J.S. McLennan, Louisbourg: From Its Foundation To Its Fall (Sydney: Fortress Press, 1969)

© Fortress Press

Chapter 14

There was great caution displayed by the British leaders in carrying out their careful preparations. The site of the camp was the same as in 1745. [1] It was now strongly entrenched.  Blockhouses or other protective works were erected : three on the west side, another to the north, and a fifth on the Miré road, beyond which was placed the camp of the Rangers. These works were to protect the army from the attacks of the Indians and irregulars, and to prevent such disturbance as had befallen other British commanders in American warfare. Similar works, three in number, were placed on the other side of the camp, to guard against operations from the town, and to make secure a way to the site of the batteries for its bombardment. 

Louisbourg was open to attack from both land and sea ; on the latter side, success involved the destruction of the Island Battery, and the men-of-war in the port. It may be recalled that Warren strongly expressed the opinion that it would be madness, even when there were no ships in the port, to attempt to force a passage past the Island Battery. It follows that, until this battery and the French ships were reduced to defensive inefficiency, the function of Boscawen's fleet was that of an adjunct to the land forces. [2]

When, however, a way into the port was made clear, or, by a desperate coup de main, it was forced, the town, scantily protected on this side, was doomed, without one shot having been fired against its walls. Equally, a destruction of its land defences would place the men-of-war in the harbour in a cul-de-sac between the guns of the conquered town, the batteries which had reduced it, and the hostile fleet waiting at the harbour mouth. It is obvious that carrying on, together, both attacks, would expedite the fall of the fortress, but the only means of attack on the ships, and the Island Battery, was by artillery on the Lighthouse Point. The reports of Hardy's frigates, and the result of a night expedition sent on June 2 to discover the enemy's strength to the eastward, gave Amherst reason to believe that the landing- places were then occupied, and that 

1. Attention is directed to the large map of the siege operations. 
2. For its great importance see Logs of the Fleet, Wood, Champlain Society,

to some degree, on a landing on that side, the attack on the Coromandière would have to be repeated. Not only was there this operation to face, but when hostilities actually began, there were five men-of-war and one frigate in the port to supplement the land defences of the French. These ships of the line mounted twice as many guns as the shore batteries. Their crews, if fully manned,[1] equalled three-quarters of the troops and militia. Their mobility added greatly to their powers of offence. Boscawen's and Hardy's ships kept them, it is true, in the harbour, but it afforded safe anchorage for the largest of them within four or five hundred yards of the places on the shore where any effective batteries could be erected. The power of the ships to impede the siege operations was fully recognized by the British,[2] but that power of the fleet was minimized by the independence of its commodore. The regulations of his service made necessary the Governor's permission for him to leave port. He had to consult with Drucour, but in other respects he disposed of his ships at his discretion. 

The weather continued bad, [3] and there was great delay in landing materials. It was the i6th before a moderate reserve of twelve days' provisions was landed, and no heavy artillery had yet been put on shore. On the 11th some 6-lb. guns were landed ; on the 18th the first 24-lb. gun ; as late as the 3rd of July we find in Boscawen's journal that they were still landing stores, so that it was a month before all the materials and guns were transferred from the ships and transports to various points on the shore.

These preliminary works of encampment and defence seemed so important to Amherst that he did not, until the I7th, personally look over the ground. He, then, accompanied by Bastide and McKellar, chief and second engineers, and Williamson, in command of the artillery, rode out toward the citadel. [4] The tone of Amherst's remarks indicates that he was not entirely in accord with Bastide, who, Amherst says, " was determined in his opinion of making approaches by the Green Hill, and confining the destruction of the ships in the harbour to the Lighthouse Point and the batteries on the side." [5]

In the meantime operations had been begun under the command of Wolfe. The first deserters, a sergeant and four men of the Volontaires Etrangers, came in on the 10th, and with false information as to the spirit of their regiment, told the truth in informing Amherst that the detachments to the eastward had been called in, and the Grand and the Lighthouse Batteries destroyed. This 

1. There was, however, much sickness among their men, and in some cases at least they were below their full complement. 
2. " The opinion of most people here, sea and land, who had a terrible notion of their broadsides " (Wolfe Hist. MSS, Com. ix- p. 76). 
3. See logs of ships for weather conditions. 
4. The ground was familiar from 1745 to Bastide, who since then had served at Port Mahon. 
5. Amherst to Pitt, June 23, C.O. 5/53.

determined the place at which to begin. Four hundred Rangers, as an advanced guard, started at two in the morning of June 12. Wolfe, with his force, 1220 men drawn from all the regiments, and four grenadier companies,[1] in light marching order,[2] set out at five. 

The weather favoured them. They marched round the harbour in a fog so thick that they could not see the men-of-war, although they were so near that they " heard very plain the noise they made on Board in the course of their duty." Unseen and unheard by the ships, they escaped cannonade, and by the late afternoon had visited Lorembec and made two encampments, one under Major Ross at the head of the North East Harbour, and another, the main camp, under Wolfe by the Lighthouse.[3] They found in the French camps the tents still standing, the cannon useless, and a considerable quantity of tools. They opened the entrenchments so that the artillery, which was being sent by sea to the camp, could be landed. While these things were being done, the Rangers returned to the main camp. It was found when the Island Battery opened fire on them the next morning (13th) that it reached Wolfe's camp which was, therefore, moved back to a place of more security, and the work of making roads to the sites selected for batteries was vigorously pushed on. Wolfe was now, for the first time, in command. His orders show the vigour of his actions, the care he took not only of the health but of the comfort of his men, his judiciousness not only in equalizing duties but in the rewards of rum and fresh fish he gave to those who had worked hard. Their tone inspired his men, and his reputation for fearlessness and activity soon spread from this detachment, not only throughout the army but even to the French.

The latter had been busy on their side with results which made a greater show than those of the English. The latest landed companies of Cambis arrived in the town on the 8th. Duchaffault was warned, by an express overland, not to attempt to gain Louisbourg. Hardy had taken his position, on the 10th, close to the harbour-mouth to prevent any vessels slipping out, but the Bizarre to Quebec, and the Comète carrying news to France, successfully eluded him. The Echo, which sailed on the 13th was, however, pursued and captured. 

Drucour's forces and materials were complete. It was his duty with them to save the town, or at worst to delay its capture to the latest possible day. He had made the repulse of landing the vital element of his defence ; when it failed he felt the town was lost. 

1, Those of Otway's, Hopson's, Lascelles', and Warburton's. 
2. " The officers must be content with soldiers' tents." 
3. A few shot were fired on them from the Island Battery.

"This unfortunate occurrence which we had hoped to overcome, casts dismay and sorrow over all our spirits, with every reason, for it decides the loss of the colony ; the fortifications are bad, the walls are in ruins and fall down of themselves, the outer defences consist only in a single covered way which, like the main works, is open and enfiladed throughout its length ; everything predicts a speedy surrender. What a loss to the State after the enormous expenses made by the King for Isle Royale since 1755 ! " 

"Cet évènement malheureux qu'on espéroit surmonter jette de la consternation et de la tristesse dans tous les esprits, avec d'autant plus de fondement qu'il décide de la perte de la colonie, le corps de la place est mauvais, les murs soiit en ruines qui tombent d'euxmêmes, les fortifications extérieures ne consistent que dans un simple chemise convert qui est donné et enfilé de partout ainsi que le corps de la place, tout ennonce une rédition prochaine. Quelle perte pour I'Etat apr'es les de'penses immenses que le Roy a faites pour l'Isle Royale depuis 1755 ! " 

At five the next morning (9th) a council was held at the Governor's house. Its members were the officers of the place, of the Battalions, and of the principal ships. Des Gouttes, the Commodore, demanded permission to take his ships out of the port as they were of little use. He said that his action was founded on the repeated demands of his Captains, made to him in writing.[1[ Des Houlières and Prévost were the only land officers who, at the council, sided with Des Gouttes and his Captains. The result of the council was that the ships were to remain and hold the harbour against Boscawen.[2] Most of the opinions were like Drucour's, that the place was doomed. D'Anthonay alone said that, notwithstanding its bad condition it might be saved.[3]

With such a spirit the defence began, but while hopeless, the efforts of the French did not lack vigour. Five companies of Rangers were formed from the townspeople. The demolition of buildings and of the limekiln near the Dauphin Gate was carried on, skirmishes took place, and three officers, the seniors of whom were the two Villejouins, were sent with a dozen soldiers and seventy Acadians to the Miré, to join sixty Acadians who had arrived there from Isle St. Jean. They had orders to remain in the woods and harass the enemy. A sally of three hundred men was made on the 13th, which, although repulsed, did some damage. After false alarms on the night of the 14th, based on a report that the enemy was marching in three columns on the town, Vauquelin anchored the frigate Arèthuse broadside to the Barachois to rake the enemy should it appear within range.[4] In this position she

1. Tourville, of the Capricieux, says that Des Gouttes asked for their opinions at a preliminary meeting, in writing and at once, " par écrit et précipitamment." 
2. There can be no question of the soundness of this view. The Island Battery was made almost useless by the 25th of June. Had Des Gouttes and his ships gone out, Boscawen would have come in and destroyed the town at once. It was approved at headquarters. A.N. B, vol. 107. 
3. These letters are at the end of Drucour's journal, A.N. Am., du N., vol. 10, Prise de Louisbourg. 
4. His position is marked by an anchor on Plan I. 

commanded, through a depression in the land, a wide extent of the ground over which any advance against the town had to be made. 

Further efforts at defence were completed by work on the walls, the establishment of shelters to prevent the raking of them, the necessity for which had been pointed out by Drucour, and much of the powder was removed from the citadel to the ice-house and limekilns outside the eastern walls. These buildings were protected by hogsheads of tobacco "that was in great plenty in Louisbourg, from the English prizes, brought there by the French privateers (Johnstone)." [1]

Wolfe continued work at his roads and batteries, being supplied with guns and materials, by sea, in boats and lighters. These were protected by a frigate and sloop, which were attacked by an armed chaloupe, with two 24-lb. guns, which did not interrupt the work, although it caused some damage to the nearest frigate (14th). The work was pushed on, but it was not until the night of the 19th-20th that fire was opened. The reputation of the French army made the besiegers act with caution. Sentinels were posted to overlook the harbour. The troops were cautioned against surprise. Although Wolfe stated in his orders that he thought an attack was scarcely possible, when he was ready to open fire, a plan of defence against a boat attack had been perfected. A strong detachment was moved out from the main camp, the Rangers occupied the ground between it and Ross's post, at the head of the North East Harbour, and a system of signals and bonfires was arranged, not only to give warning, but to deceive the enemy as to the strength of the position. The fire of Wolfe's batteries was brisk, and as briskly returned by the Island Battery and ships. Ross's post was strengthened by guns on the shore, Wolfe's at the Lighthouse was added to, and under fire from the ships a new battery was begun at the head of the harbour (June 23). They were too distant from each other to do damage, and two new batteries were later erected, which, firing over the Grand Battery, reached the shipping. Wolfe's works had now covered much more than half way round the harbour from the Lighthouse. Its batteries kept up a fire on the island, which on the 25th seemed much shattered. The besiegers surmised rightly, from its firing only shells after four on that afternoon, that its guns pointed towards the active enemy were disabled, so the British fire on it was reduced to an occasional shell for the purpose of retarding the work of reconstruction. 

The battery at Rochefort Point was used to supply its place, and the men-of-war fired constantly, but with little effect. The engineers of the town did their best to make repairs to these most important guns on the island.

1. So large was this quantity that notwithstanding its free use as protection for the men-of-war and buildings, after the capitulation Amherst sold a part of what was found in the town for £1500. Amherst to Pitt, Aug. 30.

A sally was made from the town on the 1st of July, and the troops advanced towards the Grand Battery. The engagement was kept up for two hours. Then the French gave ground rapidly, and retreated to the shelter of the outposts, while Wolfe's force, which pursued them closely, had to retire under a heavy fire from the ships and the town. This gave him the advantage of fighting over ground he had already, June 30, intended to occupy. " When the cannon and mortars are placed in battery, the Brigadier proposes to carry one Establishment nearer to the Town, and to take possession of two Eminences not far from the West Gate." [1]

At dusk, July 1, he took possession of the mound he had coveted, and the next day, under heavy fire, his men at this advanced post skirmished with the French from cover, and succeeded in making the redoubt practicable, and carrying on other works, so that on the 5th, a battery of five guns and two mortars opened from this new position. Their fire was damaging to the town and the ships. It raked the walls, rising from the Dauphin Gate to the Citadel, and demolished the Cavalier at the Dauphin Bastion, which gratified one of Wolfe's many personal animosities. 

" You know I hold Mr. Knowles in the utmost contempt as an officer, and an engineer and a citizen. He built a useless cavalier upon the Dauphin Bastion which fell to my share to demolish, and we did it effectively in a few hours." [2]

The new battery damaged the town and the shipping with a fire to which, on account of the elevation, the latter could not successfully reply. The position also enabled Wolfe to send out a detachment every night, to hold the French pickets on the town side of the bridge over the Barachois. As up to this time these were the only operations which had produced the slightest effect against the defence, it is not to be wondered at that Wolfe's celerity became famous. None knew where or when he was to be found, but certain they were that "wherever he goes he carries with him a mortar in one pocket and a 24-Pounder in the other." [3]

For the first four weeks events had not gone badly with the French. The Island Battery, it is true, had been destroyed, but the men- of-war amply protected the harbour. Not a gun, until the last few days, had been fired against the main works, and for a longer period the French were in doubt as to the place, in their defences, where the serious attack would be delivered. The elaborate approaches of the enemy were impeded by the fire of the Aréthuse, 

1. Wolfe's Orders, June 30.
2. Hist. MSS. Com. ix p. 76. Knowles, as Governor of Louisbourg, built this work in 1746. 
3. An Authentic Account, June 30. The writer attributes this saying to the " Garrison," which I take to mean the French.

until shells and grenades, from a battery erected for the purpose, drove her on July 6 from her position. Even in the camp of the enemy the French condition was not regarded as hopeless. Deserters came into the town with more or less accurate information as to the strength, the movements, and the projects of the force they had left (June 25 and 30). The troops were doing well. Their pickets held the ground beyond the outer works, and engaged in constant skirmishes with the outposts of the enemy. Sorties were made, siege material was brought in or destroyed, and the English harassed in their operations. In this desultory warfare, the soldiery was helped by the town militia, under command of volunteer officers of the garrison, and Daccarette, a merchant of the place.[1]

But in other respects Drucour's position was less satisfactory. The elaborate preparations of Amherst to protect his camp indicated how effective would have been a force of irregulars, particularly in the early days before his redoubts and entrenchments were completed. The Indians and Acadians did nothing, however, but capture wandering sailors, and rush, at intervals, a sentinel on outpost duty. News had come in on the 23rd, that Boishébert, the most famous of Indian leaders, had arrived at Port Toulouse, and from him and his forces much was expected. The Minister had sent to Drucour the Cross of St. Louis, to present to Boish6bert, as a reward for his distinguished services, but he was a dreary and astonishing failure. He who, as a lad, had performed amazing feats of endurance and leadership, had driven back the New England forces at the St. John River, was useless at Louisbourg.

Further embarrassments were caused by the action of the Abbé Maillard and his Indians. 

"We counted on that in all security (supplies of powder, ball and provisions sent to the Miré River for the use of the irregulars). But the Abbé Maillard, Missionary Priest to the Indians in this Island and Head of the Missions, who was in town the day the English landed at Gabarus, having departed hence on the evening of the same day, out of precaution and care for his person, took with him for greater safety all the Indians who were here at the time ; and presumably he left Louisbourg in the firm belief that within a few days it would fall into the power of the English. At least we must piously think so, because of his conduct, for being accurately informed where the munitions and stores were placed, the Indians who accompanied him, with great care, took away the one and the other. His care should have been to prevent their doing so by his exhortations, the supreme power of a Missionary to the Indians, but once again we assume that he truly believed the colony was lost, nevertheless the number of years during which the King 

1. The elder Daccarette, Michel, was long settled in Louisbourg. His son, also Michel, was born there in 1730, married a daughter of La Borde, the treasurer of the colony, and was more likely at twenty-eight to be the leader of the irregulars than his father. The latter was a man of substance and exemplary life, although he had embroiled himself with the Church by marrying his deceased wife's sister, a marriage which was rehabilitated by the Bishop of Quebec under authority of a Bull of Pope Clement XII. Two of his daughters married officers, La Vallière and Denis. 

has given him a stipend, the favours he has received from him in the form of a pension founded on a benefice, and those conferred on him by the head of the colony, should have been powerful enough to give him the thought that this store, in spite of his opinion, might be of use to his Majesty's service. However this may be, everything was carried off, and the Missionary, with foresight for himself, thought rather of securing abundant provision for his escort, than of the good of the state, and these are the reasons why it has been necessary to re-establish the stores and to have them sent by sea at infinite risk. [1]

The conduct of the Missionary is remarkable ; not only should lie have made every effort to prevent the stores being taken away, but, moreover, ought he not to have remained in the town ? His staying would have meant the Indians remaining also, and they numbered about sixty. [2]

The effects of the incapacity of these irregulars were negative. The attitude of Des Gouttes and his captains seriously weakened Drucour's defence, and caused him the gravest concern. Throughout his own restrained account, in the tone of his letters to Des Gouttes, in the comments he makes on events as they pass, one feels the serious situation. There breathe through his words the emotions of a man strong enough to be patient under the depression of fighting without hope, and yet not of the uncommon force which can impose his purpose on the unwilling and the backward. The view of the possibilities of the ships, already stated (p. 265), is not merely retrospective. Drucour says about the evacuation of the ships : 

" If it is carried out, it would have been as well, had they (the ships) not been here. Instead of that, such splendid floating batteries should have been in constant motion so as to prevent the besiegers establishing their batteries around the harbour and opposite the place .[3]

English and French accounts agree that the ships kept up a brisk fire; [4] it was not effective at any time, and decreased, while that of Wolfe's batteries became more damaging as they gained positions of greater vantage. When the attack was begun the ships ranged in a crescent between the Batterie de la Grave and the Royal Battery. A night's fire from the lighthouse made them move nearer the town. A few days later they came nearer in, and finally on the 2nd of July they took positions so close to the town that in it fell shells which overpassed them. 

" The vessels L'Entreprenant and the Célèbre have again approached so near the quay that both of them have risen about eight to ten inches higher at low tide, the Prudent is so near the angle of the batterie de la Grave that she is touching ground also." 

They were in water so shallow that three of them were aground. Des Gouttes renewed his request to leave ; proposed once to remain himself and

1. This was accomplished by one Paris, a pilot of the town. 
2. Drucour's Journal, July 1. 
3. Drucour's Journal, July 1. 
4. Marolles says he fired 3500 shot from the Célèbre. 

defend the port, and let Beaussier's four ships sail ; gave orders, without Drucour's consent, to the captains of the Célèbre and the Entreprenant to sail at the first favourable opportunity ; atid gave only the assistance of a midshipman in securing the blocking of the entrance of the port.[1] He also prepared for the worst by arranging with his captains a signal on the display of which they should scuttle their ships. 

The climax of his unwillingness and incapacity was reached on the 1st of July. Then the captains held with Des Gouttes a council, at which they discussed the evacuation of the ships, and in consequence Des Gouttes gave each of them a formal order to disembark their crews, leaving on board only a guard of twenty-five to thirty men. 

Prévost got wind of this before any one in the town. He hastened to Drucour, with whom he found at the moment Des Gouttes, Beaussier of the Entreprenant, and Marolles of the Célèbre. Prévost addressed the Governor: "Have you asked, Sir, that the crews of the squadron should all land to-day in the town to reinforce your garrison? " The Governor, surprised, answered that the idea had not as yet occurred to him ; then M. Pr6vost showed how prejudicial it would be to the King's service and to the safety of the place that these five vessels should be abandoned, and recalling to the memory of these gentlemen to whom the King entrusted their ships, his regulations of 1689, he asked whether they had received up to the present other losses than the death of two officers, a midshipman, two sailors, and a cabin-boy. He represented that with a guard of twenty-five to thirty men in each, of which the enemy might be informed through deserters, he (the enemy) would arrive with barges and carry them off in the night, and that then the King's own ships would destroy and reduce his town. 

"That rather than abandon them they should be used to destroy the deadly works formed by the enemy and still being formed around the harbour and in the environs of the place. All these reasons decided the officers to return on board their ships. 

" Some remarks should be made on this so extraordinary conduct, first of all, that this evacuation of the ships was founded on a written statement (procés verbal) of these gentlemen made in a council on board the Prudent, which written statement Monsieur Beaussier refused to sign to-day mid-day, though he was the moving power in the affair, for the reason that he held in his hand before signing, M. Des Gouttes' order. 

" In the second place that it was probably stipulated in the written statement that the evacuation of the ships should only be executed as a result of the Governor's request in order to have the crews as reinforcements to the garrison and to make sorties on the besiegers. There is a reason to believe that such are the terms of the written statement, since in Monsieur Des Gouttes' order to each vessel the crews are to be so employed ;

1. Four ships were sunk on the 28th and 29th of June, the Apollon, Fidèle, Chèvre, and the Ville de Saint Malo, and, on the 30th of June, another. 

however, the Governor did not only not make the request, but he did not know that he was involved in the affair." [1]

The return to the ships was temporary, for a request to Des Gouttes for 150 men to assist in the work of the defence was taken as what must seem a pretext to land the crews. Those of the Capricieux and the Bienfaisant were sent on shore on the 4th, although, on the 6th, Tourville,[2] for whom no work was found on shore, took his crew back on board to fire on Wolfe's new batteries. The crews of the other three ships were withdrawn on the 6th. The orders were in the following form : 

COPY OF A LETTER FOUND IN A DROWNED MAN'S POCKET AT LOREMBEC 

" In the evening of the 27th of June the English bombarded the Squadron, and the Capricieux received a small shell on her Forecastle, which notwithstanding every obstacle it mett with, went thro' both decks a lower deck beam, and bursting, sett her on fire, which was with much difficulty extinguished. As the Danger of the Squadron becomes each Day more evident by the increase of the Enemy's Bomb Batteries, I went immediately to consult the Governor upon the necessary measure to be taken to prevent the ships being blown up, and we determined to bring them as close to the town as we could and to moor them with 4 anchors each, so as to bring Broadsides to bear as much as possible on the passage ; also that their powder should be landed, some few rounds excepted ; that they should put on shore as much of their Provisions as would subsist their Complement in case they should be totally evacuated with a reserve of 6 weeks for each ship ; that they should each raise Tents in such places as the Governors should appoint for the looping the seamen to be landed for the service of the Garrison : These articles having been well thought and agreed on with the Consent of Mr. Drucour, it is ordered that Mons. Beaussier de lisle Capitaine de vaisseau du Roy, Commdnt. of the Entreprenant, shall conform thereto and cause the above orders to be put in execution with all the vigilance & exactness he is capable of." [3] 

It seems probable that the drowned man was one of the executive officers, to whom a copy of Des Gouttes' letter was given officially. 

This happened while the ships were seaworthy, and practically undamaged by the fire against them, for there is mentioned in the journals that up to this time only one shell had struck the Prudent, on the 29th. The casualties were trifling : from the 19th of June to the 6th of July, two officers, a midshipman, and seven men were all that were killed on these ships. [4] 

If these actions of Des Gouttes neither raised the indignation of Drucour 

1.  Drucour's Journal, July 2. 
2. So, Drucour. Tourville does not mention this, though his journal reads as if he were daily on his ship after this date. 
3. Bell MSS. 
4. The number of men put ashore : Prudent, 330 ; Entreprenant, 500 ; Célèbre, Capricieux, Bienfaisant, 66o. Total, 1490.

high enough to take action against such incapacity, nor even adequately to express it in his account of these events, others were not so reticent. 

"To-day, the fourth of July, the vessels have just confirmed the idea which their unceasing bad manoeuvres had given to all. Can it ever be believed that five pieces of artillery, placed on an eminence, at less than a quarter of a league from the shore, could have obliged M. Desgouttes and his Captains to abandon their ships, leaving in each one a guard with two officers, which were to be relieved every four and twenty hours ? This, however, is the result of the council of war these gentlemen have held and dared even to execute, leaving shamefully their vessels in front of five cannon while they had three hundred to defend them with. . . . If these commanders are treated according to the regulations, I believe their heads are in the greatest danger." 

"Aujourd'hui, quatrième de juillet, les vaisseaux viennent de confirmer l'idée que les mauvaises manceuvres qu'ils n'ont cessé de faire, avoient donné d'eux à tout le monde. Croira-on jamais que cinq pièces de canon placées à un petit quart de lieue de la mer, sur une montagne, ayent pu obliger Monsieur Dégoute [sic] et les capitaines de ses vaisseaux de les abandonner ; ne laissant dans chaque, qu'une garde avec deux officiers, qu'on devoit relever toutes les vingt et quatre heures : c'est cependant le résultat du conseil que ces messieurs ont tenu, et qu'ils ont bien osé exécuter, abandonnant honteusement leurs vaisseaux, devant cinq pièces de canon, tandis qu'ils en avoient trois cent quarante, pour les défendre. . . . Si l'on traite tous ces capitaines selon l'ordonflance, je crols leurs têtes fort hazardées." [1]

Johnstone confirms this : - "It is true that all of them (the land forces) had the most sovereign contempt for the sea officers of the French squadron, which contempt their dastardly and base conduct justly merited." [2]

There was the sharpest of contrasts between the effectiveness of the ships of the line and that of the Arèthuse, a frigate of thirty-six guns, commanded by Vauquelin. The land officers had nothing but praise for him. When he proposed to Drucour, now that he could no longer impede the English attack, that he should escape through their fleet and carry dispatches to France, Des Gouttes, present at the interview, gave his opinion that Vauquelin might still be useful at Louisbourg. To which Vauquelin replied : " Yes, by God, if you will give me one of your men-of-war of the line that are laid up doing nothing, you will see that I will do much more yet than I have done hitherto with the frigate." [3]

After the first days of July, Drucour's defence was weakened while the vigour of the attack increased. The advantages of Wolfe's new position have been pointed out. The first batteries brought into action were one of six guns, another of two mortars, specially directed against the Arèthuse. This

1. Arch. Nat. B4, vol. 80, f. 82. 
2. Quebec Lit. and Hist. Soc. 2nd Series. Tourville says Des Gouttes' view was that seeing the ships could not silence Wolfe's batteries, it would save life to employ their crews on shore, to which Drucour consented (July 3). Tourville received orders at 11 P.M. He saw to his anchors and landed his crew. 
3. MS. relatifs à la Nouvelle, France,  vol. 3, p. 480. See Appendix for biographical details on Vauquelin.

made her position untenable, and on the 6th she withdrew. The testimony as to the result of her guns is unanimous. She had, although under-manned, seriously impeded the advances of the besiegers.[1] An elaborate and costly epaulement "about a quarter of a mile long, nine feet high and sixteen feet broad," had been erected to protect the workers from her fire. When she was driven away work was carried on more rapidly, so that by the 10th Wolfe had completed a line of batteries from behind the Grand Battery to the slopes above the Barachois. His admirers, contrasting his activity with the slowness of the other Commanders, hoped that the most startling proof possible of his superiority as a leader might be given : 

". . . he is very Alert, Lives as his soldiers and Acts with such Vigour that it is Expected by many that he will make a Breach at ye West Gate in a few days and Desire the Generals on ye Right to walk in." [2] 

Notwithstanding the protection given to the French ships by cables, tobacco, and other materials, they were pierced by the nearer guns and began to suffer. 

On the 6th, the city was damaged from the shells thrown into it. The besiegers took as marks the spires of the principal buildings. One shell fell in the courtyard of the citadel, another in the ditch, and just before the fire slackened for the night, another exploded in the crowded hospital, killing the surgeon of the Volontaires Etrangers, and dangerously wounding two of the Frères de la Charité. Drucour, the next morning, sent a letter to Amherst proposing to set apart a place for the sick and wounded, which would not be fired on. An answer was not returned until the evening, as Amherst sent for Boscawen before replying. It was to the effect, as there seemed no place within the town where they might be secure, that under certain somewhat stringent conditions the sick should be placed on Battery Island, on one of the French men-of-war detached from the fleet, and anchored in the upper part of the harbour, or placed among Boscawen's fleet outside. Drucour felt that he could not accept this offer. The buildings which might have been used on Battery Island were in ruins, and to detach a ship, as an hospital, would apparently weaken their naval force. His own view was that the ship was useless as she was, but that this could not be thought possible by the English commanders. So the civilians, nearly four thousand in number, the soldiers off duty, the sick and the wounded, as well as the combatants, all in a town, the area of which was about 6oo yards in one direction, and about 4oo across, had to undergo the fire of the besiegers from the lighthouse, which reached 

1. Vauquelin kept a man at the masthead to give directions to his gunners. 
2. An account of the expedition, etc., B.M. Add. MSS. 11,813.

as far as the citadel, and from Wolfe's new batteries. In two days, the 6th and 7th, 125 or 130 shells and 60 or 70 shot had fallen in the town. The purpose of the enemy seemed irl the early days of the bombardment rather to destroy the buildings of the town than its defence. [1]

This communication was not the first which had passed between the commanders. No summons to surrender had been sent, but early in the siege, choosing a way which would give most information to the messenger bearing a flag of truce, says the observant Tourville, Amherst sent a polite note to the Governor, and a present of two pineapples to Madame Drucour. An equally polite note was returned, and Drucour again displayed his lavishness by sending back some bottles of champagne (June 17 and 18). This promptly brought back again more pineapples, one at least of which was not good (Tourville). The present in return included some fresh butter, which indicates that the ordinary activities of life in the town had not been entirely suspended. Inquiries and replies as to the missing officers taken prisoners at the landing had been exchanged ; effects had been sent to them ; and never, said one diarist, was war carried on with more courtesy. 

During a truce many officers talked together. 

" The Sieur Joubert, Captain of a Company of Volunteers while the drummer was in camp, was visited at the Barachois, by an English lady, whom he thinks is his cousin, three officers introduced her to him, they offered him refreshment, he thanked them and made the same offer; the lady asked for permission to pick a salad, this was accorded her" (Anon., July 6-7). [2]

The slowness with which the town was invested surprised the French. They thought the army was deficient in good troops, as so long a time was spent in fortifying their camp and making roads. " The sluggishness (indolence) of the English General in approaching the city makes me think he expects reinforcements." This was the opinion of Tourville on June 22. The engineer, Pollly, ten days later speaks of the slowness of their approach as exhibiting a prudence beyond bounds ("Nous fait montrer dune prudence plus que mesurée "). 

These are indications that this was owing to divided counsels. There was obviously a difference of opinion between Amherst and Bastide later than that on the 17th. Amherst again writes on the 24th : [3] " Colonel Bastide remained 

1. As Amherst gave orders on July 22 to fire at the fortifications rather than the buildings, it is probable that this view of the French is correct. 
2. Joubert's relationship with the English lady must have been through some European connection. He was one of the French officers who came to Isle Royale in 1750, after service in the regiments of Picardie and Grassin. He served in the old war in Bohemia, Bavaria, in the Rhine, and in Flanders ; received many wounds ; carried a ball from Raucoux, which could not be extracted, and at Langenfield was galloped over by the enemy's cavalry. He, some thought, should have commanded the irregulars instead of Boishébert. He served in the Windward Islands as Major in 1760, and was made Governor of Marie Galante in 1763. 
3. Letter of July 6, C.O. 5/55.

fixed in his opinion of advancing by Green Hill." The first work was pushed in this direction until about the 14th of July, when batteries were traced out on the shore, between Cap Noir, still in the French possession, and the English redoubt which had been begun on the 1st. It would, therefore, appear that the elaborate epaulement, to cover the depression which was open to the Arèthuse, was not necessary ; nor were the trenches in the vicinity, for the attack was not made by Green Hill. Even if there had not been a change of plan, work, which in any case must have been slow, was drawn out by the adoption of European methods in road- making. "Instead of laying hurdles and fascines on the surface of this swamp the sod had been pared away injudiciously, which caused a miserable waste of time and materials." Boscawen's cart [1] was not apparently used, nor were sledges such as colonists employed to bring up their heavy guns in 1745. The expedients possible to those familiar with the country were not suggested, for smallpox ravaged the New England carpenters, the loss of whom Amherst regrets. [2]

Notwithstanding delays, the advance was steady, and no position once gained was afterwards lost. On the 9th, a sortie in force was made from the town to check the English advance on the right. Seven hundred and twenty-four men, under the command of Marin, Lieut.-Col. of Bourgogne, divided into two parties, left the town about midnight and advanced along the shore, They surprised the advance post of the English, who were asleep or careless, carried this with the bayonet, and followed the fugitives to the second line, where they found a detachment drawn up to receive their charge. The English broke under it, and left Marin in possession. 

The workmen he brought with him, began to demolish the entrenchment. The alarm was now a general one, supports came up from a detachment of the 15th near at hand, daylight was near, and Marin accomplished little in the way of destruction, but led his forces back to the town in good order, bringing with him two officers and twenty-eight grenadiers as prisoners. The accounts of this sortie differ. [3]

1. Wolfe's orders mention on the 7th " a machine lately provided for that purpose," i.e. drawing guns from the Miré road to his battery. 
2. "Colonel Messervy and his son both died this day, and of his company of carpenters of 108 men, all but 16 in the smallpox, who are nurses to the sick, this particularly unlucky at this time" (Amherst to Pitt, June 28, C.O.. 5/53). Knap says the Colonel's son, John, was buried on June 29. 
3. It was stated that a good many of the French had been drinking. The French loss was 50/60 men and 2 officers, It seems certain that time was lost, and although all nocturnal movements are difficult, the alarm was the sooner spread to the British supports by the French having fired on the retreating foe, instead of having pursued them with the bayonet. Drucour's account is the most favourable to Marin and his men. Amherst admits that his men were taken by surprise, but claims that the result was not important. 

The casualties in this sortie on the English side were, Lord Dundonald killed ; a Lieutenant of the 17th and Capt. Bontein of the Engineers taken ; 4 men killed, 12 missing, and 17 wounded (Amherst). 

The French loss was 50 or 60 men killed, and 2 officers (Drucour). Other figures are given in different journals. 

Lord Dundonald, the 7th Earl, was born at Paisley in 1729, served in the Scots regiment in the, service of Holland returned to Scotland, and, after 1753, joined the 17th Regiment, and with it went to America in 1757, wintered there, and was Captain of the Grenadier Company of Forbes at the time of his death. (From notes for a history of the Cochrane family by Mrs. Parker).

The French tried to check the main attack. Small guns were erected a Cap Noir, and new cannon brought into position on the Queen's Bastion. The range was so long that their fire could not be effective. The condition of the walls was so bad that Poilly said that the fire of their own cannon would make in their own walls a breach for the English ; but to his superiors the need of replying, even ineffectively, to the attack seemed so urgent, that he was as one crying in the wilderness. The progress of the besiegers, which was satisfactory to them, and discouraging to Drucour, was still that of the left attack. New batteries were established, and bombs were thrown into the town, some days numbering as many as a hundred and twenty or thirty. The enemy carried stores from the eastern shore of the harbour to the Royal Battery unmolested by the ships. Their supineness made Drucour fear it would suggest to the English a project for cutting them out.[1] Fire was reopened on the Island Battery, and its wretched garrison had to seek shelter among the rocks, unable to defend themselves. On the night of the 1sth the Arèthuse, having been repaired, slipped out of the harbour, was seen by the watchers of the Lighthouse, who gave signals to Hardy's fleet, which unsuccessfully pursued her.

Wolfe's account of this episode is worth quoting, as an illustration of the power of the point of view. After saying that he had often been in much pain for Hardy's squadron in the rough weather it encountered, he goes on : " a frigate found means to get out and is gone to Europe chargé de fanfaronnades. I had the satisfaction of putting two or three haut- vitzer shells into his stern, and to shatter him a little with some of your lordship's 24 pound shot, before he retreated, and I much question whether he will hold out the voyage." [2] When one knows that Vauquelin had impeded the progress of the siege for at least a fortnight, that Wolfe had erected a mortar battery for the purpose of dislodging him, that Vauquelin was a gallant man and a skilful sailor, Wolfe's reference to his escape shows a less generous spirit than that of Boscawen. [3]

The French, uninspired by any success of moment, disheartened by the ineffectiveness of the ships, and by the prompt restoration of the damage their guns inflicted on the works of the British, toiled on at a task which was patently hopeless. The discouragement shows at length in Drucour's journal. On the 13th he writes : 

" The garrison becomes weaker from day to day, the ordinary fate of that of a besieged town, but this is an uncommon and special plight, it bas no secure shelter for rest, so here

1. July 12. 
2. Hist. MSS. Com. ix. This was as bad a prophecy as Wolfe's at Halifax. The Arèthuse made an extraordinarily rapid voyage, notwithstanding her condition. 
3. See Chap. XV.

the soldier who is on duty by day passes the night in the open, on the ramparts or in the covered way. He is overcome with weariness, nevertheless always shows good will which delights, but he cannot hold out. We estimate to-day a diminution of a quarter of the troops compared with the day of the landing." 

His weariness shows in this, for on the next page of his Journal he states the loss, which is one-third. [1]

A further step was made in advance on the i6th. Towards evening the French picket at the Barachois bridge was driven in. In the night, a body of troops massed just beyond it, rushed the position, entrenched themselves, and held the ground against a belated fire from the ramparts. This gave them a position about 200 yds. from the Dauphin Gate, which they held under the heavy fire of the walls. The trenches were extended, preparations for a new battery were made, [2] although the loss in officers and men was heavy. The spur was silenced, the Cavalier damaged, and the fire from the ships was much slackened. From the 19th of June, when fire from the Lighthouse began, to the 16th of July, Wolfe had extended batteries from the former point to ever closer quarters, and his men were at the latter time holding a position within 250 yards of the walls. The forces he had at his disposal were not great, apparently never more than 2000 men. Amherst had apparently overruled Bastide. The main attack was erecting batteries which had not yet fired a gun, the nearest of which was more than three times as far away from the walls as Wolfe's advanced position. When the first of the batteries of the main attack were ready, a day or two later, their fire was directed against the Queen's Bastion and the southern side of the Citadel, from which it was separated by ground most difficult for troops to cross. Therefore, even if a breach had been made in that part of the walls, it would have been practically useless for assault. The fire of cannon and musketry from the walls was very hot. Officers and men in the trenches constantly fell before it, [3] and it was vigorously returned from the batteries above the Barachois. These mounted 16 guns and 2 mortars.[4] The French heard the enemy at work, fired on them, and longed for

1. On the 13th the muster was:        |       The loss in killed and wounded up to the 12th:
                                                              |
Artois ...................................   250      |                                                    Officers.      Soldiers. 
Bourgogne ..........................   300      |          Artois . ................................   7                  27 
Cambise ..............................   300      |          Bourgogne. ........................   6                  55 
Volontaires Etrangers ........  300      |         Cambise ............................    1                   6 
Colony  ................................    400       |         Volontaires Etrangers ....    4                 17 
Grenadiers .........................    200      |          Colony Troops .................     4                  51 
Militia ...............................      300      |          Civilians ..........................                                          26 
Battery Island ...................     150      |
                                              _______ |
                                                2200      |                                                       ____               ____       ____
              Out of 3080 on June 8.          |                                                          22               156           26           

2. A battery of heavy guns on the 17th. 
3. " 18 officers and men killed in trenches in 48 hours." 
4. Drucour says 4 mortars.

a ship in the position of the Arèthuse from which the enemy in their trenches would have been uncovered down to their shoes. The ships remained as they were, firing occasionally, but with direction so bad that on the 18th their grape fell among their own men in the covered way. Cartridges began to be scarce, also balls for their 24-lb. guns. Iron scraps were used in the mortars, English shot were picked up and fired back. Houses had to be torn down for wood to repair fortifications, and such work had to be carried on under a fire which swept not only the defences, but the streets of the town. The work of repairs and the fire of the town were kept up with spirit. A lieutenant, and a handful of men of the Volontaires Etrangers, seized an outpost in front of the trenches, and held it all the afternoon of the 19th, until at nightfall they were given orders to come in - a gallant feat, but, like all that the garrison had done, of no avail. Amherst had not only his army, but the crews of the ships to draw on. As the fire drew nearer, and became more accurate, it the more incommoded the town. It was concentrated on the Citadel between eleven and two, when the whole garrison assembled there for dinner.

Des Gouttes was being roused from his torpor as far as to make a promise. He had arranged for the Bienfaisant and another ship to move out so that they could fire on the advance works, to prepare for and support a sortie of 1500 men in the early hours of the 21st. He failed to keep his word for that night, but promised again for the 22nd. In the early afternoon of the 21st, a shot struck the poop of the Célèbre, which set off some cartridges stored there. The fire caught her mizzen mast, and the score of men on board were unable to check it. She swung so that sparks from her caught aft on the Entreprenant. While her men were working at this blaze, fire had been smouldering on her bowsprit. It broke out freely in a quarter of an hour, and she in turn set fire to the Capricieux, unable to move. The Prudent escaped, for she was to windward, the Bienfaisant by swinging on her cable. The enemy poured their heaviest fire on the ships, and on the boats plying between them and the town. The French speak quite calmly of this as an ordinary incident in warfare. It impressed more deeply some of the enemy. Gordon says, " in short, to humanity tho' an enemy, the scene was very shocking." Hamilton saw both sides of such occurrences and thus comments on them in his journal : 

"About 1 A. M. (?) as I was patroling the heights in the neighborhood of the Camp over- looking the Town and harbour, I perceived a thick column of smoke and presently a great explosion announced some fatal accident, this proceeded from the accident, as I afterwards heard, of a shot from one of our batteries firing the powder magazine on board one of the French ships of war in the harbour. I was soon joined by some stragglers, among others our Chaplain, who highly enjoyed the scene, confounded the French &c. On our return to camp a great smoke arose from that part of the encampment where our Regiment lay.- Oh Lord, cried an officer, I am afraid our hospital is on fire, what will become of those poor fellows, lame and wounded. The sober divine exclaimed, I am afraid that idle rascal, my Cook, has set the hut on fire and my piece of beef will be burnt to ashes. It was not in effect so bad as either." 

The horror of the conflagration was increased by the loaded guns of the ships, as they became hot, going off and taking effect on the other ships, on the boats, and town. The ships made a prodigious blaze all night, and finally drifted with the tide to the Barachois shore, where they lay with their guns and ironwork tumbled into their holds.[1] As their flames died down, there must have sunk with them the hopes of the most optimistic of the defenders. The sortie was abandoned, nothing more could be done with exhausted troops than repair works, which before the siege began were known to be faulty in plan and hopelessly bad in condition, and to keep up a fire from their crumbling walls on an enemy with resources so superior that its advance could not be checked by any effort the defenders had made. This was done with spirit. The defection of the navy spurred the garrison to greater efforts and a stalwart endurance. Nor do we find any record of pressure to surrender brought on them by the non-combatants ; indeed, Madame Drucour dally walked the ramparts, and fired three cannons to encourage the troops. 

Thus far the storm which they had endured had been heavy. It now became a tempest. The batteries now on the 22nd playing against the town were :

In addition there were great numbers of coehorns, royals, etc.,[2] which during the day were added to by the erection of an advanced battery of four guns, and a mortar battery, which almost drove out the French from the covered way. 

About seven that morning a large shell fell in the barracks to the north of the belfry in the building, which closed, on the town side, the parade ground of the Citadel. It was thought to have done no damage, but about half an hour later a brisk fire broke out in the roof. The efforts made to stop it were

1. Forty-seven guns were afterwards recovered. 
2. Gordon, p. 139.

unsuccessful, and all except the Governor's apartments at its southern end was destroyed. The English during this fire, which lasted five or six hours, showered bombs and ball with the greatest activity into this area ; nevertheless all the workmen of the garrison and the ship's carpenters gathered there and worked with uncommon courage and energy. Without both these parties the fire would have made greater progress. There was a sad and moving sight during this time. 

"The few casemates are placed in the inner part of the citadel, in them were shut in the ladies and some of the women of the town, and one was kept for wounded officers. There was every reason to fear that the fire would reach the protection which had been placed in front of these casemates, and by the direction of the wind the smoke might stifle the women shut up in them, so that all the women and a great number of little children came out, running to and fro, not knowing where to go in the midst of bombs and balls falling on every side, and among them several wounded officers brought out on stretchers, with no safe place to put them " (Drucour). 

"All the above-mentioned batteries played extremely smart the whole time it lasted" (Gordon). 

The six-gun battery fired 600 balls that day, although three of the guns were dismounted by the fire from the walls, and remounted again. Three times in this wretched day did the wooden barracks in the Queen's Bastion, " as inflammable as a pack of matches," catch fire, and three times they were extinguished. All night long, bombs, some of them charged with combustibles, were hurled into the town, and at daylight it was worse. The siege at length was conducted with fury. The works were suffering on the left and right, and while shells passed over their heads the soldiers in the covered way and in the trenches exchanged a continued fire of musketry. In the evening the barracks were set on fire beyond control. Little help was sent in the first hour, and later, only by pulling down the neighbouring huts and a favouring wind, was the fire prevented from spreading to the town. The next day, the 24th, there was no abatement in the bombardment. Deserters who came in to the camp said the townspeople had entreated the Governor to capitulate, and this inspired the artillerymen in the trenches with the hope that the end was near. The Dauphin defences were down, the gunners were driven from the artillery of the Citadel, but they managed to serve a few guns, the fire of which seemed to Drucour more like the minute guns at a funeral than a defence (" Qu'll ressemble Plutôt à des honneurs funéraires qu' à une deffense "). 

Part of the English fire was directed against the walls, to make a breach,, but the destruction of the town was the main object of the British, it seemed to Drucour (" Il parolt aussi que leur intention n'est pas encore à battre sérieusement en brèche, mais auparavent de tuer du monde et d'incendier la ville "). Fire now seemed concentrated on the hospital and the houses near it, all filled with wounded.[1] The breaching began seriously on the 25th. Franquet alone, of those who inspected it, thought its result did not yet make an assault practicable. The town was no longer defensible, and scaling ladders were ready in the trenches. The British had seen great pieces of the wall fall into the moat after every successful shot, and meantime the fire of the bombs, as many as 300 in a night, was continued, so that there was not a house in the town which was uninjured. There were only five cannon to reply to this bombardment - two on the wall between the Dauphin Bastion and the Citadel, and three on its northern flank. 

The condition of the town was desperate, but the two battered ships were still in the harbour, and to some degree effective, or with possibilities of effectiveness. No precautions had, however, been taken to afford them the extra, protection needed after the burning of the others. They were now to fall, and with them the last hope of protracting the siege. The entrances of the harbour had been reconnoitred by Boscawen's orders, and the report of Balfour, Captain of the Etna fire- ship, being favourable, Boscawen determined to give the navy more special work than supplementing the forces on shore. During the morning of July 25, the larger boats, pinnaces, and barges of both squadrons were manned and armed. Those from the ships in Gabarus Bay went down to Sir Charles Hardy's station off the harbour mouth in small detachments, in order not to attract the attention of the town. The boats were divided in two divisions ; the command of one was given to Balfour of the Etna, and of the other to John Laforey, Commander of the Hunter. [2]

The night was thick, and the expedition entered the harbour undiscovered. The division under Laforey was directed against the Prudent, which was anchored near the Batterie de la Grave, resting on the ground. The men on board, with the exception of the sentinels, were below decks ; the highest officers were ensigns. The sentinel hailed a boat. A voice from it replied in French that it was from the town, and coming on board. An officer mounted to the deck, saw all clear, called over the side, " Monté [sic] cinq ou six hommes." Before the French bluejacket suspected anything, there were two hundred men in possession of the deck. The officers were taken, guards placed on the hatchways, twenty English prisoners released, combustibles placed in the gun-room and at the foot of the masts, ignited, the sentries withdrawn, and the English made off to the north. The few shots that were fired aroused the town. Drucour hurried to the battery, and directed a fire of cannon and musketry on the ships. Within half an hour the midshipmen and the men, some sixty or seventy in number,

 1. Parkman has admirably paraphrased Drucour's account of the effect of this fire an the wounded and their attendants. 
2. John Laforey was the descendant of a French Huguenot family settled in England in the reign of William III. In 1748 he became a lieutenant, was with Holburne in 1757, at Quebec in 1758, was made a Baronet in I789, Admiral of the Blue in 1795, and died in I796.

came ashore. The capture of the Bienfaisant was as expeditiously made. A short conflict took place. Seven of the assailants were killed, nine were wounded, before she was carried. Then she was towed by the boats of the squadron to the head of the harbour, and the port lay open to the British. The anonymous officer of the garrison comments thus on this disastrous event : [1]

"One is at first surprised to see two great ships letting themselves be taken by little boats, but one's astonishment diminishes when one knows that the officers and the crew (équipage) kept themselves bidden in the hold of the ships for fear of blows, that they had only a few men on deck to give warning. I do not undertake to say that all the ships did the same, but this is certain (mais ce qu'il a de sûr) that most of them acted in the same way. It is claimed (on prétend) that a naval officer is dishonoured when he hides himself a moment in the hold. On this principle what should one think of these gentlemen who were so long hidden there? The officers on guard on the Prudent and their midship men were quartered in the boatswain's storeroom (la fosse aux lions) where they were so safe and comfortable (si en sûreté et si tranquilles) that the English were already masters of the ship before they knew anything about it, that there was only one officer got on deck before the English had placed sentinels on the hatchways. The others only came out when they were told to come up and surrender."

The service of the naval officers on shore was equally condemned. Poilly says : 

" Our batteries entrusted to the naval officers were entirely abandoned, there was in them not even a lighted match (linstock) in readiness. We have received no help from this essential part of our forces. Their reasoning is as hard-hearted as their conduct. I should erase the word. It (their conduct) merits a greater scorn." 

When daylight came the bombardment was resumed. A new battery erected by volunteers, under Gordon, as was the one before this, was brought into play. The senior officers of the town inspected the fortifications, from which only three guns could play on the enemy, and met in council. Franquet held that the breaches were not yet practicable, and after hours of discussion it was decided to ask for a truce, in which terms of capitulation might be discussed. While this was going on, Boscawen was composing a letter to Drucour, directing him to surrender at discretion, acquainting him that he would this night be attacked by sea and land. 

" I went on shore and communicated this Letter to Major General Amherst, who approved of it, and was Sealing the said Letter when a Letter was brought to Us from Monsr. de Drucour, offering to Capitulate." [1] 

Loppinot, who, in the glory of a new position and a new uniform, had been rowed in from the Tigre, on June 29, 1749, to arrange the preliminaries of the return of Louisbourg to the French, was now, July 26, 1758, worn with the 

1.  A.N. Marine, B^4, Vol. 80. 
2. Boscawen's Jl.

siege, conducted to the tent of Amherst, to tender Drucour's offer of capitulation. The reply of the victors was, that Drucour and his garrison, as a preliminary to a capitulation, must yield themselves prisoners at discretion, than which no surrender is more humiliating, and that only an hour would be given for their decision.[1] Drucour and his council were horrified at such hard terms. D'Anthonay was sent out to endeavour to obtain better. Whitmore, who commanded in the trenches, refused to let D'Anthonay pass beyond, and would send no message from him to Amherst. The council resolved to stand the storming. While D'Anthonay was in the enemy's lines, the engineers were assembled to arrange some interior entrenchment in case of the place being carried by assault. As, in the defence of Gabarus, no rendezvous for the detachment had been arranged, so now no provision for failure had been made, and this new problem had to be faced on the spur of the moment. Franquet was in favour of the Princess Bastion, but it was pointed out to him that it would not hold 150 men, and a place was required for the whole garrison. The Brouillan Bastion on the Eastern walls was proposed, and visited, while there they were surrounded by so great a crowd of the townspeople that they could do nothing. D'Anthonay returned from the enemy's lines, unsuccessful, and Loppinot set forth with a letter to say that the town would submit to assault rather than accept the terms offered. Then Prévost presented a memoir to the council. It pointed out the hardships to the people, the discouragement to colonization, the difference between soldiers whose professional duty it was to face horrors, and civilians forced to undergo such terrors as awaited them. His view prevailed. D'Anthonay and Du Vivier overtook Loppinot with powers to capitulate. The news spread through the town. With whatever joy it may have been received by the populace, and the sick and wounded, it enraged and humiliated the troops. The attitude of the officers verged on sedition (" il y eut un mouvement violent parmi Les Officiers de la Garnison qui tendoit à la sédition "). Drucour was blamed for not surrendering two, days carlier, when they could have obtained the honours of war, or for surrendering now when they could have held out for two days more. The men of Cambis, in rage, broke their muskets and burned their colours. [2] The capitulation was signed, the barriers to the Dauphin Gate were cleared, the. bridge repaired. The vaulted roof of its gate rang the next morning to the tread of the advanced guard of the victors, the grenadier companies of the Royals, Hopson's, and Amherst's. At noon, the garrison laid down its arms. It had been " good, brave, and patient," and felt the humiliation to which its men were subjected. 

The terms were hard ; even Wolfe admitted this; but the taking of

1. The tcrm was softened to prisoners of war. 
2. Johnstone and Poilly. 

Louisbourg was the first important success in a war which had begun with Boscawen's high-handed action in 1755. He and Amherst determined to make the most of it, and bring back to Britain not only a long-deferred victory, but a striking one. 

Such was the course of events in this siege. The summing up of its salient features seems necessary to make clearer, than the foregoing narrative, the causes which produced this result. At first sight it appears that the overwhelming superiority of the British in men and material made the result a foregone conclusion. Careful reading of the documents leads to a modification of this opinion. While the fortifications were bad in design and condition, the resistance made by their defenders indicates that had they been seconded by the men-of-war with anything like the fervour of which Vauquelin displayed in fighting his frigate, the difficulties of the British would have been greatly increased. [1]

As the defection of the fleet was not sporadic, although the annals of the French Navy has perhaps no darker page than this, the next chapter deals with this subject at length. There was a fine spirit in the rank and file on both sides. There was on the British the stupendous advantage, rarely enjoyed, of complete harmony between the sea and the land commanders. Boscawen was on shore every day when it was possible to land. His men were drawn on to supplement the land forces, and the handiness and the celerity of the sailors seems to have been marked. [2] Whatever were the difficulties of the French, and they were many, it must be evident that no commanding officer on that side displayed the dash, the keenness, the military science of Wolfe, any more than that these qualities were shown by any other officer of high rank on his own side. Amherst ,stands as a shadow in the background, Whitmore and Lawrence seem to have done nothing but routine duty. Wolfe was the moving spirit of the attack. The table on p.281 shows how many batteries he had erected, with his small force, compared with the two the right attack had brought into action up to that time, and that table does not include three other batteries, the usefulness of which was then overpast. It was, however, his leap into the surf among his men, his appreciation of their good actions, his tireless activity, that made a spirit almost invincible among the British. Had there been a Wolfe in command of the French, there had been a battle of the Titans. Harsh as are his comments on many of his associates, unlovely as were some aspects of his character, Wolfe was a great leader, and to his presence at Louisbourg the result was largely due. The comments of the diarists indicate that there were in the place men who chafed at what was done, even more at what was left undone, just as a year 

1. Wolfe's opinion was : " that, to defend the Isle Royale it is necessary to have a body of four or five thousand men in readiness to march against whatever force of the enemy attempts to land. In short, there must be an army to defend the island. . . . We must not trust to the place or to any of those batteries now constructed " (Hist. MSS. Com. ix. p. 76). 
2. The quickness with which they erected batteries was noticed. 

before Wolfe had been indignant with the incapacity and slowness at Rochefort. It must be admitted that the task at Louisbourg was difficult. Two-thirds of its whole force was required for manning the defences. Their troops had no secure resting-place, and were soon exhausted. The most difficult expeditions to manage are night attacks, and these required a moral which could not be expected from tired men, and yet these sallies were the most effective means of checking the advance. Much of the cannon fire from the walls did far more damage to the walls themselves than to the works of the besiegers. It was exhaustion again which prevented the French from utilizing the mortars they had, against the batteries, after they had once mounted them to protect the harbour. The difficulties which oppressed and overwhelmed Drucour were such as his character ill-fitted him to cope with. The tact, the high-mindedness, the generosity, which made him an admirable head of a naval school, were not the qualities best fitted for the rough work he had to do in Isle Royale. He naturally had no experience in land warfare. He had, indeed, mostly held a shore appointment ; and the engineer, and commandant of the troops, were both dull, and one a cripple. The quality of Drucour's mind, which makes one respect his memory, is his scrupulous fairness. He was Governor ; his reputation was at stake. He states every case fairly, he blames little, he emphasizes every good action, he minimizes every failure in his account of the siege. Rare and worthy of respect as is such a character, it must be admitted that it is not the temper of which successful commanders are made. 

The townspeople merit great praise. We have only the evidence of a deserter to show that they were eager for capitulation before the assault was inevitable and imminent. Daccarette's company, made up of the principal merchants, when the attack was so far advanced that they could no longer skirmish outside, took charge of the battery in the southern flank of the citadel, and served its guns with a brilliancy which surprised and delighted an observer ("ils ont surpris et charme' "). Others of the bourgeoisie worked with the garrison in other batteries, undaunted by danger, and displayed the calmness of veterans ("avec autant de tratiquillité que l'homme du monde le plus aguerri" [1])

Louisbourg was in extremities when Drucour surrendered. 

" Indeed when our ships came into the Harbour, there was hardly any part of it, which had not the appearance of Distress and Desolation, and presented to our View frequent Pieces of Wrecks, and Remnants of Destruction-Five or Six Ships sunk in one Place with their Mast-Heads peeping out of the Water-the Stranded Hull of Le Prudent on the muddy shoal of the other Side, burned down to the Water's Edge, with a great deal of her Iron and Guns staring us in the Face- Buoys of slipped Anchors bobbing very thick upon the Surface of the Water in the Channel towards the Town-a number of small Craft and 

1. Poilly.

Boats towards that Shore, some entirely under Water, others with part of their Masts standing out of it ; besides the stranded Hulls, Irons, and Guns of the three Ships burned on the 21st upon the Mud towards the Barrassoy -and in the N.E. Harbour little else to be seen but Masts, Yards and Rigging floating up and down, and Pieces of burned Masts, Bowsprits, etc. driven to the Water's Edge, and some parts of the shore edged with Tobacco Leaves out of some of the ships that had been destroyed-the whole a dismal Scene of total Destruction." [1]

If this were the appearance of the harbour with the advantages of its effacing waters, the imagination can picture more vividly, than any written page can convey, the condition of the town. There was great outlay of materials in reaching the final conclusion of the siege. The loss of life was not, however, great : 195 of the British killed, and 363 wounded ; on the French side, according to De la Houlière, between 700 and 800 killed and wounded. [2]

A compilation of the troops on the eve of hostilities makes the total 3520. The French loss, therefore, was 411.

Great stores of artillery and  munitions of war fell, by the terms of the capitulation, as spoils of war. 

Hardy entered the harbour on the 30th. Boscawen came in on August 1. The town was occupied. Arrangements were completed for the embarkation of the French troops and to clear the entrance of the harbour. [3]

The news of this victory, the first important one of the war, was received with great rejoicings, when Captains Edgecumbe and Amherst, on behalf of Boscawen and the General, arrived on the 18th of August. Comparisons were drawn between the attitude of the people when they heard of the fall of Port Mahon and that with which they exulted over this success. Addresses were sent 

1. An Authentic Account. 
2. To Minister, Aug. 6. 
3. Cambis and Artois and some seamen on the Burford; Bourgogne and Vol. Etrangers and some seamen on the Kingston ; the Companies on the Northumberland ; the Naval Officers on the Dublin ; Drucour, his lady and retinue, and forty officers on the Terrible. These ships sailed about Aug. 14/15. The other prisoners and inhabitants were embarked as rapidly as possible. Some of them were fortunate enough to go directly to France for exchange, among them Des Gouttes, who did not deserve this good fortune.

to the King from the Universities and the principal towns of the kingdom. The colours taken were deposited in St. Paul's. (These have disappeared.) 

"HISTORICAL CHRONICLE, Sept. 1758 [1] 

Wednesday, 6. 

"Whitehall. The king having been pleased to order the colours taken at Louisbourg, which were lately brought to the palace at Kensington, to be deposited in the cathedral church of St. Paul; proper detachments of horse and foot grenadiers were ordered to parade at Kensington at ten o'clock, and marched before his Majesty in the following order 

"A serjeant, and twelve horse grenadiers. 

" A field officer, and officers in proportion. 

" A detachment of fourscore of the horse grenadier guards. 

" Then eighty of the life guards, with officers in proportion, with their standard, kettle drums and trumpets. 

" Then a serjeant and twelve grenadiers of the foot guards. 

" Then eleven serjeants of the foot guards carrying the eleven French colours, advanced.

"Then the four companies of Grenadiers of the foot guards closed the march. 

" In this manner they proceeded from Kensington, through Hyde Park, the Green Park, into St. James's Park, and through the Stable yard St. James's, into Pall Mall, and so on to the west gate of St. Paul's, where the colours were received by the dean and chapter, attended by the choir ; about which time the guns at the Tower and in St. James's Park were fired. "

These colours are put up near the west door of the cathedral, as a lasting memorial of the success of his majesty's arms, in the reduction of the important fortress of Louisbourg, the islands of Cape Breton and St. .John."- London Gazette. 

When Boscawen returned, the rejoicings broke out again. He received an address when he took his seat in the Commons, and an address was also sent out to Amherst, conveying the thanks of Parliament for their achievement. 

The rejoicings in the colonies were no less widespread. All grasped the significance of the victory.[2[

Drucour had saved Canada for the year. It had been decided by Amherst and Boscawen that it was too late to go up the St. Lawrence. While they were engaged in removing the army into the town, and sending away the prisoners, the news came to them, August i, of the defeat of Abercromby at Ticonderoga. It determined Amherst to hasten to his assistance. British troops were sent to Halifax on the 15th ; Amherst himself sailed to Boston on the 30th, and landed there on September 13. Meantime, expeditions were sent out to the Bay of Fundy, to Isle St. jean, under Lord Rollo of the 22nd Regiment, and to Gaspé and other French settlements on the Gulf, under Wolfe. [3]

The last was, like

1. Gentleman's Magazine, 1758, vol. 28, p. 447. 
2. The Last Siege of Louisbourg, C. Ochiltree MacDonald, London, Cassell & Co., contains many interesting details of these rejoicings. 
3. See Appendix for an account of this expedition from the unpublished Bell MSS. lent me by Dr. A. G. Doughty. 

Spry's in I757, a Pillaging of unarmed people, which excited the disgust of Wolfe ; that to Isle St. Jean resulted in the deportation to France of 3540 people. This number added materially to the task of providing transport, so that it is not until the end of September that Boscawen's journal ceases to include items as to the sailings of transports. Boscawen left on October i, and reached the Channel a month later, and Durell, promoted to be a Rear-Admiral, took charge of the fleet left in these waters. The garrison left in Louisbourg consisted of Whitmore's, Bragg's, Hopson's, and Warburton's, under command of Whitmore. The salient point in the letter in which Amherst encloses Whitmore's appointment as Governor, is Amherst's opinion of the island : [1] 

" I would have the settlements in the different parts of the island absolutely destroyed, it may be done in a quiet way, but pray let them be entirely demolished, & for these reasons, that in the flourishing state it is growing to, many years wd. not have passed before the inhabitants wd. have been sufficient to have defended it." [2] 

The next year, 1759, Louisbourg was the base from which sailed the expedition against Quebec. It gathered there in May, and sailed for the St. Lawrence on the 6th of June. 

The possibility of its being given back to France was before all. Pitt, however, unshaken in his, determination to break the maritime power of France, and to make it impossible for her to prosecute the fisheries, decided to make the return of Isle Royale to France, if it should be given back again by diplomacy, a barren one. He wrote to Amherst : - 

                                                                                "WHITEHALL, February 9th, 1760.

"SIR, I am commanded by His Majesty to acquaint you, that after the most serious and mature Deliberation being had, whether It be expedient to maintain, at so great an Expence, the Fortress at Louisburg, together with a Numerous Garrison there. The King is come to a Resolution, that the said Fortress, together with all the works, and Defences of the Harbour, be most effectually and most entirely demolished ; And I am in consequence thereof, to signify to you His Majesty's Pleasure, that you do as expediously as the Season will permit, take the most timely and effectual Care, that all the Fortifications of the Town of Louisburg, together with all the Works, and Defences whatever, belonging either to the said Place, or to the Port, and Harbour, thereof, be forthwith totally demolished, and razed, and all the Materials so thoroughly destroyed, as that no use may, hereafter, be ever made of the same. You are not, however, to demolish the Houses of the Town farther than shall be found necessary towards the full and entire Execution of the Orders for totally destroying all, and every, the Fortifications thereof; And in the Demolition of all works, You will particularly have an Eye to render, as far as possible, the Port, and Harbour, of Louisburg, as incommodious, and as near impracticable, as may be. [3]

1. Aug. 28, C.O. 5/53. 
2. Whitmore, as far as is shown in any documents I have seen, does not seem to have carried out these orders. 
3. On the same date he confirmed these instructions to Whitmore (C.O. 5/214). The Hon. John Byron, grandfather of the poet, was sent to Louisbourg in 1760, with a small squadron, to assist in this work. 

Amherst dispatched these orders to Whitmore by Captain De Ruvyne, a Captain of Miners, April 21, 1760.[1] The view of the town shows that the intention that the final state, " which is not to have the least appearance remaining of having had any works about it," was not entirely realized. 

The people of Louisbourg who returned to France were wards of the State. The Louisbourg companies were kept together for some time. Some of the officers were given commissions in similar regiments in the southern colonies of France ; all of them received pensions or were provided for. Dangeac and the Baron de l'Espérance became Governors of St. Pierre and Miquelon, Joubert of Marie Galante, and Villejouin of the island of Désirade. Many of the families received pensions. An effort was made to have many of them emigrate to Cayenne,[2] but they feared the tropics, and asked to be allowed to remain in France. The Minister had his troubles with them. De la Boularderie was given a pension on the condition that he would not come near the Court. The Henriau family for many years received a pension as Acadians to which they were not entitled. Their daughter Sophie, moreover, was not eligible although born in Isle Royale, as she was singing in the Chorus of the Opera.[3] But much of the correspondence which deals with these people consists in replies to letters from Tours, Loches, Tonnay Chàrente, and other provincial towns, asking for increases of pensions for survivors. They carried with them to France the robustness given them in the colony. Madame Costebelle did not die until I779, and her pension began in 1720. [4] Madame De la Perelle lived until 1784. The law made by the Assemblée Nationale when, in 1791, it was setting in order the affairs of France, shows that there were still a goodly number of people drawing pensions. [5]

Madame Eurry De la Perelle, to whom reference has just been made, came to Louisbourg when it was founded, a young woman of twenty. Her husband was the first officer who died in the new settlement. She lived there until the second capture ; her three sons were officers in the troops. She did not die for twenty- four years after the demolition of the town, all of the fortunes of which passed before her eyes. That the life of a town should fall so far short of that of one of its people suggests the instability of the unimportant. Yet against this one background, with this unity of space and time, developed events which displayed the genius administrative, economic, military, of two peoples. The two score and six years of Louisbourg's existence show forth causes and consequences as clearly as the colonial history of two centuries.

1. Notwithstanding delays the work was completed November 1760. The last mine was sprung on the 8th (Gibson Clough's journal, 
2. Forant's legacy was applied to the missions of that colony. 
3. B, vol. 164, 1778. 
4 B, vol. 165.
5. See Appendix.