J.S. McLennan, Louisbourg: From Its Foundation To Its Fall (Sydney: Fortress Press, 1969)

© Fortress Press

Chapter 15

The ineffectiveness of the French Navy in connection with the military events which occurred at Louisbourg is striking. These events were of such a character that the action of naval forces, as it seems to be in all conjoint operations, was of paramount importance. The French recognized these crises. Even at a time when their naval forces were lowest, they did their best to send a strong force to protect or recover Louisbourg. The fleet of D'Anville in 1746 was an Armada, that of Du Bois de la Motte in 1757 was superior to Holburne's. Had the plans of the Minister not miscarried, the naval force for the defence ill 1758 would have been less inferior to the fleet led by Boscawen to the attack on the position which held secure the French dominions in America. 

In these major operations nothing was accomplished adequate to the resources placed at the disposal of the French commanders. The inaction of Meschin in 1744, the disastrous lack of judgment of Maisonfort in 1745, the betrayal of Beaussier de l'Isle by his supporting ships in the conflict with the Grafton and Nottingham, less critical episodes, show the same inertia, slackness, or incompetence.

This condition, if we, the English-speaking, are not to fall back to the absurd point of view of the boys' book of adventure or the naval novel, demands explanation. 

The condition is summed up, from the practical standpoint, in the statement of a gallant French officer,[1] Coëtnempren de Kersaint, who fell in the Homeric fight at Quiberon. He wrote to the Minister in I755 : 

"The Deffenseur (a new 74) distinguished herself in our meeting with the English by sailing qualities superior to those of our other two ships. 'Tis a merit, my lord, in the heartrending necessity in which we find ourselves for so long a time, to fly at sea before the English, or to be overwhelmed by their numbers." [2] 

The general state of the French navy in the years we have been dealing with is shortly stated as a gradual decline. At the beginning of the eighteenth century it consisted 

1. "The best sailor that we had" (A French Account of Quiberon, Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 35,898).
2. Arch. Nat. Marine, B⁴, vol. 68. 

of  281 vessels, while that of England at the death of William III., in 1702, had 271 vessels. 

       In 1751                               Effective.                          Building. 
England had ............................    116                                      21 
France had ..............................      38                                      22 

In 1755 the forces were as follows, but it must be noted that the French included ships building, the English effective vessels : 

Guns.           110    100    90    80    74    72    70    64    60    54    50    Smaller. 
English .        1        5       13    8       5      0    29      0    39      3    28       112 
French .         0        0         0    6     21      1     4     31      2      0      6        32 

Seventy-one French ships mounted, therefore, 4790 guns, while 131 English ships mounted 8722 guns, not far from double the French strength. [1]

This was the deplorable weakness of the French at a time when a vast colonial empire was at stake, the prize of naval strength. The extent of that empire is measured by the fact, that not only off the coasts of Canada and among the West Indian Islands, but along the shores of India, thundered the broadsides which gave that empire to England. 

After the influence of Louvois overpowered that of Colbert in the councils of the Great Louis, European conquests alone appealed to the absolute Monarch. Under the Regent and the young Louis XV., the policy of the Cardinal- Ministers, Du Bois and Fleury, the one anxious to placate England, the other for peace, was to neglect the navy lest they should alarm and give offence to their only rival in overseas expansion. The consequences of that neglect were to some slight extent enhanced by the personal qualities of Maurepas, from 1723 to 1749, in full control of the navy. [2]

Maurepas knew the necessity to France of a strong navy. His memoir [3] states most ably this necessity. He, as a Minister, was the prototype of her Prime Ministers from his time to the Revolution. They knew that things were wrong, but were incapable of setting them right. A government, like an individual, exhausted by excess, retains insight into what should be done, long after the power to execute has failed. Maurepas accepted the trifle given for the navy and expended it judiciously. He was unwilling by a vigorous protest against a fatal parsimony to imperil the power, the patronage, the perquisites of a splendid position. [4]

1. Entinck, vol. i. p. 119. 
2. St. Simon speaks of " commoners born in the purple" (Bourgeois porphyrogénètes "). To no family does this expression apply more justly than to the Phelypeaux, Counts of Pontchartrain and Maurepas, who succeeded each other as Secretaries of State from 1610 to 1755 (La Cour-Gayet, p. 86). 
3. Arch. Marine, G⁴. 
4.  It is gratifying to quote in support of this view the latest work touching on Maurepas. The Marquis de Ségur, Au Couchant de la Monarchie, Paris, 1910, p. 50, says, "Il discernait nettement le bien, il le désirait de bonne foi ; le courage lui manquait pour le réaliser." Jos. Yorke, son of Lord Hardwick, wrote to his brother-in-law, Anson from Paris, March 8, 1749 : "The Marine of France don't seem to get up so fast as some people fancied it would, though I believe Msr. de Maurepas does all he can to put it on a good footing again, and he is allowed to be capable, indefategable and to have it much at heart" (B.M. Add. MSS. 15,957, f. 338).

This great office he lost through an inability to restrain a facile and niordant pen. Its play, directed against Madame de Pompadour, sent him into exile until 1774. Then the accident of a broken spur gave time for palace intrigue to divert the messenger from the road to Machault, at Arnouville. Maurepas, with age added to his other weaknesses, was recalled from his domain of Pontchartrain, to the more splendid position of Prime Minister of Louis XVI. 

The lack of the French Navy was in the numbers of ships, not in their quality. The models on which its vessels were built were surpassingly excellent.[1] They were apparently well handled, although one admirable British officer, quoted below, thinks, "our officers are better seamen." The accuracy with which various squadrons joined each other, the greater celerity with which the French fleets crossed the Atlantic as compared with the English against which they were acting, and the remarkable instances of certain voyages show that there must have been some very good navigators among the French commanders of the mid-century. Vauquelin, for example, escaped from Louisbourg on July 15 with his little frigate patched up after the bombardment of the English batteries, and with only sixty men fit for service. He drove her across the Atlantic at such a rate that, after attempting to get into Bayonne, he was able on the 2nd of August to write from St. Andero of the plight of Louisbourg. [2]

"The clever concentration of the French was drawing to a head. [3] All these ships got through, and in remarkably quick time. Boscawen bad been more than a month out when they started, and was still struggling with baffling winds somewhere between the Canaries and Bermuda, with seven more weeks before him. Yet Beaussier reached Louisbourg by the end of the month, nearly a fortnight before Boscawen made Halifax. Beaussier actually made the passage (from Brest to Louisbourg) in twenty-four days, April 4 to 28,a feat not consoling to British seamanship. Boscawen made Madeira, the Canaries, the Bermudas, and the Isle of Sable. Rodney took seventy- two days, and Hardy two months." [4]

Drucour, however, acknowledges the superiority of the British in handling vessels in port. After recounting, that there were 33 vessels of war, including frigates, together with 80 or 90 transports, brought into Louisbourg after the capitulation, he goes on, " all these vessels are ranged in an admirable way in this roadstead, where the French last year scarcely found space enough for 25 vessels and frigates." [5]

Warren, an active, capable officer, wrote to his friend and superior, George Anson : 

1. Warren said the Vigilant, a sixty-four, was larger than an English eighty (Feb. 14, 1745/6, Ad. Des. 1/480).  
2. Arch, Nat. Marine, B⁴, vol. 80, f. 285. 
3. Corbett, vol. i. p. 168. 
4. Vol. i. p. 316. 
5. Drucour's journal, Aug. 9, 1758.

"I am greatly pleas'd to hear it has been propos'd with a Prospect of Success to Augment the Number of men, and weight of Metall, in all the different classes of our ships, to ptitt them upon a Parr with those of the French. When that is the Case, there will no excuse be left for ill behaviour ; and I dare say upon all occasions when no Extraordinary or unforeseen accident shall Intervene, our Ships, and people, will give a good account of their Enemys of equal Force, when and wherever they meet. For I cant help thinking, we have this advantage of them that our Officers are better Seamen than theirs, and I hope as valiant, and our Men in general more Robust, and Stronger, and never were thought to want courage, tho' they have very little virtue of any other kind." [1]

This letter does not convey the impression that Warren felt any overwhelming sense of English superiority, unit for unit, over the French. [2]

His view is borne out by the fact that the French preferred boarding and close combat to cannonading, which implies a confidence in their crews. [3] 

These considerations point to the conclusion that, in general, the French lacked in numbers of ships, rather than in the quality of the ships themselves, or their armament, or the way in which they were placed to give the best results. There are many instances of heroic courage. Maisonfort, in the trap in which he allowed himself to be caught, fought the Vigilant gallantly against an overwhelming force. In 1755, L'Espèrance, an old tub, with only 22 guns mounted, fallen behind the fleet of Du Bois de la Motte, on its way back to France, was overtaken by the Orford, 70 guns. The Vicomte de Bouville, her commander, twice drove off the English ship. In the third attack the Orford was reinforced by the Buckingham, also of 70 guns, and the  Espèrance was surrendered in such a state that she had to be sunk, and the Orford had to hasten to Plymouth for repairs. Anson and Warren won a great victory over La Jonquière off Cape Finisterre, on May 14, 1747. The French fleet had 384 guns, the English 938, yet so sanguinary was the conflict that nearly 800 were killed on the French ships.[4]

But while disparity in numbers accounts for many English naval victories, it does not affect the conditions at Louisbourg, where twice the superiority was with the French. The efficiency of a navy depends, in a peculiar degree, on the temper and professional attainments of its officers of all ranks, because to all of them, above the subaltern grades, some important degree of independence is left from time to time. It is difficult to picture, for land forces, circumstances 

1. Warren to Anson, April 2, 1745, Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 15,957.
2 How badly things were managed in the British Navy, only a few years before he wrote, is seen in the opening chapter of Anson's voyage. 
3. " For the reason that M. de Beaussier had determined to board, having a crew superior in numbers and quality to those of the English, who prefer always cannon fire (" la manière de se battre au canon") to that of boarding, which with them rarely succeeded against the French " (Du Fresne du Motel to Surlaville, Derniers Jours, p. 193).
4. Prévost gives an account of the losses, written from the Devonshire entering Plymouth. The staff and garrison of Louisbourg, which had been sent back to France, were being returned to Canada on La Jonquière's fleet.

in which so young an officer as the officer of the watch, on a battleship, would have dependent on his immediate action the safety of so many men, the preservation of so potent an engine of war. The work of a Foreign Secretary is hampered to the slightest degree by the mediocrity of his clerks ; so it is with other Departments of State. But in a fleet, until new orders are received, the captain is in absolute command of his ship. General orders are of necessity vague in many points, so that even to the commander of the smallest vessel there is left scope for their interpretation, a chance for initiative, and in unforeseen contingencies, nowhere more likely to arise than on the sea, opportunities for independent action. It is on account of the scope the necessities of the service give them, that in a navy the moral of its officers of all grades, and the standards of performance to which they are held by their superiors, are of the most vital importance. We have to look into the internal administration of the French Navy, and the effect on its personnel of that administration, to find explanations of conditions fully accounted for neither by numerical inferiority nor the character of the unit. 

One of these explanations is closely connected, however, with relative strength of opposing navies. The most serious consequence of inferiority was not the difficulties it created for the staff trying to dispose of it to the best advantage, but its effect on the sea officers. This can be illustrated from the world of business. The merchant, with abundant capital which is constantly earning ample profits, will take more risks than any competitor other than one who is on the verge of bankruptcy, ready to risk all on a desperate venture. England was in the position of the former. France was not yet in the straits of the bankrupt. Her naval policy was similar to that of the man who fears bankruptcy and struggles to avoid it by husbanding resources, the inadequacy of which he clearly recognizes. Instructions, even when relations with England were strained, were pacific, to avoid the enemy's ships, and not to fight unless required by the honour of the flag. Thus, the native hue of resolution in her commanders seems often sicklied o'er by the thought that imperilling his ships was of vastly more consequence to his service than a similar risk in the enemy's fleet. To be exact, this consequence to the French, in 1755, was as one to one hundred and three ; to the English, as one to two hundred and forty-three. Clear proof that great gains were probable, would condone a miscarriage in the view of superiors with the ampler resources at their disposal. The relative weakness of the French sea forces, therefore, not only dictated a cautious policy to its staff, but benumbed the energy of those who were carrying it out. From this point of view, the prudent course for the French captain was to preserve his ship, for the English to risk his with any fair prospect of success. 

The cautious temper which these inadequate resources would induce, was confirmed and heightened by the ineffective discipline of the French Navy. Those amiable qualities of Maurepas, which preserved for him, throughout his exile, a host of friends, made him a poor head for such a service as a navy. His ordinary attitude, however disappointing might be the result, was that the officer had presumably done his best. There are many bulky folio volumes, [1] dealing with the personnel of the French Navy, covering his administration and those of his ephemeral successors. They give the origin and the family connections of the officers and notes on their character. It is the rarest thing to find in these records any evidence of discipline for ineffectiveness. 

Maisonfort was never given a sea command after his error contributed so largely to the fall of Loulsbourg in 1745. He, however, received pensions in due course, which could not greatly " encourager les autres." [2] The two commanders who failed to support Beaussier de lisle were acquitted by an easy board of inquiry, [3] aided by the magnanimity of Beaussier. One of them forthwith committed suicide ; the other not only retained his position, but was promoted to the command of a larger ship, which was sunk with all her crew at Quiberon. 

The most striking instance of accepting a poor performance when opportunities were given for an effective one, was in the case of Du Bois de la Motte. A skilful junction of three squadrons at Louisbourg, which there came under his flag, gave him command of a fine fleet. He passed the summer in making defensive works, while the inferior fleet of Holburne blockaded the port. A tempest in September, which did little damage to his ships, so shattered the enemy's fleet that it was a fine feat of seamanship, even after refitting at Halifax, to bring it home across the Atlantic. Du Bois, instead of issuing out and crushing Holburne, remained inactive in Louisbourg. His instructions were reasonably explicit. After recounting the forces to be placed at his disposal, the document goes on : 

" His Majesty has chosen the Count Dubois de la Motte to take command of all these vessels and frigates, and the proofs he has given at all times of his zeal, of his skill and of his experience, makes His Majesty hope that he will fill to his satisfaction this high office, which is one of the most important which can arise in the navy in the present war. 

" Its purpose is to foil (faire échouer) the projects which the enemy have made against Louisbourg or Quebec, and perhaps even against both projects for the execution of which they have made efforts which they will not likely be in a state to repeat if they do not succeed this year. . . . If the junction of the men of war of His Majesty can be made at Louisbourg, there is ground for believing not only that the enemy will not venture to undertake anything against Louisbourg or Quebec, but even that Count Dubois de 

1. Marine, C¹. 
2. Arch. Nat. Marine, C¹, vol. 167. 
3. It was headed by the Cte. du Guay, wbo was the mouthpiece for the noble officers in their protest the next year against the promotion of " officiers bleus " (La C.-G. p. 225). 

la Motte will find himself able to attack them with advantage. . . . His first object must be to assure the safety of the places which the enemy may wish to attack or threaten. . . . He can render a great service without question if lie can prevent them succeeding in their projects by making useless their efforts. Not only the best means of securing the failure of their plans will be to destroy their fleet and transports, but the advantages of an engagement (combat) will be moreover of great importance for the glory of His Majesty's arms, for the honour of His Navy, and for promoting a peace. . . . With such forces he should have superiority over the enemies. Every reason makes His Majesty wish that be (Du Bois) should profit by his superiority." 

So far, these instructions show a grasp of the conditions and their possibilities. They are so stated as to be stimulating to an officer eager to distinguish himself, or even adequately to carry out his orders, but they go on as follows : 

" His Majesty, however, does not positively order him to attack the enemy. Assured as is His Majesty of his zeal, his valour and his prudence, His Majesty can only refer in this manner to what he believes ought to be done in this regard, without too greatly risking the forces committed to his care, the safe keeping of which so vitally affects the Navy." [1] 

Here is the loophole for the cautious, so commonly was it taken advantage of, that Du Bois returned home feeling that he had done well. He asked that he should be given the baton of a Marshal of France, or appointed Vice-Admiral of France. The first seemed too great a step. There were difficulties in the way of the second, but he was given a pension of 12,000 £ until he was made Vice- Admiral, which grade he reached in I762. [2] While he accomplished the principal purposes of the expedition, the failure to do his utmost again suggests, in the effect on the service, a comparison with Byng.[3] 

The chance which Du Bois de la Motte let slip seemed in England one fraught with the greatest possibilities - 

". . . but it seems much to be feared that the French may have come out of Louisbourg, and picked up our almost wrecked ships. . . . Such is the lamentable end of that more boasted than well planned, and as ill-conducted as unfortunate American Expedition, which was to have restored this country ; and here I suppose concludes all the schemes, if there were any, upon which part of this fleet was ordered to winter in America. God grant us a tolerable peace if possible before we are more undone, for to go on is sure not possible" (Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 35,376, f. I43. This letter was written from the Admiralty, Oct. 31, 1757).

These are not the views of an irresponsible pamphleteer or a re-echoing of the opposition to the Government. They were written by Lady Anson, wife of the First Lord of the Admiralty, daughter of Lord Hardwicke, the Vice-Chancellor, than whom no one could be closer to the Ministry.

1. Arch. Marine, B⁴, vol. 76. No italics in the original. 
2. Arch. Nat. Marine, B⁴ and C¹, 165, 166. 
3. The sweeping condemnation of Admiral Matthews and his captains in 1744 is an earlier example of the severity in the English service.

In justice to Du Bois de la Motte, it should be said that his force was seriously weakened by sickness ; on his return to Brest, November 23, he disembarked 4000 sick, which spread typhus and scurvy in the town, so that not only the crew died, but over 10,000 of the inhabitants of the seaport were victims of the contagion which his squadron brought back. [1] The Inflexible states that 2000 sailors died, and that they brought back more than 2400 sick. [2] Du Revest, commander of the Hector, died at Brest, December 31 .[3] 

Des Gouttes again lost a chance for a dashing exploit. He, with his command of six ships of the line and frigates, was blockaded in Louisbourg by Boscawen's twenty- two ships of the line. Unless they all could escape through the blockade, a most improbable performance, they were bound, as the event proved, to be " burnt, sunk, or destroyed." Loss being thus most probable, there was little additional risk in taking an active course. When an easterly gale sprang up on the 5th of June it found Boscawen's principal ships either dispersed or at anchor well down in Gabarus Bay, that is on the lee shore, and encumbered by scores of transports mostly to windward of them. The possibilities of the situation are stated by an eye-witness : 

"It is well to note that if the commander of the squadron which is in our port had wished he might have immortalised himself, but that glory which is gained by danger to life is not that which this officer seeks. He has proved this in many circumstances. The hostile fleet was well down, as I have said, in the bay, by winds favourable to him (Des Gouttes), and by a fog, which would have hidden his movements from the enemy, he might have driven in to the fleet and with his six vessels destroyed it entirely. The worst would have been to lose his ships. . . . They could have beached them and saved themselves on shore under the fire of our entrenchments. This manoeuvre was easy. I have heard it said by sea officers, M. de Brunion (Brugnon), a man whose zeal equals his capacity, wished to do this with his ship, the Bizarre. They gave to his project the name of the vessel he commanded, and the commander . . . looked on what he did not dare to undertake, as an ill- considered and impossible project." [4] 

The bitterness of Poilly is surpassed by that of another writer, an officer of the garrison, on the events discreditable to the navy, in the later days of the siege. He to disguise his identity wrote his version in capitals, but, as it is preserved among official documents,[5] it must have fallen under the eyes of those in authority. There was no question of the naval commanders having " risked their heads." [6] Des Gouttes continued in the service unscathed, and retired from it in 1764 with high rank of (Chef d'Escadre) Rear-Admiral. 

These instances show that no high standard of performance was demanded from officers, not only under Maurepas, but his transient successors. Equally 

1. La Cour-Gayet, p. 360. 
2. Canadian Archives, 1906. 
3. Etat sommaire, p. 178. 
4 Poilly. 
5. Arch. Nat. Marine, B⁴, vol. 80, f. 82. 
6. This officer is quoted in Chap. XIV. pp. 274 and 284.

one fails to find the converse of this, recognition and reward of brilliant and effective services. The records show for the most part a series of jogging, monotonous advancements from step to step, appointments given by seniority rather than capacity. It was not until Choiseul took charge of the French Navy, that some degree of the same life reanimated a dormant and discouraged service which Pitt instilled earlier into the forces of England. 

Seniority counted for too much. Meschin,[1] on whose action hung, in 1744, the fate of Acadia, had commanded the Semslack, from which the first settlers of Isle Royale landed in 1713. Du Bois de la Motte [2] was an excellent officer. The disposition of his ships on the voyage and in Louisbourg seems to a layman admirable, but he was seventy-four. A Schomberg, whose leadership at eighty inspired confidence in a nation, is the rarest of commanders. Retirement at a ripe age with a pension was sure of attainment to any one who did not disgrace himself. The incentive of prompt reward was lacking. Boscawen inquired, when he landed, about Vauquelin. When he heard that it was the captain of a little frigate who had handled his vessel so brilliantly, he said that if Vauquelin were in his command he would recommend him for captain of a ship of the line. It would have been difficult for the French officers to whom he said it to find a similar instance in their own service. His remark might well have been made in the presence of one of his own captains, whose recent promotion was a proof that Boscawen's disposition was that of the Lords of the Admiralty. 

On the New Year's Day, 1758, the Adventure, Captain Bray, lay at anchor in Dungeness Roads, and saw a snow reach in. They engaged. By good seamanship and great personal bravery, Captain Bray and his pilot passed his mizzen topsail sheet and a hawser round the Frenchman's bow-sprit and made it fast to his capstan, and then after an hour's sharp fighting, the privateer, hailing from Dunkirk, surrendered. Before the January number of the Grand Magazine had gone to press it was able to announce that from the fifth rate, Adventure, 44 guns and 250 men, Bray had been promoted to the third rate, Princess Amelia, 64 guns and 600 men, in which he joined Boscawen's fleet. The capture of a privateer mounting 14 nine- pounders by a ship of 44 guns was insignificant. The great reward was given for good seamanship and personal courage. [3]

1. He entered the service in 1683, and completed in all fifty-nine years. 
2. Entered the service in 1698. He had, therefore, served fifty-nine years when he was placed in command of this fleet. 
3. Four promotions were made in Louisbourg in consequence of the boat expedition, Balfour was given command of the Bienfaisant, which was repaired and sent to England ; Laforey was made captain of the Echo. Affleck and Bickerton, senior lieutenants of the Namur, took command of the AEtna and Hunter, vacated by these promotions (Boscawen to Pitt, July 28, 1758). In 1745 also, Douglas, who, in command of the Mermaid, had been instrumental in the capture of the Vigilant, was promoted to her immediately after he towed her safely to Gabarus. 

Another characteristic of the French service, which one naturally contrasts with the system of its rival, was that the former was aristocratic. The young noble who entered as garde-marine was clothed in scarlet and gold lace. He found himself not only among his social equals, but in very many cases among his kinsmen, or others of naval families allied in the service to his own. In his list of the fleet sent out to America in 1757, La Cour-Gayet [1] gives biographical details of the twenty captains. Twelve belonged to naval families. The influence of these social conditions would tend to give a high sense of personal dignity insistent on personal rights ; to some extent, a feeling of superiority to 2 drudgery, and hostility, or at least coldness to the outsider among them, [2] and, it is not to be doubted, the disadvantages as well as the extraordinary advantages which one naturally looks for in a body of men united not only by esprit de corps, but by social equality and the ties of blood. There were, owing to relaxation of the conditions as to noble birth, some officers who were from a lower social stratum.

They were not well received in the service. Beaussier de lisle was a son of the Port Captain of Toulon, and it was hinted that his supporting captains hung back in the engagement already referred to, to embarrass and discredit one who was an outsider in their own service. He rose to a high rank in the service (Chef d'Escadre), but the officiers bleus, who came in from outside, rarely were as fortunate. Vauquelin, a ship-master of Dieppe, whose services, not only at Louisbourg but at Quebec, were so extraordinarily brilliant, never rose to a higher command than that of a king's freight-ship (flûte), although he remained in the service until I772. [3]

Rosier was said to be the son of an important merchant of Bordeaux. The brilliant defence which will shortly be recounted, gained for him a lieutenancy, and after some years the rank of a captain of a fire-ship, which seemed to be the highest rank he reached before his death in 1769. 

The relations between Anson, one of the most brilliant and distinguished naval men of his time, and Warren, whose social origin was relatively humble, were probably not exceptional in the English service. I have found in French documents no evidence that it would have been possible in that service for an

1. P. 508. 
2. " It is incredible the magnificence of the table on board the French men-of-war, served with all the elegance that it is possible to do on land, which the captains of English vessels would never be able to imitate, for as soon as they receive orders to sail with the first favourable wind, of which they render an account to the Admiralty, which they do daily in all the ports of England, they are not allowed to remain longer, as the French ships are obliged to do, sometimes during three weeks, to wait for provisions on the table ; and the English captains are often sufficiently unfortunate as to be obliged to content themselves with salt beef and bacon like the sailors, with this difference, that the captains have the choice of the pieces. It is true that the Commissioners of the Admiralty take great care that the provisions of the ships should be of good quality, well-conditioned and in good case " (Memoirs of the Chevalier Johnstone, vol. ii. p. 174, note). The gossip of the New England camp had it that Maisonfort's service of plate was worth £5000.
3. Arch. Nat. Marine, C¹, vol. 174, f. 1656. 

officer of Warren's origin to write to his superior as freely as Warren wrote to Anson ten days before their crowning victory over La Jonquière. 

                                                                                                                      "April 23, 1747. 

Dear Sir I am glad you have alter'd your Line of Battle for I observed it as you did yesterday weak in the Center, where tis most probable ye Enemy (should wee be so happy to meet them) will be strongest. You see Sir how necessary it is to Exercise fleet. 'Tis pretty difficult to keep a good Line close by the Wind-and I think when you next please to Exercise the Fleet in separate Divisions, and a Breast, The Lines should be form'd at a distance one Division to windward of the others as you shall judge proper, and the Windward one, to go down on the Leeward, in order of Battle, so near as you wou'd have them Engage an Enemy you'l pardon my taking this Lyberty." [1]

The momentous consequence to the French Navy of this difficulty of entrance to others than those to the manner born, was that it lost the services of many who had a taste for the sea, a capacity for command, and a desire to serve in the fleets of their country. Scores of men rose to high rank in the English service who entered it as ordinary seamen or as volunteers. This was the case of Warren, and of many others. The flag of an admiral was in the kit-bag of the English sailor, generations earlier than the staff of a marshal was placed, by Napoleon, in the knapsack of the French soldier. The tradition in one English family is, that the talk of an admiral, who, through the breaking down of his carriage, took shelter in a clergyman's house, led the two sons to run away to sea. Two peerages ultimately rewarded the success of their careers.[2] There is found an explanation of the prodigious exploits of French privateers [3] during this period, in what well may be a fact, that many of them were commanded by men who, had the fleets of France been as open as those of England, would have fought on her King's ships as valiantly as they made conquests of the British mercantile marine. The magazines of the period give lists of captures on both sides, and the bravery of the privateersmen and the commanders of armed merchantmen, the skill with which they handled their vessels, show the large numbers of men who might have been available for service in the French Navy, had that service been made attractive to them. 

The following is the narrative of a voyage printed in full, as a condensation cannot give, as well as the main actor's own words, the impression of capacity, modesty, and courage it conveys. 

" Narrative of the engagement between the Robuste of Bordeaux, Captain Jean Joseph Rosier, freighted by the King for Quebec, and armed with 6 eight-pounders and 18 six-

1. B.M. Add. MSS. 5,957, f. 172.
2. The captain of the Jamaica, whose skilful manoeuvres in search of information off Louisbourg harbour are recounted, was one of these boys (Ad. Des. 1/48l)
3. The privateer Machault, which Bray captured, apparently did not hesitate to engage a man-of-war of 44 guns. The latter only avoided being raked by very skilful manoeuvring. 

pounders, with a crew all told of 77, and 150 soldiers of the regiment of Volontaires Étrangers, and an English frigate of 30 guns in a tier and a half ("dans une batterie et demie'). 

" The 13th April I 757, on my voyage towards Quebec, in latitude 44⁰ 55', and longitude (of Paris) 5' 35", at daybreak I saw a vessel on my lee, pointing northwards, the wind W.N.W., carrying her four principal sails, her mizzen and mizzen-top sails without top-gallant masts. 

" She changed her course to my wake and gave chase. I set her down as a merchantman obliged to approach in tacking. Her greater speed gave her the advantage of coming at noon as near as the gunshot of a twelve-pounder. I then watched her and saw she was a frigate with a tier and a half of guns, crowded with people, and extraordinarily high out of water. Not being able to withdraw, and thinking it useless to parley, I clewed up my lower sails to wait for him. When he stood across my course, I showed him my colours, and, as customary, fired a shot. He broke out his, with all his broadside. Then the engagement began and was most sanguinary, always side by side up to 7 o'clock, when our common disorder compelled us to draw off to set things to rights. I had my inain and main top-sail yards broken, my mizzen and fore top-sail yards brought down, all my sails in tatters and useless. I had in this attack 18 instantly killed and 42 wounded, several mortally, and several cannon-shot ('à fleur d'eau ') between wind and water. 

" Our plight seemed so sorry that after making an inspection of my ship I decided, with my staff, that we should turn back on account of the impossibility of making repairs at sea. In consequence I set my course for Perthuis, or the River of Bordeaux ; the wind being favourable, I proceeded all day and the next night under easy sail. 

"About noon on the 15th my look-out saw a vessel about four leagues to leeward, which was manoeuvring to come up with me. My few sails did not permit me to avoid him ; he was within a long cannon-shot at 6 o'clock in the evening. He showed a white flag and fired a shot ; not perceiving that he showed any special sign of need, I kept on my course. I took his bearings at sunset, and thought he was in my wake, and the flares and rockets which he was throwing out made me think he was in chase. At nine he was within earshot, and hailed me. I answered him. He said to me in a compassionate tone, 'Poor prisoner, I advise you to strike and not to make any resistance; I will give you good terms.' His exhortation was followed by his broadside in my stern, where I was exposed, his sails giving him this advantage over me. In consequence I handled my ship so that it was broadside to him. Then the battle became general from stem to stern, and was more savage though less fatal than the former one. I had in this attack, which finished at one o'clock in the morning, my main and mizzen top-masts smashed, and my sails more destroyed than the former ones, 5 men killed and 11 wounded. My adversary, drawing off, favoured me in making repairs, which I did at once. I refitted my mizzen and foretop-gallant yards, these being the only ones I could trim to keep on my course, which I did. 

" At daybreak my enemy, which had watched me all night, manoeuvred to rejoin me, which he accomplished at 11 o'clock. I recognized him as the same frigate with which I had my first affair. I counted his guns, which were fifteen on each side, and some of my officers assured me that they had seen cannon on his forecastle and quarter-decks. The engagement began anew and did not stop until 6 o'clock, when he hailed and I answered. He said to me,  'Yield, gentlemen, yield, you will be treated as you deserve. We will give you good terms. We are a frigate of the English King's, so be undisturbed.' Thereupon he hoisted a square flag at his foretop. I answered, not being able to hoist a square flag like him, as I had no mast standing, that I was flattered to have intercourse with my equals, that I had still powder and shot, that I regretted extremely that I had no canvas to show him a course contrary which he would compel me to take, and, moreover, that he had only now to do his duty, and I would keep on doing mine. I gave him three Vive le Roi, my broadside of guns and musketry, at which we kept steadily until half-past seven. My enemy, as crippled as I was, was pumping out water at all his scuppers and steered with galley sweeps. I gathered that his rudder was useless, and at the same moment discovered that mine was also damaged. I had it repaired at once. In vain then would either have yielded to the other. Our condition allowed us only to think of ourselves. The night which followed put us out of sight of each other. 

" I worked hard to effect repairs. At daybreak I saw a ship ahead coming toward us. We came together at ten, and I made him out as a privateer of 16 guns and several swivels, with a large crew. He began the fight, but drew off at the end of an hour, setting his lower sails and making a following wind, satisfied with our response and our gunnery. In these two last attacks we had 3 killed and 8 wounded. At noon I sighted the land at Oleron. At eight that evening I cast anchor a league from Chassiron. 

" My situation is most pitiable. I have standing my mizzen, and that without its topmast, and my bowsprit, not a working bit of rigging from stem to stern. At least fifty shot above the water- line and a prodigious number in the hull. I think that on one side and the other there were fired 3000 shot, and we fired 15,000 rounds of musketry, which I have verified by counting the remaining cartridges. I have had 29 soldiers and seamen killed and 61 wounded.

"M. Diaparraguerre, my chief officer, received a ball in the right thigh in the first fight and is dangerously wounded. This accident greatly alarmed me, knowing his worth. 

" M. Charriolle et Du Salier, my two lieutenants, bore themselves with all imaginable bravery. The latter, who was wounded in the right shoulder in the first fight, was found faithfully at his post in the three following, and behaved himself with distinction. M. Bière, second lieutenant, was also wounded in the first fight in the right thigh, and is unfit for service. 

"MM. the officers of my passengers, the Volontaires Étrangers, distinguished themselves. In particular M. de St. Rome, the Captain, who threw into the sea a fire-pot, which fell into the midst of twenty men, and never ceased rallying his men, and by his worthy example making their volleys effective. 

" M. de Gagnereau, his lieutenant, does not merit less praise, and although wounded by a splinter in the arm, was always at his post. 

" M. de Coussade, whom the Court had sent as a passenger, has died from his wounds. He bore himself with distinction. 

"The soldiers, slack at first, afterwards displayed an intrepid bravery, and I know not how to give them praise enough. 

" I was also excited to make a most vigorous defence, not being ignorant of the importance of my cargo to the King's service. 

                                                                                                                       ROSIER." [1] 

The sense of responsibility for a few hundred tons of stores for Quebec which animated so desperate a defence, indicated a temper of mind which would not be uncommon among such men. The vividness of impressions of one in a novel position enhances greatly the sense of the importance of its duties. The incident gives rise to the thought that had the resources of Des Gouttes been at the disposal of Vauquelin, Rosier, or Brugnon, there would have been found at Louisbourg as many of the militant righteous as would have saved the city. 

In support of this view it may be pointed out that there was not a great difference in motive between the privateersmen and the merchant captain on the one hand, and the naval officer on the other, in times when every merchantman was armed, when regulations regarding naval prize money and letters of marque were issued at the beginning of every war. Prize money was an important factor in the career of the naval officer, while the privateer was not devoid of patriotism. In a crucial case, the former would be expected to sacrifice gain for the honour of the flag, a lower standard would suffice for the man whose voyage was primarily for booty. The order of the motives might, however, be reversed, without necessarily any material change in their normal power. The richness of the fleets of the French East India Company, the extent of French commerce revealed in the War of the Austrian Succession, whetted the appetite of the British naval officer. Warren, a portionless Irish lad, through his captures on his long term on the North American station and at Louisbourg, had the reputation of being very rich.' There are many 

1.  Arch. Nat. Marine, B^4, vol. 76, f. 377. Guebriant, Intendant at Bordeaux, transmitted this account to the Minister with his approval, and recommended a bonus to them all, as they had lost everything.

This account is so interesting, and displays on the part of this French merchant captain such a vigorous fighting quality, not always found in commanders of the King's ships, that a search has been made for a verification of his statements. A search through the Admirals' list-book showed that no frigate of the size of his adversary was in a position to have taken part in this fight, nor were there any sidelights found in the Admiralty papers, nor did the best of current news, namely the Magazines or the London Gazette, give any trace of this encounter. The London Chronicle, however, prints the following account, which shows that the vessel with which the Robuste was engaged was an English privateer 

" Bristol, May 7th. - By a letter received from an officer on board the Caesar privateer, brought by a Spanish vessel arrived at Plymouth, we have an account that besides taking two prizes (viz. the Black Prince from Bordeaux for Cape Breton, a snow of about 180 tons, laden with 1200 barrels of flour, 25 tuns of wine, etc., and the Jolie Pontac, of about 120 tons, bound from Bordeaux to Mississippi, laden with flour and wine) they had an engagement with a French frigate Of 36 guns, the 13th, 15th, and 16th ult., which was very obstinate and continued seven hours the last day ; and when the Caesar left her she looked like a wreck, having lost all her masts and rigging. The Caesar had but a corporal of the marines killed and 22 men wounded. During the engagement she fired 8000 musket and 700 cannon shot, besides an incredible number of Largin and Partridge shot, and three 30 Hand Grandes (?) out of the tops, which did great execution. This account was dated April 25th, in Lat. 45,00, Long. 4,50, at which time the Caesar was in sight of two sail to windward, supposed to be part of a fleet from Bordeaux, two of them of 30 guns each, 9 and 12 pounders, which she bad seen for seven days, and hoped to meet with some English Men of War or Privateers to assist her." 

2. His correspondence with Anson refers more than once to the investment of his prize money. It may be noted that he wrote to Anson in 1747 (19th May), saying that if an accident befell him he must "leave his wife and pretty Babes to the mercy of his King and Country," as his private affairs were very unsettled (B.M. Add. MSS. 15,957). 

fair mansions built, with some remote suggestion of a flagship in their architecture, by retired and enriched naval commanders. The dignity of more than one peerage is maintained by the investment of the prize money of those on whom they were conferred for naval victories. These possibilities were ever present to the naval commander. Warren proved his zeal in not murmuring in leaving the rich hunting-grounds of the West Indies for the barren seas off Isle Royale. [1] When Boscawen was in the fogs off Newfoundland, uncertain of his position, he writes to his wife : 

" I own I was in hopes never to have seen America again, but now I earnestly wish for it, not but that I think of home, and for amusement this morning, drawn a house after Lady Essex's plan, sure I am you will like it, and if we have a war, it is bard if I dont get enough to build and maintain it." [2] 

Land officers were interested in privateering. General Whitmore had a privateer schooner, while Governor of Louisbourg. [3]

There were other examples, differing from these, in which the desire for prize money was pushed to undue lengths. West Indian merchants complained that men-of-war captured in the old war French and Spanish merchantmen, instead of ridding those seas of the many privateers which were destroying English commerce. A more striking instance was that of Rodney, who was bringing out Amherst to the armament which was awaiting him at Halifax. Rodney lost over a fortnight in securing a very rich prize he made off Brest . [4] Such keenness led to a lack of decency in carrying out captures. The officers of the Alcide and Lys complained bitterly of being ill treated, and robbed of personal effects.[5]

Don Antonio d'Ulloa, a Spanish scientist, had the misfortune to be a passenger on the Notre Dame de la Déliverance, when she was captured in

1. " I cou'd have pitch'd upon none attended with a prospect of greater uneasyness, and less personal advantage, I mean where Booty is esteem'd so, which I hope will never be so with me" (Warren to Anson, April 2, 1745, B.M. Add. MSS. 15,957, f. 152). 
2. Torbay, at sea, May 25, 1755, Falmouth papers. Boscawen's tombstone states that he 

DIED OF A FEVER 
ON THE 10TH OF JANUARY IN THE YEAR 1761, 
THE 50TH OF HIS AGE, 
AT HATCHLANDS PARK, IN SURREY, 
A SEAT HE HAD JUST FINISHED AT 
THE EXPENSE OF THE ENEMIES OF HIS COUNTRY. Etc. 

3. Clough's Jl. 11 Oct. 1759.
4. "Considering that he was engaged in the special duty of carrying to the seat of war the belated commander-in-chief of the main operation of the campaign, the incident will hardly commend itself as a precedent to modern judgment (Corbett, vol. 1, p. 315). 
5. Arch. Nat,. Marine, B⁴, vol. 68, f. 267, and Pichon MSS., Halifax.

1745 off Louisbourg. He says that they were stripped naked before the crew, from apprentice to Captain, and searched in the most humiliating manner possible, so that not a penny might escape, and most astonishing of all, that in this search the English captains themselves took a foremost part. It was obviously professional, for one of these captains turned over to the Spaniards for their use a house in Louisbourg, of which he had taken possession and did not require, as he remained on board his ship. [1]

The French naval officer also knew the charm of prize money and of gain. The documents the writer has searched deal little with their success. It was far less than the English. The motive, however, seems as potent, and the official encouragement in prize money was as great. A contemporary attributes the lack of zeal among them to three causes : they remain too long idle in port, they look to their profession as a means of enriching themselves, and often their share of goods for trade (la petite pacotille) which they have on board is their only fortune. [2]

These explanations, illustrated for the sake of local colour, with incidents connected with Isle Royale, may be summarised in saying that a neglected service [3] was opposed to one high in favour with its court and country. One which was starved in money, men and equipment, had to meet in conflict another on which were lavished the resources of a country constantly growing in wealth. The commanders of one were drawn from a single class, of the other, from a whole nation. Officers, whose experience led them to expect defeat, were opposed to others flushed with victory, or desirous of emulating the exploits of their colleagues ; those knowing that neither victory nor defeat made a vital difference in their careers ; these, assured of all the rewards of success, speedy professional advancement, rank, wealth and glory. 

That period during which Louisbourg existed covers, save for a score of earlier years, that in which these striking changes in the two services were brought about. Up to a certain point the strength and morale of the French navy, if not superior, was at least not inferior to that of England. Her colonies, and still more, the vast territories brought under her sphere of influence by the energy and intrepidity of her explorers, was the vastest the 

1. D'Ulloa, Voyage Historique, vol. 2, book III, p. 116. 
2. Surlaville, Derniers Jours, p. 273. All commerce was forbidden to officers of the Navy, 13 March 1717, Isambart Recueuil, xxi. p. 139. 

There were rumours afloat not only in Isle Royale, but also in France, that Vauquelin had carried in his Aréthuse a valuable cargo when he escaped from Louisbourg. One of the New England carpenters, Knap, says it was thought "she had much Riches on board." This was the gossip of a camp. The Minister wrote to Vauquelin (October 26, B, vol. 108), asking him if he brought any cargo and for whom, which would point to some suspicion that this might be the case. I have not found Vauquelin's reply. The implication seems to be that he was acting for some one else. An " officer bleu " would be careful to obey the regulations. 
3. The Almanach Royal gives a little more than a page to the Navy.

world had ever seen. The advantages to France of this Colonial Empire were enormous. It was not until after that Empire was broken up that the growth of her maritime commerce ceased to compare favourably with that of the greatest of her rivals. The turning point seems to have been reached in 1692, when at the end of May the combined fleets of England and Holland in overwhelming force destroyed the fleet of Tourville at La Hogue. The exiled James saw in it only another disappointment; the English ministry, a proof that their fleet could be depended on ; the English people, a passing of the fear of invasion. Louis XIV., at the height of his glory, with the inviolate fortress of Namur at his feet, saw in this naval disaster only " the burning of a few ships." The perspective of time enables us to see that from it, and the subsequent neglect of the French Navy, ensued consequences, which were not written on the page of history until the signing of the Treaty of Paris in I763. The revival of France's navy about this time, and the essential aid it gave to the revolted colonies of America, led to a loss to England, which seemed for generations greater, as far as America is concerned, than that of Canada, and proves how an earlier revival might have avoided disaster to France. 

Facile generalisations about the special aptitudes of one people for successful colonisation, and pre-eminence in the arts which are based on sea-faring, do not bear examination. History shows that such pre-eminence passed in distant centuries from one people to another about the shores of the Mediterranean. An Italian town, now without sea trade, once gave to the world a code of maritime law based on the practice of its merchant adventurers. Spain and Portugal were each in their turn foremost. Later, at a time when exploration for England was most successfully conducted by foreigners hired by her Tudor monarchs, native-born Frenchmen were establishing for their kings claims to the possession of vast and fertile spaces. Holland once stood in the forefront in maritime adventure. For a long time England has held this position, but it is to be remembered that, three score years since, the marine of her most splendid offshoot, the American Union, was, in quality at least, becoming the most formidable of her rivals. If more northern nations may not succeed England in the front rank it is for reasons which were understood close on two centuries ago. These periods of expansion have been for each people most glorious and fruitful. Conquering on the sea, and the struggle with its dangers, have always produced an energy and a breadth of outlook which have invigorated every activity of the corporate life -of these nations. If one would seek light for the future from the lessons of the past, it is found in the page of La Cour-Gayet on which he says, the imperial crown of overseas possessions rests on three supports- colonies, a mercantile marine, and an adequate navy. The history of all ages makes clear that the latter cannot be neglected.

It was not through ignorance of the supremacy of sea power that France fell from her pre-eminence as a colonial power. Maurepas shows a firm grasp of this doctrine. Even Desenclaves, a priest in Acadia, implies a knowledge of it in writing ; " What good is Louisbourg? It would be good if France were as strong at sea as England." A Monsieur Du Plestay wrote in I759 : 

"France under Henri IV. and since has had no other object in its wars than to lessen the power of the House of Austria, which it suspected of aspiring to a universal monarchy. We have nothing more to fear on that side, but we are about to suffer the same disadvantage (on va tomber dans le m8me inconv6nient) in allowing England to usurp the sovereignty of the sea, which is at least as dangerous as the other, in this respect, that she increases her riches and prevents France enjoying hers, as you prove in the present war, and with her money produced by commerce, she excites against you enemies on land, who put it out of your power to use against them the resources, which otherwise ought to have been the case" (I.R. vol. 38). 

Indeed, the doctrine was never more succinctly stated than by a French poet of the period : 

" Le trident be Neptune, c'est le sceptre du Monde."