J.S. McLennan, Louisbourg: From Its Foundation To Its Fall (Sydney: Fortress Press, 1969)

© Fortress Press

Chapter 8

The declaration of war with England was made on March 18, I744, and expedited to Louisbourg by a merchant vessel of St. Malo, which arrived on May . It was accompanied and followed by letter after letter to encourage privateering. Blank commissions were sent out to Du Quesnel, as Maurepas was alive to the advantage of being first in the predatory field. His encouragement, however, stopped short of making a gift of the powder and shot which was sent out for the use of these vessels, for he sent instructions that they must pay for these supplies. A prompt shipment of food was promised, and permission was given to Bigot to send to New England for an additional supply. Orders were given for the two men-of-war to go to Louisbourg, and referring to the fortification of Canso, Maurepas said that the best way of settling the question was by the capture of that outpost of the English. The King, he added, wished that Du Quesnel should use the Indians to continually harry the English in all their settlements. These instructions, involving carrying the war into the colonies, and, if they were to be successful, demanding vigorous execution, found Louisbourg ill- prepared to do its part. 

On May 9 there was food in Louisbourg for no longer than three weeks or a month, although the people were living largely on shellfish. [1] This condition, unusual in the spring, had arisen through the Basque fishermen not coming out. The authorities foresaw that if help did not speedily come they would have to send the inhabitants back to France, unless they should migrate in a body to some foreign country. The fisher folk of Baleine and the Lorambecs, under the pressure of famine and the fear of war, had come in, and were plotting with those at Louisbourg to force the government to supply them from the military stores. Du Quesnel took steps to prevent an uprising, and lessened its possibility by giving some provisions to prevent the people dying of hunger. Some vessels arrived, and reduced the distress, although again in September it was only the receipt of the stores from Quebec which prevented their abandoning the colony, and even then Du Chambon wrote that "to- day 

1. Du Quesnel to Maurepas, vol. 26.

it was more than ever to be feared that this accident would arrive." They were in no condition, said Du Quesnel in his letter of May 1,[1] to undertake an enterprise against Acadia. He was anxious to send out privateers, but he had only Morpain, who was already at sea, and Doloboratz, then engaged in the expedition to Canso, and therefore applied to the Governor-General of Canada for men. It seemed superfluous to say that as they had no pistols or cutlasses the men of Louisbourg were loath to go unarmed on such expeditions. He again pointed out to the Minister that their request for troops, artillery, arms, and provisions had not been granted, and the condition of the place, no less for defence than offence, was pitiable. Their difficulties were material. It required no more than the receipt of some further provisions and munitions of war to cause the Governor and officers to undertake the aggressive operations suggested to them by the Minister. 

Canso was the first object of attack ; its condition was to the last degree indefensible. Its garrison consisted of about one hundred and twenty men, commanded by Captain Patrick Heron of Phillips' regiment. In the harbour was a sloop of war of unspecified strength, in command of which was Lieutenant George Ryall, [2] detached by Captain Young of the Kinsale for the protection of the fisheries and the prevention of trade with Isle Royale. Its defences were a blockhouse built of timber by the contributions of the fishermen and inhabitants, in so poor a condition that to its repair, and that of the huts in which the soldiers lived, their officers had frequently contributed from their private purses. [3] The military authorities of England were as slow as those of France. It was not until July 19, I744, [4] that the Master of the Ordnance was directed to order that the Fort of Annapolis be put into a good posture of defence without loss of time, and that a fort of sod-work be erected at Canso with the assistance of some of H.M. ships of war, and that General Phillips' regiment be forthwith augmented to the highest establishment. 

On the 23rd of October 1744, a warrant was passed to add 10 sergeants, 10 corporals, 10 drummers, and 392 privates to Lieut.-General Richard Phillips' regiment serving in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland ; establishment to take place from 2Sth August 1744.

Statement annexed of the cost of maintenance of " A Regiment of Foot commanded by Lieut.- Genl. Phillips." [5]

1. To Vaudreuil. Du Quesnel's spirit is shown in a letter to Maurepas: " trois points de mon discour Monseigneur troupes vivres et munitions de guerre avcc quoy vous devez estre persuadé que cette Place ne craindra rien et que je la deffenderay au delà de ce qu'on peut espérer " (May 11, vol. 26, pp. 55-56).
2. Captain's letters. 
3. Such was its condition as reported by Mascarene, Governor of Nova Scotia, and confirmed by the letters of Captain Young of H.M.S. Kinsale.
4 B.T. Jls. vol. 52, p. 137. 
5. Consisting of companies of 70 private men in each.

Field and Staff Officers .............................................     £2    7  10 per day, i.e. 
  Colonel, 12s. 2d. in lieu of servants .........................      0  14    0 }
  Lt.-Col. ..........................................................................   0    7    0 }
  Major, 5s. ; Chaplain, 6s. 8d. ; Adjnt., 4s. .................    0  15     8 }    £2  7  10 
  Quarter-Master, 4s. 8d. in lieu of servant ..................   0    4     8 }
  Surgeon, 4s. ; Mate, 2s. 6d. ........................................    0     6    6 }

One Company, £3 : 18 : 6 per day, including - 
  Captain, 8s. 2d. in lieu of servants ............................   £0    10   0          }
  Lieut., 4s. 8d.         ,,            ,, .....................................     0     4    8          } 
  Ensign, 3s. 8d.       ,,            ,, .....................................     0     3    8          }
  3 Sergeants at    ..........................................................     0     1     6 each} 
  3 Corporals at    ..........................................................     0     1     0   "   }
  2 Drummers at   .........................................................      0     1     0   "  }    £3  18  6 
  10 Privates at    ...........................................................      0     0     8   "  } 
  Other expenses   .........................................................      0      4    0   "  }

  Eight other Companies do.  .......................................    31      8     0 
                                                         One Company of Grenadiers. 
Pay and numbers the same as last, except they had two Lieuts. and no Ensign. 
                                     Expense P. them ...................     £3   19   6 

                                     Total for Regiment [1]  ......... £41    13  10 

For the first time, in May of this year, the officers of Louisbourg set out on a warlike expedition.[2] The command was given to Du Vivier, one of the sons of the first officer who died in Louisbourg, where he and his brother were brought up by their mother in a modest house on the Place du Port with dependencies extending to the Rue Royale. In the peace of that place he had spent his entire life. The force was made up of 22 officers, 80 French and 37 Swiss soldiers, and 218 sailors, mostly the crew assembled for manning the man-of-war Caribou, built at Quebec. They embarked on the schooner Succès, Doloboratz' privateer, a vessel of Du Chambon, and fourteen fishing boats. They met no resistance when they appeared before Canso.[3] On May 24 a capitulation was signed by which the garrison and inhabitants surrendered. They were to remain prisoners of war for a year, their property was to be spared and carried to Louisbourg on the schooner of Bradstreet, and Du Vivier under-took to use his best efforts to have the ladies and children sent at once to Boston or Annapolis. The same terms were given to the crew of the guard sloop. News of this exploit was sent to Boston. Shirley asked to have Heron sent back, but the latter would not abandon his troops. Du Quesnel returned all those 

1. In all 815 men, officers included (War Office, 24/232). 
2 Boularderie says that, as none of the officers had any experience in war, he was asked by Du Quesnel to go on the expedition (Derniers Jours, p. 188). 
3 A. M. St. M. vol. 50. The Habitant, never trustworthy, says Du Vivier had 600 soldiers and sailors. The total force was 351. 

captured at Canso, on condition that they would not bear arms against France for a year from September 1, the time of their release, and forwarded to Shirley an agreement duly signed. Shirley at once repudiated this action, on the ground that Heron and his men acted under duress ; but Heron and the other officers intimated that they felt themselves bound by the agreement into which they had entered, and when there was need of their services the next year it apparently required official action to free their consciences.[1] The vital part of the transaction was the cost of maintaining these troops, which Shirley did not care to assume, and of which, in the conditions of Louisbourg, Du Quesnel was anxious to be rid. Shirley did not accept the views of Du Quesnel, but their correspondence was courteous, and was accompanied by an exchange of presents. Du Quesnel sent with one of his letters a barrel of white wine. Shirley's reply was supplemented by a cask of English beer and three turkeys. The Governor of Massachusetts, notwithstanding these marks of good feeling, was firm in maintaining the position he took in regard to the prisoners. He also refused Du Quesnel's proposition that in any warlike operations the fisheries of both nations should, as in the beginning of the century, be neutral and undisturbed, his ground for this being that the French had been the aggressors. [2] 

It was not expected that Canso would make any resistance, but the conditions at Annapolis were not favourable to a brilliant defence. Its fort was built of earth of a sandy nature, " apt to tumble down in heavy rains or in thaws after frosty weather." It had been repaired from time to time with timber, and there was then assembled on the ground material for its permanent reconstruction. It was, however, laid out on such a scale that it would require five hundred men to defend it, and the garrison consisted of five companies, each, at its full complement, of thirty-one men. The conditions of defence were therefore not different, except to the disadvantage of the English, from those of Louisbourg. Its small garrison, commanded by Mascarene, was, for example, so ill-supplied with arms that there were not enough muskets to arm the reinforcements it received. Its troops were so ill-clothed that they were permitted to wear a blanket when on sentinel duty, and the provision of six or seven " watch coats " made of duffle, worn in turn, added much to the comfort of the garrison during the next winter. Its people had been thrown into a panic on May 18 by the report that Morpain, port captain of Louisbourg - so renowned a privateer in the wars of thirty odd years before, that his name still struck terror into an English population-was to appear before the place at the head of a band of five hundred French and Indians. The inhabitants of the lower town, among whom were the families of several officers and soldiers, began to remove their 

1. An order in Council was passed, 11th of April 1745, directing both officers and men to disregard the capitulation forced on them by Du Quesnel (B.T. Jls. vol. 53). 
2 C.0. 5/909.

goods into the fort. The report proved unfounded, but the arrival of the Massachusetts galley shortly after, bringing news of the declaration of war, gave an opportunity for some of the officers to send their families to New England. These were followed by as many as two other vessels could carry, but even after they had left, seventy women and children were quartered within the fort. Bastide, the engineer, had come on the Massachusetts galley, and under his direction temporary repairs were made to the fortifications, which work was carried on by the aid of the French inhabitants, until a band of Indians, on July 1, caused the withdrawal of the French. Mascarene had only a hundred men in the garrison fit for duty. The workmen from " Old and New England " on the whole behaved well, but the grumbling of some of the New England men, who took the ground that they had come to work, not to fight, " Caus'd a backwardness and dispiritedness amongst their fellows." The loss was small in the first attack by the Indians, who reached the foot of the glacis, but were dislodged by the cannon of the fort, which kept them from doing further harm than marauding, until the arrival of the first reinforcement of seventy men from Massachusetts caused them to retire. This reinforcement was followed by a second detachment of forty. Both of them, however, were sent without arms, and the supply on hand was not enough to furnish them with efficient weapons. 

The capture of Canso being effected, the next point of French attack was naturally Annapolis. Du Vivier set forth early in August. [1] He had with him thirty soldiers and various munitions of war on the schooner Succe's and another vessel. At Isle St. Jean he took on twenty more soldiers. His first duty was to quiet the Indians at Bale Verte, who were pillaging the Acadian inhabitants. His instructions from Du Quesnel for his later operations, were to confine the troops of England within Annapolis Royal, so that the assistance the French expected to receive from the Acadians should appear to the English as forced from them, and, still further to protect and encourage the inhabitants, to pay those who gave them any assistance. The hope of any Acadians joining Du Vivier was meagre, for only two hundred and fifty muskets were sent to arm them. Du Vivier was to approach Annapolis Royal, and if he found it possible to make a sudden attack, " À faire quelque coup sur Eux," he should do so, taking care, nevertheless, not to compromise the troops or the inhabitants of the country. If his report was favourable, and no contrary orders were received from France, Du Quesnel promised to 'send him some vessels to attempt the taking of the fort. If it could not be done without endangering themselves too much, and with a moral certainty of success, he was to withdraw, leaving one or two officers with the soldiers, and a hundred picked Indians, so as to prevent the English 

1. His expenses at Mines began on the 29th, which may be taken as the date of his arrival in the settlements of Nova Scotia. 

disquieting the Acadians. He was to retire by September 15, unless he had then received word from Du Quesnel ; and he was again cautioned to display the utmost prudence, to expose no one needlessly, and to protect the Acadians as far as possible. These instructions, which, it will be seen, were in effect simply to confine the English within the fort, that the Acadians might be unmolested, to make a reconnaissance and to report, were not such as to lead to a dashing or determined attack. 

Du Vivier arrived before the fort with colours flying, and then retired to his encampment about a mile distant. His Indians made disquieting attacks, night after night, on the little garrison, the commander of which had no intention of troubling the Acadians, who were left to gather in their harvests, which Du Quesnel feared they would not be permitted to do. Du Vivier sent word to Du Quesnel that the attack should be made, and was informed in reply that the Ardent and Caribou, two ships of force, would be dispatched to his aid. Du Vivier thus completely carried out his orders. He prepared scaling-ladders and combustible materials in preparation for the event, and on his own initiative entered into negotiations with Mascarene. [1] He sent his brother, who was serving with him, on September 14, to Mascarene with a letter saying that he expected reinforcements by sea, and proposed that Annapolis should surrender, offering very favourable terms, which were not to be effective until his good faith had been proved by the arrival of the French ships. He thus evidently expected no more resistance than he had found at Canso. His views were so far justified that when Mascarene consulted his officers he found that the majority of them were in favour of accepting the French proposal. [2] Mascarene, feeling that his hand was being forced, made the heads of the various departments sign a statement of the condition of the works and of the garrison, and then permitted, through chosen officers, various negotiations to go on, and consented (purely as a preliminary) to an acceptance by these officers of Du Vivier's terms ; but although " desired and pretty much press'd " to sign himself, he absolutely refused. The truce, which had been arranged for carrying on these negotiations, was then broken off. Mascarene found that the men of the garrison, whom their officers had represented as dispirited, were really uneasy over these negotiations with the enemy, and, to cut them short, had threatened to seize their officers " for parleying too long with the enemy." He " immediately sent the Fort Major to acquaint them with what was past, and that, all parley being broken off, hostilities were going to begin again, to which they expressed their assent by three cheerful Huzzas to my great satisfaction." Fifty more men of Gorham's Rangers arrived from Boston, and Mascarene threatened to 

1. Mascarenc to Shirley, Dec. 1744, N.S. Archives, vol. 1, p. 140. 
2. " All the officers, except three or four, very ready to accept the proposal."

visit Du Vivier at his camp. Before he did so, word was brought to him that the French had gone. His first idea was that it was a feint, but he found to his astonishment that they had left the country, which, not unnaturally, he attributed to their fear of his making an attack. Thereafter the British were only disquieted by the Indians, who were dispersed by the rangers of Massachusetts, incited thereto by scalp bounties which Shirley went beyond his powers as Governor of Massachusetts in guaranteeing them. [1] 

Du Vivier had withdrawn, not fearing conflict, but on account of orders he had received from Louisbourg. Capt. De Gannes, who felt that he had claims to lead the expedition superior to those of Du Vivier, had been appointed to take charge of the detachment which was to winter in Acadia. He set out, after making some difficulties, and, as his conduct shows, with no intention to allow any credit to Du Vivier, but with the purpose of asserting to the utmost limit his authority over him. He insisted on an immediate withdrawal, would not wait to destroy the storming materials which Du Vivier had prepared, nor to hear Mass, although the time of their leaving was a Sunday morning. 

Both expeditions returned to Louisbourg, where De Gannes found himself sent to Coventry " by his brother officers and the people of the town. He demanded a meeting with the officers in the presence of the Governor. De Gannes' excuse at this assembly was that he had no orders to carry on the siege ; that he had retired from Port Royale because they had no provisions, and from Mines because the inhabitants begged them to do so. He presented certificates from his officers, that even when they went armed, to obtain bread from the inhabitants, they had scarcely any success ; as well as one from the inhabitants of Mines begging them to withdraw. The officers remained silent with the exception of Du Vivier, who absolutely denied everything De Gannes had said. They then examined Abbé Maillard and Du Vivier. Maillard sustained Du Vivier's story and denied that of De Gannes. He explained that the refusal of the inhabitants to give them bread began only when De Gannes announced that they were to retire ; that previously there was abundance in the French camp. The Abbé added that when De Gannes arrived at Mines, 

1. " For which Reason I think it of such Consequence to his Majesty's Service that the Indians and other New England Auxiliaries enlisted in it at Annapolis Royal should have premiums for scalping and taking Captive the Indian Enemy as the People within this Province have, and, as I am inform'd, as promised to the French Indians by Mr. Du Vivier, that I am determin'd the present Demands of Captain Gorham and his Indians for three Scalps and one Captive already brought in shall be satisfy'd in some Method or other upon the hopes of a Reimbursement from his Majesty, and shall endeavour to procure for 'em the same premiums for the future from the Assembly upon the prospect of their being reimburs'd in the same Way, since I find I can't prevail upon 'em to extend their own Bounty to those enlisted in his Majesty's Service within his Government of Nova Scotia, which they seem to have an unalterable persuasion ought to be given at his Majesty's Expence " (Shirley to Newcastle, Nov. 9, 1744, C.O. 5/900)

I have found no reference in the French documents to any bounty offered by Du Vivier. It does not seem probable that if a bounty had been offered this proof of zeal an the part of the authorities would have passed unnoticed in letters to the Minister.

the latter held a council with himself and the other priests, Miniac, Lagoudalie, Leloutre ; that he represented to them the pitiful situation of the Acadians, whom it would better serve to join with the English than to enter again into allegiance with France, as Louisbourg was incapable of helping them. De Gannes had gone on to make the same statement to the principal inhabitants, with whom in the presence of the priests he arranged for presenting to him the request to withdraw his force, on which De Gannes relied as a justification,[1] and notwithstanding a letter from Du Chambon blaming him for being so precipitate, he persisted in his withdrawal. So when, in default of the ships of the line, which for a variety of causes had not been sent, on the night of October 25 the frigate Le Castor and two vessels with French troops arrived before Annapolis, they found all quiet. Bonnaventure went ashore. He, to find out the situation, aroused an inhabitant and brought him and a companion on board the frigate, and from him heard the astonishing story that De Gannes had remained only two days at the camp. The Acadians said that the fort, which contained only provisions for eight days, was ready to surrender, and that the women and children were prepared to fly to the head of the river, at the time the situation was relieved by the departure of the French. After a stay of three days the expedition returned to Louisbourg, taking with them their captures, two small vessels with supplies from Boston. The deputies of the Acadians promptly made their peace with Mascarene.

It is difficult to account for the conduct of De Gannes. His views were justified by events, but unsuitable to be proclaimed by a French officer. Under any administration less lax than that of the French Navy at that time, his conduct would have met with the severest punishment. Du Chambon, who had succeeded Du Quesnel after the latter's sudden death on October 9, instead of deposing De Gannes, simply reported to the Minister. Bigot, ready enough generally to express his opinion, brought no influence to bear on Maurepas, and De Gannes continued to serve, and eventually passed to higher positions. 

The only ones to suffer were the priests. Year after year the priests of Acadia had been cautioned to confine themselves to their sacerdotal functions and respect the British power. But the three priests who fell in with De Gannes' views were deprived of their allowance from the French Government. Desenclaves was not present, but a captured letter forwarded by Warren expresses his views on the expedition : 

" Surtout après trop de Légèreté que avoit fair parottre du Tems de Monsr. Du Vivier. II est étonnant que l'on se soit mis dans L'Idée, qu'avec une petite Poignée du Monde qui n'avoit aucune Idée de la Guerre on Voulut essayer de réduire un Province aux Portes 

1. Oct. 10, 1744, N.S. Archives, vol. 1, p. 135, printed on p. 125. 

de Boston " . . . and, thus, on the way they were treated as priests, " Le Point le plus Important est celui de la Religion mais nous sommes entiėrement libre là-dessus, n'ayant eut d'autre Empêchement dans nos Exercises, que celui qui est devenu de la Part de Franqois ; je pense Monsr. que ces Egards que l'on a là-dessus ne laissent pas d'atterer les Bénédictions de Ciel sur les Puissances qui nous commandent." [1] 

Returning now to the events which had taken place at Louisbourg, we find that the proceedings of the French men-of-war were as ineffective as those of the land forces. Meschin was in command of the Ardent, a vessel of sixty-four guns, which, although her departure had been planned for April, did not leave Rochelle until June 18, and then convoyed twenty-six vessels for the West Indies and Canada. After leaving them, he lost his bowsprit in a gale, shortly before arriving at Louisbourg on August 16. He found that the Caribou, a vessel built at Quebec, had been rigged and manned and was privateering under the command of Morpain. He promised to be ready to sail for Annapolis by the 5th or 6th of September after his repairs were made and his crew refreshed ; but when the time came, his version is that Du Quesnel said that it was undesirable to go, as the English had been reinforced, and that it was important to guard their own coast from privateers. On the 9th they went cruising, captured a privateer of twelve cannons, twenty-one swivels, and ninety men, attempted to find three other Boston privateers at Newfoundland, and returned unsuccessful on October 11.

Bigot and Du Chambon proposed to him to attempt Annapolis, to which he willingly agreed. The news of this venture having spread abroad, the captains of eight vessels of the Compagnie des Indies made formal representations to him, and, as well, to Du Chambon and Bigot, in which they said that they had orders to come to Louisbourg to be convoyed thence to France by the King's ships. Meschin proposed that they should accompany him to Acadia, as he might not be able to regain Louisbourg on his way to France. As these vessels from China and India were without moorings, their captains justly said that it would be an enormous risk to their valuable cargoes to accompany him into the Bay of Fundy. It was decided that he should take them to France, but, as the voyage turned out, he might as well have gone to Acadia, for the fleet of fifty-two sail which had left Louisbourg under his convoy became dispersed, and he arrived towards the end of December without any of them. 

A knowledge of this fleet of East Indiamen comes to us through a deposition made by two men "of full age" who appeared in Boston in September.[2] They had been in the East Indies, and being minded to return 

1. Desenclaves to the Superior of St. Sulpice, Sept. 25, 1765, Ad. Sec. In Letters, No. 2655. Desenclaves was a severe critic of his compatriots. Maillard also was not hopeful about French prospects; see Canadian Archives, 1906, p. 45.
2 C.O. 5/900, f. 122. 

home, had taken passage in the spring on a French East Indiaman the Mars, and sailed for France in company with the Baleine. Five other ships left the undesignated port in the East about the same time : three of which were from China, loaded with tea and porcelain two others from Bengal and Pondicherry, loaded with piece goods and coffee and the fifth from the Isle De Bourbon. Off the Cape of Good Hope they fell in with a French vessel, which advised them that war was about to be declared. At Ascension, where they arrived about the latter end of May, a packet boat from France was waiting for them with orders to proceed direct to Louisbourg. They arrived there, with olie exception, in July and August, and in the latter month also came in two armed vessels of the company, with three or four merchantmen with provisions and reinforcements for the armament and crews of the ships from the East. The Mars and Baleine, after this strengthening, mounted upwards of fifty guns, each with a crew of three hundred and fifty men. The Fullavie (?), Philibert, Argonaute, and the Duc d'Anjou mounted thirty guns with a crew of one hundred and fifty. The deponents seem to have returned from Louisbourg with the Canso prisoners, and at once gave this information to Shirley. 

Meschin was an officer of good reputation, and his letters shows willingness to act. The moral effect of Shirley's unarmed and untrained reinforcements, in deterring Du Quesnel from sending vessels against Annapolis, was of vastly greater importance than the services of these levies in the actual defence against the skirmishing of Du Vivier. [1] 

The New England colonies had remained on the defensive during the year. All that they did was to lay an embargo with very severe penalties on trade with Louisbourg and Martinique. Dissatisfied as were the officials of Louisbourg with the number of privateers they were able to send out, those that they did, as well as the privateers from France, making Louisbourg or ports in the West Indies their head-quarters, seriously interfered with the extended commerce of New England. Even with the towns of Isle Royale there were eighty or ninety vessels regularly employed. The fishing fleet of New England was very large, and their coasters plied along the littoral of the North Atlantic from Newfoundland and the Gulf of St. Lawrence to the West Indies. In addition to Morpain, Doloboratz was in command of a privateer of twelve cannon and as many swivels, in which he assisted at the reduction of Canso, and then proceeded to cruise on the New England coast. There he was captured, after a spirited encounter in which no one on either side was injured, by Captain Tyng in the Prince of Orange, the first " man-of-war " of Massachusetts. [2] Nine vessels

 1. In addition to documents referred to, see also others in I.R. vol. 26; Acadie, vol. 8 ; Marine, B4, vol. 56, and C.O. 5/900. 
2. Printed in full on p. 124. 

were taken on the banks by two Louisbourg privateers early in June, and a merchantman coming from Ireland, [1] with a number of women on board, who were sent on to Boston with the Canso prisoners. These unhappy women were thrown into terror by the statement of the master of the vessel on which they were to make the voyage, that he had the right to sell them as slaves. Du Quesnel informed Shirley of this, and begged his offices on their behalf, which the latter effectively used. In another detachment Shirley received one hundred and seventy prisoners, and Du Quesnel sent in addition seventy-seven to Placentia, which would represent a not inconsiderable loss inflicted on the commerce of New England.[2] Some measure of it is shown by the fact that the sale of eleven vessels taken at sea, and at Canso and Annapolis Royal, produced at Louisbourg a total of 114,409 £, according to the account rendered by the treasurer of Louisbourg.[3] These were the vessels taken on the King's account, others were captured by private parties, and Bigot in his defence says that he sold, to the great advantage of himself and partners, the prizes which he sent to France instead of to Louisbourg. 

The damage inflicted by the English during this year was vastly greater than the losses suffered by her maritime commerce, although it was greater than that of France. The Kinsale (44), Captain Robert Young, was again sent out to this station. She left Plymouth on the 7th of May. On her way to St. John's, Newfoundland, where she arrived on the 23rd of June, she captured five vessels. By the 2nd of August, on a cruise to the westward, she had destroyed St. Peter's and everything between Cape Ray and Placentia, and had sent an expedition northwards, about Trinity, to take, sink, burn, and destroy what French they met ; a kindly office which was also performed by Louisbourg privateers for the abandoned English fishing stations on Newfoundland. At Fishott, Young's expedition met with resistance, which lasted for five hours, but they were rewarded with 18,000 quintals of cod and " 80 ton " of oil, and another expedition captured five French privateers. [4] The nature of these exploits justifies their inclusion in the record of privateering rather than that of military operations. 

On the coast of Isle Royale and in the Gulf of St. Lawrence English privateers were most active, and interrupted the commerce between Quebec, Louisbourg, and Martinique, so that Beauharnois and Hocquart wrote that it was necessary to have a convoy to protect their trade. Their representations were supplemented by petitions of the syndics of the merchants of Quebec and Montreal, 

1. Possibly the Hope. Cork to New England, reported in London, Nov. 8.
2. " A List of  769 Ships taken by the Enemy which the merchants of London have received an account of, from the Commencement of the War, March 31, 1744, to the 11th of March 1745-6 inclusive," gives the name of six taken to Cape Breton, all on deep-sea voyages. 
3. I.R. vol. 27, f. 116.
4. Captains' Letters, No. 2732.

who stated that, on account of Boston privateers, the previous year there had been only half the ordinary trade, and that in the next year there would be none. In September four of these privateers had taken five St. Malo fishermen, and had other prizes even in sight of Louisbourg. The situation was so serious that these officials did not hesitate to refer to the complaints of the merchants against ships of the navy. These vessels arrived late in the season, their officers were indifferent and remained in port. They went so far as to say that four vessels manned by sailors of St. Malo, commanded by a townsman to be selected by the King, would be a more efficient protection to commerce. 

Boston had sent out since June, when the news of the declaration of war was received, fifteen privateers, and four more were being built. Rhode Island, a nursery ground (Pépinière) of privateers, sent out twenty - three, and Philadelphia seven or eight, which were fitted out with money borrowed from Quakers, whose scruples did not permit them to engage directly in the lucrative sport. Captain Jeffo, in the Swallow, brought to Boston not only the declaration of war, but the news that he had captured a French merchantman bound for Isle Royale, and set free an English ship homeward bound from Jamaica.[1] New York gave a great reception to Commodore Warren, who in the Launceston brought in the St. François Xavier with a rich cargo of sugar and specie. Captain Spry of H.M. ketch Comet, received at Boston a handsome piece of plate in recognition of his capture, off Nantucket, of a noted French privateer fitted out at Louisbourg. She was more heavily armed and carried a crew of ninety, compared with sixty-four men of the Comet. The fight lasted over five hours, and was in doubt until Le Gras, the privateer captain, described by Shirley as a brave commander, was shot through the temple by a musket- ball.[2]

A Massachusetts privateer did almost as much damage as H.M.S. Kinsale and the expeditions Captain Young sent out. He broke up eight fishing settlements within the space of five leagues, burned the houses and works, sunk nearly one thousand boats, took seventeen ships, five of which were armed with from eighteen to twelve carriage guns, and took nearly seven hundred prisoners. [3] French accounts do not permit the identification of the scene of these exploits. They would appear to have taken place in the Gulf, and the sufferers to have been the vessels of St. Malo and the shore fisheries at Gaspé. Even allowing for exaggeration, for there do not seem to have been outside of Louisbourg any settlements which would have yielded so rich a spoil, it seems probable that this one vessel did more damage to the French than was inflicted by all the Louisbourg privateers on British commerce. 

1. Shirley to Newcastle, Nov. 9, 44, C.O. 5/900, f. 135.
2. Among her crew were twelve Irishmen, one of them lately a soldier at Canso. They were detained in jail, and the others exchanged at Louisbourg for the men of New England privateers captured by the French.
3 Shirley to Newcastle, C.O. 5/900.

The practice of privateering lacked official encouragement as little on one side as on the other. Newcastle's letter to the Governor of Rhode Island enclosing the declaration of war, ends with a command to do everything in his power to encourage privateering, and to distress and annoy the French in their settlements, trade, and commerce.[1] The authorities of Massachusetts broke up the comfortable custom of the old war by which privateers avoided each other, and made those to whom commissions were given give bonds that they would fight privateers as well as capture merchantmen.[2] Governor Shirley sent for the owners of a vessel commanded by one Captain " W.," who had allowed a small French privateer to escape, with the result that the latter had since captured several American vessels. This the Governor pronounced to be " scandalous behaviour." The minutes of Council, [3] August 16, less discreet than the newspaper, says Capt. Samuel Waterhouse, of the brigantine Hawk privateer, was severely reprimanded for " not vigorously attacking a French privateer of much lesser force." Having promised "to manage his affairs for the future more agreeably to the honour of his Commission," his commission was continued on trial (News-Letter, August). This rebuke, or the chances of war, led, the next week, to his sending three prizes to Boston. 

The occupation was so attractive that one hundred and thirteen privateers were sent out by the British colonies the next year . [4] It was difficult to obtain crews, as they were fitted out faster than they could be manned, so that special inducements had to be offered to obtain a crew for the Prince of Orange, the ship of the Commonwealth. 

The effect of war naturally told on the commerce of Isle Royale, although the chances of the sea gave some opportunity, even amidst privateers and men-of-war, to carry on trade. In 1743 one hundred and seventy-two vessels from other places than Nova Scotia and New England had come to Isle Royale. In 1744 there were fifty less, while the intercourse with these British colonies almost completely stopped, for in place of seventy-eight in the last year of peace only twelve came, and it is possible that these were prizes brought in and not traders. 

War, however, was the predominant interest of the time. Doloboratz was captured in the vicinity of Boston, and while there as a prisoner a great deal of liberty was given him. After his return to Louisbourg he presented to the authorities a memoir stating the condition, not only of Boston, but of other towns as far south as Philadelphia. He said that he knew Boston perfectly, had previously been at Rhode Island, and had spent five days there at this time, where

1. R.I. Records, vol. 5, p. 80. 
2. News-Letters. 
3. C.O. 5/808. 
4. The Boston News-Letter proudly says that this is a greater fleet than the Royal Navy in the time of Elizabeth. The Gentleman's Magazine says one hundred were fitted out.

he consulted with a native of France, residing in that place (Newport), from whom he had bought a thousand barrels of flour to be delivered in April. His view was that the defences of these places were weak. He would risk his life on laying them under contribution if he had five or six vessels of war, a fire-ship, and some small merchant vessels. He excepts from these New York, which, being under a Royal Government, would be more difficult to attack, as order is well maintained there, better than in those other towns where every on is master. 

Although Du Chambon's experience had been entirely at Isle Royale he seems to have done what he could with vigour. As to warning the Minister, he did so as forcibly as his predecessors, and had more specific information to give him.[1] He sent on Doloboratz' memoir,[2] which contained the report that an enterprise against Louisbourg was being prepared in England, and that the four northern colonies had offered the English Government the services of six hundred men and a money contribution amounting to £800,000 of provincial money, if they would send fifteen men-of-war for an expedition against Louisbourg. The merchants of Boston believed so firmly that this offer would be accepted that they had laid in extra stores to sell to this fleet. Du Vivier also brought back word from Acadia, that an enterprise against Louisbourg was to be attempted in the spring, and the matter had been so fully discussed with his English acquaintances that he was able to add that the English hoped to arrange devices by which the Island Battery could be shrouded in smoke long enough for their ships to enter the harbour. The authorities impressed on the Minister that if he did not forestall the English, who would follow the ice to blockade the port and prevent their receiving any help, the position of Louisbourg would be a sorrowful one, as the English intention was to starve out the inhabitants, and thus compel the reduction of the place. Du Chambon was doing all he could for its defence, and attempted to provide a large quantity of faggots on the quay for the use of the fire-ships. He proposed a battery on the top of Cap Noir, and asked the Minister to send out more cannon and bar iron for use iii the guns of the Island Battery. Their efforts were not confined to preparations for defence. They sent a new memorandum of the requirements for an expedition against Annapolis more powerful than the preceding ones, as Annapolis was to be strengthened, and recommended for its command Du Vivier, who, on account of his health, had been allowed to go to France for the winter.[3] They also pointed out that an expedition could be sent against Placentia with fair prospects of success, for its defences consisted of pickets, a battery in bad order, and a garrison of forty-five soldiers and three officers. These 

1. See p. 124. 
2. MSS. Que. vol. 3, f. 211. 
3. The Minister was urged to send him out with the first vessel in the spring.

were the final events of the active season of Louisbourg and this warfare of unwilling amateurs. 

The somnolent condition of a Louisbourg winter  was broken into by an extraordinary event. Serious efforts, which have been recounted, were made by Forant and Bigot to remedy the conditions of the troops, and there is no evidence in the official correspondence to show that after this time, and the subsequent steps taken by Du Quesnel to suppress the canteens, there was any unusual degree of dissatisfaction among the troops. But as told by Du Chambon and Bigot, [1] on the 27th of December, in the dreary dawn, the Swiss troops armed themselves, and took their ranks in the parade ground of the citadel. Their one officer who was on duty made them return to their quarters, after having promised them all they wanted. Instead of remaining quietly there, they went into the quarters of the French troops and so effectively reproached them for not having joined them as they had promised, that the whole garrison formed up in the court. They then sent the drummers of the garrison, threatened by the bayonets of twenty men, to beat to arms throughout the town. All the officers rushed immediately to the citadel, which some of them entered only by craft or supplication. The others were unable, even sword in hand, to move the sentinels, whom the mutineers had placed. De la Perelle, the major, placed himself before the drummers in the town in an effort to stop them, but was unable to do so, as he was covered by the muskets and bayonets of the soldiers. They even surrounded him and carried him off his feet to some distance, but he at last prevailed on them to cease the drumming, and by agreement followed them into the fort, where the officers by this time had got the soldiers to form themselves in their companies. 

Order being restored, they promised to recognize De la Perelle as their major, and Du Chambon, who had been on the scene, asked them the reasons why they had so signally failed in their duty to the King. They said that each company required half a cord more wood, the return of five cords which had been kept back from them on account of their having stolen the same quantity ; that they should be given their proper rations to those soldiers who had been in the expeditions to Canso and Acadia ; that the recruits of 1741 should receive their clothing, which had not been given them, as it had not been sent out for the extra ten men then added to each company. All this was accepted, and Bigot at once began to carry out the agreement. The Swiss again came out under arms after the dispersal of the French troops, although their officer had promised them all they demanded, and they refused to recognize M. Cherrer (Callly) for their commander. They had been uneasy for some time, and he had been in bed for a month, which prevented him appearing in person. 

The officials thought the object of the troops was to take possession of the 

1. Letter of Dec. 31, vol. 26, pp. 231-234.

magazines and of the treasure and to yield the place to the enemy in the spring. They had not given up this idea of rebellion, although their demands had been complied with. The situation was intolerable. All the officials were their slaves ; the mutineers caused all the disorder which they wished ; made the merchants give them, at their own prices, all they asked for ; for as there were only forty or fifty of these merchants and these not armed, they were unable to join together to resist. They were in consequence more dead than alive, and intended to go to France the following autumn, if they were permitted to live so long. The revolt was complete, for there was not a single soldier who had not joined the mutineers. All the Swiss corporals and sergeants had sustained their soldiers, and the only men who stood firm were the sergeants of the French companies and the small company of French artillerymen. At the time, the 31st of December, when Du Quesnel and Bigot wrote this letter there happened to be in the Port two small vessels bound for the West Indies. They wrote it secretly, as they were under observation night and day, and they did not send the vessels direct to France for fear that some vessel coming out would warn the mutineers that they had asked for help. If this were known the soldiers would first ransack the town, and then deliver it to the enemy, for they were aware of their strength, and knew that the six hundred civilians in the colony would be easily overpowered. The situation became less alarming, and the soldiers behaved not badly during the winter, owing to some extent to the tact of Bigot, and the fact that nothing was required of them by their officers. 

The condition of the King's finances was so low that in February Maurepas felt that he could do little for Isle Royale ; he accepted all the suggestions that had been made, even to sending a captain of St. Malo to cruise with Morpain in the Gulf, which the syndics of Quebec and Montreal had thought desirable. The Vigilant, La Renommée, and Le Castor were intended for Isle Royale, and as M. Chateaugué, who had been appointed Governor, was too ill to leave France the command of the colony was given to Perrier de Salvert, who was commander of the Mars, in which ship he was to proceed to Louisbourg.