J.S. McLennan, Louisbourg: From Its Foundation To Its Fall (Sydney: Fortress Press, 1969)

© Fortress Press

Chapter 10

Pepperrell had many causes for anxiety. His stores were inadequate, and many of the small arms were in bad order. Rioting had taken place at Canso, so he had to find, and did find, that middle way between a severity to which his levies would not submit, and a laxity perilous to the success of the expedition. The detachment which was sent against St. Peter's had acted without dash, " which party returned without success, not having carefully conformed to their orders, for landing in whale boats by night, and finding there several vessels, which though of no force, yet well manned for trade, and a number of Indians being alarmed ; their whole force appeared so considerable, that our party did not think it safe to land." [1]

These were indications that neither his materials nor his men would stand much strain ; and yet his officers had urged him to push on to Louisbourg without waiting for the transports laden with his artillery. The ice on the Cape Breton coast made impossible this advance. The vessels with this part of his armament had arrived before the sea cleared. As soon as navigation to the eastward became practicable, the movement on Louisbourg began. The expedition started from Canso early on the morning of the 29th of April. That day, the most warm and pleasant since their arrival at Canso, opened with light winds, which, after a calm, rose again to a gentle breeze from the north- west. It, being a fair wind, enabled the fleet of about one hundred vessels to reach along the coast to their appointed position in Gabarus Bay. Here, after passing Warren's cruising ships, they arrived in the morning of Tuesday the thirtieth. [2]

Du Chambon had been in doubt as to what was going on, or perhaps was in that frame of mind which tries not to see indications of a crisis to which he felt himself unequal. The vessels in the offing, and reports that there was unusual activity at Canso, were disquieting. But the former, it was hoped,

 1. Pepperrell to Shirley, Massachusetts Historical Society vol. 1, p. 24. 
2. The large map of this siege can be used with great advantage in following its course. Its comparison with written accounts shows its substantial accuracy. It is necessary to collate the letters which passed between the officers and the minutes of the Council of War. The latter and some of the letters are in Massachusetts Historical Society, sixth series, vol. 10. Other letters are in vol. 1 of its first series. These are referred to as vol. 1 and vol. 10. 

might be the succour from home for which they had asked ; the latter the carrying out of English plans for the fortification of Canso, of which they had knowledge. He ordered Benoit in command at Port Toulouse (St. Peter's) to ascertain what was going on. The latter sent out a civilian, an Indian, and a soldier, who captured four of the enemy. These in turn overpowered their captors, and brought the Frenchmen in as prisoners, the Indian having escaped.[1]

The miscarriage of this scout left Du Chambon still uncertain. Nor could the people of Louisbourg tell the nationalities of the combatants, in seeing from the land the running fight between the Renommée and the provincial cruisers. There was little room left for doubt when a vessel from St. jean de Luz arrived safely, and reported that on the 25th she had exchanged three broadsides with the enemy. Whatever uncertainty still existed in their minds was dispelled by the capture of three coasting boats.[2]

Du Chambon, thus driven from the position that there was no cause for alarm, in conjunction with Bigot, sent word to France of their condition.[3] The Société slipped successfully through the blockade, and bore to the court their evil tidings, which falsified the optimistic previsions of Maurepas. The preparations for defence which Du Chambon had made in the autumn seem to have been held in abeyance by the mutiny of the garrison. Officials, officers, and townspeople feared the purpose of the troops was to deliver the place without striking a blow, so its condition was one of suspended animation. The conduct of the soldiery during the winter had been orderly. When the crisis came it was spirited. Du Chambon and Bigot appealed to their patriotism, and promised, in the name of the King, a pardon for their past offences. The troops responded to their appeal, returned to their duty, and behaved well during the siege. [4]

Although arrangements had been made for calling in the people of the outlying settlement of Baleine and Lorambec, who joined the townspeople in a militia for its defence, there seems to have been no settled plan of action in event of these threatening appearances proving to be the prelude of an attack. 

Du Chambon was Governor by accident. Neither Chateaugué, appointed to succeed Du Quesnel, nor De Salvert, his substitute, had been able to reach Louisbourg. Du Chambon was inexperienced. Neither he nor any of the officers of the troops had even been in action, so that this siege is the culminating event of that warfare of amateurs which began at Canso a year earlier. The New Englanders at least made plans ; Du Chambon seems to have been incapable of 

1. Mass. Hist. Soc. vol. 1, p. 23; Que. Hist. Mass. vol. 3, p. 238.
2. One was a large sloop loaded with game. 
3. Bigot does not seem to have been in doubt. 
4. Bigot says none deserted. This is almost literally true, there were only two desertions. The promise of pardon was repudiated after the return of the garrison to France. Certain of the soldiers were executed. The alleged ringleader had died in prison, Bigot made a statement in favour of the soldiers, which the court-martial did not admit (Colonies, B, Vol. 82). Bigot, however, wrote to the Minister, Oct. 9, 1745, taking a different view. He said, it is of the utmost importance to the colonies that an example be made ("Qu'on fasse un example dune pareille sédition ").

foresight. His disastrous lack of judgment was shown in his dealing with the force of Marin. This officer had been sent with a strong detachment from Quebec for a winter journey to Acadia, there to act against Annapolis or to help Louisbourg. It left on January 15. Du Chambon informed Marin in April that it was unnecessary for him to come to Louisbourg. He consequently attacked Annapolis. It was not until the provincial artillery had begun to fire on the town, May 5, that Du Chambon attempted to avail himself of this reinforcement. At this late day, Du Chambon sent a messenger on the long journey to Annapolis. Marin set out, penetrated to Isle Royale, after an encounter with provincial cruisers in the Gut of Canso, and arrived too late to be of any help. [1]

It was not until the French saw from the ramparts on the morning of the 3oth a disembarkation begun, its boats moving towards two points, one near, the other much more to the westward of Flat Point, that the question of resistance was raised. Two civilians were the spokesmen of those who desired action. One was the retired officer of the Regiment de Richelieu, de la Boularderie, who, on hearing of the cruisers off the port, had come in an open boat from his estate at Petit Bras d'Or. Morpain, now port captain, but at the beginning of the century a privateer of Port Royale, was the other. 

De la Boularderie said that, under cover of the woods, a force could advance within half a pistol-shot of the beach ; that half of the garrison should be sent out to fall on the enemy, who would be in that confusion which always attends landings ; that they would be chilled from exposure, and that they were, moreover, but poor creatures ("miserables"). Morpain recounted his exploits in 1707 and appealed to Du Chambon to give him leave to go out with those of the townspeople who were willing. Du Chambon, who had taken the view that he had no men to spare, at last gave way. Fifty civilian volunteers and twenty- four soldiers, the latter under Mesillac Du Chambon, the Governor's son, the youngest officer of the garrison, set forth from the town with vague instructions and under uncertain command. 

When they were about half - way across the marsh, Boularderie thought the attempt was hopeless, as fifteen hundred men had landed and were taking regular formation. Morpain was for keeping on. Marching in solid formation, they came under the fire of the ships, [2] and alarmed the landed troops. The French had reached a depression when the enemy closed in on them. Morpain, heedless of De la Boularderie's expostulations, withdrew all the men except twelve soldiers. These momentarily withstood the provincial attack made in 

1. The first news they received in Quebec of the fall of Louisbourg was from the younger Marin, who was dispatched by his father with this disappointing intelligence (MSS. Que. vol. 3, p. 217). 
2 " We were covered in our landing by Fletcher, Bush, and Saunders, who fired their cannon smartly on the enemy" (Pepperrell's journal).

overwhelming force. De la Boularderie was twice wounded and surrendered, five of the soldiers were wounded, but escaped, and seven were killed. Morpain was wounded, but watched over by a faithful negro slave, was later brought. into the town.[1] The losses were trifling : only two or three provincials wounded, and on the French side sixteen or seventeen killed and wounded. From the English accounts there does not appear to have been the delay of which the French speak, nor the number of men landed at the time the attempt at a repulse was made. The provincial troops, after dispersing this tardy and ill-led expedition, were emboldened to advance freely. In a few hours irregular groups of them emerged from the woods overlooking the town, in which their exultant cheering could be heard. Order was maintained among some others, for regular squads advanced through the woods, and came into the open in the neighbourhood of the Grand Battery. 

Two thousand were landed before nightfall, and the work of encamping was begun. The site of the camp was on either side of a small brook which runs into Gabarus Bay, between Flat Point and the boggy plain which stretches to the outworks of the fortress. The land is dry, and the wisdom of Pepperrell's officers is shown by the fact that Amherst's engineers in 1758 found no better place for the encampment of a much larger force. [2]

While morning of this day brought to Du Chambon these perplexities, the evening brought another, of no less moment. This was the report of Chassin de Thierry, Captaian in command of the Grand Battery, that, in his opinion, the post was not tenable. He proposed to blow it up, as it would be of great value to the enemy, and spike the cannon. A council of war was held, and the opinion of the engineer, Verrier, confirmed Thierry's statement. At its best, the fort was commanded by higher ground ; in its present state, difficult to defend, for on the landward side its defences had been levelled preparatory to their repair. The council without a dissenting voice voted for its abandonment, and, with the exception of Verrier, thought that it should be blown up. His protests against the destruction of the work were so vigorous that the point was given up, and Thierry was ordered to spike the guns and withdraw his men and as many provisions and warlike stores as he could bring away. This he did with such haste that the guns were not properly spiked, and the garrison was back in the town about midnight. A detachment had to be sent to complete the evacuation. Other detachments, on the 1st and 2nd 

1. Morpain set free the man as a reward. Boularderie was taken to Boston, made a good impression on its authorities and people, took charge of the other prisoners, and left for France with a certificate that he had behaved like a gentleman, and was of great service to the prisoners. This was signed and sealed on September 2 by various distinguished gentlemen, among whom were members of Council and B. Pemberton, its Secretary (C11, Canada, vol. 87).
2. The earthworks which enclosed the latter camp are still quite visible. 

of May, sunk at their moorings the vessels near the town, those at the head of the harbour, and brought away from the lighthouse its supply of oil. A third force, a mixed detachment of French and Swiss, protected those who demolished the houses between the Dauphin Gate and the Barachois, and while at this work beat off an attack. 

The disembarkation was completed on the 1st, but for a fortnight the troops, landing stores and artillery on an exposed shore in cold and foggy weather, and in bringing the artillery over rocks, through woods and bogs, suffered the severest hardships. They worked so effectively that, on the fifth day after the descent, a battery was in position opposite the citadel at a distance of 1550 yards, and then opened fire on the town. 

On the night of the 1st a strong detachment marched through the woods and destroyed the houses at the head of the harbour. The next morning, William Vaughan, returning from this expedition, reconnoitred the silent Grand Battery, and, preceded by an Indian, entered its court and found it deserted, a condition which scarcely justifies the opening of his letter to Pepperrell : 

" May it pleasure your Honour, to be informed yt with y^e grace of God and y^e courage of about thirteen men I entred this place about nine a clock and am waiting here for a reinforcement and flag." [1]

Another account speaks of this event from a different standpoint, and incidentally illustrates the conditions of the troops in these early days. 

"This Morning we had an alarm in the Camp suposing there was a Salley from the town against us We Ran to meet them but found ourselves Mistaken : I had a Great Mind to se the Grand Battery So with five other of our Company I went towards it and as I was a Going about Thirty more fell in with us ; we Came in y^e Back of a hil within Long Muskitt Shot and fired att y^e s^d fort & finding no Resistance I was Minded to Go & Did with about a Duzen men setting a Gard to y- Norward Should We Be asolted who Espied two trench men whom we Imeadately Took Priseners with two women & a Child then we went in after some others to ye s^d Grand fort & found itt Desarted." [2]

Before Vaughan was reinforced, he beat off four boat-loads of men, covered by the fire of the town and island batteries. Colonel Bradstreet was sent with a reinforcement, and began at once getting the guns into order, in which he was so successful that the next day, the 3rd of May, at noon, one gun had fired on the town, and a second was in service at seven the same evening. This, Colonel Waldo, who had taken over the command, reports with satisfac- 

1. Vol. 10, p. 138. 
2. Gidding's Journal, Essex Inst, vol. 48. The " some others " I take to be the men under Vaughan.

tion, and enlivens his letter to the General by a jest in the manner of the times over the poor quality of the bombs fired at them by the French. 

His regiment continued to garrison this fort, and the artillery officers soon had enough cannon drilled and in service against the town to amply justify, by the effects of their fire, the view of the importance of this position held by the planners of the expedition. Waldo made daily reports to Pepperrell while he was at the Grand Battery, in which the most striking feature was the constant clamour for rum. Day after day it was asked for, and it was not quantity alone, for in one letter they beg for French rather than the home-made drink. The quantity required apparently seemed excessive to the Commissariat, for Waldo writes : 

"The short supply of rum, the severall Captains tell me, is of prejudice to the people. Should one from the dead tell the soldiery anything, in the prejudice of it, 'twould have no weight." [1]

In warlike stores the supply was short. Waldo was constantly on the point of being left without powder, and feared at one time that their battery would have to be silent, which he felt sure would lead to a revival of the drooping spirits of the besieged, and possibly to an attempt to retake it. [2] He reported that its cannon were twenty-eight of 42 Pounds and two of 18 pounds, "as good pieces as we could desire. I fear the only badd quality in them will be in the opinion of our principalls that they devour too much powder." He wrote to Pepperrell that his men were poor, and "we are in great want of good gunners that have a disposition to be sober in the daytime " ; and again, that he would answer for the flag provided he had men and good officers. Three fourths of the men which you apprehend are here are party employed in speculation on the neighbouring hills and partly employed in ravaging the country." 

While the excessively arduous work of establishing batteries and serving them was going on, it is evident from the journals of individuals, that the troops were not all engaged in this legitimate work, but parties of them went out on expeditions, the purpose of which was plunder and destruction of property, as well as taking prisoners. It is quite evident from the numbers taken, either that, owing to the short notice given by signals, all the inhabitants of the outports did not come in, or that people of the town passed to and from their properties on the shores of the harbour. The scanty records show that both the dwellers in the environs, and those who left the town, fell into the hands of these roving bands, who apparently had at best no other commission than the permission of 

1. Vol. 10, p. 158. 
2. One diarist notes that a sermon was preached on the morning of the 5th in the chapel of the Grand Battery from the text : " Enter into his gates with thanksgiving, and into his courts with praise."

their regimental officers. The records of one diarist [1] begin on the day of landing with the capture of five cows, from which, as only three of them were killed, follows in natural sequence, that he breakfasted the next morning on milk. Horses and cattle were both taken and killed ; houses were plundered. Forty - eight hours later he says again, that " our men keep continually plundering," and on the first Sunday they were on shore, May 5, he records that one of the General's men killed himself with drink in a house he was looting. The same day two unhappy Frenchmen, clearly non- combatants, for they were carrying their goods from the city to a hiding-place in the woods, were killed by a party numbering a score. Their boat-loads of property and two bags of gold became a richer booty to a more unscrupulous squad than was usual. Another writer, in recounting the events of May 2, says, " and after that (we) took the grand Batry and several cows and horses and sum plunder viz. sum pots sum kitles sum grid irons sum one thing atid sum another." [2] The value of the spoils impressed the enemy. Gibson later describes handsome farms on the Miré. It is said that in one house, burned at St. Peter's, there were 1000 bushels of wheat, [3] and more than once the good looks of the women captured are mentioned, " of which is hansom ladeys," [4] but it was not always so easy as in these instances. Friday io, Gibson's journal : 

"A small scout of twenty-five men got to the north-east harbour. I and four more being in a house upon plunder, 140 French and Indians came down upon us first, and fired a volley, with a great noise. Two jumped out of the window and were shot dead. With great difficulty the other two and myself got safe to the grand battery. They afterwards killed nineteen of the remaining twenty." [5] 

The authorities were seriously concerned about this plundering. Waldo wrote to Pepperrell soon after he went to the Grand Battery : 

" I fear yr Honr will be under necessity of appointing a moroding officer with ye powers, & without it, should an obstinate siege be our portion, a train of ill consequence must ensue which I doubt not you'll be pleased to consider of." 

Pepperrell was evidently determined to arrange some means of dealing with the matter, for he wrote to Warren the same day : 

" The unaccountable irregular behaviour of these fellows (the masters of transports) ot some moroders is the greatest fatigue I meet with; hope to reduce them to a better discipline soon." 

War is a cruel thing even with a disciplined army ; with irregular troops it

1. Bradstreet. 
2. Gaddings, p. 6. 
3. From French sources there is no evidence of such abundance.
4. Vol. 10, p. 155. 
5. The next day forty prisoners were taken by the force which set out to bury the dead. It made a clean sweep of the place, chapel, fish stages, and a hundred fishing-boats. 

is a scourge to the people of the invaded territory. Neither Pepperrell's correspondence, nor the journal of the Council of War, shows what measures were taken, but the later entries of the diarists narrate no such barbarities on the part I of the provincials as the records of the earliest days. [1]

Having abandoned a surprise on the town, in the securing of the Grand Battery, and the encampment of the army, Pepperrell had carried out in the main the instructions of Shirley. He was left, supported by his Council, to devise further action ; except in one respect, the destruction of all French property. This work was steadily prosecuted, until in three or four weeks, either by land expeditions or the forces of Warren, no hamlet or settlement on the island was left unravaged. 

The question of sending a summons to Du Chambon was the first considered by the Council on the 3rd. The matter was under consideration intermittently until the 7th, when it was decided on. Some of the seniors, among them Waldo, held that Du Chambon would be justified in hanging the bearer of their message, " unless we had made a more formidable genl. appearance than we have yet been able to make." [2]

The Council took up the erection of batteries. Beginning at the Green Hill, these were pushed forward with a celerity which was possible only among a force made up of men, some with the dexterity of seafarers, others with that of woodsmen accustomed to handle mast timber from the stump in the forests of New Hampshire to its berth in the vessel. By the 20th, a fifth battery, sweeping across the little Barachois, completed the attack against the fortifications towards their northern end, where the ground was most suitable for these (The boggy grounds south of the citadel protected operations and an assault. the place from attack on that side.) Other projects against the town were considered and attempted. Warren proposed an operation against the Island Battery, which guarded the mouth of the harbour. It was tried unsuccessfully, as the boats withdrew on account of the surf. It was determined in the Council on the 9th to storm the town that night. When news of the decision spread through the camp, so much dissatisfaction was expressed that a hastily summoned meeting of Council was held in the afternoon, and abandoned the project. There were seventeen members present in the morning and six in the afternoon. The latter passed the following : 

"Advised, that in as much as there appears a great dissatisfaction in many of the officers & soldiers at the design'd attack of the town by storm this night, and as it may 

1. The only officer whose diary shows any sympathy with plundering was Gibson, who was not a New Englander, but had held his Majesty's commission in the Foot Guards at Barbadoes (Gibson's journal, p. 21). Pepperrell and his second, Waldo, were strongly opposed to it. 
2. Vol. 10, p.141. This, written by Waldo on the 3rd, confirms the impression given by other records that the disorder was great.  

be attended with very ill consequence if it should not be executed with the utmost vigour whenever attempted, the said attack of the town be deferr'd for the present. [1]

Warren was present at both meetings. 

The outlook was not as brilliant as the leaders had hoped. Du Chambon had returned a spirited answer to the summons to surrender. The guns of their siege batteries were burst by overloading,[2] and, firing at long range, did little damage to the French defences ; and it was found impossible to arrange an attack on the Island Battery. Discouragement dictated the decision of the Council of War which met on the 11th ; for this was virtually to abandon the offensive, and to attempt no more than to hold the harbour until reinforcements were sent to them. The Council decided at its meeting as follows : 

"Advized, that the battery begun at the west part of the Town be compleated with all possible expedition, and the eight 22lb cannon be mounted there. 

"Advized, that two regiments be posted on the west part of the town to guard the batteries there, and to intercept succours that may attempt to get into the town that way. 

"That one regimt be posted at the Grand Battery. 

" That a battery be thrown up, and the New York train of artillery and some cannon from the Grand Battery be mounted between the light-house and careening place, and that the remaindr of the army with the stores encamp in some proper place abt the North East Harbour, & intrench there and place the field pieces round the camp, that so they may be able to keep possession of the harbour till measures can be taken for the effectual re- duction of the town. 

" That some guard- boats be prepared & kept in readiness in the North East Harbour to intercept small vessells from getting to the town with succors." [3]

It was also decided that Shirley send down a reinforcement of one thousand men. The battery was begun, no steps were taken to remove the troops, and by the 18th the action was reconsidered in Council and the project abandoned. Vaughan wrote, on the 11th, that he could take the Island Battery if given control of an expedition against it. He busied himself with preparations, but was obliged to write Pepperrell that the indiscipline of the men made the expedition impossible. A bungling attempt to burn a vessel from France, which had passed through the cruisers unhurt by their fire and that of the Grand Battery, and had been anchored or was beached close under the walls of the town, was also made and failed. 

Warren was getting uneasy. He pointed out to Pepperrell that the St. Lawrence was open, and that reinforcements might be sent down from Quebec as well as from France. Pepperrell's letters to Shirley became apologetic in their tone, for he and his officers were receiving letters which showed that at home hopes were held that they were in Louisbourg when they had not landed. [4]

1. Vol. 10, p. 17. 
2 Many accidents of this kind took place to their own guns and men. 
3. Vol. 10, p. 18. 
4. Parkman, also vol. 10. 

Warren proposed an attack on the town, by the combined land and sea forces, for which he secured the approval, not only of his own captains, but of Rous and Fones, of the colonial cruisers. The Council determined that the circumstances of the army did not justify its immediate undertaking. Warren was unquestionably disappointed, and some irritation appears in his letters to Pepperrell. Before this had risen to any plain expression one event occurred which materially affected the course of the siege. This was the capture of the one ship sent out from France which could have helped Du Chambon in his defence. The Vigilant was a new ship mounting sixty-four guns. It was said that she was so heavily laden that her lowest tier of guns was not available in battle. Her command was given to Maisonfort, who was given instructions to succour Louisbourg without uselessly exposing his vessel. [1]

The Vigilant, on her voyage from Brest, captured two British vessels, on which she put prize crews to bring them in to Louisbourg. On the 20th of May she was off the coast of Isle Royale, proceeding with a fair north-east wind for her destination. She fell in with and chased the Mermaid, of forty guns, Captain Douglass. The latter, replying with his stern guns to the fire of the Frenchman, was pursued towards the northwards where Warren's ships lay. Douglass signalled to them the presence of the enemy. When Maisonfort [2] (at 2 P.m.) discovered the British ships, conditions were reversed. He turned south-westwards to sea, and was chased by the Mermaid. He crowded on all sail. The British ship was joined at six by Rous, in command of the Shirley, who " Ply'd his Bow Chase very well." At eight the Eltham and Superbe came up, and after an hour's action Maisonfort struck. In the darkness of night-time and fog they all but lost the prize. Maisonfort had made a gallant fight, and did not surrender until his ship was unworkable, and was so much shattered that she had to be towed into Gabarus Bay the next day, so that he had no chance of escaping. Sixty of her crew of 500 were killed or wounded. Douglass was put in command of her, and with difficulty a crew was obtained from the transports and army.[3] The Superbe's master's log, No. 722, has a slightly different account, agreeing that the Vigilant fought until completely disabled. "She could make no sort of sail." The logs all show that she inflicted considerable damage on the three ships which overpowered her. 

Had the Vigilant successfully entered the harbour the effect on the siege must have been great.[4] Its crew would have about doubled the number of the defenders of the town. The stores she carried would have most opportunely 

1. I.R. B, vol. 82, f. 59 and 70. 
2. See Biographical Appendix. 
3. This in brief is the account of the Mermaid's log (R.O. Captains' Logs, 820). 
4. If she had got in, I believe she would have put them in such a condition as to prevent any Fleet in the World's coming in the Town " (Capt. Ph. Durell of the Superbe). "If the Ship had got into the Harbour we should never have taken the place " (" an officier of Marines " in Durell, Captain M'Donald (?). 

supplemented those of the defence, which were so low that the powder was sparingly used. The rashness of De la Maisonfort would have animated the defence with the spirit it needed. The courage and tenacity with which he and his crew fought on the Vigilant until she was completely disabled, we must believe, would have proved too much for the few and unskilled gunners of the Grand Battery. Had they silenced these guns, then, from some such position as the Arethuse occupied in 1758, the siege batteries would have been laid open to the devastating broadsides of the Vigilant.[1] The fortunes of France suffered grievously from the rashness of her commander. 

Powder from her stores was found very useful by the provincials in adding to their stores, which, like those of the French, had run low. But the fire of their batteries was not very effective. With regard to other operations, the officers had not enough control over their men to order them to the attack on the Island Battery, and to have that order obeyed. The organization of this expedition was being attempted continuously from the time that it was first spoken of, but night after night it was put off. The first of the attempts which were serious was made on the 21st. Warren had two hundred men ready to assist, but the disorderly mob which appeared at the Grand Battery was in no condition to make an attack.

"The night, owing to the moon and the northern lights, was not so agreeable as may happen the ensuing one, and the appearance of small detachments of men without officers was much less pleasing, many of which only under the conduct (not influence) of a sarjeant & many others only centinells without any officer of any kind, & not a few of them noisy & in liquor." [2] 

Waldo wrote that only fourteen of his men would go ; although he claimed that the spirit of his regiment was better than others. The men believed the French had wind of their design. D'Aillebout, in command of the island, was erecting a fascine battery to protect its landing-place. The council had an examination of witnesses the next day. Their decision was that Colonels Noble and Gorham, who were in command, were not chargeable with misbehaviour in the affair. The council also " advised, that if a number of men to the amount of three or four hundred appear as volunteers for the attack of the Island Battery, they be allowed to choose their own officer and be entitled to the plunder found there." [3] This offer produced some effect. 

1. See map. 
2. Vol. 10, Waldo to Pepperrell, p. 213. 
3. Vol. 10, p. 21. Had plunder been much of an inducement, the adventurers would have been sorely disappointed had the island been taken. Young d'Estimauville was burned out when in command of the detachment at Fort Guillaume, at Table Head, in September 1752. His claim for reimbursement of his losses represents that he had the following property : 10 shirts, 10 handkerchiefs, i11 stockings, 2 vests, 2 shoes, 8 towels and bedding ; also an overcoat, a silver convert, and a goblet, a hunting knife, etc., a canteen of 5 bottles, demijohn of wine, 8 glasses, 2 flasks, etc. He was probably better supplied than any officer in 1745, and the four or five on the Island Battery and their eighty men would have given little to divide.

The officers chosen found over four hundred adventurers assembled at the Grand Battery on the night of the 26th. As they embarked they gave the impression to Waldo that the greater part of them never intended to land in the attack. The surf was as heavy as any Warren had known on the coast.

" I am very sorry for the miscarriage and loss of men in the attempt on the Island Battery. There was as great a surer the night it was undertaken as I have known here, and I desired Captain Durell to acquaint you, if you wou'd lend us your whale boats we wou'd attempt it from the ships the first favourable opportunity, tho' I must own I think wee ought not to unmann them upon any account, as the sea force of the enemy may be daily expected, whom we ought to be in a condition to receive." [1] 

The foremost boats reached the island and landed their men. The garrison was ready for them and a conflict began. The garrison was small. One account says 60 to 80 soldiers. There were also about 140 militiamen. After three hours of fighting, which ended at four in the morning, the victory was with the French. The loss was 189 men, [2] and it paralyzed for the moment the besieging forces. The next day the batteries were silent for some time ; that of the Grand because it had no powder, nor men to work it ; the others presumably on account of the confusion. Waldo sent one of his vigorous letters to Pepperrell : 

" The silence of all our batterys after the misfortune of last night is very prejudicial to our interests. I humbly apprehend we ought rather to have doubled our zeal ye way." From all accounts from shore we learn the men are prodigiously discouraged." [3] 

Warren's impatience increased. On the 24th he again sent a plan approved by his captains. It proposed that 1000 men from the army should embark on the vessels, that 600 men more should be found from the land forces to man the Vigilant, that the harbour should be forced, the transports to be under cover of the men-of-war, and that a vigorous attack in boats should be made from the ships, and that Captain McDonald should land the marines and lead the land attack. [4]

The council on the 25th "maturely weighed" this plan, pointed out that the reduction of the Island Battery, and of that circular battery with which Du Chambon [5] had replaced and reinforced the guns at the Dauphin Gate, would be of great service to the attack on the town, and that they would endeavour it, 

1. Vol. 10, p. 233. 
2 Pepperrell to Warren, May 28, vol. 1, p. 33. 
3. Diary of Rev. Joseph Emerson, Chaplain of the Molineux frigate ; published by Sam. A. Green. 
4. The marines on the men-of-war were about 300 in number. Capt. James M'Donald came to Shirley highly recommended, and received from him a Colonel's commission to command the marines under Pepperrell, if they served on shore (Shirley to Pepperrell, May 10). Pepperrell thought he was boastful and a martinet. " I am well assurd. he never was, put it all together, one hour in any of ye trenches, & he might be on shore before we came in ye citty three days at a time in ye camp, & then to be sure we were glad to get rid of him, for ye most he did was to find fault that our encampment was not regulr., or yt the soldrs. did not march as hansome as old regulr. troops, their toes were not turned enough out, &c." (Pepperrell to Shirley, vol. 10, p. 330).
5. Lartigue, a civilian, was very active in this work. 

while the Vigilant was refitting. They then summarized the difficulties of the situation : 

" That as the difficulties of communication between the army and shipping are often so great that boats cannot put off nor reland for several days together ; there being a considerable degree of sickness in the army ; there being reason to apprehend that a number of French Indians may be dayly expected on the back of our camp ; also that our men being unused to the sea would be soon unfitted for service by being on shipboard ; it is by no means advizeable to send off any number of the land forces to go into the harbour in the ships, lest if by any accident the ships should not go in at the time proposed, the land men might not be able immediately to repair on shoar, which might be attended with the worst consequences to the army. 

" That a general attack be made on the town by the army and naval force as soon, and in such manner, as shall be determined upon by their united Councils [and submitted an alternative plan] : 

" Vizt. That five hundred men be taken out of the cruizers and transports, and distributed in the ships of war, in order to facilitate the manning the Vigilant. 

"That the ships and other vessels proceed into the harbour at the time agreed upon in such manner as Com^re Warren shall direct. 

"That five hundred land men and what men can be spared from the cruizers be in readiness at the Grand Battery to put off in boats upon a signal, and to land and scalade the wall on the front of the town, under the fire of the ships' cannon. The marines and what seamen Com^re Warren thinks proper to attack at the same time and place. 

"That five hundred men, or more if to be had, scalade the wall at the southeast part of the town at the same time.

" That five hundred men make an attack at the breach at the West Gate, and endeavour to possess themselves of the Circular Battery. 

"That five hundred men be posted at a suitable place to sustain the party attacking at the West Gate." [1]

Warren's impatience showed in his letters. He transmitted his plan of the 24th in a letter beginning with these words : 

" I am sorry to give you the trouble of so many plans of operation against the garrison of Louisbourg, and beg leave to assure you, most candidly, that they all have been such as  appeared best to my weak judgment, under the several circumstances that you were in, at the different times of my proposing them." [2]

Pepperrell replied in a calm tone on the same day in transmitting the report of the council, which drew from Warren a brusque answer, the basis of which is in two of its passages. "For God's sake, let us do something, and not waste our time in indolence" showed Warren's frame of mine. The reasons for this impetuous appeal Warren stated as follows : 

" I sincerely wish you all the honour and success imaginable, and only beg to know, in what manner I can be more serviceable, than in cruizing, to prevent the introduction of

1. Vol. 10, p. 23. 
2 Vol. 1, p. 32. 

succours to the garrison. I fear that if that be all that is expected from the ships, or that they can do, Louisbourg will be safe for some time ; for my part I have proposed all that I think can be done already, and only wait your answer thereto." [1]

Pepperrell replied on the 28th with a statement of what the army had done and its condition. 

" In answer to yours of 26th inst. I beg leave to represent to you that this is now the 29th day since the army first invested the town of Louisbourg, and drove the inhabitants within their walls. That in this time we have erected five fascine batteries, and with hard service to the men, drawn our cannon, mortars, ball, etc. ; that with 16 pieces of cannon, and our mortars mounted at said batteries, and with our cannon from the royal battery, we have been playing on the town, by which we have greatly distrest the inhabitants, made some breaches in the wall, especially at the west gate, which we have beat down, and made a considerable breach there, and doubt not but shall soon reduce the circular battery. That in this time we have made five unsuccessful attempts upon the island battery, in the last of which we lost about 189 men, and many of our boats were shot to pieces, and many of our men drowned before they could land ; that we have also kept out scouts to destroy any settlements of the enemy near us, and prevent a surprise in our camp . . . that by the services aforesaid and the constant guards kept night and day round the camp, at our batteries, the army is very much fatigued, and sickness prevails among us, to that degree that we now have but about 2100 effective men, six hundred of which are gone in the quest of two bodies of French and Indians we are informed are gathering, one to the eastward, and the other to the westward." [1]

He promised that he and some of his council will wait on Warren as soon as possible, but told him that an attempt on the Island Battery by boats was impracticable ; a tribute to the vigour of D'Aillebout's defence on the 26th. 

Warren writes again on the 29th after being 

"three days in a fog that I could not see the length of my ship, nor one of my squadron when that is the case I look on myself to be as far from you as if I were in Boston." He quotes Shirley's letter in which the Governor refers to Warren's command. This Warren says he mentions "but to show that my opinion, which I shall ever give candidly to the best of my judgment, might have, in conjunction with the captains under my command, some weight and force with you." 

A most important step was now taken, one which might have been earlier begun, had the technical skill at Pepperrell's disposal been more adequate.' The nearest point to the Island Battery was the land across the mouth of the harbour on which the lighthouse was placed. A distance of about one thousand yards separated these points. It was not, however, until towards the end of May that it occurred to the besiegers to attack the Island Battery from 

1. Vol. 1, pp. 34-35, May 26. 
2. Pepperrell to Warren, vol. 1, p. 35. 
3. "We being poorly provided with persons experienced in engineering " (Pepperrell to Bastide, June 2, vol. 10, p. 239). Bastide arrived at Louisbourg about June 5. The lighthouse battery was then under construction.

this point. The first mention of the project in letters to Pepperrell is in that of Waldo, who wrote on the 26th : 

"I have been over to the Lighthouse side, where have found a very convenient place for electing a fine battery to the seaward . . . and a flank or bastion to ye said battery that will mount four or five guns that will range the Island Battery . . . I have determined as Col. Gorham's have leisure enough that they this evening and the ensuing night thrô up another . . . which will greatly annoy the Island Battery, being the best-situated in my poor apprehension for the purpose." [1]

Guns and materials were conveyed by sea to the position, and the work carried on. No movement made by the besiegers was more effective. Warren's ships were held outside the harbour by the Island Battery. The injuries to the walls of the town were being repaired as the damage was done, or when the permanent works were destroyed, they were, as at the Dauphin Gate, replaced by newly erected defences of earthwork and fascines. The French thus deferred the possibilities of a successful land attack. They guarded, in the event of the harbour being forced, against boats landing from the ships or from the Grand Battery on the beaches and quays, by stretching a chain between the Dauphin Works and the Batter's de la Grave. Du Chambon and his men, with dogged tenacity rather than Gallic dash, were doing all they could to hold the place. Eager as Warren was, his captains had on June 7 declared that it was inadvisable to attempt to force the harbour without silencing the Island Battery, nor would the pilots then with them bring the ships close enough to bring their guns to bear effectively on it. [2] Warren's captains added that if they could get pilots who would anchor the ships halt a cable length from the battery, and they had five hundred men from the army with officers, who would land where Warren directed, they would attempt its reduction. Such pilots did not exist, and Pepperrell replied : 

" I cannot think it advisable to attempt it again in whale boats which a few musket balls will sink." [3] 

The progress of the siege was almost blocked when the Lighthouse Battery began its work. 

Shirley's account of the later days of the siege clearly and briefly sets forth the conditions and course of events. 

"And by the 14th, four more Guns were placed on the 11th, fuftained by 320 Men. Powder growing short, the Fire had for fome days been very much flacken'd, and the French began to creep a little out of the Cafmates and Covers, where they had hid 

1. Vol. 10, p. 224. As Waldo gave orders to proceed with the work, it is likely that the project had been discussed before. There is no entry in the minutes of the Council of War about this battery until June 9, then only about  transferring to it one of their largest mortars. 
2. June 7, vol. 1, p. 41.
3. Pepperrell to Warren, June 8.

themfelves, during the greateft Fiercenefs of it ; but this being the Anniverfary of his Majefty's happy Acceffion to the Throne, it was determined to celebrate it as became loyal Subjects and good Soldiers ; and Orders were given for a general Difcharge of all the Cannon from every Battery, at Twelve O'Clock, which was accordingly done, and follow'd by an inceffant Fire all the raft of the Day: which much difheartened the Enemy, efpecially as they mutt be fenfible what mutt be the Confequence of this new Battery. It was now determined, as foon as poffible, after the Arrival of the Canterbury and Sunderland, to make a general Attack by the Sea and Land: Accordingly they arriving the next Day, all the Tranfports were order'd off to take out the fpare Mats and Yards, and other Lumber of the Men of War. The Soldiers were employ'd in gathering Mofs to barricade their Nettings, and 600 men were fent on board the King's Ships at the Commodore's Requeft. The large Mortar was order'd to the Light-houfe Battery ; and a new Supply of Powder arriving, the Fire was more fierce from this Time to 

"The 15th, than ever. When the Mortar began to play from the Light-houfe Battery upon Ifland Battery ; out of 19 Shells, 17 fell within the Fort, and one of them upon the Magazine, which, together with the Fire from the Cannon, to which the Enemy was very much expofed, they having but little to fhelter them from the Shot that ranged quite through their Barracks, fo terrified them, that many of them left the Fort, and run into the Water for Refuge. 

"The Grand Battery being in our Poffeffion ; the Ifland Battery being fo much annoy'd by the Light-houfe Battery ; the North-Eat Battery fo open to our Advance Battery, that it was not poffible for the Enemy to ftand to their Guns ; all the Guns in the Circular Battery except three being difmounted, and the Wall almoft wholly broke down ; the Wet Gate demolifhed, and a large Breach in the Wall adjoining ; The Wet Flank in the King's Bation almost ruined ; all the Houfes and other Buildings almoft torn to Pieces, but one Houfe in the town being left unhurt, and the Enemy's Stock of Ammunition growing fhort, they fent out a Flag of Truce to the Camp, defering Time to confider upon the Articles of Capitulation. This was granted till the next Morning when they brought out Articles, which were refuted, and others feat in by the General and Commodore, and agreed to by the Enemy : Hoftages were exchanged and 

"On the 17th of June, the City and Fortreffes were furrendered, and the Garrifon and all the Inhabitants, to the Number of 2000, capable of bearing Arms, made Prifoners, to be tranfported to France with all their perfonal Effects. During the whole Siege, we had not more than 101 Men killed by the Enemy and all other Accidents, and about 30 died of Sicknefs. And according to the beft Accounts, there were killed of the Enemy within the Walls about 300, betides Numbers that died by being confined within the Cafemates." [1]

This was brought about by the hopelessness of the situation, well described by Shirley. The principal inhabitants of the city begged Du Chambon to capitulate. Verville, the engineer, at his request, made a report on the battered state of the fortifications ; Ste. Marie, another on their exhausted munitions of war. A council of war met, and unanimously decided the proper course was to offer to capitulate. [2] 

1. Shirley, p. 30. 
2. The originals of these documents or at least contemporary facsimiles are in M. St. Mery, vol. 50.

Du Chambon sent an officer, young Eurry de la Perelle, who had recovered from his wound received in the defence of the Island Battery, with a letter asking for a suspension of hostilities to arrange terms for a capitulation. It was high time. We know the condition of the town. There were but forty-seven barrels of powder in its stores. The men-of-war cleared for action, their crews supplemented by 600 provincials lay ready in Gabarus Bay, over against the camp, to force the harbour. The land forces were prepared with scaling ladders and fascines to storm the breaches in the walls. Warren had landed, and the regiment drawn up on parade listened to his inspiring words. The suspension was granted until nine the next morning. Negotiations were carried on during the i6th, Sunday, and resulted in the following letter from Warren and Pepperrell, which was modified by later arrangements : [1]

" We have before us yours of this date, together with the several articles of capitulation on which you have proposed to surrender the town and fortifications of Louisbourg with the territories adjacent, under your government, to his Britannic Majesty's forces, now besieging said place, under our command, which articles we can by no means conceed to. But, as we are desirous to treat you in a generous manner we do again make you an offer of terms of surrender proposed by us in our summons sent you the 7th may last ; and to further consent to allow and promise you the following articles," viz. : 

First.-" That if your own vessels shall be found insufficient for the transportation of your persons and proposed effects to France, we will provide such a further number of vessels as may be sufficient for that purpose. also any provisions necessary for the voyage which you cannot furnish yourselves with." 

Secondly.-" That all the commission officers belonging to the garrison, and the inhabitants of the town may remain in their houses with their families and enjoy the free exercise of their religion, and no person shall be suffered to misuse and molest any of them till such time as they can be conveniently transported to France." 

Thirdly.-" That the non-commission officers and soldiers shall immediately upon the surrender of the town and fortresses, be put on board of his Britannic Majesty's ship till they also be transported to France." 

Fourthly.-"That all your sick and wounded shall be taken tender care of in the same manner as our own." 

Fifthly.-" That the commander in chief now in Garrison shall have liberty to send off covered waggons to be inspected only by one officer of ours, that no warlike stores may be contained therein." 

Sixthly.-" That if there are any persons in the town or garrison which shall desire may not be seen by us, they shall be permitted to go off masked." 

" The above we do consent to, and promise upon your complyance with the following conditions : " 

First.-"That the said surrender and due performance of every part of the aforesaid premises, be made and completed as soon as possible." Secondly.-" That as a security for the punctual performance of the same, the Island

1. See end of chapter.

Battery or one of the batteries of the town shall be delivered together with the warlike stores, thereunto belonging unto the possession of his Brit. Majesty's troops, before six of the clock this afternoon.

" Thirdly.-" That his said Brit. Majesty's ship of war now lying before the port, shall be permitted to enter the Harbour of Louisbourg without any molestation as soon after six of the clock this afternoon as the commander in chief of said ships shall think fit.

" Fourthly.-" That none of the officers, soldiers, non-inhabitants in Louisbourg who are subjects of the French King shall take up arms against his Brit. Majesty, nor any of his allies until after the expiration of the full term of twelve months from this time.

" Fifthly.-" That all subjects of his Brit. Majesty who are now prisoners with you shall be immediately delivered up to us." 

"In case of your non-compliance with these conditions we decline any further treaty with you on this affair, and shall decide the matter by our arms, and are, Sir, Your humble servants, 

P. WARREN, 
W. PEPPERRELL." 

The point on which Du Chambon held out to the last was the granting the honours of war, that is marching out with their arms and colours flying. An interchange of letters between Pepperrell and Warren showed that their sentiments agreed on this point, " the uncertainty of our affairs that depends so much on wind and weather make it necessary not to stick at trifles." [1] Hostages from the town were sent to them. It was arranged that Warren should take possession of the Island Battery and Pepperrell of the town. The inexperience of the civilian General led to precipitancy, of which Du Chambon complained to Warren. Pepperrell did not, apparently, know that taking possession was irregular until after the ratification of the articles of capitulation. These were hastened to completion, and on the 17th the town was yielded up. 

"Monday, 17. This day, the French flag was struck, and the English one hoisted up in its place at the island battery. We took possession early in the morning. We hoisted likewise the English flag at the grand battery, and our other new batteries ; then fired our cannons and gave three huzzas. At two o'clock in the afternoon, Commodore Warren, with all the men-of-war, as also the prize man-of-war of sixty guns ; (the Vigilant), our twenty guns ships; likewise our snows, brigantines, privateers and trans- ports, came all into Louisbourg harbor, which made a beautiful appearance. When all were safely moored, they proceeded to fire on such a victorious and joyful occasion. About four o'clock in the afternoon, our land army marched to the south gate of the city, and entered the same, and so proceeded to the parade near the citadel ; the French troops, at the same time, being all drawn up in a very regular order. Our army received the usual salutes from them, every part being performed with all the decency and decorum imaginable. And as the French were allowed to carry off their effects, so our guards took all the care they possibly could to prevent the common soldiers from pilfering and stealing, or otherwise giving them the least molestation. The guard and watch of the city, the garrisons &c., were delivered to our troops" (Gibson, p. 52). 

1.  Vol, 1, p. 45.

The terms gave little satisfaction to the rank and file. The prospect of booty was as potent an influence in favour of enlistment as it was in all other armies to a much later time than 1745, and the troops, after a campaign which was full of hardship, if not of fighting, saw French property secured to its owners. Warren had foreseen the possibility of disorder. He wrote to Pepperrell on the 16th : 

" I rejoice at our success : be assured, sir, that I shall always be glad of your approbation of my conduct. I beg we may all behave to the prisoners that fall under our protection by the chance of war, with the humanity and honour becoming English officers, and be persuaded it will add greatly to the reputation which we acquire by the reduction of this formidable garrison." [1]

His words of caution were justified by the result. The French had been irritated by irregularities in the official conduct of affairs. They commented on Bradstreet being sent in at the head of the detachment which took possession of the town. He had broken, from their point of view, his parole, given at Canso, by serving in this campaign. They later laid stress on the infraction of the terms of capitulation in some of the prisoners being sent to France by the way of Boston instead of directly from Louisbourg. They had now more substantial grievances. The arrangements to protect the inhabitants were inadequate. Pillage, rioting, and insult were the lot of these people who had already been subjected to the hardship of so long a siege. Du Chambon complained to the authorities. Pepperrell entered in his diary on the 19th, " Many complaints of abuses done by the English soldiers to the French inhabitants." Rejoicing took place and dinners. Haste was made in removing the troops to the town and destroying the entrenchments, for there were rumours that a large force of French and Indians were close at hand. The inhabitants were shipped to France as rapidly as possible. Eleven transports sailed on the 4th of July. It was found that as there was scarcely accommodation in the vessels for the people, they had to leave behind much of their property, so that to a great extent they lost the benefits of the capitulation. They were deprived of their own vessels, which fell as spoils to the victors. Bigot, however, secured the King's cash, 200,000 £, by representing it as the property of private parties.[2] 

1. vol. 1, p. 45. 
2 Bigot Memoirs. The losses of this siege were not great in men. About one hundred on the English side. A French return gives their force and losses as follows : 

Statement of the soldiers, inhabitants, sailors, and fishermen who were in the town of Louisbourg at the beginning of the siege:

Soldiers ....................................................................   500 
Inhabitants, sailors, and fishermen ....................... 762   1262 

                                         AT ILE DE L'ENTREE

Soldiers ....................................................................     90
Inhabitants, etc........................................................    138     228
                                                                                               ______ 
                                                                                                 1490

To be deducted : 
          Killed during the siege ...................................   50
          Wounded .........................................................     80      130 
                                                                                               ________
Remaining after the siege .........................................          1360 

Besides the Srs. de Souvigny, la Fresilliere, and Loppinot, officers, killed (M. St. M. vol. 50, p. 495). This seems to include only the combatants, the actual number of inhabitants, including those of the outports, was nearly 8000. 

The garrison of St. John's Island resisted an attack made by provincial cruisers, and the younger Du Vivier, its commander, carried off his soldiers in safety to Quebec. [1] The inhabitants, unlike those of Isle Royale, were allowed to remain undisturbed. 

A joint letter to the Prime Minister was dispatched. Shirley and the other Colonial Governors were advised of this victory.[2] The mother country and the colonies rejoiced over the capture of a fortress the reputation of which for strength had been supposed to be much more nearly commensurate with its strategic importance. 

Britain was not ungrateful. Warren was promoted and made Admiral of the Blue, and hoisted his flag amid the salutes of his ships when the news was received at Louisbourg on the 25th of September. It had been proposed to make him a Baronet, but apparently his own representations caused this offer to be withheld. The prospect of an hereditary title brought too closely to him, as the full tide of his success was in flood, the disappointment of his most personal hopes. " Lord Sandwich in his letter mentions the intention to create me a Baronet. I have no son, therefore if that cou'd without offence be let alone, I shall take it as a favour." [3]

Pepperrell was made a Baronet. To him and Shirley was given the right to raise regiments. This in itself was a large pecuniary reward, as the perquisites of a colonel were very considerable. Pepperrell, although Warren, a little later, thought that he on no account would accept the Governorship of the new dependency, had on July 30 applied to the Duke of Newcastle for the position. 

"My Lord Duke, I beg leave to trouble yr. Grace to request yr. favour in my behalf to His Majesty, that if my Services in ye Expedition against this place have merit'd His Majesty's Gracious Notice, I may obtain His Royal Commission for ye Government hereof." [4] 

Now that the expedition had been found a sudcess, the outlay incurred by the provinces in raising and supplying it became of the first importance to them i,n their impoverished condition. Massachusetts could not have undertaken it had ready money not been supplied by contributions of its citizens.[5]

1. He arrived there on August 7. 
2. The news reached Boston early on the morning of July 3. 
3. Warren to Anson, Oct. 2. 
4. Pepperrell to Newcastle, Louisbourg, July 30, 1745. C.O. 5/. 
5 Mr. Dudley Pickman was the largest subscriber to this fund, with the exception of Pepperrell. A handsome piece of silver presented by Massachusetts in recognition of his services is still extant.

The custom in the old wars had been to reimburse the colonies for such expenditures. All their expeditions had been undertaken by authority from home, but in this case, Massachusetts having been its prime mover, the question was raised as to whether the reimbursements should be a matter of grace or justice. There was considerable delay in the verification of accounts, and when the amounts were settled there were again difficulties on account of exchange. While the negotiations were in progress, the value of the bills of the Province of Massachusetts had fallen so materially that it was a question as to whether one hundred and eighty-three thousand pounds or one hundred and four thousand pounds sterling should be remitted. Bollan, who was acting for Massachusetts, displayed ability in dealing with all these matters. Finally the larger amount was paid over and divided among Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island. The share of the larger province was wisely used in reducing its paper money.[1] Pepperrell's contribution to the expedition was ten thousand pounds. It was presumably repaid, but it is probable that Pepperrell's perquisites of two and one-half per cent commission on the disbursements made the expedition not unprofitable to him. Douglass does not hesitate to say that it was remunerative to Shirley. [2]

When the French garrison and inhabitants had left, some attempt to clean the town was made, and to put it in a state to resist an attack which might be made by the squadron of de Salvert. [2] Colonel Bastide now became important. The return which he and Gridley made of the warlike stores in the town bore out the contentions of Du Chambon. There were but 27 bbls. of powder found in it. Bastide made an estimate of the cost of repairs which were immediately required. This amounted to £9000 sterling. While the army, defrauded of their hopes of plunder by the capitulation, were engaged in unexciting tasks, they saw the navy, which from their point of view had done little, now reaping a rich harvest. The day after the capitulation a well-laden French vessel found itself becalmed off the mouth of the harbour.  It was towed in, a capture, to 

1. The sums paid over were : 

Massachusetts  ...................................  £ 183,649    2    7 1/2
New Hampshire .................................       16,355   13   4
Connecticut ........................................       28,863   19   1
Rhode Island .....................................           6,332  12  10
James Gibson ....................................              547  15   0

2. Waldo had to write to the home authorities in Feb. 49/50 for £ 1339 pay due him. He said Pepperrell was also unpaid. C.O. 5/. 
3. "As writers and preachers forbear publifhing . . . which are fingular, rare or new, left they fhould prove of bad example, I fhall only fum up thefe perquifites in this manner : In the fpace of four years, viz. I741, the introductory gratuities from the province, and from . . . of many thoufand of pounds and the unprecedented perquifites in the three expedition years of 1745, 1746, and 1747, from a negative fortune, was amaffed a large profitive eftate and the loofe corns built a country-houfe at the charge of about fix thotifand pount fterling " (Douglass' Summary). 
3. De Salvert heard at sea of the fall of Louisbourg and returned to France.

the port, which its master had thought French. The ships of the French East India Company had been ordered to rendezvous at Louisbourg. Three of them came to that port, where they expected to find refitment and a convoy across the Western Ocean. Warren's dispatches tell their fate 

"On the 22d June a large Ship appear'd in the Offing which I took to be a Sixty Gun Ship, and the next morning at daylight I sent out the Princess Mary & Canterbury, & had the pleasure to see them from the Remparts take her, without opposition, they brought her in the day following, & she proves to be the Charmante, a French East India Ship of about five or Six Hundred Tuns, Twenty Eight Guns & Ninety Nine Men Commanded by Mr. Nouoal of Contrie, who assures us that she is except Mr. Ansons, as good a Prize as has been taken this war." 

Thus Warren wrote to the Secretary of the Admiralty on the 25th of July. By the fortunes of war he was able in his next letter, that of August 1, to go on as follows : 

"And have now only to acquaint you that the Chester & Mermaid have brought in here the Heron, a French East India Ship from Bengal, pretty rich, by her we learn that the Triton is on her passage, and that this is the appointed Rendezvous for their Indian Trade." 

Again 

" On the 2nd inst. the Sunderland and Chester brought in the French ship, Notre Dame De la Deliverance, Capt. Pierre Litant, Twenty two Guns, and about Sixty men, from Lima in the South Seas, for which place she sail'd from Cadiz in the year Forty one, she has on board in Gold and Silver upwards of Three hundred thousand pounds Sterling, & a Cargo of Cocoa, Peruvian Wool, and Jesuits Bark ; She came from Lima with two others, each of them much richer than this." 

These were Warren's official accounts of these events so interesting to him and to the crews of the ships concerned.[1]

The personal aspect he touches on in the letter to Anson: 

"The Captains that I now send home under Captain Edward's Command carry home the South seamens money, and they will pay one hundred thousand pieces of Eight, to my Attorneys, and the Eighth of her cargo, and that of the two India Ships when sold, and settled, and also of the Vigilant, all of which you will please to vest in the best Funds you can for my advantage." [2]

1. Ad. Sec., In Letters No. 2655.
2. Warren to Anson, October 2, Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 15,957, f. 160. 
From the 6th to the 18th of August the Canterbury took on board, according to her Captain's Log, R.O. No. 161, the following treasure : 

"Came on board from the Deliverance South Seaman 39 bags said to contain 1000 Dollars & 9 bags, each bag said to contain 300 'Double Loons in Gould.' 
          Received from Deliverance 3 boxes sd. to contain 2000 dollars each. 
                  "                     "            1   "                  "              1 000    "
                  "                      "          7 pigs of virgin silver. 
          Received from Deliverance 32 boxes sd. to contain 2000 dollars each. 
                  "                      "             1   "                  "             1140 doubleoones.
                   "                      "            18 bars of gold sd. to weigh 65 1/2 lbs. 
                   "                      "       1000 dollars in silver & 39 bales of wool. 
                   "                      "           22 chests sd. to contain 2000 dollars each. 
                   "                      "           11   "                  "            3000      " 
                   "                      "           40    "                  "           3000 dollars each."  

Such captures as these show the enormous growth of Law's one success, the French East India Company, founded less than thirty years before, as well as the effect of the system of prize money, which made a naval command during these wars one of the most remunerative enterprises in which one could be engaged.[1]

Warren was appointed Governor, but his commission not arriving, he and Pepperrell remained at Louisbourg until the spring of 1746 and jointly administered the affairs of a new establishment. The problems with which they had to deal were as trying, if not as critical, as those which arose during the siege. The rank and file, as well as many of the officers of the provincial forces, began as soon as they had entered the town to turn their thoughts to getting back to their homes. Shirley's proclamation for raising the troops was loosely worded, but the preservation of this important capture, open, it was felt by the authorities, to attack from France or from Canada, made the retention of these forces at Louisbourg until the arrival of regular troops absolutely indispensable. Pepperrell dealt as well with the matter as was possible. The sick were sent home ; as many as could be spared of those whose affairs urgently required them were also returned, and, showing the importance of one of the principal industries of New England, those who had contracts for the supply of mast timber were also allowed to go. 

The temper of the troops was, however, unsatisfactory. Shirley was sent for, and he arrived, together with Mrs. Warren and his own family, on the 17th of August. The troops by this time were mutinous. However, they received the Governor with due form and ceremony. " 

The whole army was mustered and placed in the most Genteel manner to Receive the Govr. the Genl. walk't foremost the Governors Lady at his Right. Then his Excellency &c. The men Stood on Each Side with their arms Rested from ye Gate By ye Comondores To ye Barracks att ye Govrs: Landing ye Cannon fir'd from ye Batterys & from ye men of war ; when the Battallian was Dismissed there was fireing with Small arms for two Hours. His Excellency's arrival was verry Rejoycing To us all." [2] 

The dissatisfaction of the troops was at its height in September. On the 17th they had plotted to lay down their arms on the next day. Acting after consultation with the Council, Shirley addressed the troops and promised an 

1. Warren also retained of his specie 100,000 Spanish dollars to meet the immediate expenses of the ships 
2. Bradstreet's Diary, p. 33.

increase of pay to forty shillings a month.[1] His efforts to placate the soldiers were successful. On October 2 the members of Council, answering his inquiry, 

" Unanimously declared that it was their opinion that His Excellency's said declarations and measures had quite appeased and delayed the spirit of discontent, and that the soldiers appeared well satisfied with his declaration to them, claiming that many of them were uneasy in their prospects of being detained here from their families till Spring, some of them for want of cloths." [2] 

When these exciting events had ceased to occur, the garrison settled down to what to them would have seemed a dreary winter, with their only occupation, the repair of the fortifications and buildings. It proved more than a dreary autumn and winter. Louisbourg at its best was a town of narrow streets and lanes. The interruption to ordinary life of the siege had resulted in an accumulation of filth that turned the town into a midden. The change from sleeping in the open, to infected barracks and houses was unwholesome, and the entries in the diaries of these months is a dreary repetition of sickness and burials. Warren, in addition to the " scorbutick disorder " which afflicted him, had a touch of the prevailing disease from which he recovered. The Rev. Stephen Williams was at death's door for weeks with sufferings which he bore with fortitude, ceasing his ministrations to the men only when his strength was completely spent. 

In October the garrison, reduced by mortality and the return of the troops to New England, was nominally two thousand men. About one- third of them were on the sick list. Warren, who was recovering, more than once, in a long letter, touches on the danger of an attack on a garrison of this size where from eight to fourteen of its members die dally.[3]

There were causes for alarm. Some of de Salvert's smaller ships touched at a port in Newfoundland, which Warren thought might be a base from which an attack would be directed. Word was brought that a force of six thousand men would be sent down from Canada to retake Louisbourg. [4] It followed the same lines as the first scheme for the British attack in I758, namely, a landing in Miré Bay and an advance overland. The town itself was strengthened as much as possible. A boom was made ready to protect the mouth of the harbour. Guns which could be spared from the ships were mounted on the walls and the Grand Battery was dismantled. The adequacy of these preparations was not tested.[5]

1. Vol. 10, p. 45. 
2. Vol. 10, p. 47. 
3. Douglass' estimate that New England lost two thousand of its able-bodied people as the price of this victory was not exaggerated. Warren said in the spring that two thousand had died since the occupation. 
4. This project, that of Beauharnois and Hocquart, was set forth in a letter to the Minister, Sept. I2, 1745, A.N. C11, vol. 83. 
5. Warren was dismayed at the expense, and assured the Lords of the Admiralty that the utmost economy was practised by Pepperrell and himself. 

One loose thread may be fastened in. The friction between Pepperrell and Warren was only during the period when the troops were inactive, and Warren saw that unless more progress was made the expedition would fail. Then, irritated by the lack of attention paid to his proposals, the inefficacy of the Council's actions, his letters lose their courteous phrasing. It is fair also to infer that his bearing in personal intercourse during these days may have been very different from that which made him so great a favourite with the colonists among whom he had been stationed. [1] 

Pepperrell's tone in his letters never varied. It commands admiration. He retained his calmness in his dealings not only with Warren, but in those with his Council. He was undismayed by the failure of plan after plan, shaken neither by the jealousies of his officers, the recklessness of some, the sluggishness of others, nor by the unreasoning rashness nor the equally unreasoning despondency of his men. For some weeks, under less momentous circumstances, for diplomacy made their victory ephemeral, the colonial merchant - general displayed many of the qualities which have made immortal the name of William the Silent. Pepperrell and Warren busied themselves in providing for the future of the colony. They urged that it should be made a free port in so far as the Acts of Trade would allow, confirming in this the soundness of the view of Raudot and Costebelle. They thought Louisbourg would be an admirable port of call. They insisted that it must have a civil government, for settlers would not come under a military governor and toleration for all Protestants, and they parted with mutual esteem, Pepperrell to dignified colonial activities, Warren to professional advancement and an early death. There was opportunity later for misunderstandings, had these men been of different calibre. 

New England had taken fire when the news came that the town had surrendered to Warren. The Legislature of Massachusetts was precipitate in stating its dissatisfaction. The keys were delivered up by Du Chambon to Warren. He apparently handed them to Pepperrell, who in turn, at the parade on Shirley's arrival, delivered them over to the Governor. 

Pepperrell sums up the matter in a letter to Shirley on July 17 : 

" I am very sorry you should meet with anything to damp yor. joy relating to any dispute between the Comodore Warren & myselfs, & considering that we are both quick in our tempers, I do think ye land & sea have agreed in this expedition as well as ever they did on ye like occasion, & if it had not been for some who have had yor, favours I dont think there would have been any, and I was well assurd. that before we got possession of this place and since that it was of absolute necessity to keep from disputes & differences (or otherwise ye grand design might have sufferd.) & I have strove to my uttermost to keep things easey. It is true Mr. Warren did tell me he was the chief officer here. I

1. He certainly placed Pepperrell's character, position, and conduct in the most favourable light in all his letters to the home authorities. 

told him, Not on shoar. I look upon it that these disputes are all over, as we both aim at ye good & security of this place." 

Warren wrote to Anson about the attitude of Massachusetts :

"As it is very probable you will see in some of the New England papers, or hear of an address from the Council & General Assembly of the Massachusetts Bay to Governor Shirley, upon his departure for this place, I think it proper as it carrys a reflection in it, both upon the General, and me, upon him for submitting to, and upon me for assuming (if it had been true), an undue authority to tell you of it as my Friend, to prevent any Ill impression with regard to my Conduct, this was done without any manner of foundation by Ill dispos'd people, to make a breach between the General and me, to serve some dirty end. The General, and I have resented it both to Governor Shirley, and his Council and Assemble, who all declare their concern at it, and say they are now convinc'd it was done too rashly, upon a misrepresentation, and that they will give us publick satisfaction for it when the two houses meet ; I resented this treatment so warmly, that I have had many letters of excuse from numbers of the people concern'd in the address." [1] 

A curious afterglow is thrown on Warren's dealings with the provincial officers and men by a posthumous quotation of his opinion of them, given by Lord Sandwich in the House of Lords during the troubles with the colonists in 1775.

" As to their prowess, I remember very well, when I had the honour to be at the Board at which I now preside, I had the curiosity to inquire about the surprising feats said to be performed by those people (the Americans) at the siege of Louisbourg, of the great naval officer who commanded on the expedition, as able and honest a seaman as ever lived (Sir Peter Warren), who told me very frankly they were the greatest set of cowards and poltroons he ever knew ; they were all bluster, noise, and were good for nothing. remember a particular instance he told me, which, from the ludicrous circumstances attending it, made a very deep impression on my mind. Soon after their landing, there was a battery, called the Island Battery, which commanded the entrance of the harbour. Sir Peter having ordered them to attack it, they engaged to perform it ; but what was the consequences ? They ran away on the first fire. And how did you manage ? Did you employ them afterwards, or upbraid them with their cowardice, says I ?-No, answers Sir Peter, neither would it have been prudent ; I formed the marines and part of the ship's crews into a body, to act on shore ; and instead of upbraiding them, I told them they had behaved like heroes ; for, if I had acted otherwise, I should have never taken the town, as their presence and numbers were necessary to intimidate the besieged." [2]

This is at best a free report of an off-hand statement by Warren, obviously inaccurate as a statement of facts. Its tone differs completely from all we know of Warren's expressions. Still, this may well have been his opinion of these troops. We have instances of individual recklessness like that of the man, who enraged by the injury to a borrowed coat, killed many Frenchmen

1. Warren to Anson, Nov. 23, 1745 ; Add. MSS. 15,957, f. 164. 
2. Vol. 1, p. 109. 

on the walls from a position he took in the open ; and like that privateer, who in his eagerness in the chase of the Marguerite was driven under and disappeared in the Gulf. The indifference they displayed to ineffective fire from the walls is common among raw soldiers. But if with the qualities of cheerfulness, ingenuity, and self-will they did not display military virtues, it makes more significant the course of events. The aggressive upholding of colonial claims which we associate with the name of Pitt gave in the next war seven years of training to these men and their fellows. This training, and the inspiration of a nobler cause than the capture of Louisbourg, turned a population, in their first essay as soldiers such as Sandwich describes, into troops before whom, at Saratoga and Yorktown, the armies of England laid down their arms. 

The winter wore away. In the spring the provincial troops were relieved and returned to New England in May. Their places were taken by two regiments from Gibraltar, and Pepperrell's and Shirley's newly raised regiments. Until the return of the island to France, the garrison was maintained at an effective strength of twenty-five to eighteen hundred men. The force of June 2, I 746, was : 

Fuller ............................................ 613 
Warburton .................................... 613 
Shirley............................................ 517 
Pepperrell...................................... 417 
Artillery.........................................   64 
Framlon........................................ 300 
                                                 ___________
                                                     2524 [1] 

On September 1, I747, the effective strength was 1919, of whom 1709 were fit for duty. [2]

Pepperrell and Shirley found great difficulty in getting recruits. Shirley said it was easier to get 10.000 men for an expedition against Canada, than 1000 for garrison duty.[2] The state of these regiments in May 1746 shows that recruiting had given them 

                                                          Pepperrell's.    Shirley's. 

Massachusetts                                 ...                400 
Pennsylvania                                   ...                150 
New York                                        20                70 
Connecticut                                    50                  ... 
New Hampshire                             50                  ... 
Louisbourg                                   300                150 

When one notes that 80 had died in Louisbourg betweet December and April, and that for weeks, in the weather described by Knowles, living and dead 

1. C.O. 5/13. 
2. C.O. 5/901. 
3. Shirley to Warren, Sept. 22, 1745 (C.O. 5/900). 

had remained under the same roof, it is not surprising that the adventurous preferred a campaign in the open to such service. [1]

Vice-Admiral Townsend took Warren's place in the sea command. Commodore Charles Knowles, Warren's former junior, became Governor. Warren returned to Boston with Shirley on the Chester, sailing June 7, 1746, and all misunderstanding having been cleared away, the warmth of his reception was scarcely less than that of Sir William's. 

One-tenth of the forces destined by a mortified minister to rescue Louisbourg and deliver a counterstroke, which might restore in America the prestige of French arms, would have saved the place from capture. Slowness in gathering together this great armament prevented its dispatch until June 1746. 

The command of the expedition was given to De Roye de la Rochefoucauld, Duc d'Anville, then in his thirty-seventh year, described by one subordinate as worthy to be loved and born to command. In the latter capacity he succeeded his father as Lieutenant-General of the Gallies at eleven years of age. Without any sea service he was made Lieutenant-General of the Naval Armaments of the King, than which but one grade higher was held by those not of royal blood. [2] Whatever may have been his qualities, every disaster known to the seafarer was the lot of his armada. Tempest, the thunderbolt, collision, an appalling epidemic, and starvation ruined the expedition. D'Anville died in Halifax of apoplexy, or, some said, poison. D'Estournel, who succeeded him, overwhelmed by responsibility committed suicide, and it fell to La Jonquère to bring back to France the ships and men which had survived. Those who would read its fate will find in Parkman [3] pages in which lucidity no less than picturesqueness adorn the tale of its ill fortune.[4]

Not only Louisbourg and Annapolis, but New England was alarmed by the news of this expedition. The hardy provincials marched from their inland homes to defend Boston with an eagerness that they had not displayed before the Island Battery. Townsend and Knowles prepared to hold Cape Breton and Nova Scotia. The best disposition possible was made of their resources. Knowles, looking back over the events of the summer, thought that if the French fleet had arrive
d before August, Louisbourg might have fallen, as there were but five or six guns mounted to the land and the breaches made were not repaired. [5] But so sturdy was his spirit that with a garrison of only 2015 effective men, he wrote on September 19, when the arrival of D'Anville was expected, " M. le Duc with all his force shan't have Louisbourg this Trip " [6]

I Knowles knew of the movements of the French fleet. He sent a flag of

1. C.O. 5/901 and C.O. 5/13. 
2 A.N. Marine, C^1, vol. 161. 
3. A Half Century of Conflict, ch. xxv. 
4. The official documents on the French side are in A.N. Marine, B4, Vol. 59. Bigot was a commissary in the fleet (Mémoire pour Messire Francois Bigot, Paris, MDCCLXIII).
5. Ad. Sec., In Letters, No. 234. 
6. C.O. 5/44.

truce to D'Anville with prisoners, and learned something of their condition.[1] Spies whom he sent later gave him the information, that La Jonquière, who had succeeded to the command, sailed to attack Annapolis.[2] Warren at Boston got the same news, and while he felt that Louisbourg was secure, grieved for poor Spry [3] at Annapolis. Spry awaited the attack which never came, with more solicitude for chances of British victory than about what might befall him. He wrote to Knowles, " Good God, Sir, if you had but Ten Sail of Ships now how easy it would be to compleat the Destruction of this Grand Armament. " [4] 

No further warlike alarm disturbed Knowles. The administration of Louisbourg occupied his attention. He did not share the optimistic views of Shirley, Warren, and Pepperrell. He held the worst possible opinion of the place. It would cost five or six hundred thousand pounds to put it in proper condition. He thought the soil barren, the climate either frost or fog for nine months of the year, and within a few weeks of his taking command had stopped the carrying out of the designs of Pepperrell and Warren, except completing the necessary barracks. He had sound views of the command of the sea, and therefore thought little of the importance of Louisbourg as a fortress. 

" Neither the Coast of Accadia nor any of the Harbours in Newfld. (except St. John's and Placentia) are fortifyed and these but triflingly and yett we continue masters of them, and whatever nation sends the Strongest fleet into these seas will always be masters of the Cod fisheries for that year whether there be a Louisbourg or not." [5] 

Of the people who came he also had a poor opinion. He sent back the parish beggars of New England who hung about. He said that rum was the chief trade in which were engaged every one in the New England army from the General down to the Corporal,[6] and he describes vividly the ravages of alcohol.

"As the Commerce of this Place was changed from Fish to Rum and the loss of so many of the New England troops last year was principally occasioned by that Destructive Liquor, I found myself obliged for the preservation of His Majesty's Forces to endeavor to put a stop to the vending of it in such unlimited quantities and as Admiral Warren just before his Departure had published an order for every suttler to lodge what spiritous Liquors they were possessed of in the Cittadel casements," [7] 

he got possession of 64,000 gallons ; but from secreted stuff, often as many as one thousand men dally were drunk, until the supply ran short. A rate 

1. Capt. Scott, C.O. 5/44.
2.C.O.5/44. 
3. Spry was an officer of whom Warren thought highly, and had been sent to Annapolis in the Chester to guard that position. He was followed by Rous, now a captain in the navy in command of H.M.S. Shirley, bought from Massachusetts. On Nov. 4, 1744, Spry had gained reputation among the people of New England by his capture of a Louisbourg privateer. Shirley to Newcastle, Nov. 9 (C.O. 5/900). 
4. Chester at Annapolis, Oct. 4 (C.O. 5/44). 
5. C.O. 5/44. 
6. Letter of July 9. 
7. C.O. 5/44. 

of consumption which had such results must have rapidly depleted the stores of the traders. 

His judgment in certain respects was sound. He foresaw that a change in the stoppages of the regiments would lead to disturbances and mutiny. He was right in this, for when about June 26 Knowles communicated to the mustered troops instructions he had received with regard to stoppages, and gave an order that they should be deducted from their pay, 

"... in a few hours after the whole garrison was in a general mutiny & the troops ran & returned their provisions into store in a tumultous manner & swore that they were no longer soldiers. It was impossible to discover any leader, for in an instant there were more than a thousand assembled together ; as I thought no time was to be lost to prevent the threatening danger I immediately order'd them under arms & met them upon the parade & informed them it was His Majesty's Order & that nothing but the exigencies of the state for money to carry on the War could occasion this stoppage being made. They remonstrated regiment by regiment that they were ready to obey His Majesty's commands with their lives, but they must perish in this climate if those stoppages were made, that it was scarce possible for them honestly now to supply themselves with necessarys and the Common Refreshments of Life in this Scarce and dear place but it would be absolutely so with those deductions & that therefore, if they had not their full Pay they could be no longer soldiers, all reasoning proving ineffectual], and perceiving many to be heated with drink, I found myself obliged to order their pay & provisions to be continued to them till His Majesty's further Pleasure should be known, when they huzza'd & said they would serve faithfully. I told your Grace in several of my former letters that I dreaded the consequences of such an order being issued & I may now rejoice that nothing worse had happened, for I will venture to affirm that had four hours been neglected to have given them satisfaction no reasoning would have been able to have stopped their rage & force we had not to quell it with." [1]

Much to his delight he was relieved to take command of the West Indies squadron. On the 18th of September 1747 he resigned the government to Col. Peregrine Hopson, the senior officer of the garrison, and sailed the next day for Jamaica. Hopson's occupancy of the position was not marked by any events more serious than an attack on a block-house at Table Head, erected by the English to protect the coal mines. The occasional capture by bands of Indians of an officer, and the incursion of Marin into Cape Breton in I74 which Hopson claimed was a breach of the peace which had then been established, broke the monotony of the place. While the officers of its garrison were still uncertain as to their fate,[2] diplomacy had dealt with the situation.[3]

1. Knowles to Newcastle, June 28, 1747, C.O. 5/901, p. 128. Choleric and unpleasant as Knowles was, he acted in this instance with excellent judgment. 
2. " Some say we shall battle the elements in this damned place for six or eight months longer " (Lawrence to Knowles, Oct. 12, 1748, B.M. MSS. 15,956, f. 177). 
3. The forecasts of Knowles proved nearer correct than those of Shirley or Warren. The holding of Cape Breton had not proved the advantage to New England which they and many others had hoped. The settlers were few, but this was accounted for by the disturbed conditions of these few years. At least two thousand men died as the result of the siege, a large proportion of the young and adventurous of the people of sparsely settled Colonies. The projected expeditions against Canada in 1746 and 1747 so upset the normal course of events that New England was unable to adequately exploit industries her people had already developed. War and commercial depression rather than any local conditions accounted fully for the stagnation of Louisbourg during the years it was under the British flag.