeated earnestly his request for munitions ; and referring to his forty-five years of service, said to the Minister that the experience of the past made him fear for the future. 

These representations, made ten years before the war broke out, so accurately forecast the course of events, that St. Ovide in 1745 might, with a sad satisfaction, have recalled to his associates the predictions which he made at this time. St. Ovide hoped, if there was no war, that in the troubled conditions France might again get possession of Acadia by exchange, for it would be of infinite importance to France. He based this hope on the indifference to Nova Scotia of the English Government, as shown by the continuous neglect of that province from 1710, the year of its capture, to 1734, the time of his writing in this strain. 

General matters of defence probably engaged the attention of the French authorities at this time. Chaussegros de Lery combated an idea, which he says was prevalent in France, that Louisbourg was the highway " le boulevard " to Quebec and Canada. He said that a naval expedition against Canada would require three squadrons, and that Quebec was more vulnerable by way of the woods. Were it not for the general policy of France in relation to her colonies during this period, it might be thought that the views of Chaussegros had more weight with the Minister than those of St. Ovide and his successors. In 1737 the colony again suffered from famine, but affairs had so far adjusted themselves that St. Ovide was able to go to France in the autumn of 1738, leaving, as before, the government in the hands of De Bourville, while Sabatier discharged the duties of Le Normant de Mezy, who was promoted to the Intendancy of St. Dominique, as the first step towards the highest position in the administration of the navy. (As Intendant-General he was practically joint Minister for the few months in which Massiac held the portfolio.) [1]

St. Ovide does not seem to have thought that he would not return to Isle Royale. Not long before that he had obtained a large grant at the head of the harbour, and more recently a splendid tract of land on the Miré River.[2] In the ordinary course of business, after his arrival in France, he wrote to the Minister about an increase in that garrison, and Maurepas in January said that he would await his suggestions before dealing with the question of promotions. [3] But between this time and March the Minister bad taken a more hostile and determined attitude than he had yet shown. St. Ovide went, or was summoned, to Versailles, and had a painful interview with Maurepas, who charged him with many faults. The Minister told him that he was acquainted with a transaction in which, it was said, that as far back as 1725 St. Ovide had a pecuniary interest in Ganet's 


1. La Cour-Gayet, pp. 211-217. 
2. 1737, B, 65, 451.- 
3. B, 68, f. 1.


contract for the fortifications.[1] St. Ovide admitted that the offer of a share had been made to him, but declared that he had declined it. He said the sworn testimony of two survivors of the transaction, Daligrand, a merchant of the town, and Ganet, the contractor, would bear out his statement. De Pensens, who was alleged to be his partner, had died, and the incident had become public through a clause in his will. The Minister does not seem to have been convinced by his explanations. The charges have this much prima facie evidence in their support, that it was through De Pensens, St. Ovide was said, in the accusations of 1728, to have carried on his illicit trading.[2] No further steps were taken, and St. Ovide, bearing his wounds [3] and the burden of his forty-seven years of service, was permitted to retire with a pension of 3000 livres. 

As a civil administrator he had little success, but the evils of his administration seemed to be as much due to the lack of discipline and inspection as to the personal faults of the man. His quarrels with both De Mezys, his slackness at the time of Smart's attack at Canso, the reiterated reports, some of them circumstantial, which were made of his complicity in illegal trade, were, beyond occasional reproofs and exhortations to amend his ways, ignored by Maurepas. During the whole period no report by an independent person seems to have been made on the condition of the colony. Those familiar with affairs can well picture the slackness and abuses which would exist in a distant establishment, uninspected for nearly a generation, from which no report of irregularity received more than a rebuke from the central administration. This laxity is the more astonishing as both the colonies and the navy were under the direction of Maurepas, and although the correspondence contains remarks on Louisbourg in the reports of the voyages [4] there is nothing to show that the Minister ever sought information as to conditions in the colonies from the captains of the ships he annually sent out. Whether this slackness was the result of indifference, incompetence, or hopelessness, the results were a demoralized administration and a stunted development. 


1. St. Ovide, April 4, vol. 21, p. 290. 
2. B, 52, f. 605. Cf. Appendix. 
3. These wounds were a shattered shoulder- blade received in an attack on St. John's, Newfounland, and three others received in action. 
4. Arch. Nat. Marine, B4.