J.S. McLennan, Louisbourg: From Its Foundation To Its Fall (Sydney: Fortress Press, 1969)

© Fortress Press

Chapter 13

The war had been, so far, barren of results satisfactory to the English people. It had yielded only a succession of failures or defeats. Pitt described the operations of 1757 as "the last inactive and unhappy Campaign," and prepared " for the most vigorous and extensive Efforts to avert by the Blessing of God on His Arms, the Dangers impending in North America." [1]

On the same day he wrote to Loudon : 

"My Lord, I am with concern to acquaint Your Lordship that the King has judged proper that Your Lordship should return to England." [2]

Loudon was superseded by Abercromby, to whom Pitt addressed a long, masterly and lucid statement of his plans for 1758. [3]

The reduction of Louisbourg was their first objective, and lavish preparations were made for its success. Engineers were ordered to Halifax to prepare siege material, and in his first letter to Abercromby Pitt said that the supplies gathered for Loudon were to be cared for and held in readiness. Troops and ships were to be concentrated at Halifax, so that the siege of Louisbourg might begin as early in the year "as the Twentieth of April, if the season should happen to permit. [4] Abercromby was to apply himself to other operations.

Fourteen thousand troops, the greater part regulars, were provided, and a General officer appointed for the command. Colonel Jeffrey Amherst, then serving in Germany, was selected and promoted to the rank of Major-General.[5] Amherst's brigadiers were Whitmore, Lawrence, and Wolfe. Boscawen was given command of the fleet, which was a force of twenty-three ships of the line, from which Boscawen had to provide convoys for the transports.[6] Hardy, Boscawen's second in command, had preceded him to take up the blockade of Louisbourg with eight ships of the line and two frigates. He arrived at Halifax on March 19, and left there on April 5 ; but the first time the French 

1. Dec. 30, 1757. Pitt to Governors of the Northern Colonies (Kimball, vol. i. p. 136 from C.O. 5/212). 2. Kimball, vol. i. p. 143 from C.O. 5/212. 
3. Kimball, vol. i. p. 143 from C.O. 5/212.. 
4. Orders were given to rendezvous at Halifax, not later than April 12. 
5. 600 Rangers were to be sent, but the number of Regulars was not to fall below that planned, Dec. 30, 1757. 
6. His Instructions are in Ad. 0. and I., vol. 80. 

note his appearance so close to the town that his force could be counted was on April 28, although early in the month his ships had been sighted off Scatari. The safe arrival of French ships, hereafter stated, shows that his blockade, like most, was not effective. He sent into Halifax, however, as captures the Diane, 22, a frigate "full of Provisions, Cloathing and Arms," and four other provision ships. 

Boscawen's voyage was extremely slow. He was clear of the Channel on February 24, but did not arrive in Halifax until May 12. [1]

The forces had not all arrived, and Amherst was still at sea. Boscawen and Whitmore had received instructions for preliminary steps to be taken in the event of such delay as had occurred. They were to land on Cape Breton, either at Gabarus Bay or at Mira.[2] But before this could be attempted, preparations were complete. The fleet and forces straggled into Halifax a month behind Pitt's appointed time. 

The account of an eye-witness,[3] who regretted not to have been appointed to serve on the expedition, gives a livelier account of these days in Halifax than a transcript of diverse official documents. 

                                                                              "ON BOARD THE 'LUDLOW CASTLE' AT SEA, 
                                                                                                         May 30th, 1758. 

"My DEAR LORD - ... In my letter to your Lordship from Boston dated in March I informed you of what was at that time transacting on this Continent and of my motives for proceeding to Halifax, and I cannot say that I repent of the Voyage I made ; I must own I was a good deal mortified that my situation obliged me to quit a service I was so deeply interested in, and in which some intimate friends of mine have so great a share ; both my gratitude to General Abercromby in appointing me his Aid de Camp, and obedience to your Lordship's intentions, that I should serve with him, soon determined what part to take. 

" April 23rd. - I imbarked with General Lawrence, his Battalion and Frazers at Boston. 

" 28th.-We arrived at Halifax where we found that from the I5th to that day the Prince Frederick and Juno, Transports with Amherst's Regiments on board, and some Ordinance Store Ships, had arrived from England. The Prince Frederick had lost her masts in a gale of Wind, and had replaced them from the Le Arc en Ceil [sic] Of 50 Guns-which lay at Halifax. One transport had sprung a leak at Sea, was lost, but the Troops saved. We found the Royal 40th, 45th and 47th Regiments that wintered at Halifax, employed in making Fascines and Gabiens, etc., and go Carpenters that had been sent from New England employed under the direction of Colonel Basteed, in making six Block Houses of Squared Timber, upon the upper part of which a Platform is made for small Cannon, with a Parapet

1. Wolfe gives, in a letter to Lord George Sackville, an account of the voyage (Ninth Report, Hist. MSS. Com. p. 74). 
2. C.O. 5/213. In the preparation of these instructions to his commanders, Pitt had before him a communication from Brigadier Waldo, second in command to Pepperrell in the siege of 1745. Waldo recommended the attack, actually carried out by Amherst. The document is to be found in R.O. Secret and Miscellaneous Papers, 3756-61, and has been reprinted in Can. Archives Reports, 1886. 
3. James Cunningham on Abercromby's staff, letter to Lord Sackville. 

Musquet proof, and underneath Musquetry may likewise be used through loop holes. The Timbers are marked, and the edifice may be constructed in a few hours. They will answer the end Ridouts for the protection of the Camp. They were likewise employed in making a sort of Sling Cart, with wheels Eight Feet high, of a great breadth to transport Cannon over Marshy Ground, this at Mr. Boscawen's request. The Troops remained on board the Transports and were extremely healthy.

"At this time General Hopson was Ignorant of his destination, and Continued to command. It was determined to send to Boston for fifty Horses and fourty Yoke of Oxen to adjust [sic] in drawing Artillery Horses, etc., at the Siege.

" March 19th. - Sir Charles Hardy arrived in the Captain from England, and found the Squadron that had Wintered at Halifax in great forwardness.

" April 5th. - Sir Charles sailed to cruize off Louisburg with the following ships. Northumberland 74 Summerset 70 Terrible 74/ Orford 70/ Defence 60/ Captain 64/ Kingston 60/ Southerland 50/ and one Frigate. Sir Charles sent into Halifax Four Provision Ships taken off Louisburg.

" 30th. - He sent in a French Frigate of 22 guns, called the Diana. She sailed from Rochfort in Company with the Prudent Of 7o Guns and another Frigate that are supposed to have got into Louisburg.

"May 2nd. - She was full of Provisions, Cloathing and Arms.

The Juno Frigate sailed to join Sir Charles Squadron, and the same day the Trent Frigate that had been separated ten days from Mr. Boscawen's Fleet off the Island of Barmudas, arrived.

"8th.- A Fleet was seen to the Eastward of the Harbour.

"9th. - Admiral Boscawen arrived with the following Ships. Namur 90/ Princess Emelia 80/ Royal William 84/ Burford 70/ Pembroke 60/ Lancaster 68/ Prince of Orange 60/ Bedford 64/ Nottingham 60/ Shannon Frigate, Etna and Tylo Fire Ships.

" The same day arrived the 35th/ 48th/ and Monckton's Battn. of R. As/ under Convoy of a 20 Gun Ship from Philadelphia.

"The whole Fleet immediately on their arrival begun to take in Water and clean-the ships all healthy, except the Pembroke and Devonshire.

" 12th. - Arrived Captain Rouse in the Sutherland of 50 Guns from the Squadron off Louisburg. Sir Charles says in a letter of the 8th of May, that after a Storm of Snow which Continued thirty-six hours, upon its clearing up, he perceived several Ships within him, near to the Harbour, to which he gave chase, but they escaped him. Soon after he stood into the Harbour, and perceived Seven Ships at Anchore, three of which he imagined were of war. In Chaberouse Bay they perceived the enemy throwing up an Intrenchment.

"13th. - Sailed the Beaver to Piscatua for Masts. Sir Charles's Squadron seems to have Cruized off Louisburg as Early as the Season would permit. The cold was extremely severe, and the Ice floating very troublesome. They saw a French ship catched in it, which they could not reach, & some of his Squadron at times stuck fast. [1]

"14th.- Sailed the Squirrell and on the 14th the Scarborough to join the Fleet.

"16th. - Arrived Commodore Durrell from New York, with the Devonshire of 66 Guns, the Ludlow Castle of 40, and three Frigates, with Brigadier General Whitmore the 17th/ and 22nd/ Regiments, all the Artillery and Stores intended for the Siege of Louisburg last

1. The Magniflque, see p. 244.

year, except some Howitzers kept by General Abercromby Three Companys of Artillery, Thirty-two empty Transports and Victuallers. Those empty Transports were provided at home for the Troops to be imbarked at New York, but General Abercromby that no time might be lost had imbarked his Troops from different places ordering them to proceed to the place of Randesvouse in Separate divisions. And when your Lordship considers, that the orders for this Imbarkation did not reach General Abercromby before the 11th March, Great dispatch must have been used, to mark [sic] the Troops from these Cantonments about Albany and elsewhere, to have them imbarked, and the last of them at the place of randes- vouse by the 16th of May. All the Transports from the Continent are Victualled for four months. They will find full employment for the empty Transports to carry Fascines, etc.

"17th. - Arrived the Centurion of 60 Guns from Plymouth, and informed us that General Amherst was to Imbark in the Dublin which was to replace the Invincible, want of canvass prevented the Centurion from proceeding with Admiral Boscawen from Plymouth. The same day arrived the York Man-of-War of 64 Guns, and Anstruther's Regiment which are sickly. The York in her passage ran foul of the America, lost her head, and carried away the Masts of the America. 

" 20th.- Royal William and Prince Frederick sailed to join Sir Charles Hardy's Squadron. The same day the Massachusetts Province Ship, 20 Guns, brought in three Prizes, two of which were bound to Louisburg with provisions. 

" 21st. - Brigadier Lawrence received a letter from Admiral Boscawen, acquainting him that he should be ready to sail on the 23rd May, no objection occurring it was determined, but calm thick weather and Contrary winds prevented them. 

" A Body of Rangers were formed consisting of 1100 from Detachments of the several Corps and 500 were sent from New England, all under the Command of Captain Scott of the 70th Regiment, who has been accustomed to that service. Their Clothes are cut short, & they have exchanged their heavy Arms, for the light fusils of the Additional Companies of Frasers that are left at Halifax. This body of Troops will be of excellent service in protecting There Camp from the Insults of the Indians. The Company of Carpenters consisting of go men will be extremely useful as they have been accustomed to the drawing of Masts. 

" During the recess there stay at Halifax afforded them, the Generals did not fail to accustom the Troops to what they were soon to encounter. Some Military operations were dayly carried on. They frequently landed in the boats of the Transports and practised in the Woods, the different Manuvres they were likely to act on the Island of Cape Breton. In all these operations you may imagine that Gen. Wolfe was remarkably active. The Scene afforded Scope for his Military Genius. We found it possible to land 3500 Men in the Boats belonging to Transports, and when the Boats from the Men of War assisted, 5000 Men could be landed. 

" To facilitate the landing at Chaberus Bay the following Scheme was that they seemed inclined to put in execution, and which the following scetch of the Coast will explain. It was proposed to detach Brigadier-Genl. Wolfe with the 15th/ 48th/ Fraser's Battn. of Highlanders & 1100 Rangers, to perfect a landing at Miray Bay, 15 miles from Chaberus Bay, and to force his march thro' the Woods along the road, against whatever might oppose him, making short marches in case of opposition, & securing his Camp every night in the best manner. 

" Colonel Monckton to be detached, to perfect a landing with two Battalions at Grand Lorem Beek, and to secure his small force with an Intrenchment. 

"The rest of the force under cover of the Cannon of the Ships, to land at Chaberus Bay, but I suppose they will delay making that attempt, should any formidable force oppose them, untill the other two Bodys of Troops can cooperate, in making a diversion in their favour. "

"Your Lordship doubtless knows that General Whitmore was directed from Home to Command in Nova Scotia, & to detach General Lawrence, in case General Amherst did not arrive in time, to proceed in the operations of the Siege. 

" 28th. - The wind coming fair in the night, the Admiral made the Signal to unmore at daylight, at seven she weighed, and the whole Fleet were under Sail at Eight O'clock, little Wind, including the whole they amounted to 180 Sail. The Pembroke having 200 Men sick, the Devonshire sickly. The L'Arc en Ceil whose Masts were taken to refit the Prince Frederick were left at Halifax with orders to join the Fleet when in a proper condition, from hence you will find that Mr. Boscawen sailed from Halifax with Twenty-one Sail of the line, & fourteen Frigates. I mean when he joins Sir Charles, his Fleet will amount to that number. He was fortunate in meeting with a fair Wind, & clear Weather for three Days together, which must have afforded them an opportunity of surveying the Coast, & making their disposition. 

" The inclosed return will show you the effective strength of the Troops on the expedition, & those left at Nova Scotia, & I dare say that you must approve of General Abercromby's doing everything in his power, to forward the service, in many things at the expence of that he is himself to Conduct. 

"It is impossible for me to express to your Lordship, the harmony, Spirit, and confidence, that reigns universally thro' the Army and Navy. I parted with my friends General Lawrence, Gen. Wolfe and the Admiral on board the Namur when they were under Sail, and I cannot say but that I earnestly wished that I had been destined for that service. I imbarked on board the Ludlow Castle of 40 Guns with General Hopson, we cleared the Harbour before the Fleet. We met the Dublin, and saw her join the Fleet. I suppose that General Amherst was on board. I esteem myself unfortunate in not meeting him before my departure, as he possibly might have dispatches for General Abercromby. 

"As the Enemy will certainly exert the whole Regular Canadian and Indian Force of Canada against General Abercromby so soon as they are at a certainty of our design against Louisburg, I cannot persuade myself that he will be able to act offensively against the enemy unless a diversion is immediately made up the River St. Lawrence, which may oblige the Enemy to divide their force. I had several opportunities of urging this point to Admiral Boscawen, and he desired me to inform General Abercromby that be proposed sending some Men of War and Troops up the River St. Lawrence to make a diversion the moment that he was persuaded that he could spare them. We all have the utmost confidence in Admiral Boscawen's zeal and activity in the service and when we heard that he was to command the Fleet we assured ourselves that the Campaign would be vigorous & Active. The unanimity that presides at Home seems to defuse itself abroad, whereas of late we have been a divided and distrustful people. A successful Campaign will I hope give Peace to America. Without it I fear the Country will be exhausted and provisions for the supply of a large Army must grow scarce from so many hands being employed in the Field. 

"Capt. Boyer who lately got a £10,000 Ticket has promised me to deliver this letter to your Lordship, he is a particular friend of mine. - I am, my dear Lord, Your faithful servant,

                                                                                                       JAS. CUNINGHAME." [1]

Wolfe, who landed at Halifax from the Princess Amelia on May 8, was eager and dissatisfied. He thought the troops were too few, as deaths, wounds, sickness, and a necessary garrison would take up three thousand men, and suggested reinforcements. He spoke well of the Highland regiments, both officers and men, then beginning their glorious service in the British Army. " The Highlanders are very useful serviceable soldiers, and commanded by the most manly corps of officers I ever saw.[2] The Rangers he described as little better than la canaille." [3] 

He had a poor opinion of the Americans as soldiers. 

" The Americans are in general the dirtiest, most contemptible cowardly dogs that you can conceive. There is no depending upon 'em in action. They fall down dead in their own dirt and desert by battalions, officers and all. Such rascals as those are rather an incumbrance than any real strength to an army." [4] 

But these strictures were but little more severe than those he wrote about the regulars, who, like the Rangers, as the event proved, so willingly and successfully followed his leadership. Of their spirit he had no doubt, but otherwise they fell far below his standard. " Too much money and too much rum necessarily affect the discipline of an army." " I believe no nation ever paid so many bad soldiers at so high a rate." 

The siege supplies were inadequate in important respects ; the muskets were in poor condition. 

"We ought to have had a dozen of the largest sort (Howitzers) for this business. I am told too, that his Excellency had a great mind to keep the tools, in which case there was an end of the siege of Louisbourg altogether, and I believe it will now be found that we have not one pick axe too many.

Our Cloaths, our arms and accoutrements, nay even our shoes and stockings, are all improper for this country. . . . The army is undone and ruin'd by the constant use of salt meat and rum . . . so your lordship may rest assured that the enterprize of Louisbourg will cost a multitude of men." [5] 

Although Wolfe was dissatisfied with the forces gathered at Halifax, Pitt had nevertheless placed at the disposal of the commanders a powerful armament.

1. I owe the full text of this letter and the map, not reproduced, to the kindness of Colonel Stopford Sackville of Drayton House. A few lines of it are quoted in Ninth Report Hist. MSS. Com. p. 75. 
2. Ninth Report Hist. MSS. Com. p. 74. 3.
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid. p. 77. 
5. The above quotations are all from Wolfe's letters to Lord Sackville (Ninth Report Hist. MSS. Com. pp. 74 to 77). 

On the naval side it was made up of 23 men-of- war and i6 smaller vessels, mounting 1842 guns, and carrying crews of 14,005 men. 

The land forces consisted of 13,142 men and officers. Lord Ligonier had responded to the call of Pitt, in a lavish supply of munitions of war. 

Detailed statements of the forces and supplies are printed later, in which will also be found the quantities used, which show that Wolfe's fears were groundless ; as well as for purposes of comparison, the resources in men and ships of the French. 

On Monday, May 29, the advance was begun.[1] At dawn the signal to unmoor was given from the Namur. At nine the fleet was under way, and saluted with seventeen guns by the little citadel, was passing out of the harbour. The breeze was so light at 10.30 that the ships' boats towed them out, and by the afternoon they were still off Cape Sambro. Even at the last it was augmented. The vessels carrying Bragg's, and some detachments from the Bay of Fundy and the new settlement of Lunenburg, joined the fleet and continued with it. The Dublin came in from sea, transferred Amherst to the Namur, and went on into the harbour, as her crew was sickly.[2]

With varying but not unfavourable weather, the fleet tacked along the coast of Nova Scotia and Cape Breton. When the weather cleared, on Friday, June 2, Boscawen saw Louisbourg, and with light airs came slowly to his chosen anchorage in Gabarus Bay, which he reached about four that afternoon. He was followed that evening and the next day by the rest of the fleet. As they passed in, Amherst and his men saw rise above the circumvallation the slender spires of the principal buildings, and beyond them the slenderer masts of the ships in the harbour. 

The position taken by Boscawen was dangerous. His principal ships were anchored about the middle of Gabarus Bay, six miles from the entrance of Louisbourg harbour, and little over two from the shallow water at the head of the bay.[3] As happens yearly at this season, there was much fog, and the prevailing winds were easterly, so that ships leaving the harbour could have run down on the anchored enemy crowded in a bay with a lee shore close aboard. On Sunday, Boscawen's account of conditions is as follows : 

"At 4A.M. it was little wind with a thick haze, the Kennington and Halifax still continue firing. At 5 the breeze began to freshen and it came on foggy. . . . At 8 the gale increased, got down topgallant yards and the Sheat Anchor over the side, and at noon 

1.  The time in naval records of the period was from noon to noon. Thus Boscawen says "at 4.30 A.M., Sunday, May 28," where Gordon says " Monday, May 28." May 28 is, in the former case, from Sunday at noon to noon on the Monday, 29th. The dates in the text follow the reckoning of landsmen.
2. The Grammont was dispatched to reconnoitre Gabarus Bay, and discover the best landing-place ; the Kennington and a transport arrived from sea. The number of transports reported by Boscawen is 127.
3 Their position is indicated on the map, p. 243, from data furnished by the chief Hydrographer of the Navy. 

struck yards and topmasts." Although the weather fell lighter in the afternoon, it was not until 5 the next morning that they " got up topmasts and Yards." 

The Kennington and other frigates, with the sloop Halifax, ranged on shore close to the French batteries with which they were engaged, had to be towed by the ship's boats into deeper water. The Trent took the ground, but was got off with a damaged rudder. " 

It looked," says Gordon, "as if many vessels would go ashore and many suffered the loss of anchor and cables." It would appear that the disposition of the British fleet was the least favourable for defence. Its first line, the frigates, were dragging ashore under the fire of the batteries, while the battleships, to leeward of the transports, were dismantled, and incapable of speedily protecting these ships on which were the troops and warlike stores. The conditions were most favourable for attack. Fog at times hung over all to obscure movements of the French, who had a wind favouring them, strong enough to produce disorder among the British, but, as it was not so heavy as to prevent the working of the fleet's boats, it was favourable to the manoeuvring of the French ships. The easterly winds were against any assistance coming from Hardy and his ships. Everything was prepared for a disaster, which would have stood out in naval annals with Quiberon and La Hogue, had the French grasped the overwhelming value, at critical moments, of an aggressive defence. [1]

The French defence, instead of being greater than that of 1757, in face of the greater forces arrayed against Louisbourg, was weaker. The supply of money in the treasury of France was low, and was engaged for the land war in Germany. The British captures of her men-of- war and her merchantmen had diminished the number of seamen. The appalling mortality of the autumn and winter, through plague brought back to Brest by Du Bois de la Motte's fleet, had further reduced the forces available for manning the ships.[2] Insubordination and desertion, the results of ill-treatment, lowered the quality of those who embarked. So few were the men, that La Clue was nearly a year recruiting for the six ships under his command. [3[ So bad was their quality that Le Chevalier de Mirabeau refused command of a squadron, giving his reasons to the Minister in these outspoken words :

"My life, Sir, and not my honour, belongs to the King. They have broken pledges to the sailors in an unheard of manner. Not paying these wretches is a cruelty, palliated here (Toulon) by necessity without doubt, but marked by incidents which make one shudder when they happen before one's eyes. . . . Du Quesnel's men failed him before the enemy; I cannot, nor do I wish to expose myself to the same hazard." [4] 

1.  This condition is further dealt with in Chap. XV. 
2. See Chap. XV. 
3. La Cour-Gayet, p. 179. 
4. La Cour-Gayet, p. 282. 

With such crews La Clue left Toulon, November 8, to repeat, if possible, the voyage to St. Domingo and Louisbourg which De Beauffremont had so successfully made in the spring. Admiral Osborne held for England the Straits of Gibraltar, and forced La Clue to take refuge in Carthagena, where he was joined in January by some ships under De Motheux, which brought his strength up to thirteen vessels. Preparations to strengthen Louisbourg, notwithstanding this delay, were continued by the French. Du Quesnel, lately Governor-General of Canada, by drawing on men recently returned from a cruise, was able to sail from Toulon in command of the Foudroyant, 80, one of the finest ships of the French Navy, and peculiarly endeared to that service as she had been La Galissonière's flagship at Minorca. She was accompanied by the Orphée, 64, and two smaller vessels. In sight of La Clue, Du Quesnel engaged the English ships off Carthagena on the 28th of February. The Orphée fell at once, and after a combat carried on by the Monmouth, 70, with unabated pertinacity, after the death of her captain, Du Quesnel struck to the smaller ship.[1] La Clue had to return to Toulon, for the superior forces of the British, with Gibraltar as its base, blocked the passage to the Atlantic. 

The strengthening of Louisbourg from the Mediterranean being thus rendered impossible, efforts were made elsewhere, and the intendants of the naval dépôts on the Atlantic were ordered to hasten the dispatch of ships for Isle Royale. The Magnifique left Brest early in March, and arrived in the drift ice off Louisbourg on the 31st of that month. She hung there with appalling sufferings of her crew. One hundred and twenty of her men died, twelve from cold in one night. On another, the ship was unworkable from a " silver thaw.", Villeon, her commander, abandoned the voyage, and with only thirty men, including officers, fit for duty, arrived back on May 5, at Corunna. [2] Another vessel never got away from the French coast : the Raisonable, 64, commanded by the Prince de Montbazon, was overpowered and captured just after leaving Brest for Louisbourg.[3] The Prudent, 64, commanded by the Marquis des Gouttes,[4] arrived at Louisbourg on March 24, and on the 28th Beaussier brought into port his squadron consisting of : 

L'Entreprenant, 74. (Beaussier).                      Le Capricieux, 64 (De Tourville). 
Le Bienfaisant, 64 (Courserac).                        Le Célèbre, 64 (De Marolle). 
                                                La Comète, 74 (Lorgeril). 

The two first named were fully armed ; the other three were en flute, that is, serving as freighters and transports. They brought provisions, and a battalion of Volontaires Etrangers under D'Anthonay.[5] The supplies brought by these 

1. Corbett gives a brief and picturesque account of this action and its significance to the two services, vol. i. 259. 
2. Marine, B⁴, 80. 
3. La Cour-Gayet, p. 311 
4. See Appendix. 
5. See Appendix. 

vessels and others [1] placed Drucour in a position to carry on his detence without further anxiety about munitions or supplies.[2] 

The Court was anxious to supplement Drucour by officers of experience in warfare. Blenac de Courbon  [3] was transferred from his position as Commandant at Brest to Louisbourg with the grade of Commander of its sea and land forces. [4] He set sail on the Formidable on May 11, found Louisbourg blocked, and returned to Brest on June 27. [5] His appointment was made on April 10, so that there was no haste displayed in his setting out, while his report to the Minister, that he was " exceedingly happy to bring back to a good port the ship which had been entrusted to me,"[6] would indicate a lack of energy which made his absence no great loss to the defence. On March 30, De la Houlière was appointed to command the land forces, and arrived in Louisbourg by the Bizarre on the 30th of May. The troops were assembled and his position proclaimed on June 1. [7] On the same day there came to the town an officer of the Dragon, and the adjutant of Cambis, with the welcome news that Duchaffault had arrived at Port Dauphin. His force consisted of six vessels; only two of them and a frigate had then arrived, but these had on board a battalion of Cambis as a reinforcement for the garrison. An officer was sent with instructions for Duchaffault to land this regiment, and to come with his ships to Louisbourg as soon as possible. 

The sight of Boscawen's fleet was no surprise to Drucour and his officers. Indians had come with the news that they had seen the fleet off Fourchu. His vigilance was fully awake. He had, as early as the 28th of April, manned the entrenchments along the shores which Du Bois de la Motte had planned and erected in I757 against Loudon's threatened attack. In consultation with Franquet, he bad visited the shore and agreed on the sites at Pointe Blanche and Pointe Plate for cannon (May 1 and 3), and forthwith proceeded to prepare for their emplacement (May 5), while on the eastern side of the harbour he established posts of 100 men, afterwards increased to 250, drawn in part from the fleet, at L'Anse à Gautier, the most practicable landing near the lighthouse, as well as at the Lorembecs. 

The garrisons of Port Toulouse and Port Dauphin were brought in on the 7th, and Drucour for the first time this spring had authentic news, but 

1. The Apollo, April 15 ; Le Chèvre, April 24 ; La Fidèle, frigate, May 10 ;three merchant vessels on May 19-27 ; the frigates Bizarre and Aréthuse on May 30, the former en flute. 
2. He says that Louisbourg was fully provisioned for a year for the first time since 1735 (Drucour's journal). 
3. See Appendix.
4 I.R. B, 107.
5. Marine, B4, vol. 80.
6. Waddington, Guerre de Sept Ans, vol. ii. p. 336. 
7. For further details of De la Houlière's interesting career see Appendix. De la Houlière had seen much service, had taken part in nine sieges, and had been since 1735 King's Lieutenant at Salces, near Perpignan.

not later than early April, that the ships which had wintered in Halifax were refitting.[1]

Various bands of Indians and Acadians came in, and the younger Villejouin brought ninety Acadians from Lisle St. Jean, who were sent to a camp at Gabarus Bay. In expectation of harassing the besiegers by these irregulars and Indians, two dépôts of provisions were made on the Miré. A battery was even erected at Port Dauphin and abattis and other siege material prepared. The troops in the entrenchments were relieved weekly, but, before the month had ended, the chapel of the spacious hospital had to be turned into a ward, to accommodate the men who had fallen ill from exposure to the fog and rain. A council of the captains of the ships of the navy was held on the 15th of May, to concert measures for the defence of the port. It was decided to prepare fireships, and an armed chaloupe, and to range the men-of-war in positions most favourable for the defence of the port. The larger ships lay in their new positions in a crescent between the Royal Battery and the Bastion de la Grave. 

Those of the men-of-war which had arrived en flûte, had mounted their guns, but were otherwise inactive. An English frigate more than once came along past the town and penetrated, with her boats out, taking soundings, into the very bottom of Gabarus Bay ; she lay at anchor another night, only two cannon-shot off Pointe Blanche; and although in the former case no supporting ships were within four or five leagues, no attempt was made to attack her. Drucour notes with admiration the daring of her commander. 

A few words will describe the site of the impending conflict. The shores of Gabarus Bay slope upwards from beaches and rocky points to a considerable height, which is reached at about a mile distant from the water. This tract, except where the morass or moorland extends to the shore, or the rocky ledges rise in bare shoulders, is covered with forest or scrub growth. The farthest point to the westward, which the French guarded by seventy troops under the younger Villejouin, was the Montagne au Diable, from which a footpath led to the Miré road, giving by it access to the town. About 4000 yards nearer was L'Anse à la Coromandiėre, which French and English strategists alike had picked out as a vulnerable point. It was, therefore, the object of attack, but also the place where were made the most elaborate preparations for defence. The distance between its headlands is about 660 yards, but on neither of these points did it seem possible to land. Midway on the arc of its shore is a rocky point, and on either side of it a beautiful sandy beach, from which the cliff rises abruptly about 15 or 20 feet from high water. Along this higher land the trenches were strengthened by an abattis of trees felled with their tops outward, thickly strewn along the beach below. So thickly were they planted that they 

1. Eleven Indians brought back 7 prisoners and 16 scalps in a schooner they had captured. 

appeared as a natural grove. A little brook runs into the sea close to the eastern point of the cove. This point is a shoulder of land high enough to hide from the shores of the cove all the coast and sea to the eastward. This disadvantage of the position had been foreseen in the defences made in 1757. A nid de pie or watch-tower had been erected on or near this ridge, from which could be seen the whole range of the shore towards the town, say about four miles ; and during the time in 1757 that a descent by the English was possible had been occupied by a detachment.[1] It was now left unoccupied. Pointe Platte and Pointe Blanche were strongly entrenched and guarded. The stretches of coast between these defences was most difficult to land on, and, by the more sanguine of the defenders, thought inaccessible. Tourville, perhaps the most accurate of the observers of events in Louisbourg, however, took a less hopeful view. He walked forth one day, the 7th, to inspect the defences at these nearer posts, and was satisfied with them, and knew Coromandière was good ; but, while the coast was rock strewn, the intervals between the defences were great, and he believed there was danger of an unexpected landing. [2]

The gale of Sunday subsided, and Monday was a day of calm and thick fog, so that both sides were ignorant of what the other was doing. The French heard the sounds of hammering without knowing its cause, the carpenters of the fleet working at the Trent's rudder. While the fog continued Wolfe reconnoitred the shore to see if a landing was practicable. Boscawen, possibly not to have to depend on the decision of a marine question by an impetuous soldier, sent Commodore Durell on the same mission, but there was no difference of opinion between the sea and land officers. They agreed that a landing could not be made. 

As was known to Amherst, the French were strengthening their defences. An 8-inch mortar was mounted on the 5th on a small hillock between Pointe Platte and the Coromandière, and fired that day until the fog came down.[3] The same day the encouraging news came in that eleven companies of Cambis had arrived at Miré, and that De Chaffault had worked out of Port Dauphin with the remaining six on his ships, and lay under Cibou Islands, at the mouth of that harbour, in the most advantageous position, to sail with the first fair wind for Louisbourg. [4] 

Details of men from their ships in the harbour were engaged in hauling a 24-lb. cannon to its position at the battery of the Coromandiėre, an arduous task, delayed by the nature of the ground and the breaking of its carriage. 

Although the Bay of Gabarus was occupied by the enemy, in whose sight 

1. Johnstone says he served there. 
2. " je croy qu'il a lieu de craindre à cet égard " (journal of the Capricieux). 
3. Lartigue, in a note on his map, says a battery should have been placed at this point, but Drucour's account is confirmed by the Anon. Jl. 
4. Ten arrived in Louisbourg the next day, the other on the 7th. 

they performed the feat, two boats' crews of Basque fishermen, volunteers for the service, carried two heavy cannon to Pointe Blanche ; where they were at once mounted.[1] 

The disposition of the regular troops in the field was finally : 

In addition there were the militia, Acadians, and Indians, making the total force over 3000. [2] 

While these preparations for defence were being carried on the plans of the besiegers were modified by fresh discoveries of local conditions. The landing force was to be divided in three parts : Whitmore's, the white division, was to form the right wing ; Lawrence's, the blue, the left ; and Wolfe was to lead a body of Highlanders, Light Infantry, and Irregulars. Amherst's general orders of the 3rd indicate that his purpose was to attack at three places, at White and Flat Points, and Wolfe's force [3] further to the west. A heavy surf prevented an attempt being made that day ; and it was, moreover, discovered that the water off White Point would not allow the frigates to approach that point near enough to have their fire cover effectively the landing troops of the right division. A modification of the first plan was made in the orders of the 4th. 

Amherst determined to have the white division, Whitmore's, distract the enemy's attention at White Point, and then to follow Lawrence's division, the 

1. Drucour's Jl. 7th. 
2. There is no great discrepancy between this list and the number of guns taken as given by Gordon, p. 116. 
3. It was, after a landing, to join that of Lawrence.

blue, which was to land on the shore opposite their station, Flat Point, or to follow the Grenadiers. The reconnaissances along the shore had obviously failed to give Amherst and his staff any adequate idea of the French strength, for these orders state that : 

"The General, not to lose a moment of time, has thought proper to order that an attack be made upon the little Intrenchments within the Fresh Water Cove with four companies of Grenadiers. That no Body, regulars or irregulars, may dare stand before them. These detachments are to be commanded by Brigadier General Wolfe. . . . The Army is to land and attack the French in three different Bodies and at three different places, all the Grenadiers and detachments of the right Wing land upon the right in the bay within White Point, the Light Infantry, Irregulars, and Highlanders are to land in the Fresh Water Cove in order to take the Enemy in the flank and rear, and cut some of them off from the Town. The Highlanders, Light Infantry, and Irregulars, are to Rendezvous to the right of the Island lying before the Fresh Water Cove to be ready to run in the cove when the Signal is given." 

It seems probable that Amherst's Fresh- Water Cove was at the outlet of the stream which falls into the sea near Flat Point. Here is an islet only about a furlong from the shore to the right of which might advantageously be placed the supports of the four companies which were to effect the landing. From this point they could best " take the enemy in flank and rear," and cut some of them off from the town. If Fresh- Water Cove was the same place as Coromandière, the supports of the four companies were to rendezvous at an islet six or seven times as far from the shore as the one at Flat Point, and the position, if the landing were effected, the least favourable for cutting the enemy off from the town. The operation would have been a pursuit, as in the event it was, not an intersection of a line of retreat. Moreover, if Fresh-Water Cove was the same as Coromandière, as it was in the usage of the navy, [1] it would be absurd to assemble the force for an; attack on it, at the most distant part of the line, " the right of the right attack." But if there be doubt as to Amherst's intentions on different days, it is clear that attempts to effect a landing were being made. 

On the 6th, a day which opened with south-west wind and fog, Boscawen signalled to prepare to land, in an interval when the weather showed signs of clearing. The boats were sent to the ships, and by eight the troops were in them, under the immediate supervision of Lawrence and Wolfe Boscawen and Amherst went later to order the disembarkation, but it fell calm, the fog came down with heavy rains, and, following a rising breeze, " a large swell tumbled in from the sea." The men, after rowing in shore and finding it 

1. Boscawen's JI. speaks of Cormorant, and Captain Jacobs of Fresh-Water Cove, referring to the same place (Captains' Logs, 499)

impossible to land, were recalled and ordered back to the ships, Amherst " first acquainting them with the reason for so doing." With the knowledge fresh in his mind of the irritation in subordinate officers, and the rank and file, over the faint-hearted attack on Rochefort, the previous year, Amherst doubtless did not wish to damp the ardour of his force by an appearance of a lack of enterprise.

Wednesday, the 7th, the weather was clear, but the surf was still high, though operations at sea could be carried on, and Wolfe spent the early morning in sounding at the head of the bay. Bragg's regiment, which were still in the small vessels in which they had come from the Bay of Fundy, were detached, under convoy of the frigate Juno, to make a feint on the lighthouse point and L'Anse à Gautier. This had little effect, for the French recognized it as being not serious. Hoping that the next day would bring better weather, Boscawen gave orders to the captains to have their boats at the transports at midnight, and that profound silence should be observed. Amherst again, on the 7th, issued general orders. The boats of the right were to assemble at the transport Violet, to which they were to be guided by three lights hung on the seaward side at the water's edge. The left wing, under Lawrence, assembled at the St. George, which hung out two lights ; and Wolfe with the Grenadier Companies, the Highlanders, Light Infantry, under Major Scott, picked marksmen from all the regiments, and colonial irregulars, was to be in readiness at the Neptune, distinguished by a single lantern. After midnight no other lights were to be shown on the transports, and the men were cautioned to prevent the accidental discharge of a musket, as the General's intention was to surprise the French as well as attack them. He asked for the care and vigilance of the officers of the transports, and expressed his confidence in the good disposition of the troops, and added that should the Admiral and General decide to alarm the enemy earlier, the troops were to take no notice.

Although the fire from the French positions, well maintained between the 4th and 7th, indicated that they were stronger than Amherst had thought, it did not alter his later dispositions,' and the attack was arranged for in this order :

The right wing directed against Pointe Blanche:

 Brigadier Whitmore 

Colonel Burton                                                      and                            Colonel Foster 
        Regiments 1st Royals                                                                            48 Webb's 
             47 Laselies'                                                                                       58 Anstruther's
             2nd Batt. Americans                                                                         17 Forbes'

Bragg's, which should have formed part of this brigade, was detached to make a feint to the eastward to distract the enemy. 

1.  The fog lifting on the 7th disclosed to some degree these positions to the British (Gordon Jl. 7).

The left wing directed against Pointe Platte:

Brigadier-General Lawrence

Colonel Wilmot                                                     and                             Colonel Handfield
        22nd Whitmore's                                                                                  35 Otway's
        3rd Batt. Americans                                                                             40 Hopson's
        45 Warburton's                                                                                    15 Amherst's.

The 63 Fraser's were detached from this brigade to form part of 

The Left Attack 

Brigadier Wolfe 
Colonels Murray and Fletcher 
The Grenadier Companies of the 15th, 22nd, 17th, and 1st Regiments 
The Irregulars and Light Infantry 
The 63 Fraser's Regiment and the Grenadier Companies of the 4oth, 47th, 45th, 35th, 58th, and the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 6oth and 48th Regiments in the order named.

The right wing took up its position behind its supporting frigates, the Sutherland and Squirrel; the left were, until the decisive moment, to be drawn up behind the Gramont, Diana, and Shannon ; while the left attack was supported by the Kennington frigate and the Halifax snow, which were close in shore at the Coromandi6re, to which the frigate has since given her name.[1]

Nothing but success was counted on. The troops were to take in their pockets bread and cheese for two days, and leave their blankets to follow after a landing had been secured. 

Thursday, June 8, Durell rowed along the shore unmolested by the French, and came back to report that there was not so heavy a surf as to prevent landing, at least in Coromandi6re. The French batteries began firing at the nearer ships, and their troops were mustered in the entrenchments. The frigates fired briskly on them for about a quarter of an hour. It being then light, the watchers from the ramparts of the town, drawn there by the heavy firing giving poignancy to their anxiety, saw three to four hundred boats row in divisions from between the sheltering ships. The attack they thought was being delivered on the eastern points. In a little time, before these boats had reached the shore, they were seen to turn towards the Coromandiėre. As Wolfe's force, the weakest of the three in numbers, but made up of picked men, rowed into the cove, " the enemy," says Amherst, " acted very wisely, did not throw away a shot until the boats were close in shore," and then poured in on them so deadly a fire, as the soldiers in the trenches were provided with spare loaded muskets, that 

1. The Kennington, Captain Jacobs, had taken up her position on the 3rd (Captains' Logs, No. 499). As they were being damaged by the fire from the shore, she and the other frigate were ordered by Boscawen to warp further off on the 4th (Boscawen's journal). On the morning of the 8th, she took her position within a musket-shot of the shore (Captains' Logs, No. 499).

landing was impossible. It looked as if Wolfe's first experience in command was to be a disastrous failure, for, notwithstanding his eagerness and the courage of his men, his advance was decisively checked. He gave the signal to retreat, and his boats turned to the open. In Amherst's orders, the officers in charge were cautioned to " avoid huddling together and running into a lump." Three boats on the right of Wolfe's force drifted or rowed towards the east and there found themselves sheltered by the ridge from the fire of St. Julhien's men. just at its foot is still a little space of sand among the rocks of the shore. They effected a landing on it. Wolfe saw the movement, or was advised of it by one of them, and turned again to the point. The repulse had not chilled the ardour of his men. A sergeant in one of the boats, as they rowed into the first attack, stood up in his boat and cried out, " Who would not go to Hell, to hear such music for half an hour ? " [1] A shorter time was given him, for he was shot dead as he stood ; but there were many among the soldiery as reckless of consequences. Some of the boats, when they reached the rocky shore, were dashed to pieces or stove in by collision. The men, Wolfe among them, leaped into the water. Those who kept their feet waded ashore, those who fell were drowned or crushed by the heaving boats. Some of them had taken regular formation on the higher ground before the other brigades reached the shore. St. Julhien, his outlook obscured by the smoke of his own fire and that of the frigates, was busy serving his guns at an enemy which he thought was still in the boats in front of his position. The distance was too great for Marin at Flat Point to know what was taking place. Some skirmishing between irregulars and Wolfe's men occurred. [2] When St. Julhien was advised of the landing, he hesitated, lost time, and, instead of a brilliant attacked delivered by him, on a handful of men with wet muskets, what took place was an attack of his flank and rear by an enemy pouring over the ridge. His troops, which had been in the trenches in bad weather, some for a week, others for a fortnight, were in no condition to stand such an onslaught.[3] They broke and fled towards the town, pursued by Wolfe and the light troops. So rapid was the advance that it was only by travelling with seven-league boots, " à pas de géant," that Marin's men were not cut off in their retreat from Flat Point. The French rallied for a little above the Barachois, but were there in danger of being surrounded by the two forces in which the British advanced. The pursuit was only ended by a cannonade from the walls, which marked for Amherst the point at which he could safely put his advanced camps. The artillery and stores at Coromandière and Flat Point fell into the English hands. D'Anthonay held his ground at White Point until he received orders to retire,

1. Hamilton MSS. 
2. " Our troops killed and scalped an Indian Sachem the day we landed " (Wolfe to Sackville). 
3. " Ye Rangers Started them first, they Ran and Hollow'd and fired on behind them and they left their Brest work" (Knap, p. 8).

and then came in, after destroying his material.[1] It was after four when the attack began, it was six when Boscawen landed, and at about eight the French troops were under the protection of the guns of the town. So short a time had this decisive event taken, but little more than twice as long as leisurely and unmolested pedestrians would take to land and go over the same broken ground. [2]

The young officers who turned the tide were Lieutenants Hopkins and Brown and Ensign Grant of the 35th Regiment.[3] Their exploit may well have been one of the foundations for the tradition as to the luck of the British Army. Wolfe's attack was a direct frontal one on an impregnable position. Had St. Julhien allowed his enemy to land and become entangled in the abattis, the appalling disaster which befell at Ticonderoga [4] the equally gallant troops of Abercomby would have been anticipated at the Coromandière. Had a corporal's guard been on the ridge, the first boats might have been beaten off. Had Wolfe been no quicker to act than at least one of his fellow-brigadiers,[5] or had St. Julhien been as quick as Wolfe, success would have continued with the French. Neither Wolfe nor Amherst mention the incident ; we know of it through private accounts both French and English. 

The three young officers leading Highlanders, says Hamilton, the light infantry, says Gordon, struck a new note in the Seven Years' War. Vacillation and an excess of caution had marked its conduct, but later its most brilliant exploits were in the form which they first gave, accomplishing the impracticable. Perchance to them had filtered down the opinion of Wolfe, " The greatness of an object should come into consideration as opposed to the impediments that lie in the way." Its spirit surely informed their action. Wolfe, himself, but followed their example at Quebec ; and like them, Lambart " by attempting a place where 

1. He did not spike his guns. 
2. After much hesitation I have adopted this version of the sequence of these events. It follows Amherst's account in so far as the main attack, being intended against the Coromandière. There are, however, difficulties in accepting this view. If the attacks of the main brigades were not to be serious, why did Whitmore come under fire ? (Anon. journal). If it was the well-ordered operation which appears in Amherst's account, it is difficult to explain Wolfe's view of the event, except by attributing to him a talent for exaggeration quite phenomenal. That opinion was, " Our landing was next to miraculous. . . . I wouldn't recommend the Bay of Gabarouse for a descent, especially as we managed it " (Wolfe to Sackville, Hist. MSS. Com. Ninth Report, p. 76). 

The losses at the landing were: 

British Regulars :- killed 3 officers, Captain Baillie and Lieut. Cuthbert of Fraser's. Lieut. Nicholson of Amherst's, 4 sergeants, 1 corporal, and 38 men. Of these only 8 were shot, the others were drowned. Wounded : 5 lieuts., 2 sergeants, I corporal, and 51 men. 

Ranges :- l ensign and 3 men killed, 1 wounded and 1 missing, They took 4 French officers and about 70 men prisoners, 17 guns, 2 mortars, and 14 swivels, with supplies and stores of all kinds. 

The French loss is stated by Drucour as 114, including deserters from the Volontaires Etrangers. Three officers were wounded. 

3. For the meagre details I have been able to find about these officers, see end of Chapter. 
4. July 8, 1758. See Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, chap. xx., and his App. G.
5. "Whitmore is a poor, old, sleepy man" (Wolfe to Sackville, Ninth Report Hist. MSS. Com. p. 76).

the mounting of the rocks was just possible" won a foothold at Belle Isle.[1] True it may be that had there been above the rocks of Coromandi6re a post in the " magpies' nest," had a more vigilant officer than Vergor held the outpost at L'Anse à Foulon, had the force under the gallant De Ste. Croix been larger, failure and not success had befallen the British arms on these decisive occasions, but greatly daring, and promptly succoured, they all won, through unexpected ways, the crucial foothold.

1. In 1760 (see Corbett, vol. ii. pp. 160-167, for an account of this event, in which we read the names of places familiar to us in the pages of Dumas).